WEBVTT 00:00:08.219 --> 00:00:11.060 Welcome to Nuclear Matters from the Australian 00:00:11.060 --> 00:00:13.960 National University College of Systems and Society. 00:00:14.519 --> 00:00:17.199 I'm your host, Liz Williams, a nuclear physicist 00:00:17.199 --> 00:00:19.559 and nuclear systems discipline lead for the ANU 00:00:19.559 --> 00:00:22.760 School of Engineering. On today's episode, I'm 00:00:22.760 --> 00:00:24.899 talking all things nuclear security with Jasmine 00:00:24.899 --> 00:00:27.940 Diab. Jazz is the managing director of Global 00:00:27.940 --> 00:00:30.579 Nuclear Security Partners and president of Women 00:00:30.579 --> 00:00:33.640 in Nuclear Australia. She is also a military 00:00:33.640 --> 00:00:35.659 veteran with a couple of decades of experience, 00:00:35.960 --> 00:00:38.240 thinking about how to secure nuclear technologies, 00:00:38.439 --> 00:00:42.619 both at home and abroad. I am personally fascinated 00:00:42.619 --> 00:00:45.439 by how experienced nuclear professionals grapple 00:00:45.439 --> 00:00:48.380 with changes in both technologies and geopolitics. 00:00:48.939 --> 00:00:50.380 I invited Jazz because I thought she could help 00:00:50.380 --> 00:00:53.140 me explore this in more depth. Long story short, 00:00:53.600 --> 00:01:01.380 she delivered. Let's listen in. Thank you so 00:01:01.380 --> 00:01:03.759 much, Jess, for joining us today on Nuclear Matters. 00:01:03.820 --> 00:01:06.560 It's so wonderful to have you here today. Thanks 00:01:06.560 --> 00:01:08.700 for having me, Liz. I'm excited to be able to 00:01:08.700 --> 00:01:11.480 chat nuclear. with you. Yeah. I think this is 00:01:11.480 --> 00:01:13.140 the first time we're doing this kind of thing 00:01:13.140 --> 00:01:16.120 on a podcast format. Usually it's in the context 00:01:16.120 --> 00:01:19.859 of women in nuclear, I think. Yeah. Normally 00:01:19.859 --> 00:01:22.859 we nerd out with a group of women talking about 00:01:22.859 --> 00:01:25.319 nuclear. Yeah. So it's interesting that it's 00:01:25.319 --> 00:01:28.140 just you and I today. I know. Slightly different 00:01:28.140 --> 00:01:31.750 dynamic. Let's dive right in though. You specialize 00:01:31.750 --> 00:01:33.510 in nuclear security and you have an interest 00:01:33.510 --> 00:01:35.750 in nuclear threat reduction and you are based 00:01:35.750 --> 00:01:38.430 in Australia, which doesn't have a civil nuclear 00:01:38.430 --> 00:01:41.390 industry. So I wanted to ask you how you came 00:01:41.390 --> 00:01:44.689 to specialize in nuclear security and how you 00:01:44.689 --> 00:01:48.040 ended up doing this work internationally. Bit 00:01:48.040 --> 00:01:51.439 of a weird career trajectory that I've had. I 00:01:51.439 --> 00:01:54.140 actually started out in the Australian Army. 00:01:54.319 --> 00:01:57.659 I did 22 years in uniform as a combat engineer 00:01:57.659 --> 00:02:01.299 officer. My undergraduate degree was in nuclear 00:02:01.299 --> 00:02:04.560 physics and explosive chemistry. So things that 00:02:04.560 --> 00:02:07.799 you could really only use in a military context 00:02:07.799 --> 00:02:10.860 most of the time. Had a really great career in 00:02:10.860 --> 00:02:13.819 the Army, looking at threat reduction from an 00:02:13.819 --> 00:02:18.659 operational response. capability. And so I lived 00:02:18.659 --> 00:02:21.580 all around Australia and I've done some tours 00:02:21.580 --> 00:02:25.580 around the world focused on predominantly countering 00:02:25.580 --> 00:02:28.360 chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 00:02:28.360 --> 00:02:31.860 threats. And so when it came time for me to leave 00:02:31.860 --> 00:02:34.699 Army a couple of years ago, I got the tap on 00:02:34.699 --> 00:02:37.120 the shoulder from some colleagues over in the 00:02:37.120 --> 00:02:41.020 UK to get into nuclear security consulting. And 00:02:41.020 --> 00:02:45.080 so that's what I've done. 10, 12 years ago, I 00:02:45.080 --> 00:02:47.300 went and studied nuclear engineering, mainly 00:02:47.300 --> 00:02:51.780 to keep my nerd brain active. So I did that as 00:02:51.780 --> 00:02:54.819 a bit of a side hustle to get the technical understanding 00:02:54.819 --> 00:02:58.240 of the engineering of nuclear facilities. And 00:02:58.240 --> 00:03:00.719 so being able to bring my experience from Army, 00:03:00.960 --> 00:03:03.560 my nuclear engineering together, I'm able to 00:03:03.560 --> 00:03:07.210 specialise that into... security and how we make 00:03:07.210 --> 00:03:10.509 sure material is being secured appropriately, 00:03:10.969 --> 00:03:13.270 but still being able to be used for peaceful 00:03:13.270 --> 00:03:17.169 purposes. Because ultimately, that's what excites 00:03:17.169 --> 00:03:19.669 me about nuclear is the peaceful use of nuclear. 00:03:20.069 --> 00:03:23.669 And Australia has always been pretty anti -nuclear 00:03:23.669 --> 00:03:26.750 weapons. We were a country that was used in weapons 00:03:26.750 --> 00:03:30.189 testing in the 60s. And so I want to be able 00:03:30.189 --> 00:03:32.229 to use my skills to make sure that we can still 00:03:32.229 --> 00:03:35.819 use nuclear peacefully without proliferating 00:03:35.819 --> 00:03:39.180 the spread of weapons, all the information that 00:03:39.180 --> 00:03:41.479 leads to nuclear weapons and nuclear threats. 00:03:41.900 --> 00:03:44.300 So let's talk about some of those peaceful uses 00:03:44.300 --> 00:03:46.879 and how those are connected to some of the threats 00:03:46.879 --> 00:03:48.960 that you were just talking about. Can you give 00:03:48.960 --> 00:03:53.900 us a particular example of where nuclear technology 00:03:53.900 --> 00:03:57.400 for peaceful use might, if not properly secured, 00:03:58.039 --> 00:04:00.539 lead to an issue down the line? Yeah, so we see 00:04:00.539 --> 00:04:02.939 that with any kind of nuclear reactor, whether 00:04:02.939 --> 00:04:06.719 it's a research reactor, a nuclear medicine production 00:04:06.719 --> 00:04:10.800 facility or a power generating reactor. Whether 00:04:10.800 --> 00:04:13.960 it's the fuel itself, not so much unused fuel. 00:04:14.219 --> 00:04:17.540 Unused fuel is pretty stable in its natural form, 00:04:18.240 --> 00:04:22.120 but spent fuel, radioisotopes that come out of 00:04:22.120 --> 00:04:27.040 reactors, materials that a lot of threat groups 00:04:27.040 --> 00:04:30.839 like to be able to use to either create a credible 00:04:30.839 --> 00:04:34.550 weapon or in most cases, just create chaos and 00:04:34.550 --> 00:04:37.009 hysteria which gives them the outcome they want, 00:04:37.269 --> 00:04:41.269 which is terrorizing communities, governments, 00:04:41.790 --> 00:04:45.170 and just creating fear within a community or 00:04:45.170 --> 00:04:49.769 country. And so what we really do is work with 00:04:49.769 --> 00:04:53.360 those facilities to make sure that... it's unattractive 00:04:53.360 --> 00:04:55.439 for threat forces to get their hands on that 00:04:55.439 --> 00:04:58.579 material because the loss of that material is 00:04:58.579 --> 00:05:01.779 actually quite catastrophic. And so we work to 00:05:01.779 --> 00:05:04.759 make sure that it can be done in a way that is 00:05:04.759 --> 00:05:07.899 cost effective because someone standing there 00:05:07.899 --> 00:05:10.420 with a gun at a door is quite expensive and it's 00:05:10.420 --> 00:05:13.160 a bit overbearing in most cases. So there are 00:05:13.160 --> 00:05:15.399 smarter ways we can secure material, make it 00:05:15.399 --> 00:05:20.000 unattractive to be taken. And we work with facilities 00:05:20.000 --> 00:05:23.379 to tailor it for their their particular needs 00:05:23.379 --> 00:05:26.600 and each country varies as well. Big machine 00:05:26.600 --> 00:05:29.920 guns and towers in the US isn't as big of an 00:05:29.920 --> 00:05:32.040 issue as it would be here in Australia. If you 00:05:32.040 --> 00:05:36.660 had a huge machine gun tower outside a facility, 00:05:36.800 --> 00:05:38.740 let's say at Lucas Heights, for example, that 00:05:38.740 --> 00:05:41.779 would terrify the community. We have to be smarter 00:05:41.779 --> 00:05:44.620 and more nuanced in how we look at security for 00:05:44.620 --> 00:05:47.300 each of these facilities and countries. So what 00:05:47.300 --> 00:05:49.819 does nuclear security encompass and how does 00:05:49.819 --> 00:05:52.420 it interact with nuclear safety in particular? 