WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:03.480 Welcome to Meteorology Matters. When we think 00:00:03.480 --> 00:00:06.620 of a hurricane, our minds often rush to the immediate 00:00:06.620 --> 00:00:09.259 devastation, the terrifying force of the wind, 00:00:09.679 --> 00:00:12.880 the relentless surge of water, the chaos that 00:00:12.880 --> 00:00:14.800 overtakes everything in its path. Absolutely. 00:00:14.880 --> 00:00:17.739 That initial impact is just devastating. But 00:00:17.739 --> 00:00:21.579 what truly happens after the storm clears? What 00:00:21.579 --> 00:00:24.879 kind of aftermath unfolds once the initial blast 00:00:24.879 --> 00:00:27.219 has passed? That's the critical question, isn't 00:00:27.219 --> 00:00:29.640 it? In the case of New Orleans following Hurricane 00:00:29.640 --> 00:00:32.820 Katrina, this period became, as one former mayor 00:00:32.820 --> 00:00:36.439 described it, a profound laboratory for innovation 00:00:36.439 --> 00:00:38.960 and change. Hmm. Laboratory. That's a loaded 00:00:38.960 --> 00:00:41.859 term. It is. And it immediately begs a critical 00:00:41.859 --> 00:00:44.439 question. For whom was this innovation truly 00:00:44.439 --> 00:00:47.479 happening? And what kind of change actually materialized 00:00:47.479 --> 00:00:49.359 on the ground, especially for the city's most 00:00:49.359 --> 00:00:51.899 vulnerable residents? Precisely. Because natural 00:00:51.899 --> 00:00:54.000 disasters like powerful hurricanes, they don't 00:00:54.000 --> 00:00:56.380 just strike a blank slate, they hit existing 00:00:56.380 --> 00:00:58.820 social structures. Right. And in doing so, they 00:00:58.820 --> 00:01:01.759 often reveal and frankly, brutally amplify the 00:01:01.759 --> 00:01:04.260 pre -existing inequalities already embedded within 00:01:04.260 --> 00:01:06.540 those structures. So it rips the cover off things 00:01:06.540 --> 00:01:08.819 that were already there. Exactly. Which compels 00:01:08.819 --> 00:01:12.200 us to ask. What does recovery genuinely mean 00:01:12.200 --> 00:01:14.980 when its experience is so dramatically uneven 00:01:14.980 --> 00:01:17.879 across a city's population? That's our focus 00:01:17.879 --> 00:01:20.680 for this Meteorology Matters exploration. We 00:01:20.680 --> 00:01:22.659 want to look beyond the immediate headlines, 00:01:23.200 --> 00:01:25.859 uncover the underlying processes that led to 00:01:25.859 --> 00:01:28.909 this, well, deeply unequal recovery. And we need 00:01:28.909 --> 00:01:31.629 to focus particularly on the specific challenges 00:01:31.629 --> 00:01:34.170 encountered by different communities. A critical 00:01:34.170 --> 00:01:36.890 eye needs to be on the experiences of low income 00:01:36.890 --> 00:01:39.189 African -American women and their families. Because 00:01:39.189 --> 00:01:41.489 their story is so central to understanding this. 00:01:41.629 --> 00:01:44.150 It really is. We'll explore how policies and 00:01:44.150 --> 00:01:46.730 practices, even those often presented as well 00:01:46.730 --> 00:01:49.510 intentioned, maybe even neutral, can inadvertently 00:01:49.510 --> 00:01:52.390 or sometimes quite deliberately deepen existing 00:01:52.390 --> 00:01:55.290 societal divides. And fundamentally reshape a 00:01:55.290 --> 00:01:57.629 city along its most entrenched fault lines of 00:01:57.629 --> 00:02:00.269 race. and gender. Yeah, those fault lines become 00:02:00.269 --> 00:02:03.230 starkly visible. That's a powerful framing. So 00:02:03.230 --> 00:02:06.209 let's really zoom in on this idea of New Orleans 00:02:06.209 --> 00:02:09.050 as a laboratory and understand what kind of experiment 00:02:09.050 --> 00:02:11.930 was actually conducted. Mayor Mitch Landry, as 00:02:11.930 --> 00:02:14.810 you mentioned, once lauded the city as the nation's 00:02:14.810 --> 00:02:17.389 most immediate lab for innovation and change. 