Welcome to Nuclear Matters from the Australian
National University College of Systems and Society.
I'm your host, Liz Williams, a nuclear physicist
and nuclear systems discipline lead for the ANU
School of Engineering. On today's episode, I'm
talking all things nuclear security with Jasmine
Diab. Jazz is the managing director of Global
Nuclear Security Partners and president of Women
in Nuclear Australia. She is also a military
veteran with a couple of decades of experience,
thinking about how to secure nuclear technologies,
both at home and abroad. I am personally fascinated
by how experienced nuclear professionals grapple
with changes in both technologies and geopolitics.
I invited Jazz because I thought she could help
me explore this in more depth. Long story short,
she delivered. Let's listen in. Thank you so
much, Jess, for joining us today on Nuclear Matters.
It's so wonderful to have you here today. Thanks
for having me, Liz. I'm excited to be able to
chat nuclear. with you. Yeah. I think this is
the first time we're doing this kind of thing
on a podcast format. Usually it's in the context
of women in nuclear, I think. Yeah. Normally
we nerd out with a group of women talking about
nuclear. Yeah. So it's interesting that it's
just you and I today. I know. Slightly different
dynamic. Let's dive right in though. You specialize
in nuclear security and you have an interest
in nuclear threat reduction and you are based
in Australia, which doesn't have a civil nuclear
industry. So I wanted to ask you how you came
to specialize in nuclear security and how you
ended up doing this work internationally. Bit
of a weird career trajectory that I've had. I
actually started out in the Australian Army.
I did 22 years in uniform as a combat engineer
officer. My undergraduate degree was in nuclear
physics and explosive chemistry. So things that
you could really only use in a military context
most of the time. Had a really great career in
the Army, looking at threat reduction from an
operational response. capability. And so I lived
all around Australia and I've done some tours
around the world focused on predominantly countering
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
threats. And so when it came time for me to leave
Army a couple of years ago, I got the tap on
the shoulder from some colleagues over in the
UK to get into nuclear security consulting. And
so that's what I've done. 10, 12 years ago, I
went and studied nuclear engineering, mainly
to keep my nerd brain active. So I did that as
a bit of a side hustle to get the technical understanding
of the engineering of nuclear facilities. And
so being able to bring my experience from Army,
my nuclear engineering together, I'm able to
specialise that into... security and how we make
sure material is being secured appropriately,
but still being able to be used for peaceful
purposes. Because ultimately, that's what excites
me about nuclear is the peaceful use of nuclear.
And Australia has always been pretty anti -nuclear
weapons. We were a country that was used in weapons
testing in the 60s. And so I want to be able
to use my skills to make sure that we can still
use nuclear peacefully without proliferating
the spread of weapons, all the information that
leads to nuclear weapons and nuclear threats.
So let's talk about some of those peaceful uses
and how those are connected to some of the threats
that you were just talking about. Can you give
us a particular example of where nuclear technology
for peaceful use might, if not properly secured,
lead to an issue down the line? Yeah, so we see
that with any kind of nuclear reactor, whether
it's a research reactor, a nuclear medicine production
facility or a power generating reactor. Whether
it's the fuel itself, not so much unused fuel.
Unused fuel is pretty stable in its natural form,
but spent fuel, radioisotopes that come out of
reactors, materials that a lot of threat groups
like to be able to use to either create a credible
weapon or in most cases, just create chaos and
hysteria which gives them the outcome they want,
which is terrorizing communities, governments,
and just creating fear within a community or
country. And so what we really do is work with
those facilities to make sure that... it's unattractive
for threat forces to get their hands on that
material because the loss of that material is
actually quite catastrophic. And so we work to
make sure that it can be done in a way that is
cost effective because someone standing there
with a gun at a door is quite expensive and it's
a bit overbearing in most cases. So there are
smarter ways we can secure material, make it
unattractive to be taken. And we work with facilities
to tailor it for their their particular needs
and each country varies as well. Big machine
guns and towers in the US isn't as big of an
issue as it would be here in Australia. If you
had a huge machine gun tower outside a facility,
let's say at Lucas Heights, for example, that
would terrify the community. We have to be smarter
and more nuanced in how we look at security for
each of these facilities and countries. So what
does nuclear security encompass and how does
it interact with nuclear safety in particular?