00:05:52.639 --> 00:05:56.060 Yeah, a great question because a lot of times 00:05:56.060 --> 00:05:59.860 people look at security in a siloed manner and 00:05:59.860 --> 00:06:02.620 think it's just about guns, gates and guards, 00:06:02.740 --> 00:06:05.800 which is a very, I guess, old school way of looking 00:06:05.800 --> 00:06:08.860 at nuclear security. How we actually look at 00:06:08.860 --> 00:06:12.259 nuclear security is predominantly at how do you 00:06:12.259 --> 00:06:15.600 control and account for material to make sure 00:06:15.600 --> 00:06:18.139 only the right people have access to that material 00:06:18.139 --> 00:06:21.980 or information? leading to that and that it is 00:06:21.980 --> 00:06:25.019 being used in the appropriate manner and then 00:06:25.019 --> 00:06:28.079 disposed of in an appropriate manner as well. 00:06:28.199 --> 00:06:32.000 So how it links to safety systems is really in 00:06:32.000 --> 00:06:35.120 the materials accounting and control of material 00:06:35.120 --> 00:06:38.500 in making sure that facilities are designed to 00:06:38.500 --> 00:06:41.339 allow for that movement to occur within a facility 00:06:41.339 --> 00:06:44.660 in an appropriate manner that it doesn't impact 00:06:44.660 --> 00:06:48.259 the operations and safety. of that facility because 00:06:48.259 --> 00:06:51.560 if you have impacts on operational use, people 00:06:51.560 --> 00:06:53.779 aren't going to follow them because we're human 00:06:53.779 --> 00:06:56.839 and we like doing things the easiest way possible. 00:06:57.199 --> 00:06:59.240 So it's making sure those systems work closely 00:06:59.240 --> 00:07:02.220 together. But one of the big friction points 00:07:02.220 --> 00:07:05.579 we have when designing nuclear facilities between 00:07:05.579 --> 00:07:09.199 safety and security is in the event of a safety 00:07:09.389 --> 00:07:12.750 accident, let's say you want as many safety doors 00:07:12.750 --> 00:07:14.949 as possible to open up and allow people to run 00:07:14.949 --> 00:07:19.290 out and be safe and get to a control point. From 00:07:19.290 --> 00:07:22.470 a security perspective, all those doors, it's 00:07:22.470 --> 00:07:25.430 too much. You can't just let them unlock and 00:07:25.430 --> 00:07:28.889 go. So it's where's the right balance to allow 00:07:28.889 --> 00:07:31.009 for a facility to be safe enough for individuals, 00:07:31.089 --> 00:07:34.709 but at the same time, provide enough security 00:07:34.709 --> 00:07:39.279 measures to allow access control. to material. 00:07:39.360 --> 00:07:41.300 And so it's finding that nice balance. And this 00:07:41.300 --> 00:07:44.620 is where my background with nuclear engineering 00:07:44.620 --> 00:07:47.680 comes in handy because I can understand both 00:07:47.680 --> 00:07:50.560 sides of the fence. I can understand where safety 00:07:50.560 --> 00:07:53.540 is really paramount and you need to have the 00:07:53.540 --> 00:07:56.879 right safety features in place, but can also 00:07:56.879 --> 00:07:59.060 understand, hey, this has now become a security 00:07:59.060 --> 00:08:02.740 vulnerability and security needs to be taken 00:08:02.740 --> 00:08:05.879 into account in this circumstance. So it's a 00:08:05.879 --> 00:08:09.019 really fine balance, but it's I think it's something 00:08:09.019 --> 00:08:12.000 that the nuclear industry has been quite conscious 00:08:12.000 --> 00:08:16.620 about over at least the last five, six, seven 00:08:16.620 --> 00:08:19.459 years. I think the Russian invasion in Ukraine 00:08:19.459 --> 00:08:22.879 really highlighted it as well, is that hey, security 00:08:22.879 --> 00:08:26.160 and safety have to work closely together if you 00:08:26.160 --> 00:08:30.420 want facilities to continue operating as designed 00:08:30.420 --> 00:08:35.399 in a way that allows the general public to be 00:08:35.399 --> 00:08:37.830 comfortable that they're still running. in a 00:08:37.830 --> 00:08:40.870 war zone, for example, or in a country that might 00:08:40.870 --> 00:08:43.990 be having some instability. That's actually a 00:08:43.990 --> 00:08:46.389 really important question. I'm wondering, in 00:08:46.389 --> 00:08:50.909 your work, does what has been going on in Ukraine 00:08:50.909 --> 00:08:53.889 with Russia coming in and occupation of nuclear 00:08:53.889 --> 00:08:55.970 facilities, et cetera, is that influencing how 00:08:55.970 --> 00:08:59.190 you are advising clients, for instance, in terms 00:08:59.190 --> 00:09:02.269 of their security planning? Definitely. And we've 00:09:02.269 --> 00:09:04.789 done a little bit of work with Ukrainian critical 00:09:04.789 --> 00:09:08.450 infrastructure security forces to allow them 00:09:08.450 --> 00:09:11.210 to understand, OK, what are the crucial bits 00:09:11.210 --> 00:09:14.629 that need to be guarded and protected? And how 00:09:14.629 --> 00:09:18.289 do you do that from a nuclear security perspective? 00:09:18.350 --> 00:09:22.610 Because there is so much they need to do to keep 00:09:22.610 --> 00:09:27.129 just everything running to survive. And a war 00:09:27.129 --> 00:09:30.490 zone is very different to a a country that might 00:09:30.490 --> 00:09:33.309 have just general instability, political instability. 00:09:35.129 --> 00:09:37.529 We're talking about very different threats here 00:09:37.529 --> 00:09:41.490 that have much more sophisticated capabilities 00:09:41.490 --> 00:09:47.669 and probably some quite targeted things they 00:09:47.669 --> 00:09:49.610 would want to do to a nuclear facility. And we 00:09:49.610 --> 00:09:52.629 saw that with some of the Russian targeting of 00:09:52.629 --> 00:09:56.409 Zaprovitzia nuclear power plant. And so that's 00:09:56.059 --> 00:09:58.600 There are different challenges that the country 00:09:58.600 --> 00:10:01.200 in an active war zone needs to worry about from 00:10:01.200 --> 00:10:05.220 a nuclear security perspective. So that is something 00:10:05.220 --> 00:10:08.299 we do talk about with other clients, depending 00:10:08.299 --> 00:10:10.100 on what country they're in. And this is where 00:10:10.100 --> 00:10:13.759 when we see a lot of emerging nuclear nations, 00:10:14.080 --> 00:10:16.559 which is right that they want to embark on a 00:10:16.559 --> 00:10:19.679 power program, but it is, hey, there is so much 00:10:19.679 --> 00:10:22.940 more to nuclear security. That's not just about 00:10:22.940 --> 00:10:27.129 the fence around the reactor site. What is the 00:10:27.129 --> 00:10:29.610 security culture in general in this country? 00:10:30.210 --> 00:10:32.330 Where do we see the vulnerabilities and those 00:10:32.330 --> 00:10:37.350 threats? And so what the IAEA has as best practice 00:10:37.350 --> 00:10:39.750 is what we call the design basis threat for each 00:10:39.750 --> 00:10:42.409 country. Each country should have its own and 00:10:42.409 --> 00:10:45.610 internally to that it should have a design basis 00:10:45.610 --> 00:10:49.769 threat for civilian power plants, military nuclear 00:10:49.769 --> 00:10:53.019 uses. and that will tailor the kinds of threats 00:10:53.019 --> 00:10:55.720 that they need to protect against. And so that's 00:10:55.720 --> 00:10:57.740 the type of stuff we'll work with a facility 00:10:57.740 --> 00:11:00.860 with to say, hey, you don't need to really worry 00:11:00.860 --> 00:11:04.480 about an invasion from another country, but you 00:11:04.480 --> 00:11:07.299 do need to worry about insurgent activity, for 00:11:07.299 --> 00:11:10.340 example, or protestor, like violent protest activity 00:11:10.340 --> 00:11:13.820 or outlaw motorcycle gangs. And each of those 00:11:13.820 --> 00:11:16.919 will vary depending on location, the country 00:11:16.919 --> 00:11:20.629 itself, and then the country's... general security 00:11:20.629 --> 00:11:24.389 culture and stance, which might mean some reactors 00:11:24.389 --> 00:11:27.649 have quite heavy handed nuclear security measures, 00:11:27.690 --> 00:11:30.690 some might not. I'm curious about how you think 00:11:30.690 --> 00:11:32.629 across a life cycle for that. I mean, obviously, 00:11:32.850 --> 00:11:36.210 when you're looking at safety for a nuclear reactor, 00:11:37.149 --> 00:11:39.289 even in the early stages of the design process, 00:11:39.389 --> 00:11:41.309 you're planning for that decommissioning and, 00:11:41.309 --> 00:11:44.690 you know, waste handling in the long term. Security, 00:11:44.889 --> 00:11:47.960 it seems like It seems like you're looking at 00:11:47.960 --> 00:11:50.120 local conditions based on what you know about 00:11:50.120 --> 00:11:52.440 a country and the likely threats. But I'm wondering, 00:11:52.580 --> 00:11:54.440 I mean, those can change over time. How do you 00:11:54.440 --> 00:11:56.759 think through that? Or to what extent can you 00:11:56.759 --> 00:11:59.000 think through that, you know, for a given circumstance? 