00:02:17.629 --> 00:02:20.310 It's quite a boast, isn't it? It is. But this 00:02:20.310 --> 00:02:22.969 grand experiment, as it was sometimes termed, 00:02:23.009 --> 00:02:26.009 came with a very real and unevenly distributed 00:02:26.009 --> 00:02:29.780 cost. Academic and journalistic analyses of the 00:02:29.780 --> 00:02:33.379 period really highlight how a major crisis can 00:02:33.379 --> 00:02:35.740 become a powerful liver for what some critics 00:02:35.740 --> 00:02:38.199 have termed disaster capitalism. Right. This 00:02:38.199 --> 00:02:40.900 idea that a crisis becomes an opportunity. Exactly. 00:02:41.080 --> 00:02:43.879 An opportunity for certain interests. Some observers 00:02:43.879 --> 00:02:46.000 noted that the decade after Katrina presented 00:02:46.000 --> 00:02:49.580 a model case study of this, a period where significant 00:02:49.580 --> 00:02:51.759 parts of the state's responsibilities and assets 00:02:51.759 --> 00:02:54.400 were essentially sold off or transferred to private 00:02:54.400 --> 00:02:56.849 players. While citizens were still reeling. while 00:02:56.849 --> 00:02:59.469 they were still reeling from the immediate disaster. 00:02:59.990 --> 00:03:02.710 And what's more, these reforms were then quickly 00:03:02.710 --> 00:03:06.150 made permanent, cementing a new landscape. It's 00:03:06.150 --> 00:03:08.430 a stark thought that a catastrophe could be viewed 00:03:08.430 --> 00:03:10.889 and leveraged in that way. It's a key takeaway 00:03:10.889 --> 00:03:14.349 here how the concept of disaster capitalism provides 00:03:14.349 --> 00:03:17.610 a crucial lens. It helps us understand the rapid 00:03:17.610 --> 00:03:20.289 acceleration of what we often call neoliberal 00:03:20.289 --> 00:03:23.469 policies. Can you unpack that term neoliberal? 00:03:23.659 --> 00:03:26.500 in this context? Sure. So neoliberalism here 00:03:26.500 --> 00:03:29.400 refers to a set of market -oriented solutions 00:03:29.400 --> 00:03:32.060 that tend to prioritize private interests over 00:03:32.060 --> 00:03:35.039 public services. It often advocates for reduced 00:03:35.039 --> 00:03:37.819 state intervention, favoring private sector involvement 00:03:37.819 --> 00:03:41.240 instead. And when a city is devastated, a common 00:03:41.240 --> 00:03:44.069 argument emerges. that traditional governmental 00:03:44.069 --> 00:03:45.750 approaches have failed. Which sort of clears 00:03:45.750 --> 00:03:48.250 the path. It clears the way for these new market 00:03:48.250 --> 00:03:50.949 -driven solutions. In New Orleans, this meant 00:03:50.949 --> 00:03:53.349 an accelerated intensification of development 00:03:53.349 --> 00:03:55.969 and policy changes that, frankly, policymakers 00:03:55.969 --> 00:03:58.110 and business elites in other places could only 00:03:58.110 --> 00:04:00.409 dream of implementing so swiftly. Like, what 00:04:00.409 --> 00:04:02.460 kind of changes are we talking about? Well, we 00:04:02.460 --> 00:04:05.139 saw dramatic examples within just three months 00:04:05.139 --> 00:04:08.180 of Katrina. The Louisiana legislature controversially 00:04:08.180 --> 00:04:10.780 fired seventy five hundred teachers. Seventy 00:04:10.780 --> 00:04:13.340 five hundred. Wow. Yeah. And took over one hundred 00:04:13.340 --> 00:04:15.360 and seven New Orleans schools. Most of those 00:04:15.360 --> 00:04:18.000 were then closed or privatized, transformed into 00:04:18.000 --> 00:04:20.379 charter schools. That's a massive shift in public 00:04:20.379 --> 00:04:23.379 education done incredibly quickly. Unbelievably 00:04:23.379 --> 00:04:26.800 fast. Similarly, the city's major public housing 00:04:26.800 --> 00:04:29.199 projects, which were absolutely vital for many 00:04:29.199 --> 00:04:31.339 low income families, predominantly African -American. 00:04:31.209 --> 00:04:34.269 and families, they were systematically leveled. 00:04:34.269 --> 00:04:36.389 Torn down. Torn down and handed over to private 00:04:36.389 --> 00:04:38.769 developers. The plan was to replace them with 00:04:38.769 --> 00:04:41.910 mixed income communities. Which sounds OK on 00:04:41.910 --> 00:04:44.470 the surface, maybe? Mixed income. Well, the reality 00:04:44.470 --> 00:04:47.009 was they ultimately housed significantly fewer 00:04:47.009 --> 00:04:50.430 families. We're talking a staggering 64 % reduction 00:04:50.430 --> 00:04:53.459 in available deeply affordable units compared 00:04:53.459 --> 00:04:55.839 to what was there before. 