Yeah, a great question because a lot of times
people look at security in a siloed manner and
think it's just about guns, gates and guards,
which is a very, I guess, old school way of looking
at nuclear security. How we actually look at
nuclear security is predominantly at how do you
control and account for material to make sure
only the right people have access to that material
or information? leading to that and that it is
being used in the appropriate manner and then
disposed of in an appropriate manner as well.
So how it links to safety systems is really in
the materials accounting and control of material
in making sure that facilities are designed to
allow for that movement to occur within a facility
in an appropriate manner that it doesn't impact
the operations and safety. of that facility because
if you have impacts on operational use, people
aren't going to follow them because we're human
and we like doing things the easiest way possible.
So it's making sure those systems work closely
together. But one of the big friction points
we have when designing nuclear facilities between
safety and security is in the event of a safety
accident, let's say you want as many safety doors
as possible to open up and allow people to run
out and be safe and get to a control point. From
a security perspective, all those doors, it's
too much. You can't just let them unlock and
go. So it's where's the right balance to allow
for a facility to be safe enough for individuals,
but at the same time, provide enough security
measures to allow access control. to material.
And so it's finding that nice balance. And this
is where my background with nuclear engineering
comes in handy because I can understand both
sides of the fence. I can understand where safety
is really paramount and you need to have the
right safety features in place, but can also
understand, hey, this has now become a security
vulnerability and security needs to be taken
into account in this circumstance. So it's a
really fine balance, but it's I think it's something
that the nuclear industry has been quite conscious
about over at least the last five, six, seven
years. I think the Russian invasion in Ukraine
really highlighted it as well, is that hey, security
and safety have to work closely together if you
want facilities to continue operating as designed
in a way that allows the general public to be
comfortable that they're still running. in a
war zone, for example, or in a country that might
be having some instability. That's actually a
really important question. I'm wondering, in
your work, does what has been going on in Ukraine
with Russia coming in and occupation of nuclear
facilities, et cetera, is that influencing how
you are advising clients, for instance, in terms
of their security planning? Definitely. And we've
done a little bit of work with Ukrainian critical
infrastructure security forces to allow them
to understand, OK, what are the crucial bits
that need to be guarded and protected? And how
do you do that from a nuclear security perspective?
Because there is so much they need to do to keep
just everything running to survive. And a war
zone is very different to a a country that might
have just general instability, political instability.
We're talking about very different threats here
that have much more sophisticated capabilities
and probably some quite targeted things they
would want to do to a nuclear facility. And we
saw that with some of the Russian targeting of
Zaprovitzia nuclear power plant. And so that's
There are different challenges that the country
in an active war zone needs to worry about from
a nuclear security perspective. So that is something
we do talk about with other clients, depending
on what country they're in. And this is where
when we see a lot of emerging nuclear nations,
which is right that they want to embark on a
power program, but it is, hey, there is so much
more to nuclear security. That's not just about
the fence around the reactor site. What is the
security culture in general in this country?
Where do we see the vulnerabilities and those
threats? And so what the IAEA has as best practice
is what we call the design basis threat for each
country. Each country should have its own and
internally to that it should have a design basis
threat for civilian power plants, military nuclear
uses. and that will tailor the kinds of threats
that they need to protect against. And so that's
the type of stuff we'll work with a facility
with to say, hey, you don't need to really worry
about an invasion from another country, but you
do need to worry about insurgent activity, for
example, or protestor, like violent protest activity
or outlaw motorcycle gangs. And each of those
will vary depending on location, the country
itself, and then the country's... general security
culture and stance, which might mean some reactors
have quite heavy handed nuclear security measures,
some might not. I'm curious about how you think
across a life cycle for that. I mean, obviously,
when you're looking at safety for a nuclear reactor,
even in the early stages of the design process,
you're planning for that decommissioning and,
you know, waste handling in the long term. Security,
it seems like It seems like you're looking at
local conditions based on what you know about
a country and the likely threats. But I'm wondering,
I mean, those can change over time. How do you
think through that? Or to what extent can you
think through that, you know, for a given circumstance?