00:12:00.019 --> 00:12:03.940 Yes. So we design nuclear security systems against 00:12:03.940 --> 00:12:06.940 a probability of one so that it is guaranteed 00:12:06.940 --> 00:12:09.740 that this threat will happen to that facility. 00:12:09.740 --> 00:12:11.899 And that allows you to, I guess, design worst 00:12:11.899 --> 00:12:17.250 case scenario. But That does get reviewed throughout 00:12:17.250 --> 00:12:20.009 the lifetime of that facility because, as you 00:12:20.009 --> 00:12:23.769 say, threats will change, the local environment 00:12:23.769 --> 00:12:27.509 will change, and this is where we try to... If 00:12:27.509 --> 00:12:30.129 a facility is designed well at the start with 00:12:30.129 --> 00:12:33.409 its safety and security systems working closely 00:12:33.409 --> 00:12:37.009 together, then you shouldn't have too many large 00:12:37.009 --> 00:12:40.509 retrofit... requirements later down the lifetime 00:12:40.509 --> 00:12:44.029 of that facility, where we have seen facilities 00:12:44.029 --> 00:12:46.450 that have focused purely on safety at the start 00:12:46.450 --> 00:12:48.970 and a little bit on security. When they get a 00:12:48.970 --> 00:12:50.690 couple of years down the track and something 00:12:50.690 --> 00:12:53.450 happens, they're having to go back and retrofit 00:12:53.450 --> 00:12:57.730 security systems, which is so costly and unnecessarily 00:12:57.730 --> 00:13:00.409 costly if you just design all those features 00:13:00.409 --> 00:13:02.610 in at the start to work with the safety system. 00:13:03.409 --> 00:13:06.129 So security is constantly getting reviewed, much 00:13:06.129 --> 00:13:08.610 like Safety systems are constantly getting reviewed. 00:13:08.669 --> 00:13:12.070 They'll get upgrades if technology is advanced. 00:13:12.549 --> 00:13:14.649 Same sort of thing with nuclear security. If 00:13:14.649 --> 00:13:17.470 the technology advances, it can be upgraded to 00:13:17.470 --> 00:13:21.009 make it more reliable, more secure. Cyber security 00:13:21.009 --> 00:13:24.529 is probably a really great example of that, where 00:13:24.529 --> 00:13:28.350 digital systems need to constantly be upgraded 00:13:28.350 --> 00:13:32.210 and reviewed to make sure that external threat 00:13:32.210 --> 00:13:36.070 vectors can't target them. It is a constant review. 00:13:36.250 --> 00:13:38.590 You can't just design, build the facility and 00:13:38.590 --> 00:13:40.610 go, okay, it's secure for life. It's awesome. 00:13:41.429 --> 00:13:44.309 I wish. I wish it were that easy. That would 00:13:44.309 --> 00:13:47.850 be really great. But unfortunately, people that 00:13:47.850 --> 00:13:50.870 like being in the threat game aren't really nice 00:13:50.870 --> 00:13:54.750 people, right? And they will try to alter how 00:13:54.750 --> 00:13:57.860 they target facilities. to exploit the vulnerabilities, 00:13:58.080 --> 00:14:00.600 right? Some of these threat forces, and especially 00:14:00.600 --> 00:14:03.659 when you talk about nation states that want to 00:14:03.659 --> 00:14:06.139 influence a facility, they're patient and they'll 00:14:06.139 --> 00:14:09.399 wait to find your vulnerabilities. And so it's 00:14:09.399 --> 00:14:11.299 making sure that you can understand the vulnerabilities 00:14:11.299 --> 00:14:14.940 before they do to put the right mechanisms in 00:14:14.940 --> 00:14:18.210 place to reduce them. Yeah. This is making me 00:14:18.210 --> 00:14:20.129 think of Stuxnet. I'm wondering if you have any 00:14:20.129 --> 00:14:24.049 some like favorite lessons learned. Stuxnet is 00:14:24.049 --> 00:14:26.769 a really great example because it said whilst 00:14:26.769 --> 00:14:30.809 this facility might have had the perfect physical 00:14:30.809 --> 00:14:34.169 security measures in place, the fact that they 00:14:34.169 --> 00:14:37.549 were able to get access to the digital systems 00:14:37.549 --> 00:14:40.190 within this facility and exploit those digital 00:14:40.190 --> 00:14:43.190 systems to tweak them so that they weren't getting 00:14:43.190 --> 00:14:46.830 the output in their enrichment. centrifuges that 00:14:46.830 --> 00:14:50.490 they were hoping and it took a long time to realize 00:14:50.490 --> 00:14:54.629 that meant that it had degraded the output of 00:14:54.629 --> 00:14:57.230 that facility and meant they took a lot longer 00:14:57.230 --> 00:15:00.409 for them to be able to get the amount of enriched 00:15:00.409 --> 00:15:02.769 uranium that they wanted to potentially use in 00:15:02.769 --> 00:15:07.190 a weapons program. And so that's why I think 00:15:07.190 --> 00:15:11.250 a lot of nuclear facilities and digital systems 00:15:11.250 --> 00:15:14.740 like that is a big vulnerability. How do you 00:15:14.740 --> 00:15:17.960 reduce that? A lot of civilian nuclear power 00:15:17.960 --> 00:15:19.899 plants won't have a lot of their operational 00:15:19.899 --> 00:15:23.460 systems on the open net so that they can control 00:15:23.460 --> 00:15:25.600 those systems inside. That doesn't make them 00:15:25.600 --> 00:15:28.139 completely impenetrable. That now then puts the 00:15:28.139 --> 00:15:31.139 onus on the individuals in the operations room 00:15:31.139 --> 00:15:33.539 with access to those facilities that they have 00:15:33.539 --> 00:15:36.899 to be screened and they have to understand their 00:15:36.899 --> 00:15:40.740 security requirements and be trusted. And that's 00:15:40.740 --> 00:15:43.539 why nuclear jobs often pay really well because 00:15:43.539 --> 00:15:46.139 they don't want you to be exploited by a threat 00:15:46.139 --> 00:15:48.620 force to offer money. You should be comfortable 00:15:48.620 --> 00:15:52.779 and happy enough in your job. So it's very intertwined. 00:15:53.580 --> 00:15:57.039 It's a big network of people and systems. Absolutely. 00:15:57.320 --> 00:15:59.639 It's complicated. It is. For those of you who 00:15:59.639 --> 00:16:02.659 aren't aware of Stuxnet, basically the idea was 00:16:02.659 --> 00:16:05.919 they wanted to target a physical system within 00:16:05.919 --> 00:16:09.419 the enrichment facilities in Iran. And what they 00:16:09.419 --> 00:16:12.279 did was they put out a virus that only targeted 00:16:12.279 --> 00:16:15.720 those particular controllers. And that virus, 00:16:15.899 --> 00:16:18.139 they basically waited for it to be brought in 00:16:18.139 --> 00:16:21.159 on a USB stick inadvertently by staff members 00:16:21.159 --> 00:16:23.730 because the facility was not. on the network. 00:16:23.889 --> 00:16:27.009 It was set up to be a secure facility. And so 00:16:27.009 --> 00:16:29.389 eventually, of course, the USB stick came in 00:16:29.389 --> 00:16:32.990 because humans are humans. And that virus then 00:16:32.990 --> 00:16:35.750 caused physical damage to the facility itself. 00:16:36.549 --> 00:16:40.929 This does bring up, for me, the question of how 00:16:40.929 --> 00:16:44.649 to deal with emerging technologies in nuclear 00:16:44.649 --> 00:16:47.350 and, in particular, the security implications 00:16:47.350 --> 00:16:49.870 of such technologies. And I remember a while 00:16:49.870 --> 00:16:51.889 back, we actually had a chat about this. I think 00:16:51.889 --> 00:16:53.649 we were talking about fusion energy in particular. 00:16:53.690 --> 00:16:56.649 And I was wondering, this is something you're 00:16:56.649 --> 00:16:58.309 actively working on. Can you share some of the 00:16:58.309 --> 00:16:59.970 exciting developments in nuclear that we should 00:16:59.970 --> 00:17:02.370 be thinking about and planning for and what you 00:17:02.370 --> 00:17:03.929 and your colleagues are working on right now? 00:17:04.430 --> 00:17:07.309 Yeah, so there's some really interesting emerging 00:17:07.309 --> 00:17:10.890 technologies in nuclear that challenge our security 00:17:10.890 --> 00:17:13.569 and the nuclear safeguard system more broadly 00:17:13.569 --> 00:17:16.210 as well. And fusion is one of those technologies. 