64 % reduction. That's 00:04:55.839 --> 00:04:58.959 huge. It's huge. So these swift, profound changes, 00:04:59.220 --> 00:05:01.139 often cloaked in the language of efficiency, 00:05:01.560 --> 00:05:04.920 innovation, progress, they reveal how a crisis 00:05:04.920 --> 00:05:07.800 can become this powerful lever for a neoliberal 00:05:07.800 --> 00:05:10.800 agenda. Prioritizing private interests, profit. 00:05:11.160 --> 00:05:14.240 Over genuine public benefit often at the direct 00:05:14.240 --> 00:05:16.779 expense of the city's most vulnerable citizens 00:05:16.779 --> 00:05:19.279 Especially those women heading households we 00:05:19.279 --> 00:05:20.980 mentioned earlier. It sounds like this played 00:05:20.980 --> 00:05:25.019 out as a stark tale of two cities then Can you 00:05:25.019 --> 00:05:28.040 unpack how this rapid reinvention created such 00:05:28.040 --> 00:05:30.379 vastly different realities for residents? It 00:05:30.379 --> 00:05:33.079 absolutely did On one hand, you had this narrative 00:05:33.079 --> 00:05:35.699 of rapid rebuilding. You know, 80 % of homes 00:05:35.699 --> 00:05:39.620 destroyed, yet a staggering $71 billion in federal 00:05:39.620 --> 00:05:42.360 support poured in. That signals a monumental 00:05:42.360 --> 00:05:44.180 effort, right? Yeah, huge sums of money. But 00:05:44.180 --> 00:05:46.560 the human story behind that reinvention... It 00:05:46.560 --> 00:05:48.579 painted a dramatically different picture for 00:05:48.579 --> 00:05:52.079 distinct communities. We witnessed profound demographic 00:05:52.079 --> 00:05:54.060 shifts. Like the numbers you mentioned earlier. 00:05:54.379 --> 00:05:57.500 Exactly. A tragic figure. Ninety thousand African 00:05:57.500 --> 00:06:00.279 -American residents who, years later, still had 00:06:00.279 --> 00:06:01.939 not returned to their homes. Ninety thousand 00:06:01.939 --> 00:06:05.699 people. Just gone from the city fabric. And alongside 00:06:05.699 --> 00:06:08.860 that, an influx of approximately 30 ,000 new 00:06:08.860 --> 00:06:10.879 residents, most of whom were white. This wasn't 00:06:10.879 --> 00:06:12.980 just a statistical shift. It was a fundamental 00:06:12.980 --> 00:06:15.620 reshaping of the city's cultural and social fabric. 00:06:16.199 --> 00:06:18.800 And the language used reflected this divide, 00:06:18.939 --> 00:06:21.319 didn't it? Completely. The very language used 00:06:21.319 --> 00:06:24.870 exposed these deep... fault lines. What was uniformly 00:06:24.870 --> 00:06:28.170 described as an existential crisis for many longtime 00:06:28.170 --> 00:06:31.149 residents, especially those displaced, became 00:06:31.149 --> 00:06:33.689 an opportunity, became framed as an opportunity 00:06:33.689 --> 00:06:36.990 for a select few with capital and political connections. 00:06:37.389 --> 00:06:39.290 And what was officially labeled neighborhood 00:06:39.290 --> 00:06:41.850 revitalization from above was experienced as 00:06:41.850 --> 00:06:45.439 something else entirely on the ground. undeniable 00:06:45.439 --> 00:06:47.560 gentrification by those who were being pushed 00:06:47.560 --> 00:06:50.740 out, their communities transformed beyond recognition, 00:06:51.319 --> 00:06:53.480 often losing the very character that made them 00:06:53.480 --> 00:06:56.120 home. Delving deeper into that one notable aspect 00:06:56.120 --> 00:06:59.620 is how this tale of two cities narrative, while 00:06:59.620 --> 00:07:02.079 often presented as somehow unique to New Orleans. 00:07:02.259 --> 00:07:04.339 Right, like it was some kind of isolated case. 00:07:04.500 --> 00:07:06.360 Yeah, it actually masks a much more universal 00:07:06.360 --> 00:07:08.600 pattern of urban redevelopment, doesn't it? It 00:07:08.600 --> 00:07:10.720 really does. The notion that New Orleans was 00:07:10.720 --> 00:07:13.920 an isolated site of exception, a one -off, incomparable 00:07:13.920 --> 00:07:16.980 case, it serves to obscure a critical truth. 00:07:17.420 --> 00:07:19.920 Its post -Katrina development actually provided 00:07:19.920 --> 00:07:23.519 a powerful prototype, a blueprint almost, for 00:07:23.519 --> 00:07:25.860 urban policies that are either already underway 00:07:25.860 --> 00:07:28.680 or being considered in other cities facing similar 00:07:28.680 --> 00:07:32.399 challenges. Think New York, Cleveland, Detroit. 