Yes. So we design nuclear security systems against
a probability of one so that it is guaranteed
that this threat will happen to that facility.
And that allows you to, I guess, design worst
case scenario. But That does get reviewed throughout
the lifetime of that facility because, as you
say, threats will change, the local environment
will change, and this is where we try to... If
a facility is designed well at the start with
its safety and security systems working closely
together, then you shouldn't have too many large
retrofit... requirements later down the lifetime
of that facility, where we have seen facilities
that have focused purely on safety at the start
and a little bit on security. When they get a
couple of years down the track and something
happens, they're having to go back and retrofit
security systems, which is so costly and unnecessarily
costly if you just design all those features
in at the start to work with the safety system.
So security is constantly getting reviewed, much
like Safety systems are constantly getting reviewed.
They'll get upgrades if technology is advanced.
Same sort of thing with nuclear security. If
the technology advances, it can be upgraded to
make it more reliable, more secure. Cyber security
is probably a really great example of that, where
digital systems need to constantly be upgraded
and reviewed to make sure that external threat
vectors can't target them. It is a constant review.
You can't just design, build the facility and
go, okay, it's secure for life. It's awesome.
I wish. I wish it were that easy. That would
be really great. But unfortunately, people that
like being in the threat game aren't really nice
people, right? And they will try to alter how
they target facilities. to exploit the vulnerabilities,
right? Some of these threat forces, and especially
when you talk about nation states that want to
influence a facility, they're patient and they'll
wait to find your vulnerabilities. And so it's
making sure that you can understand the vulnerabilities
before they do to put the right mechanisms in
place to reduce them. Yeah. This is making me
think of Stuxnet. I'm wondering if you have any
some like favorite lessons learned. Stuxnet is
a really great example because it said whilst
this facility might have had the perfect physical
security measures in place, the fact that they
were able to get access to the digital systems
within this facility and exploit those digital
systems to tweak them so that they weren't getting
the output in their enrichment. centrifuges that
they were hoping and it took a long time to realize
that meant that it had degraded the output of
that facility and meant they took a lot longer
for them to be able to get the amount of enriched
uranium that they wanted to potentially use in
a weapons program. And so that's why I think
a lot of nuclear facilities and digital systems
like that is a big vulnerability. How do you
reduce that? A lot of civilian nuclear power
plants won't have a lot of their operational
systems on the open net so that they can control
those systems inside. That doesn't make them
completely impenetrable. That now then puts the
onus on the individuals in the operations room
with access to those facilities that they have
to be screened and they have to understand their
security requirements and be trusted. And that's
why nuclear jobs often pay really well because
they don't want you to be exploited by a threat
force to offer money. You should be comfortable
and happy enough in your job. So it's very intertwined.
It's a big network of people and systems. Absolutely.
It's complicated. It is. For those of you who
aren't aware of Stuxnet, basically the idea was
they wanted to target a physical system within
the enrichment facilities in Iran. And what they
did was they put out a virus that only targeted
those particular controllers. And that virus,
they basically waited for it to be brought in
on a USB stick inadvertently by staff members
because the facility was not. on the network.
It was set up to be a secure facility. And so
eventually, of course, the USB stick came in
because humans are humans. And that virus then
caused physical damage to the facility itself.
This does bring up, for me, the question of how
to deal with emerging technologies in nuclear
and, in particular, the security implications
of such technologies. And I remember a while
back, we actually had a chat about this. I think
we were talking about fusion energy in particular.
And I was wondering, this is something you're
actively working on. Can you share some of the
exciting developments in nuclear that we should
be thinking about and planning for and what you
and your colleagues are working on right now?
Yeah, so there's some really interesting emerging
technologies in nuclear that challenge our security
and the nuclear safeguard system more broadly
as well. And fusion is one of those technologies.