00:17:16.789 --> 00:17:20.910 There are lots of different ways people are conceptually 00:17:20.910 --> 00:17:24.049 building fusion power reactors. Each of them 00:17:24.049 --> 00:17:26.829 have a similar sort of requirement, which is 00:17:26.829 --> 00:17:29.750 a different kind of radioisotope as the starter 00:17:29.750 --> 00:17:33.970 fuel to then get their reaction going and a requirement. 00:17:34.109 --> 00:17:37.309 predominantly on tritium to keep those reactions 00:17:37.309 --> 00:17:41.970 going as well. Now, what we really worry about 00:17:41.970 --> 00:17:46.450 in nuclear security is any radioisotope or uranium, 00:17:46.549 --> 00:17:49.349 plutonium that can be weaponized. That's really 00:17:49.349 --> 00:17:53.369 what we're trying to prevent. Things like tritium 00:17:53.369 --> 00:17:57.309 historically haven't been as high on the radar 00:17:57.309 --> 00:18:01.430 because you didn't need a lot of it. in nuclear 00:18:01.430 --> 00:18:03.849 applications, whereas in fusion, you actually 00:18:03.849 --> 00:18:06.450 need a fair bit of tritium to keep your reaction 00:18:06.450 --> 00:18:11.309 going. A lot of tritium triggers a lot of stuff 00:18:11.309 --> 00:18:15.130 because tritium is often used as a starter for 00:18:15.130 --> 00:18:18.869 a weapon, a nuclear weapon, or it can be used 00:18:18.869 --> 00:18:23.170 in large components as a material that can be 00:18:23.170 --> 00:18:28.970 used to create fear in a... nuclear dirty bomb 00:18:28.970 --> 00:18:31.970 sense or radiological dispersion or exposure 00:18:31.970 --> 00:18:36.130 device. And so whilst looking at some of these 00:18:36.130 --> 00:18:39.150 emerging technologies, it is getting a good understanding 00:18:39.150 --> 00:18:42.630 of, OK, what radioisotopes are being used in 00:18:42.630 --> 00:18:46.430 these technologies? What's their half life? What 00:18:46.430 --> 00:18:50.190 form do these come in? Are they in a material 00:18:50.190 --> 00:18:54.130 form that can be easily proliferated, stolen, 00:18:54.549 --> 00:18:57.069 sold? And if that's the case, how do we secure 00:18:57.069 --> 00:19:01.029 them? And if they're in a state that is really 00:19:01.029 --> 00:19:05.630 difficult to move, sell, shift around, then okay, 00:19:05.829 --> 00:19:08.089 so what are the ways we're making sure that we 00:19:08.089 --> 00:19:12.019 can... keep it that way on a site. And I know 00:19:12.019 --> 00:19:15.079 a lot of the startup companies hate when I talk 00:19:15.079 --> 00:19:17.740 to them about nuclear security because a lot 00:19:17.740 --> 00:19:19.519 of people love fusion because, oh, there's no 00:19:19.519 --> 00:19:22.859 waste, there's no weaponizable material. You're 00:19:22.859 --> 00:19:25.440 like, look, as a bad person, you can weaponize 00:19:25.440 --> 00:19:27.640 anything. That's the problem with bad people. 00:19:28.140 --> 00:19:30.279 And so we want to prevent that from happening 00:19:30.279 --> 00:19:33.200 before commercialization of a lot of these technologies. 00:19:33.259 --> 00:19:35.319 So we understand the risks and vulnerabilities. 00:19:36.109 --> 00:19:38.009 And you just put the right mechanisms in place 00:19:38.009 --> 00:19:40.369 to prevent them and allow that to be understood. 00:19:41.069 --> 00:19:43.549 And so fusion's a really exciting one. I love 00:19:43.549 --> 00:19:45.509 that because I get to understand more about different 00:19:45.509 --> 00:19:48.210 types of isotopes, which gets the nerd in me 00:19:48.210 --> 00:19:51.769 happy. Another space we're looking at is commercial 00:19:51.769 --> 00:19:54.309 maritime and floating nuclear power plants, because 00:19:54.309 --> 00:19:58.329 that presents a different kind of security challenge. 00:19:58.809 --> 00:20:03.329 The safety around maritime nuclear is well understood. 00:20:03.650 --> 00:20:06.809 The US Navy, the British Navy, French navies 00:20:06.809 --> 00:20:10.130 have been using maritime nuclear for decades. 00:20:10.890 --> 00:20:13.569 And so safety is really well known around that. 00:20:13.910 --> 00:20:17.809 But often those reactors are pretty high enriched 00:20:17.809 --> 00:20:22.130 uranium. They're sealed units so you can't just 00:20:22.130 --> 00:20:25.549 open up a reactor core and take fuel and steal 00:20:25.549 --> 00:20:27.470 it, and you'd probably die if you gave that a 00:20:27.470 --> 00:20:31.750 go. But I don't recommend it. But it's, hey, 00:20:31.829 --> 00:20:34.430 these are vessels that could be out in the middle 00:20:34.430 --> 00:20:38.250 of nowhere, essentially. Who's now responsible 00:20:38.250 --> 00:20:41.569 for the security of that? Is it the commercial 00:20:41.569 --> 00:20:44.410 shipping merchant? Is it the state that that 00:20:44.410 --> 00:20:48.349 vessel is flagged under? What does the response 00:20:48.349 --> 00:20:50.190 force look like? Because I'm pretty sure a lot 00:20:50.190 --> 00:20:53.630 of these commercial shipping merchants aren't 00:20:53.630 --> 00:20:55.970 going to now pay for an armed security force 00:20:55.970 --> 00:20:59.329 to live on these vessels. So what are some other 00:20:59.329 --> 00:21:02.829 more sophisticated ways we can secure material 00:21:02.829 --> 00:21:06.410 utilizing the technology we currently have, utilizing 00:21:06.410 --> 00:21:10.529 sensors and detectors and tracking tools to be 00:21:10.529 --> 00:21:14.109 able to do that? And the joy of having a nuclear 00:21:14.109 --> 00:21:18.079 propelled... cargo vessel is you no longer need 00:21:18.079 --> 00:21:21.680 to hug the coastline where there are pirates. 00:21:22.299 --> 00:21:25.240 You can just sail really far away from them because 00:21:25.240 --> 00:21:27.400 you've got the speed, you've got the endurance. 00:21:28.420 --> 00:21:30.759 You no longer need to be a target for some of 00:21:30.759 --> 00:21:34.539 these pirates. So that's a really fascinating 00:21:34.539 --> 00:21:38.019 one because it is a security problem that hasn't 00:21:38.019 --> 00:21:42.640 really been grappled with before because maritime 00:21:42.640 --> 00:21:45.140 has predominantly been in the defence space where 00:21:45.140 --> 00:21:49.440 they've been state -owned, military people on 00:21:49.440 --> 00:21:51.539 board, security's not a problem there because 00:21:51.539 --> 00:21:53.839 they're providing the security. They are the 00:21:53.839 --> 00:21:57.500 security, yes. They are the security, yeah. So 00:21:57.500 --> 00:21:59.640 it's been, yeah, that's been a really interesting 00:21:59.640 --> 00:22:04.160 one because the carbon emissions from the maritime 00:22:04.160 --> 00:22:08.500 sector quite high globally because we rely on 00:22:08.500 --> 00:22:10.420 ships, especially here in Australia, all our 00:22:10.420 --> 00:22:13.960 stuff comes in by boat. If they've got the ability 00:22:13.960 --> 00:22:17.380 to decarbonize through how they propel their 00:22:17.380 --> 00:22:20.759 vessels, that's a great thing for us. We just 00:22:20.759 --> 00:22:23.160 want to make sure that the material is being 00:22:23.160 --> 00:22:25.480 secured and handled appropriately and it's not 00:22:25.480 --> 00:22:28.680 creating another vector for the threat forces 00:22:28.680 --> 00:22:31.559 to be able to get their hands on material. Yeah. 00:22:32.460 --> 00:22:35.730 The tritium As I understand it also connects 00:22:35.730 --> 00:22:38.670 to fission reactors, at least for some of the 00:22:38.670 --> 00:22:41.730 fuel cycles for these facilities that would involve, 00:22:41.809 --> 00:22:44.250 for instance, transport of tritium, etc. Is that 00:22:44.250 --> 00:22:45.990 something that you think about when you're looking 00:22:45.990 --> 00:22:48.650 at these things? Yeah, definitely. Transporter 00:22:48.650 --> 00:22:52.269 material is one of the more important aspects 00:22:52.269 --> 00:22:55.869 we look at for a facility because any material 00:22:55.869 --> 00:22:59.690 in transport is at risk and vulnerable. And there's 00:22:59.690 --> 00:23:03.569 a couple of case studies one pretty interesting 00:23:03.569 --> 00:23:08.710 one out of Mexico where a source was stolen off 00:23:08.710 --> 00:23:12.069 a truck while it was in transit. And so how material 00:23:12.069 --> 00:23:14.829 is being transported and how it's been secured 00:23:14.829 --> 00:23:19.430 in transport and tracked by the right authorities 00:23:19.430 --> 00:23:23.730 is really important so that you can reduce the, 00:23:23.730 --> 00:23:26.910 I guess, access to that material and make it 00:23:26.910 --> 00:23:29.680 unattractive for them to take it as well. So 00:23:29.680 --> 00:23:32.740 yes, the movement of tritium between sites is 00:23:32.740 --> 00:23:35.339 an important one that we look at from a security 00:23:35.339 --> 00:23:39.000 perspective, much like any kind of radioisotope 00:23:39.000 --> 00:23:44.119 being transported around. In terms of the maritime 00:23:44.119 --> 00:23:47.859 space, how big is the market for commercial maritime 00:23:47.859 --> 00:23:50.400 nuclear? Or do you have a sense of that? Is this 00:23:50.400 --> 00:23:53.339 growing? Where is this in terms of development? 