00:07:32.699 --> 00:07:34.759 So what happened there wasn't just about New 00:07:34.759 --> 00:07:37.730 Orleans? Not at all. The provisional extensions 00:07:37.730 --> 00:07:39.930 of power that were initially justified during 00:07:39.930 --> 00:07:42.310 what was deemed a state of exception right after 00:07:42.310 --> 00:07:44.990 the storm, they quickly became normalized within 00:07:44.990 --> 00:07:47.170 routine governance. Standard operating procedure, 00:07:47.189 --> 00:07:49.990 basically. Essentially, yes. The redevelopment 00:07:49.990 --> 00:07:52.569 strategies employed in this site of exception 00:07:52.569 --> 00:07:55.230 served as a blueprint for how to leverage a crisis 00:07:55.230 --> 00:07:57.290 for that neoliberal agenda we talked about. Where 00:07:57.290 --> 00:07:59.709 private interests and profit maximization get 00:07:59.709 --> 00:08:02.410 prioritized. Over genuine public benefit and 00:08:02.410 --> 00:08:05.209 the needs of existing communities. So this isn't 00:08:05.209 --> 00:08:08.129 merely about New Orleans, it's a profound lesson 00:08:08.129 --> 00:08:11.149 in how cities across the globe can and do respond 00:08:11.149 --> 00:08:13.750 to crises. And the often unequal choices they 00:08:13.750 --> 00:08:16.009 make about who ultimately benefits from the so 00:08:16.009 --> 00:08:18.050 -called recovery. Exactly, who gets included 00:08:18.050 --> 00:08:21.509 and who gets left behind. So if New Orleans became 00:08:21.509 --> 00:08:25.389 this reluctant laboratory for urban change, it's 00:08:25.389 --> 00:08:27.629 crucial to understand the foundation upon which 00:08:27.629 --> 00:08:30.430 this experiment was built. What kind of city 00:08:30.430 --> 00:08:34.000 was it before Katrina hit? Was it a blank slate 00:08:34.000 --> 00:08:36.120 or were there pre -existing conditions that made 00:08:36.120 --> 00:08:38.500 it especially vulnerable? Oh, absolutely not 00:08:38.500 --> 00:08:40.820 a blank slate. Far from it. What did the housing 00:08:40.820 --> 00:08:43.980 landscape look like in New Orleans before the 00:08:43.980 --> 00:08:47.029 hurricane? It's vital to recognize that New Orleans 00:08:47.029 --> 00:08:50.110 was already grappling with deep -seated inequalities, 00:08:50.649 --> 00:08:52.990 particularly concerning housing affordability, 00:08:53.169 --> 00:08:55.950 long before Katrina made landfall. The hurricane 00:08:55.950 --> 00:08:58.769 didn't create these problems. It simply, as you 00:08:58.769 --> 00:09:01.529 said earlier, blew the roof off them quite literally 00:09:01.529 --> 00:09:04.129 and magnified their devastating impact. So what 00:09:04.129 --> 00:09:06.049 did that look like on the ground pre -Katrina? 00:09:06.250 --> 00:09:08.549 Even back in 2000, five years before the hurricane, 00:09:08.970 --> 00:09:11.549 census data revealed that two -thirds, two out 00:09:11.549 --> 00:09:13.529 of three of extremely low -income households 00:09:13.529 --> 00:09:16.659 in New New Orleans were already considered cost 00:09:16.659 --> 00:09:18.639 burdened. Cost burdened meaning? Meaning they 00:09:18.639 --> 00:09:21.440 were spending over 30 % of their income and often 00:09:21.440 --> 00:09:23.740 much, much more just to keep a roof over their 00:09:23.740 --> 00:09:26.580 heads. Leaving precious little for food, health 00:09:26.580 --> 00:09:29.279 care, anything else. Precisely. And furthermore, 00:09:29.580 --> 00:09:31.600 home ownership rates in New Orleans were significantly 00:09:31.600 --> 00:09:33.779 lower than both state and national averages. 00:09:34.200 --> 00:09:36.220 Less than half of households owned their homes. 