There are lots of different ways people are conceptually
building fusion power reactors. Each of them
have a similar sort of requirement, which is
a different kind of radioisotope as the starter
fuel to then get their reaction going and a requirement.
predominantly on tritium to keep those reactions
going as well. Now, what we really worry about
in nuclear security is any radioisotope or uranium,
plutonium that can be weaponized. That's really
what we're trying to prevent. Things like tritium
historically haven't been as high on the radar
because you didn't need a lot of it. in nuclear
applications, whereas in fusion, you actually
need a fair bit of tritium to keep your reaction
going. A lot of tritium triggers a lot of stuff
because tritium is often used as a starter for
a weapon, a nuclear weapon, or it can be used
in large components as a material that can be
used to create fear in a... nuclear dirty bomb
sense or radiological dispersion or exposure
device. And so whilst looking at some of these
emerging technologies, it is getting a good understanding
of, OK, what radioisotopes are being used in
these technologies? What's their half life? What
form do these come in? Are they in a material
form that can be easily proliferated, stolen,
sold? And if that's the case, how do we secure
them? And if they're in a state that is really
difficult to move, sell, shift around, then okay,
so what are the ways we're making sure that we
can... keep it that way on a site. And I know
a lot of the startup companies hate when I talk
to them about nuclear security because a lot
of people love fusion because, oh, there's no
waste, there's no weaponizable material. You're
like, look, as a bad person, you can weaponize
anything. That's the problem with bad people.
And so we want to prevent that from happening
before commercialization of a lot of these technologies.
So we understand the risks and vulnerabilities.
And you just put the right mechanisms in place
to prevent them and allow that to be understood.
And so fusion's a really exciting one. I love
that because I get to understand more about different
types of isotopes, which gets the nerd in me
happy. Another space we're looking at is commercial
maritime and floating nuclear power plants, because
that presents a different kind of security challenge.
The safety around maritime nuclear is well understood.
The US Navy, the British Navy, French navies
have been using maritime nuclear for decades.
And so safety is really well known around that.
But often those reactors are pretty high enriched
uranium. They're sealed units so you can't just
open up a reactor core and take fuel and steal
it, and you'd probably die if you gave that a
go. But I don't recommend it. But it's, hey,
these are vessels that could be out in the middle
of nowhere, essentially. Who's now responsible
for the security of that? Is it the commercial
shipping merchant? Is it the state that that
vessel is flagged under? What does the response
force look like? Because I'm pretty sure a lot
of these commercial shipping merchants aren't
going to now pay for an armed security force
to live on these vessels. So what are some other
more sophisticated ways we can secure material
utilizing the technology we currently have, utilizing
sensors and detectors and tracking tools to be
able to do that? And the joy of having a nuclear
propelled... cargo vessel is you no longer need
to hug the coastline where there are pirates.
You can just sail really far away from them because
you've got the speed, you've got the endurance.
You no longer need to be a target for some of
these pirates. So that's a really fascinating
one because it is a security problem that hasn't
really been grappled with before because maritime
has predominantly been in the defence space where
they've been state -owned, military people on
board, security's not a problem there because
they're providing the security. They are the
security, yes. They are the security, yeah. So
it's been, yeah, that's been a really interesting
one because the carbon emissions from the maritime
sector quite high globally because we rely on
ships, especially here in Australia, all our
stuff comes in by boat. If they've got the ability
to decarbonize through how they propel their
vessels, that's a great thing for us. We just
want to make sure that the material is being
secured and handled appropriately and it's not
creating another vector for the threat forces
to be able to get their hands on material. Yeah.