00:23:53.980 --> 00:23:58.559 So this is growing and there are Organizations 00:23:58.559 --> 00:24:00.460 at the moment, so the one we're working with 00:24:00.460 --> 00:24:03.819 closely is called NEMO, the Nuclear Energy Maritime 00:24:03.819 --> 00:24:06.920 Organization. It's a not -for -profit that is 00:24:06.920 --> 00:24:13.480 helping shipping companies, regulators, and licensing 00:24:13.480 --> 00:24:18.279 authorities understand the problem around nuclear 00:24:18.279 --> 00:24:21.140 propulsion in general from the maritime space. 00:24:21.609 --> 00:24:24.009 There are some pretty clear laws of the sea through 00:24:24.009 --> 00:24:26.369 the International Maritime Organization, but 00:24:26.369 --> 00:24:28.990 the stuff on nuclear was written in the 80s and 00:24:28.990 --> 00:24:35.730 is pretty outdated. And so working with that 00:24:35.730 --> 00:24:39.210 organization to say, OK, well, what is in the 00:24:39.210 --> 00:24:41.289 realm of the possible? And this really comes 00:24:41.289 --> 00:24:45.930 from a responsibility and regulation side of 00:24:45.930 --> 00:24:49.430 the house. Where are these ships likely to be 00:24:49.430 --> 00:24:53.910 flagged? does that country have a legitimate 00:24:53.910 --> 00:24:57.670 nuclear regulator that is able to responsibly 00:24:57.670 --> 00:25:02.049 give a licence for a reactor on a vessel and 00:25:02.049 --> 00:25:04.089 make sure that those licence conditions are being 00:25:04.089 --> 00:25:07.269 met whilst out at sea? The thing is with commercial 00:25:07.269 --> 00:25:11.289 maritime, this is big companies that have large 00:25:11.289 --> 00:25:14.450 amounts of money and so they are willing to... 00:25:14.650 --> 00:25:17.369 to throw money at this problem to see how it 00:25:17.369 --> 00:25:22.269 can work and working with small modular reactor 00:25:22.269 --> 00:25:27.730 startups to get maritime small modular reactors 00:25:27.730 --> 00:25:30.670 that are suitable. There's interesting concepts 00:25:30.670 --> 00:25:34.390 about does the ship buy the reactor and keep 00:25:34.390 --> 00:25:37.750 it forever? Is it a leasing arrangement? What 00:25:37.750 --> 00:25:40.170 happens with fuel? So there's so many questions 00:25:40.170 --> 00:25:43.619 out there. It is figuring out What is the most 00:25:43.619 --> 00:25:48.359 viable and most responsible way to do this? And 00:25:48.359 --> 00:25:52.400 it will impact the shipping industry significantly 00:25:52.400 --> 00:25:55.200 because it will mean that ships that are flagged 00:25:55.200 --> 00:25:57.799 in countries like Tuvalu that have great tax 00:25:57.799 --> 00:26:01.740 breaks actually don't have a nuclear industry 00:26:01.740 --> 00:26:04.359 and might not be suitable for a nuclear propelled 00:26:04.359 --> 00:26:07.619 ship. So there's a lot of effort going into understanding 00:26:07.619 --> 00:26:11.579 the regulations and the challenges. once we've 00:26:11.579 --> 00:26:13.859 got that well understood, then I think it'll 00:26:13.859 --> 00:26:17.240 be pretty quick to get to a concept and operational 00:26:17.240 --> 00:26:20.819 state to do that because there is an impetus 00:26:20.819 --> 00:26:24.460 from the international commercial maritime to 00:26:24.460 --> 00:26:27.980 reduce their carbon emissions and their reliance 00:26:27.980 --> 00:26:31.660 on oil predominantly in their shipping because 00:26:31.660 --> 00:26:34.380 it costs them a lot of money and we're trying 00:26:34.380 --> 00:26:37.369 to be greener. in how we approach things. I am 00:26:37.369 --> 00:26:39.869 curious about how the work that you're doing 00:26:39.869 --> 00:26:43.650 for NEMO might impact international regulations 00:26:43.650 --> 00:26:47.750 with regards to nuclear maritime. I do want to 00:26:47.750 --> 00:26:49.869 know what is the connection there? Do you put 00:26:49.869 --> 00:26:52.809 out information for international regulatory 00:26:52.809 --> 00:26:55.799 authorities to consider? Yeah, so it's working 00:26:55.799 --> 00:26:58.779 with the IMO, the International Maritime Organization, 00:26:58.960 --> 00:27:01.859 who's responsible for all the laws and regulations 00:27:01.859 --> 00:27:05.440 out at sea, and in this case, also working with 00:27:05.440 --> 00:27:08.460 the International Atomic Energy Agency to make 00:27:08.460 --> 00:27:11.880 sure that they are also comfortable with the 00:27:11.880 --> 00:27:14.440 concept of this going forward. Because whilst 00:27:14.440 --> 00:27:18.039 the IAEA is not a regulator as such, like the 00:27:18.039 --> 00:27:22.599 IMO kind of is, it still needs to be... given 00:27:22.599 --> 00:27:24.839 the warm and fuzzies that this is responsible 00:27:24.839 --> 00:27:27.740 use of nuclear technology. Because if you don't 00:27:27.740 --> 00:27:32.319 have the IAEA on board, then other states aren't 00:27:32.319 --> 00:27:35.039 going to follow, right? Yeah, they're a key stakeholder. 00:27:35.619 --> 00:27:38.099 They are a very key stakeholder. So it's really 00:27:38.099 --> 00:27:40.619 working with those two big organizations in the 00:27:40.619 --> 00:27:43.759 first instance to make sure that, hey, these 00:27:43.759 --> 00:27:48.410 plans are suitable. and appropriate and manageable, 00:27:48.750 --> 00:27:50.950 because there will be safeguards elements to 00:27:50.950 --> 00:27:53.829 this that the IAEA will need to be deeply involved 00:27:53.829 --> 00:27:57.970 in and will change how they do safeguards in 00:27:57.970 --> 00:28:02.789 its current, I guess, land -based static facility 00:28:02.789 --> 00:28:07.750 kind of perspective. So it's working with them 00:28:07.750 --> 00:28:11.109 to make sure if everybody is comfortable with 00:28:11.109 --> 00:28:14.589 this conceptually, now how do we operationalise 00:28:14.589 --> 00:28:17.559 it? I find it really exciting because I don't 00:28:17.559 --> 00:28:20.400 think there's many other industries, aviation 00:28:20.400 --> 00:28:22.519 is probably the only other one in the world that 00:28:22.519 --> 00:28:28.539 has such rigorous international regulatory requirements, 00:28:29.400 --> 00:28:31.299 that being able to impact that and influence 00:28:31.299 --> 00:28:34.599 that is quite exciting because hopefully we can 00:28:34.599 --> 00:28:37.259 see commercial maritime being done successfully 00:28:37.259 --> 00:28:40.859 and peacefully into the future. I think that's 00:28:40.859 --> 00:28:44.950 a really, it'd be a great way to reduce operational 00:28:44.950 --> 00:28:46.809 costs of commercial shipping, which hopefully 00:28:46.809 --> 00:28:49.609 means things cost a little bit less to move around 00:28:49.609 --> 00:28:53.789 the world. My thought is that we in Australia 00:28:53.789 --> 00:28:56.230 right now are thinking about how to manage visits 00:28:56.230 --> 00:28:58.769 from or more visits, I should say, from nuclear 00:28:58.769 --> 00:29:00.130 submarines, for instance, and we're thinking 00:29:00.130 --> 00:29:01.730 about things like what about how do we handle 00:29:01.730 --> 00:29:03.549 the waste that's going to be produced through 00:29:03.549 --> 00:29:05.890 the maintenance process, etc. If you're thinking 00:29:05.890 --> 00:29:08.309 about maritime nuclear and you're thinking about, 00:29:08.309 --> 00:29:12.789 you know, doing that at a commercial scale. globally, 00:29:13.210 --> 00:29:15.670 are there things that countries need to be thinking 00:29:15.670 --> 00:29:19.170 about now with regards to preparing for that 00:29:19.170 --> 00:29:22.869 