00:09:36.539 --> 00:09:39.389 Less than half. So a majority were renters. Yes, 00:09:39.710 --> 00:09:41.850 a very large portion of the city's population 00:09:41.850 --> 00:09:44.590 was already in a precarious housing situation, 00:09:45.110 --> 00:09:47.269 renting, often struggling to make ends meet. 00:09:47.710 --> 00:09:50.389 This made them extremely vulnerable when any 00:09:50.389 --> 00:09:52.789 significant disruption occurred, let alone something 00:09:52.789 --> 00:09:55.230 on the scale of Katrina. That paints a stark 00:09:55.230 --> 00:09:59.460 picture of pre -existing vulnerability. With 00:09:59.460 --> 00:10:01.919 a city already struggling with housing, how did 00:10:01.919 --> 00:10:04.440 Katrina itself impact these fragile communities? 00:10:04.980 --> 00:10:07.700 Did the storm affect everyone equally? Or did 00:10:07.700 --> 00:10:10.919 it, as you suggested, exploit and amplify those 00:10:10.919 --> 00:10:13.139 pre -existing economic and racial disparities? 00:10:13.279 --> 00:10:15.440 Oh, the impact was anything but indiscriminate. 00:10:15.480 --> 00:10:18.179 When Katrina struck, it didn't just cause widespread 00:10:18.179 --> 00:10:20.259 destruction. It hit the poorest neighborhoods 00:10:20.259 --> 00:10:24.320 hardest. Why was that location? Often, yes. It 00:10:24.320 --> 00:10:26.879 specifically wiped out most high -poverty census 00:10:26.879 --> 00:10:29.539 tracts. These were frequently historically African 00:10:29.539 --> 00:10:32.019 -American communities located in lower lying 00:10:32.019 --> 00:10:35.059 areas, making them geographically more susceptible 00:10:35.059 --> 00:10:37.460 to flooding. So the geography itself was tied 00:10:37.460 --> 00:10:39.759 to historical segregation patterns. Absolutely. 00:10:40.000 --> 00:10:43.440 The sheer scale of destruction was immense. An 00:10:43.440 --> 00:10:47.179 estimated 80 % of the city was flooded. A staggering 00:10:47.179 --> 00:10:50.580 134 ,000 occupied housing units were damaged. 00:10:50.919 --> 00:10:54.159 134 ,000. That's roughly 70 % of all occupied 00:10:54.159 --> 00:10:57.039 residential units in the city. 70%. It's almost 00:10:57.039 --> 00:11:00.360 unimaginable. This disproportionate impact unequivocally 00:11:00.360 --> 00:11:02.899 highlights how environmental disasters are never 00:11:02.899 --> 00:11:05.019 solely natural phenomena. They become social 00:11:05.019 --> 00:11:08.080 disasters. Profoundly social disasters that exploit 00:11:08.080 --> 00:11:10.600 and exacerbate pre -existing economic and racial 00:11:10.600 --> 00:11:13.320 disparities. That foundational instability in 00:11:13.320 --> 00:11:15.580 housing affordability meant that when the storm 00:11:15.580 --> 00:11:18.120 surge came, the communities already living on 00:11:18.120 --> 00:11:20.700 the margins were the ones most utterly devastated. 00:11:20.919 --> 00:11:22.820 Facing not just physical destruction, but the 00:11:22.820 --> 00:11:25.059 complete unraveling of their social and economic 00:11:25.059 --> 00:11:28.259 fabric. Losing homes, jobs, schools, community 00:11:28.259 --> 00:11:30.679 networks, everything. And here's where the story 00:11:30.679 --> 00:11:33.720 becomes even more critical and frankly heartbreaking. 00:11:35.080 --> 00:11:38.120 At the very core of this pre -existing crisis 00:11:38.120 --> 00:11:41.279 and its severe exacerbation post -Katrina was 00:11:41.279 --> 00:11:45.259 a profound gendered and racialized impact. Yes. 00:11:45.360 --> 00:11:47.919 This is absolutely central. The data reveals 00:11:47.919 --> 00:11:50.779 a stark and undeniable reality. Public housing 00:11:50.779 --> 00:11:52.799 tenants who faced the most severe displacement 00:11:52.799 --> 00:11:55.399 and uncertainty were predominantly low -income 00:11:55.399 --> 00:11:58.019 African -American women and their families. Can 00:11:58.019 --> 00:12:00.700 you elaborate on the specific numbers? The statistics 00:12:00.700 --> 00:12:03.159 are indeed compelling and paint a clear picture 00:12:03.159 --> 00:12:06.149 of who bore the heaviest burden. As of 2008, 00:12:06.409 --> 00:12:09.750 a few years after the storm, a striking 77 % 00:12:09.750 --> 00:12:12.049 of households in public housing. Over three -quarters. 00:12:12.429 --> 00:12:15.889 Yes. And an even higher 88 % of voucher -subsidized 00:12:15.889 --> 00:12:17.710 housing units in the New Orleans metropolitan 00:12:17.710 --> 00:12:20.750 area were headed by women. 88 % with vouchers. 