The tritium As I understand it also connects
to fission reactors, at least for some of the
fuel cycles for these facilities that would involve,
for instance, transport of tritium, etc. Is that
something that you think about when you're looking
at these things? Yeah, definitely. Transporter
material is one of the more important aspects
we look at for a facility because any material
in transport is at risk and vulnerable. And there's
a couple of case studies one pretty interesting
one out of Mexico where a source was stolen off
a truck while it was in transit. And so how material
is being transported and how it's been secured
in transport and tracked by the right authorities
is really important so that you can reduce the,
I guess, access to that material and make it
unattractive for them to take it as well. So
yes, the movement of tritium between sites is
an important one that we look at from a security
perspective, much like any kind of radioisotope
being transported around. In terms of the maritime
space, how big is the market for commercial maritime
nuclear? Or do you have a sense of that? Is this
growing? Where is this in terms of development?
So this is growing and there are Organizations
at the moment, so the one we're working with
closely is called NEMO, the Nuclear Energy Maritime
Organization. It's a not -for -profit that is
helping shipping companies, regulators, and licensing
authorities understand the problem around nuclear
propulsion in general from the maritime space.
There are some pretty clear laws of the sea through
the International Maritime Organization, but
the stuff on nuclear was written in the 80s and
is pretty outdated. And so working with that
organization to say, OK, well, what is in the
realm of the possible? And this really comes
from a responsibility and regulation side of
the house. Where are these ships likely to be
flagged? does that country have a legitimate
nuclear regulator that is able to responsibly
give a licence for a reactor on a vessel and
make sure that those licence conditions are being
met whilst out at sea? The thing is with commercial
maritime, this is big companies that have large
amounts of money and so they are willing to...
to throw money at this problem to see how it
can work and working with small modular reactor
startups to get maritime small modular reactors
that are suitable. There's interesting concepts
about does the ship buy the reactor and keep
it forever? Is it a leasing arrangement? What
happens with fuel? So there's so many questions
out there. It is figuring out What is the most
viable and most responsible way to do this? And
it will impact the shipping industry significantly
because it will mean that ships that are flagged
in countries like Tuvalu that have great tax
breaks actually don't have a nuclear industry
and might not be suitable for a nuclear propelled
ship. So there's a lot of effort going into understanding
the regulations and the challenges. once we've
got that well understood, then I think it'll
be pretty quick to get to a concept and operational
state to do that because there is an impetus
from the international commercial maritime to
reduce their carbon emissions and their reliance
on oil predominantly in their shipping because
it costs them a lot of money and we're trying
to be greener. in how we approach things. I am
curious about how the work that you're doing
for NEMO might impact international regulations
with regards to nuclear maritime. I do want to
know what is the connection there? Do you put
out information for international regulatory
authorities to consider? Yeah, so it's working
with the IMO, the International Maritime Organization,
who's responsible for all the laws and regulations
out at sea, and in this case, also working with
the International Atomic Energy Agency to make
sure that they are also comfortable with the
concept of this going forward. Because whilst
the IAEA is not a regulator as such, like the
IMO kind of is, it still needs to be... given
the warm and fuzzies that this is responsible
use of nuclear technology. Because if you don't
have the IAEA on board, then other states aren't
going to follow, right? Yeah, they're a key stakeholder.
They are a very key stakeholder. So it's really
working with those two big organizations in the
first instance to make sure that, hey, these
plans are suitable. and appropriate and manageable,
because there will be safeguards elements to
this that the IAEA will need to be deeply involved
in and will change how they do safeguards in
its current, I guess, land -based static facility
kind of perspective. So it's working with them
to make sure if everybody is comfortable with
this conceptually, now how do we operationalise
it? I find it really exciting because I don't
think there's many other industries, aviation
is probably the only other one in the world that
has such rigorous international regulatory requirements,
that being able to impact that and influence
that is quite exciting because hopefully we can
see commercial maritime being done successfully
and peacefully into the future. I think that's
a really, it'd be a great way to reduce operational
costs of commercial shipping, which hopefully
means things cost a little bit less to move around
the world. My thought is that we in Australia
right now are thinking about how to manage visits
from or more visits, I should say, from nuclear
submarines, for instance, and we're thinking
about things like what about how do we handle
the waste that's going to be produced through
the maintenance process, etc. If you're thinking
about maritime nuclear and you're thinking about,
you know, doing that at a commercial scale. globally,
are there things that countries need to be thinking
about now with regards to preparing for that
kind of shift? Yeah, definitely. I think countries
that already have nuclear regulators and an industry
need to be conscious that some of these regulations
need to be reviewed and updated and working with
the technology provider to make sure that they're
working well together, not just very rigid, enforced
regulations. That will stifle the ability to
grow this kind of industry. And I think we're
going to learn a lot from the increase in visiting
nuclear ships, developing our own... nuclear
submarine capability that will force us to understand,
OK, how do we regulate something at sea? And
yes, this is from a defence context, and it will
be very different to commercial. But we can learn
those lessons and the challenges and put that
into a maritime context, which I think is really
exciting for the Australian regulators. Hopefully
our pans are as no. like that challenge, because
this puts it clearly in their space, not in the
defence regulator space, but it allows those
regulators to work closely together, which is
what we should see anyway from regulatory bodies
in the nuclear space. Absolutely. So our PANZA
is our civil safety regulator and ASNO is our...