kind of shift? Yeah, definitely. I think countries 00:29:22.869 --> 00:29:26.329 that already have nuclear regulators and an industry 00:29:26.329 --> 00:29:29.470 need to be conscious that some of these regulations 00:29:29.470 --> 00:29:34.150 need to be reviewed and updated and working with 00:29:34.150 --> 00:29:37.309 the technology provider to make sure that they're 00:29:37.309 --> 00:29:42.430 working well together, not just very rigid, enforced 00:29:42.430 --> 00:29:46.089 regulations. That will stifle the ability to 00:29:46.089 --> 00:29:49.410 grow this kind of industry. And I think we're 00:29:49.410 --> 00:29:53.349 going to learn a lot from the increase in visiting 00:29:53.349 --> 00:29:56.880 nuclear ships, developing our own... nuclear 00:29:56.880 --> 00:30:00.319 submarine capability that will force us to understand, 00:30:00.619 --> 00:30:03.700 OK, how do we regulate something at sea? And 00:30:03.700 --> 00:30:06.259 yes, this is from a defence context, and it will 00:30:06.259 --> 00:30:09.720 be very different to commercial. But we can learn 00:30:09.720 --> 00:30:12.700 those lessons and the challenges and put that 00:30:12.700 --> 00:30:16.079 into a maritime context, which I think is really 00:30:16.079 --> 00:30:18.700 exciting for the Australian regulators. Hopefully 00:30:18.700 --> 00:30:22.730 our pans are as no. like that challenge, because 00:30:22.730 --> 00:30:25.490 this puts it clearly in their space, not in the 00:30:25.490 --> 00:30:28.369 defence regulator space, but it allows those 00:30:28.369 --> 00:30:30.450 regulators to work closely together, which is 00:30:30.450 --> 00:30:34.309 what we should see anyway from regulatory bodies 00:30:34.309 --> 00:30:38.170 in the nuclear space. Absolutely. So our PANZA 00:30:38.170 --> 00:30:42.710 is our civil safety regulator and ASNO is our... 00:30:42.710 --> 00:30:47.410 Well, they do both civil and defence security 00:30:47.410 --> 00:30:51.539 and safeguards regulation. for those of you who 00:30:51.539 --> 00:30:53.460 are not across all of the acronyms in the school, 00:30:53.720 --> 00:30:56.980 there are many of them. Should get better at 00:30:56.980 --> 00:30:59.980 spelling out the acronyms. I almost feel like 00:30:59.980 --> 00:31:02.380 I should release a like cheat sheet with this 00:31:02.380 --> 00:31:09.500 podcast sometimes. The lexicon. Well, there's 00:31:09.500 --> 00:31:12.839 one topic I wanted to specifically ask you about, 00:31:12.900 --> 00:31:15.359 but I do a lot of work on artificial intelligence 00:31:15.359 --> 00:31:19.559 and I do have conversations on a semi -regular 00:31:19.559 --> 00:31:22.420 basis about the increase in the availability 00:31:22.420 --> 00:31:27.880 of sensors and basically just information of 00:31:27.880 --> 00:31:31.880 all kinds that you can then combine and use both 00:31:31.880 --> 00:31:35.819 for good and for not so good, let's say. I'm 00:31:35.819 --> 00:31:39.079 wondering how you think about the technologies 00:31:39.079 --> 00:31:42.779 that you might be using for tracking from that 00:31:42.779 --> 00:31:44.759 perspective, from the perspective of, well, they 00:31:44.759 --> 00:31:48.299 can be used for useful purposes for security. 00:31:48.579 --> 00:31:51.519 They can be used to help improve the safety and 00:31:51.519 --> 00:31:54.380 security of a system, but they can also be used 00:31:54.380 --> 00:31:56.519 problematically. And how do you think through 00:31:56.519 --> 00:31:59.519 that? Yeah, so I think there's lots of opportunities 00:31:59.519 --> 00:32:03.559 for AI in the nuclear security space. Maybe not 00:32:03.559 --> 00:32:05.900 so much for operational facilities, but when 00:32:05.900 --> 00:32:08.819 we talk about decommissioned facilities or long 00:32:08.819 --> 00:32:12.599 -term waste and disposal sites, the ability to 00:32:12.599 --> 00:32:16.640 use sensors to track and alert and alarm when 00:32:16.640 --> 00:32:20.000 there is any change occurring within those sites 00:32:20.000 --> 00:32:23.119 or facilities. I think there's a really great 00:32:23.119 --> 00:32:26.339 way for AI to help do that, which reduces costs 00:32:26.339 --> 00:32:31.049 to those sites. because often the largest cost 00:32:31.049 --> 00:32:35.589 to a disposal site or a decommissioned site that's 00:32:35.589 --> 00:32:39.109 sitting laying dormant is insecurity forces. 00:32:39.529 --> 00:32:42.470 And so any way that you can supplement human 00:32:42.470 --> 00:32:46.150 with some digital systems reduces the costs. 00:32:46.190 --> 00:32:49.170 And I think the technology is getting to a point 00:32:49.170 --> 00:32:51.190 where you can get some assurance that you are 00:32:51.190 --> 00:32:55.230 getting some decent output there. There are risks 00:32:55.230 --> 00:32:58.109 and vulnerabilities, as you mentioned, too. that 00:32:58.109 --> 00:33:01.089 can be a way that a sophisticated threat actor 00:33:01.089 --> 00:33:03.910 can influence the information that's being fed 00:33:03.910 --> 00:33:08.869 to a response force or a security operation center. 00:33:09.710 --> 00:33:13.289 And so how do we ensure that those systems are 00:33:13.289 --> 00:33:17.509 being regularly checked and tested and not vulnerable 00:33:17.509 --> 00:33:22.230 to external influences? I think that there is 00:33:22.230 --> 00:33:25.430 a way that we can we can nuance that and we can 00:33:25.519 --> 00:33:28.240 be a bit smart and there are some sites globally 00:33:28.240 --> 00:33:30.779 that I think will be really great case studies 00:33:30.779 --> 00:33:34.700 for us to be able to do that and test it with 00:33:34.700 --> 00:33:37.500 the risk not being so extreme. I think we're 00:33:37.500 --> 00:33:39.740 a little way off doing that on operational sites 00:33:39.740 --> 00:33:44.119 where the material in use is quite spicy, I guess, 00:33:44.400 --> 00:33:49.740 as opposed to facilities where the material, 00:33:49.940 --> 00:33:52.589 like in a in a long -term disposal site, it is 00:33:52.589 --> 00:33:54.730 packaged in a way that makes it very difficult 00:33:54.730 --> 00:33:56.529 for someone to get their hands on the material 00:33:56.529 --> 00:33:59.769 they want. So it is really about just reducing 00:33:59.769 --> 00:34:03.230 access. And I think there are AI tools and systems 00:34:03.230 --> 00:34:06.069 that can be used to help. Probably part of that 00:34:06.069 --> 00:34:08.989 security architecture. But again, this is shifting 00:34:08.989 --> 00:34:14.070 mindsets of regulators that you're not just laying 00:34:14.070 --> 00:34:17.469 out the templated security plan of a fence and 00:34:17.469 --> 00:34:20.380 a gun and a gate. you're doing something that's 00:34:20.380 --> 00:34:24.099 a bit more nuanced and the assurances might be 00:34:24.099 --> 00:34:26.820 a little bit different. And I don't think different 00:34:26.820 --> 00:34:28.619 is bad. I think that's actually great for us 00:34:28.619 --> 00:34:32.940 to evolve the capabilities. I find that quite 00:34:32.940 --> 00:34:36.940 exciting. Yeah, it is. It's an interesting research 00:34:36.940 --> 00:34:39.039 problem in the sense that you're talking about 00:34:39.039 --> 00:34:41.099 assurance and there is an interplay between like 00:34:41.099 --> 00:34:44.179 the human actors within the facility that are 00:34:44.179 --> 00:34:46.340 charged with making sure that these facilities 00:34:46.340 --> 00:34:51.429 stay secure. and the AI tools that they might 00:34:51.429 --> 00:34:54.510 be using to do that. And I'm wondering, is that 00:34:54.510 --> 00:34:56.269 a discussion that is happening in your field 00:34:56.269 --> 00:35:00.210 right now? Yeah, it is. It is. And we are looking 00:35:00.210 --> 00:35:02.670 a lot towards academia to see what's in the realm 00:35:02.670 --> 00:35:08.010 of the possible and potentially, could you have 00:35:08.010 --> 00:35:14.130 a fully autonomous, secured site that robotics 00:35:14.489 --> 00:35:17.550 could be the responders or different kind of 00:35:17.550 --> 00:35:21.050 sensors trigger different kind of responses and 00:35:21.050 --> 00:35:24.389 that the humans in the loop might be delayed 00:35:24.389 --> 00:35:27.449 for a really big response, but it gives them 00:35:27.449 --> 00:35:32.289 time to get their traps, whatever threat actor 00:35:32.289 --> 00:35:34.690 has got to that site through other mechanisms. 