00:12:20.850 --> 00:12:23.409 Wow! This means that low -income African -American 00:12:23.409 --> 00:12:25.509 women were overwhelmingly at the epicenter of 00:12:25.509 --> 00:12:27.850 this housing crisis, both before and especially 00:12:27.850 --> 00:12:30.549 after Katrina. And as heads of households, the 00:12:30.549 --> 00:12:33.490 burden on them must have been immense. Immense. 00:12:33.990 --> 00:12:36.570 These women bore the multifaceted brunt of the 00:12:36.570 --> 00:12:39.529 disaster. They were often solely responsible 00:12:39.529 --> 00:12:42.570 for finding new, stable housing for their families 00:12:42.570 --> 00:12:45.509 in a completely decimated market. Impossible 00:12:45.509 --> 00:12:47.490 conditions. Trying to place their children in 00:12:47.490 --> 00:12:50.370 new schools, often in unfamiliar cities or states, 00:12:50.929 --> 00:12:53.149 navigating the complex and utterly disrupted 00:12:53.149 --> 00:12:56.629 landscape of social services, employment, daily 00:12:56.629 --> 00:13:00.289 life. all amidst rapidly rising costs and extremely 00:13:00.289 --> 00:13:02.789 limited options. Exactly. Their struggle wasn't 00:13:02.789 --> 00:13:05.049 just for shelter, it was for the very stability 00:13:05.049 --> 00:13:07.690 and future of their families. Their experiences 00:13:07.690 --> 00:13:11.370 are absolutely central to understanding the true... 00:13:11.120 --> 00:13:14.139 human cost of recovery. And how pre -existing 00:13:14.139 --> 00:13:16.899 racial and gender divides were not only revealed 00:13:16.899 --> 00:13:19.919 but tragically deepened after the storm. Deepened 00:13:19.919 --> 00:13:22.820 and in many ways institutionalized by the recovery 00:13:22.820 --> 00:13:25.100 process itself. It's truly difficult to grasp 00:13:25.100 --> 00:13:27.679 the scale of this. The very places meant to house 00:13:27.679 --> 00:13:30.279 the city's most vulnerable were torn down. And 00:13:30.279 --> 00:13:32.279 what replaced them housed significantly fewer 00:13:32.279 --> 00:13:34.700 people and often not the original residents. 00:13:34.759 --> 00:13:37.200 That's the crux of it. Let's talk about New Orleans's 00:13:37.200 --> 00:13:39.980 traditional public housing, known locally as 00:13:40.200 --> 00:13:43.799 The Big Four multi -storied complexes like B 00:13:43.799 --> 00:13:47.240 .W. Cooper, St. Bernard, C .J. Peat, and Lafitte. 00:13:47.940 --> 00:13:50.159 These weren't flimsy structures, were they? Not 00:13:50.159 --> 00:13:53.080 at all. They were solidly built brick structures. 00:13:53.379 --> 00:13:55.299 And even after the storm and flood, they were 00:13:55.299 --> 00:13:57.179 pronounced structurally sound. That's correct. 00:13:57.639 --> 00:14:00.059 Engineering reports deemed them sound. Yet the 00:14:00.059 --> 00:14:03.039 Housing Authority of New Orleans, ANO, pursued 00:14:03.039 --> 00:14:06.320 aggressive demolition plans, even taking legal 00:14:06.320 --> 00:14:09.379 action to enable it. Can you detail the scale 00:14:09.379 --> 00:14:12.500 of this demolition? The scale was immense. Approximately 00:14:12.500 --> 00:14:15.580 4 ,500 public housing units, despite being deemed 00:14:15.580 --> 00:14:17.940 structurally sound, were slated for demolition. 00:14:18.360 --> 00:14:21.879 4 ,500 units. Gone. And the plans propose to 00:14:21.879 --> 00:14:23.879 replace them with only 1 ,600 units of mixed 00:14:23.879 --> 00:14:26.659 -intem housing. From 4 ,500 down to 1 ,600. That's 00:14:26.659 --> 00:14:29.000 a massive reduction already. And crucially, of 00:14:29.000 --> 00:14:31.799 these new 1 ,600 units, only about one -third 00:14:31.799 --> 00:14:34.139 would be deeply subsidized, meaning genuinely 00:14:34.139 --> 00:14:36.179 affordable to the lowest -income residents, the 00:14:36.179 --> 00:14:39.419 original tenants. So only around 500 truly affordable 00:14:39.419 --> 00:14:43.519 units replacing 4 ,500. That's the math. By 2013, 00:14:43.960 --> 00:14:47.659 the redevelopment had ultimately replaced 6 ,171 00:14:47.659 --> 00:14:50.559 pre -storm public housing units citywide, including 00:14:50.559 --> 00:14:54.379 others beyond the Big Four, with a mere 2 ,114 00:14:54.379 --> 00:14:57.139 new units. OK, so a lightly broader picture there. 