Well, they do both civil and defence security
and safeguards regulation. for those of you who
are not across all of the acronyms in the school,
there are many of them. Should get better at
spelling out the acronyms. I almost feel like
I should release a like cheat sheet with this
podcast sometimes. The lexicon. Well, there's
one topic I wanted to specifically ask you about,
but I do a lot of work on artificial intelligence
and I do have conversations on a semi -regular
basis about the increase in the availability
of sensors and basically just information of
all kinds that you can then combine and use both
for good and for not so good, let's say. I'm
wondering how you think about the technologies
that you might be using for tracking from that
perspective, from the perspective of, well, they
can be used for useful purposes for security.
They can be used to help improve the safety and
security of a system, but they can also be used
problematically. And how do you think through
that? Yeah, so I think there's lots of opportunities
for AI in the nuclear security space. Maybe not
so much for operational facilities, but when
we talk about decommissioned facilities or long
-term waste and disposal sites, the ability to
use sensors to track and alert and alarm when
there is any change occurring within those sites
or facilities. I think there's a really great
way for AI to help do that, which reduces costs
to those sites. because often the largest cost
to a disposal site or a decommissioned site that's
sitting laying dormant is insecurity forces.
And so any way that you can supplement human
with some digital systems reduces the costs.
And I think the technology is getting to a point
where you can get some assurance that you are
getting some decent output there. There are risks
and vulnerabilities, as you mentioned, too. that
can be a way that a sophisticated threat actor
can influence the information that's being fed
to a response force or a security operation center.
And so how do we ensure that those systems are
being regularly checked and tested and not vulnerable
to external influences? I think that there is
a way that we can we can nuance that and we can
be a bit smart and there are some sites globally
that I think will be really great case studies
for us to be able to do that and test it with
the risk not being so extreme. I think we're
a little way off doing that on operational sites
where the material in use is quite spicy, I guess,
as opposed to facilities where the material,
like in a in a long -term disposal site, it is
packaged in a way that makes it very difficult
for someone to get their hands on the material
they want. So it is really about just reducing
access. And I think there are AI tools and systems
that can be used to help. Probably part of that
security architecture. But again, this is shifting
mindsets of regulators that you're not just laying
out the templated security plan of a fence and
a gun and a gate. you're doing something that's
a bit more nuanced and the assurances might be
a little bit different. And I don't think different
is bad. I think that's actually great for us
to evolve the capabilities. I find that quite
exciting. Yeah, it is. It's an interesting research
problem in the sense that you're talking about
assurance and there is an interplay between like
the human actors within the facility that are
charged with making sure that these facilities
stay secure. and the AI tools that they might
be using to do that. And I'm wondering, is that
a discussion that is happening in your field
right now? Yeah, it is. It is. And we are looking
a lot towards academia to see what's in the realm
of the possible and potentially, could you have
a fully autonomous, secured site that robotics
could be the responders or different kind of
sensors trigger different kind of responses and
that the humans in the loop might be delayed
for a really big response, but it gives them
time to get their traps, whatever threat actor
has got to that site through other mechanisms.