00:35:34.989 --> 00:35:37.690 I think that is stuff we talk about and think 00:35:37.690 --> 00:35:41.369 about a lot. It is what country and facility 00:35:41.369 --> 00:35:46.139 is willing to take the plunge and do that. Unfortunately, 00:35:46.219 --> 00:35:49.079 I don't think it's Australia. I don't think the 00:35:49.079 --> 00:35:51.539 risk appetite is there. But I think there are 00:35:51.539 --> 00:35:53.820 some countries around Europe that would look 00:35:53.820 --> 00:35:57.880 to this as a viable thing to try. And as I was 00:35:57.880 --> 00:36:00.519 saying before, it would be on sites that are 00:36:00.519 --> 00:36:03.699 lower risk from an access to material perspective, 00:36:03.940 --> 00:36:06.780 like a waste site, like a decommissioned dormant 00:36:06.780 --> 00:36:10.139 site. Well, we could do that and improve the 00:36:10.139 --> 00:36:13.449 concept. Because that's a big deterrent to threat 00:36:13.449 --> 00:36:17.230 actors as well. Who's not terrified of the rise 00:36:17.230 --> 00:36:22.829 of the robots? They're much scarier than human 00:36:22.829 --> 00:36:26.630 security forces. Yeah, why scarier? You can distract 00:36:26.630 --> 00:36:29.409 a human with something shiny. A robot doesn't 00:36:29.409 --> 00:36:32.349 care about that. Let's go to Australia. I'm wondering, 00:36:32.530 --> 00:36:34.170 I mean, we've talked about the maritime case, 00:36:34.269 --> 00:36:37.199 but I'm wondering if given Australia's somewhat 00:36:37.199 --> 00:36:39.559 unique history with nuclear technologies, how 00:36:39.559 --> 00:36:42.500 engaged we are likely to be in these kinds of 00:36:42.500 --> 00:36:44.139 things. What roles do you think we should be 00:36:44.139 --> 00:36:47.480 playing in these conversations? So this is where 00:36:47.480 --> 00:36:52.440 I'm really torn because there are so many amazing 00:36:52.440 --> 00:36:55.780 nuclear startups in Australia. We've got some 00:36:55.780 --> 00:36:58.860 clever people that are developing technologies 00:36:58.860 --> 00:37:01.880 for things like nuclear batteries, so maritime 00:37:01.880 --> 00:37:05.639 nuclear reactors, the fusion reactors. But they 00:37:05.639 --> 00:37:10.460 get to a point where they can no longer do their 00:37:10.460 --> 00:37:13.260 research and build their prototypes here in Australia 00:37:13.260 --> 00:37:17.860 due to our laws and legislations. And then we 00:37:17.860 --> 00:37:20.519 lose them. They go offshore and they will take 00:37:20.519 --> 00:37:23.860 this technology and they will do that overseas, 00:37:24.420 --> 00:37:27.059 which is heartbreaking because we could be a 00:37:27.059 --> 00:37:29.820 really great player in the emerging tech space 00:37:29.820 --> 00:37:34.179 in nuclear globally and within our region. And 00:37:34.179 --> 00:37:37.340 what frustrates me from the nuclear security 00:37:37.340 --> 00:37:40.460 perspective is this is where we could understand 00:37:40.460 --> 00:37:42.980 some of the nuclear security challenges and help 00:37:42.980 --> 00:37:46.460 support our regional partners to lift their nuclear 00:37:46.460 --> 00:37:49.440 security as they take on some of these emerging 00:37:49.440 --> 00:37:53.320 technologies. And I'll use small modular reactors 00:37:53.320 --> 00:37:56.860 as an example here. There are countries within 00:37:56.860 --> 00:37:59.360 our region, the Indo -Pacific region, that are 00:37:59.360 --> 00:38:01.599 seriously considering small modular reactors 00:38:01.599 --> 00:38:04.219 because it's perfect for them as island nations 00:38:04.219 --> 00:38:07.199 to help reduce their carbon emissions, but to 00:38:07.199 --> 00:38:09.900 just have electricity because a lot of them don't 00:38:09.900 --> 00:38:16.539 have reliable electricity. So we could be a really 00:38:16.539 --> 00:38:19.139 great player in helping support that so that 00:38:19.139 --> 00:38:22.739 we can have strong nuclear security network around 00:38:22.739 --> 00:38:26.230 our region protecting Australia's borders too. 00:38:26.869 --> 00:38:30.210 But I think that some of our politics around 00:38:30.210 --> 00:38:32.829 nuclear technology really limits our ability 00:38:32.829 --> 00:38:35.170 to do that, which is really unfortunate. And 00:38:35.170 --> 00:38:39.869 I'd like to see us to be a bit more active in 00:38:39.869 --> 00:38:42.610 that space because we already have the young 00:38:42.610 --> 00:38:45.610 talent creating these amazing emerging technologies 00:38:45.610 --> 00:38:48.630 that are understanding what this technology looks 00:38:48.630 --> 00:38:52.849 like that can help shape how we can secure that 00:38:52.849 --> 00:38:55.889 and do it responsibly within our region. So I 00:38:55.889 --> 00:38:59.429 think no matter what side of the fence people 00:38:59.429 --> 00:39:02.150 sit on for civilian power in Australia, that 00:39:02.150 --> 00:39:06.170 doesn't matter. Our ability to use our clever 00:39:06.170 --> 00:39:11.070 people to help develop future nuclear technologies. 00:39:11.710 --> 00:39:15.389 is there we need to keep them and use that use 00:39:15.389 --> 00:39:18.429 that knowledge for good. It just breaks my heart 00:39:18.429 --> 00:39:21.210 when I meet these young people that are so excited 00:39:21.210 --> 00:39:23.349 and they get to a point and I've seen it with 00:39:23.349 --> 00:39:27.409 a couple of really great technologies and they 00:39:27.409 --> 00:39:29.329 go move overseas because that's the only way 00:39:29.329 --> 00:39:31.389 that they can get their technology off the ground. 00:39:31.989 --> 00:39:34.130 It would be good if we could do a better job 00:39:34.130 --> 00:39:36.070 of I think raising awareness of the fact that 00:39:36.070 --> 00:39:39.679 they're There we can pretend that there is a 00:39:39.679 --> 00:39:42.559 hard border around Australia where we don't have 00:39:42.559 --> 00:39:44.760 to think about nuclear but as you said we have 00:39:44.760 --> 00:39:47.159 neighbors who are thinking about it we have in 00:39:47.159 --> 00:39:49.860 around the globe pledges to increase the use 00:39:49.860 --> 00:39:53.019 of nuclear and in other nations energy mix and 00:39:53.019 --> 00:39:57.519 they those those things can and likely will down 00:39:57.519 --> 00:40:01.679 the line impact us and Australia has a history 00:40:01.679 --> 00:40:04.119 of playing a strong role in for instance the 00:40:04.119 --> 00:40:07.920 safeguards community and so How do you think 00:40:07.920 --> 00:40:11.219 we could move the needle on that in terms of 00:40:11.219 --> 00:40:14.340 how we see our involvement in that kind of work 00:40:14.340 --> 00:40:18.039 outside of small pockets who are already engaged 00:40:18.039 --> 00:40:21.719 within Australian nuclear? Yeah, so I think it's 00:40:21.719 --> 00:40:25.179 remaining engaged in the safeguard space and 00:40:25.179 --> 00:40:27.780 the nuclear security space globally as these 00:40:27.780 --> 00:40:30.440 emerging technologies come out and being able 00:40:30.440 --> 00:40:33.300 to support our regional partners in setting up 00:40:33.300 --> 00:40:36.179 the right security and safeguards frameworks 00:40:36.179 --> 00:40:40.860 to do that. IAEA is really good at supporting 00:40:40.860 --> 00:40:44.960 safety cases around technology, but not necessarily 00:40:44.960 --> 00:40:49.079 as strong in supporting security and safeguards 00:40:49.079 --> 00:40:53.119 because as the external verification, they can't 00:40:53.119 --> 00:40:57.699 really do that. It's hard to play both sides. 00:40:58.360 --> 00:41:01.519 But we could do that. We can support our regional 00:41:01.519 --> 00:41:04.159 partners because at the end of the day, it's 00:41:04.159 --> 00:41:09.110 about peaceful technology being used across the 00:41:09.110 --> 00:41:13.150 globe. We sometimes need to put our bias aside 00:41:13.150 --> 00:41:16.070 and support some of our neighbours so that they 00:41:16.070 --> 00:41:19.070 can benefit from peaceful nuclear. I mean, we've 00:41:19.070 --> 00:41:21.650 done it for 17 years with a research reactor. 