00:14:57.399 --> 00:15:02.360 6 ,171 down to 2 ,114. Still a huge loss. A huge 00:15:02.360 --> 00:15:06.460 loss. And of these new 2 ,114 units, only half 00:15:06.460 --> 00:15:08.980 were subsidized or public housing. The other 00:15:08.980 --> 00:15:11.980 half were market rate. Meaning completely unaffordable 00:15:11.980 --> 00:15:14.019 for the original residents. For the vast majority, 00:15:14.240 --> 00:15:17.399 yes. This represents a drastic reduction in deeply 00:15:17.399 --> 00:15:20.360 affordable housing stock, a loss of over 65 % 00:15:20.360 --> 00:15:23.379 of those original units. It fundamentally transformed 00:15:23.379 --> 00:15:25.519 the housing support landscape for thousands of 00:15:25.519 --> 00:15:28.220 families. Particularly those headed by low -income 00:15:28.220 --> 00:15:30.299 African -American women who had relied on these 00:15:30.299 --> 00:15:32.200 homes. They were disproportionately impacted 00:15:32.200 --> 00:15:34.399 by this demolition and the failure to replace 00:15:34.399 --> 00:15:37.100 those units adequately. That's a staggering reduction. 00:15:37.320 --> 00:15:39.679 And this large -scale demolition was funded through 00:15:39.600 --> 00:15:42.059 specific federal initiative wasn't it? Yes that's 00:15:42.059 --> 00:15:43.570 right. Could you tell us more about the Hope 00:15:43.570 --> 00:15:46.309 Six program and how Katrina impacted its implementation 00:15:46.309 --> 00:15:48.830 in New Orleans? Absolutely. This large scale 00:15:48.830 --> 00:15:51.490 demolition was primarily funded through the Federal 00:15:51.490 --> 00:15:54.009 Home Ownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere 00:15:54.009 --> 00:15:57.850 program, known as Hope Six. Hope Six. OK. This 00:15:57.850 --> 00:16:00.850 program, initiated back in the early 1990s, was 00:16:00.850 --> 00:16:03.870 originally designed to revitalize severely distressed 00:16:03.870 --> 00:16:07.090 public housing. The idea was to demolish existing 00:16:07.090 --> 00:16:09.830 high rise structures and replace them with smaller 00:16:09.830 --> 00:16:13.639 mixed income communities. but often with significantly 00:16:13.639 --> 00:16:16.139 fewer deeply affordable units, as we just heard. 00:16:16.440 --> 00:16:19.559 That was often the outcome. Yes. And what's particularly 00:16:19.559 --> 00:16:21.600 striking in New Orleans is that before Katrina, 00:16:21.759 --> 00:16:24.539 only one Hope Six project was even planned for 00:16:24.539 --> 00:16:26.740 the city. Just one. Just one. And there were 00:16:26.740 --> 00:16:28.620 reports the Bush administration was actually 00:16:28.620 --> 00:16:31.360 considering canceling the program entirely nationwide 00:16:31.360 --> 00:16:33.519 due to mixed results and growing concerns about 00:16:33.519 --> 00:16:35.919 displacement. So it wasn't exactly a universally 00:16:35.919 --> 00:16:39.659 loved program at the time. No. But the hurricane 00:16:39.659 --> 00:16:43.059 created an opportunity, quote unquote, to accelerate 00:16:43.059 --> 00:16:45.559 its implementation in New Orleans with what observers 00:16:45.559 --> 00:16:48.659 described as zeal. Using the crisis to push through 00:16:48.659 --> 00:16:50.600 a program that might have otherwise faded away. 00:16:51.220 --> 00:16:54.419 Precisely. And the underlying ideological shift 00:16:54.419 --> 00:16:57.039 here, often called the deconcentration thesis, 00:16:57.740 --> 00:17:00.379 argued that mixing income levels would somehow 00:17:00.379 --> 00:17:03.440 benefit the poor. How so? What was the argument? 00:17:03.600 --> 00:17:06.420 The argument was it would expose them to middle 00:17:06.420 --> 00:17:08.339 class role models and opportunities, thereby 00:17:08.339 --> 00:17:11.519 breaking cycles of poverty, sort of social engineering 00:17:11.519 --> 00:17:14.779 through architecture. And the outcome? Well, 00:17:14.779 --> 00:17:16.819 as we just discussed, the practical outcome was 00:17:16.819 --> 00:17:19.700 a massive reduction in deeply subsidized units. 