I think that is stuff we talk about and think
about a lot. It is what country and facility
is willing to take the plunge and do that. Unfortunately,
I don't think it's Australia. I don't think the
risk appetite is there. But I think there are
some countries around Europe that would look
to this as a viable thing to try. And as I was
saying before, it would be on sites that are
lower risk from an access to material perspective,
like a waste site, like a decommissioned dormant
site. Well, we could do that and improve the
concept. Because that's a big deterrent to threat
actors as well. Who's not terrified of the rise
of the robots? They're much scarier than human
security forces. Yeah, why scarier? You can distract
a human with something shiny. A robot doesn't
care about that. Let's go to Australia. I'm wondering,
I mean, we've talked about the maritime case,
but I'm wondering if given Australia's somewhat
unique history with nuclear technologies, how
engaged we are likely to be in these kinds of
things. What roles do you think we should be
playing in these conversations? So this is where
I'm really torn because there are so many amazing
nuclear startups in Australia. We've got some
clever people that are developing technologies
for things like nuclear batteries, so maritime
nuclear reactors, the fusion reactors. But they
get to a point where they can no longer do their
research and build their prototypes here in Australia
due to our laws and legislations. And then we
lose them. They go offshore and they will take
this technology and they will do that overseas,
which is heartbreaking because we could be a
really great player in the emerging tech space
in nuclear globally and within our region. And
what frustrates me from the nuclear security
perspective is this is where we could understand
some of the nuclear security challenges and help
support our regional partners to lift their nuclear
security as they take on some of these emerging
technologies. And I'll use small modular reactors
as an example here. There are countries within
our region, the Indo -Pacific region, that are
seriously considering small modular reactors
because it's perfect for them as island nations
to help reduce their carbon emissions, but to
just have electricity because a lot of them don't
have reliable electricity. So we could be a really
great player in helping support that so that
we can have strong nuclear security network around
our region protecting Australia's borders too.
But I think that some of our politics around
nuclear technology really limits our ability
to do that, which is really unfortunate. And
I'd like to see us to be a bit more active in
that space because we already have the young
talent creating these amazing emerging technologies
that are understanding what this technology looks
like that can help shape how we can secure that
and do it responsibly within our region. So I
think no matter what side of the fence people
sit on for civilian power in Australia, that
doesn't matter. Our ability to use our clever
people to help develop future nuclear technologies.
is there we need to keep them and use that use
that knowledge for good. It just breaks my heart
when I meet these young people that are so excited
and they get to a point and I've seen it with
a couple of really great technologies and they
go move overseas because that's the only way
that they can get their technology off the ground.
It would be good if we could do a better job
of I think raising awareness of the fact that
they're There we can pretend that there is a
hard border around Australia where we don't have
to think about nuclear but as you said we have
neighbors who are thinking about it we have in
around the globe pledges to increase the use
of nuclear and in other nations energy mix and
they those those things can and likely will down
the line impact us and Australia has a history
of playing a strong role in for instance the
safeguards community and so How do you think
we could move the needle on that in terms of
how we see our involvement in that kind of work
outside of small pockets who are already engaged
within Australian nuclear? Yeah, so I think it's
remaining engaged in the safeguard space and
the nuclear security space globally as these
emerging technologies come out and being able
to support our regional partners in setting up
the right security and safeguards frameworks
to do that. IAEA is really good at supporting
safety cases around technology, but not necessarily
as strong in supporting security and safeguards
because as the external verification, they can't
really do that. It's hard to play both sides.
But we could do that. We can support our regional
partners because at the end of the day, it's
about peaceful technology being used across the
globe. We sometimes need to put our bias aside
and support some of our neighbours so that they
can benefit from peaceful nuclear. I mean, we've
done it for 17 years with a research reactor.