00:41:21.730 --> 00:41:25.429 We have some really great lessons. It'd be a 00:41:25.429 --> 00:41:27.989 shame for us not to continue being engaged in 00:41:27.989 --> 00:41:31.159 that space. Is there anything that you've been 00:41:31.159 --> 00:41:32.699 working on lately that you want to share with 00:41:32.699 --> 00:41:34.599 our listeners that maybe we haven't touched on 00:41:34.599 --> 00:41:37.960 yet? I guess the thing that excites me, and this 00:41:37.960 --> 00:41:42.500 is again my nerdy side playing out, is the role 00:41:42.500 --> 00:41:46.280 that potentially micro reactors could take around 00:41:46.280 --> 00:41:50.719 the globe for either small nation states or small 00:41:50.719 --> 00:41:53.800 mine sites. So I live in Western Australia. We 00:41:53.800 --> 00:41:56.699 have quite a large mining community. A lot of 00:41:56.699 --> 00:42:00.360 that community is still on. diesel -powered generators 00:42:00.360 --> 00:42:04.719 or gas turbines. And I think what microreactors 00:42:04.719 --> 00:42:07.820 could do into the future is fascinating. That 00:42:07.820 --> 00:42:10.219 comes with its own security challenges. So this 00:42:10.219 --> 00:42:13.460 is the stuff that I kind of think about when 00:42:13.460 --> 00:42:15.380 I'm thinking about, hey, what's something that 00:42:15.380 --> 00:42:19.500 could be cool into the future here in WA? But 00:42:19.500 --> 00:42:22.639 how do you also ensure that it's being used responsibly? 00:42:22.980 --> 00:42:25.800 Because you're not going to have a staff of reactor 00:42:25.800 --> 00:42:28.960 operators. like running a shipping container 00:42:28.960 --> 00:42:33.159 size reactor, that's just unrealistic. So that's 00:42:33.159 --> 00:42:35.840 something that I guess personally spend a bit 00:42:35.840 --> 00:42:38.780 of time thinking about and conceptualizing because 00:42:38.780 --> 00:42:40.980 I see it as something that's pretty cool and 00:42:40.980 --> 00:42:43.800 interesting, a bit different. Do you have a favorite 00:42:43.800 --> 00:42:46.639 microreactor pilot project or design project? 00:42:47.239 --> 00:42:49.920 So I've been watching Project Pele out of the 00:42:49.920 --> 00:42:53.719 US Army. for quite a while now. I find that fascinating 00:42:53.719 --> 00:42:55.800 and maybe it's because I've come from an army 00:42:55.800 --> 00:42:58.559 background because they've designed this for 00:42:58.559 --> 00:43:01.760 deployable power and energy. You go to a place 00:43:01.760 --> 00:43:04.820 that's been devastated by a natural disaster 00:43:04.820 --> 00:43:08.380 and power is often a really big challenge. Rock 00:43:08.380 --> 00:43:12.150 up with it. shipping container that has a microreactor 00:43:12.150 --> 00:43:14.449 on there, and you've been able to power a whole 00:43:14.449 --> 00:43:17.369 city. Like, that's pretty cool. So Project Pelé 00:43:17.369 --> 00:43:20.050 is one that I've been watching, and that's predominantly 00:43:20.050 --> 00:43:23.989 looking at the Westinghouse -Evinci microreactor, 00:43:24.230 --> 00:43:26.150 which is pretty cool. The Koreans have a really 00:43:26.150 --> 00:43:29.690 cool one as well. Smart 100, I think, is what 00:43:29.690 --> 00:43:32.809 they've named that. And there's a few I'm keeping 00:43:32.809 --> 00:43:35.070 an eye on. I like microreactors. I think they're 00:43:35.070 --> 00:43:38.190 really great. Well, we can put a link or two 00:43:38.190 --> 00:43:41.010 in the show notes for people to check those out. 00:43:41.590 --> 00:43:43.929 Is there anything else you wanted to say anything 00:43:43.929 --> 00:43:45.630 about? You can tell people a little bit about 00:43:45.630 --> 00:43:47.789 Women in Nuclear, for instance. We mentioned 00:43:47.789 --> 00:43:52.809 that. Yeah. So Women in Nuclear is a global organization 00:43:52.809 --> 00:43:56.829 of professionals that believe in diversity and 00:43:56.829 --> 00:44:00.849 inclusion in the workforce. But it is an amazing 00:44:00.849 --> 00:44:03.809 network of professionals across all facets of 00:44:03.809 --> 00:44:07.340 nuclear and radiological technology. So as a 00:44:07.340 --> 00:44:10.059 bit of a nuclear tourist, if I want to travel 00:44:10.059 --> 00:44:12.239 somewhere, I'll reach out to one of my women 00:44:12.239 --> 00:44:15.159 in nuclear global friends and say, Hey, I'm coming 00:44:15.159 --> 00:44:18.159 here. Can we check this out? And it's an amazing 00:44:18.159 --> 00:44:21.500 network here in Australia. We have our own chapter 00:44:21.500 --> 00:44:24.760 women in nuclear Australia. We are across the 00:44:24.760 --> 00:44:27.300 whole of Australia. I think less Tassie. I don't 00:44:27.300 --> 00:44:29.519 think we have a member in Tassie yet and we need 00:44:29.519 --> 00:44:33.539 to get one. Look at that. Yeah. You Tass must 00:44:33.539 --> 00:44:36.650 have some sort of nuclear program there. But 00:44:36.650 --> 00:44:39.789 we are a network of professionals of any gender 00:44:39.789 --> 00:44:43.030 that work in the nuclear industry. And what we 00:44:43.030 --> 00:44:46.510 try to do is encourage young people for nuclear 00:44:46.510 --> 00:44:49.510 careers through networking and role modeling. 00:44:49.889 --> 00:44:52.909 And then for the rest of us that are just working 00:44:52.909 --> 00:44:57.150 in the industry is be able to have this amazing 00:44:57.150 --> 00:44:59.750 network of professionals to bounce ideas off 00:44:59.750 --> 00:45:04.150 to support one another. I think one of our most 00:45:04.150 --> 00:45:06.409 popular things we do is we have a newsletter 00:45:06.409 --> 00:45:08.869 every month and it has links to lots of different 00:45:08.869 --> 00:45:12.929 jobs and opportunities and we get access to various 00:45:12.929 --> 00:45:16.389 scholarships for short courses or activities. 00:45:16.769 --> 00:45:19.170 And so that's something we can provide our members. 00:45:19.289 --> 00:45:22.750 And it's free to join. You just jump on the website 00:45:22.750 --> 00:45:28.219 and join. And I love it. It's my village. That's 00:45:28.219 --> 00:45:31.340 how I met you, Liz. We have lots of chats through 00:45:31.340 --> 00:45:33.840 Women in Nuclear and some of my closest friends 00:45:33.840 --> 00:45:37.300 are Women in Nuclear colleagues, because we can 00:45:37.300 --> 00:45:41.619 have great chats about everything from nuclear 00:45:41.619 --> 00:45:44.780 stuff through to having to deal with some really 00:45:44.780 --> 00:45:47.920 difficult individual in the workplace. Everyone 00:45:47.920 --> 00:45:50.320 needs a community that they can bring those things 00:45:50.320 --> 00:45:56.480 to. Yeah, yeah, definitely. Well, I will put 00:45:56.480 --> 00:45:59.420 a link to Women in Nuclear Australia also in 00:45:59.420 --> 00:46:01.320 the notes that go with this show so that you 00:46:01.320 --> 00:46:04.320 can go have a look. And if you are interested, 00:46:04.559 --> 00:46:07.400 you are also welcome to join. So thank you so 00:46:07.400 --> 00:46:09.500 much, Jazz. I really appreciated this conversation. 00:46:09.539 --> 00:46:12.579 I learned so much from you. And I'm really glad 00:46:12.579 --> 00:46:14.920 because I feel like I know a lot more about what 00:46:14.920 --> 00:46:18.840 you do now. And so I'll get to nerd out with 00:46:18.840 --> 00:46:21.500 you a bit more in future conversations. Awesome. 00:46:21.800 --> 00:46:33.300 This has been really fun. Nuclear Matters is 00:46:33.300 --> 00:46:35.360 a production of the Australian National University 00:46:35.360 --> 00:46:38.239 College of Systems and Society. We acknowledge 00:46:38.239 --> 00:46:39.980 the traditional owners of the lands on which 00:46:39.980 --> 00:46:42.059 this podcast is being recorded on or listened 00:46:42.059 --> 00:46:44.739 to and pay our respects to their elders and all 00:46:44.739 --> 00:46:47.719 First Nations people. If you liked what you heard 00:46:47.719 --> 00:46:50.079 today, please share this episode with friends, 00:46:50.159 --> 00:46:52.809 family and colleagues. If you want to send us 00:46:52.809 --> 00:46:55.309 some feedback on an episode, please email us 00:46:55.309 --> 00:47:00.150 at nuclearmatterspodcast .anu .edu .au. Keep 00:47:00.150 --> 00:47:02.590 in mind that this podcast is intended for information 00:47:02.590 --> 00:47:05.610 and education only. The views and opinions expressed 00:47:05.610 --> 00:47:07.989 in each episode are those of the individual speakers 00:47:07.989 --> 00:47:10.650 and do not represent the official policy or position 00:47:10.650 --> 00:47:12.570 of the Australian National University College 00:47:12.570 --> 00:47:15.329 of Systems and Society or the university as a 00:47:15.329 --> 00:47:15.489 whole.