We have some really great lessons. It'd be a
shame for us not to continue being engaged in
that space. Is there anything that you've been
working on lately that you want to share with
our listeners that maybe we haven't touched on
yet? I guess the thing that excites me, and this
is again my nerdy side playing out, is the role
that potentially micro reactors could take around
the globe for either small nation states or small
mine sites. So I live in Western Australia. We
have quite a large mining community. A lot of
that community is still on. diesel -powered generators
or gas turbines. And I think what microreactors
could do into the future is fascinating. That
comes with its own security challenges. So this
is the stuff that I kind of think about when
I'm thinking about, hey, what's something that
could be cool into the future here in WA? But
how do you also ensure that it's being used responsibly?
Because you're not going to have a staff of reactor
operators. like running a shipping container
size reactor, that's just unrealistic. So that's
something that I guess personally spend a bit
of time thinking about and conceptualizing because
I see it as something that's pretty cool and
interesting, a bit different. Do you have a favorite
microreactor pilot project or design project?
So I've been watching Project Pele out of the
US Army. for quite a while now. I find that fascinating
and maybe it's because I've come from an army
background because they've designed this for
deployable power and energy. You go to a place
that's been devastated by a natural disaster
and power is often a really big challenge. Rock
up with it. shipping container that has a microreactor
on there, and you've been able to power a whole
city. Like, that's pretty cool. So Project Pelé
is one that I've been watching, and that's predominantly
looking at the Westinghouse -Evinci microreactor,
which is pretty cool. The Koreans have a really
cool one as well. Smart 100, I think, is what
they've named that. And there's a few I'm keeping
an eye on. I like microreactors. I think they're
really great. Well, we can put a link or two
in the show notes for people to check those out.
Is there anything else you wanted to say anything
about? You can tell people a little bit about
Women in Nuclear, for instance. We mentioned
that. Yeah. So Women in Nuclear is a global organization
of professionals that believe in diversity and
inclusion in the workforce. But it is an amazing
network of professionals across all facets of
nuclear and radiological technology. So as a
bit of a nuclear tourist, if I want to travel
somewhere, I'll reach out to one of my women
in nuclear global friends and say, Hey, I'm coming
here. Can we check this out? And it's an amazing
network here in Australia. We have our own chapter
women in nuclear Australia. We are across the
whole of Australia. I think less Tassie. I don't
think we have a member in Tassie yet and we need
to get one. Look at that. Yeah. You Tass must
have some sort of nuclear program there. But
we are a network of professionals of any gender
that work in the nuclear industry. And what we
try to do is encourage young people for nuclear
careers through networking and role modeling.
And then for the rest of us that are just working
in the industry is be able to have this amazing
network of professionals to bounce ideas off
to support one another. I think one of our most
popular things we do is we have a newsletter
every month and it has links to lots of different
jobs and opportunities and we get access to various
scholarships for short courses or activities.
And so that's something we can provide our members.
And it's free to join. You just jump on the website
and join. And I love it. It's my village. That's
how I met you, Liz. We have lots of chats through
Women in Nuclear and some of my closest friends
are Women in Nuclear colleagues, because we can
have great chats about everything from nuclear
stuff through to having to deal with some really
difficult individual in the workplace. Everyone
needs a community that they can bring those things
to. Yeah, yeah, definitely. Well, I will put
a link to Women in Nuclear Australia also in
the notes that go with this show so that you
can go have a look. And if you are interested,
you are also welcome to join. So thank you so
much, Jazz. I really appreciated this conversation.
I learned so much from you. And I'm really glad
because I feel like I know a lot more about what
you do now. And so I'll get to nerd out with
you a bit more in future conversations. Awesome.
This has been really fun. Nuclear Matters is
a production of the Australian National University
College of Systems and Society. We acknowledge
the traditional owners of the lands on which
this podcast is being recorded on or listened
to and pay our respects to their elders and all
First Nations people. If you liked what you heard
today, please share this episode with friends,
family and colleagues. If you want to send us
some feedback on an episode, please email us
at nuclearmatterspodcast .anu .edu .au. Keep
in mind that this podcast is intended for information
and education only. The views and opinions expressed
in each episode are those of the individual speakers
and do not represent the official policy or position
of the Australian National University College
of Systems and Society or the university as a
whole.