00:17:20.339 --> 00:17:22.920 It effectively pushed out the poorest residents 00:17:22.920 --> 00:17:25.640 who, as we've established, were overwhelmingly 00:17:25.640 --> 00:17:28.240 low income African -American women and their 00:17:28.240 --> 00:17:30.660 children. So the colorblind rhetoric of social 00:17:30.660 --> 00:17:33.859 integration. in practice had a profoundly racialized 00:17:33.859 --> 00:17:37.160 and gendered impact. It arguably exacerbated 00:17:37.160 --> 00:17:39.420 the very inequalities it claimed to address by 00:17:39.420 --> 00:17:42.539 dismantling vital community infrastructure without 00:17:42.539 --> 00:17:44.640 adequately replacing it for those who needed 00:17:44.640 --> 00:17:47.099 it most. And the effects of this demolition and 00:17:47.099 --> 00:17:48.920 displacement didn't stop at the public housing 00:17:48.920 --> 00:17:51.299 complexes themselves, did they? They rippled 00:17:51.299 --> 00:17:53.180 across the entire city's housing market. Oh, 00:17:53.339 --> 00:17:55.480 absolutely created immense pressure. How did 00:17:55.480 --> 00:17:57.980 this impact rents? And what were the consequences 00:17:57.980 --> 00:18:00.569 for the city's low -wage renters? the majority 00:18:00.569 --> 00:18:02.549 of the population. The consequences were immediate 00:18:02.549 --> 00:18:05.450 and severe. Rents across New Orleans rose sharply 00:18:05.450 --> 00:18:08.750 and dramatically. The median rent was up an astonishing 00:18:08.750 --> 00:18:12.890 89 % since 2000. 89%. And we saw a particularly 00:18:12.890 --> 00:18:16.029 brutal 39 % increase in just the three years 00:18:16.029 --> 00:18:19.130 between 2005 and 2008 alone, right after the 00:18:19.130 --> 00:18:20.789 storm. Just when people could least afford it. 00:18:21.049 --> 00:18:24.349 Exactly. This rapid escalation created what many 00:18:24.349 --> 00:18:28.119 called a second exodus. It hit low -wage renters 00:18:28.119 --> 00:18:30.079 who were disproportionately African -American, 00:18:30.200 --> 00:18:32.819 especially hard. A second wave of displacement 00:18:32.819 --> 00:18:35.839 driven by economics this time. You got it. Imagine 00:18:35.839 --> 00:18:39.630 36 % of renters in Orleans Parish. A significant 00:18:39.630 --> 00:18:42.990 jump from 24 % pre -storm were forced to pay 00:18:42.990 --> 00:18:46.230 50 % or more of their pre -tax income just for 00:18:46.230 --> 00:18:48.450 housing. Half their income just for rent. Leaving 00:18:48.450 --> 00:18:50.950 them with extremely limited resources for everything 00:18:50.950 --> 00:18:53.490 else. Food, transportation, child care. It's 00:18:53.490 --> 00:18:55.569 an impossible situation. And for those displaced 00:18:55.569 --> 00:18:57.809 public housing residents, could they even access 00:18:57.809 --> 00:19:00.210 the new mixed income housing? It was incredibly 00:19:00.210 --> 00:19:02.769 difficult. They faced much tighter eligibility 00:19:02.769 --> 00:19:05.490 restrictions and significantly higher affordability 00:19:05.490 --> 00:19:08.329 thresholds. So even the affordable units were... 00:19:08.140 --> 00:19:11.119 affordable for them. Often not. These new units 00:19:11.119 --> 00:19:13.640 were typically only affordable to those making 00:19:13.640 --> 00:19:17.240 maybe 40 % to 100 % of the area median income, 00:19:17.440 --> 00:19:20.400 not the original 30 % or less that the most vulnerable 00:19:20.400 --> 00:19:23.000 residents relied on. So it was a complete overhaul 00:19:23.000 --> 00:19:25.960 that essentially screamed out the poorest. It 00:19:25.960 --> 00:19:28.339 effectively made it nearly impossible for many 00:19:28.339 --> 00:19:30.240 to return to their communities or even remain 00:19:30.240 --> 00:19:33.220 in the city. It locked them out of the new New 00:19:33.220 --> 00:19:35.640 Orleans being built. That demonstrates such a 00:19:35.640 --> 00:19:39.059 systemic issue where the very policies designed, 00:19:39.059 --> 00:19:42.539 ostensibly, to facilitate recovery, instead created 00:19:42.539 --> 00:19:45.460 new barriers and reinforced existing ones. Exactly. 00:19:45.740 --> 00:19:48.660 It really leaves us wondering who was truly benefiting 00:19:48.660 --> 00:19:51.039 from this redevelopment. The narrative of rebuilding 00:19:51.039 --> 00:19:53.500 often focuses on, you know, shiny new buildings, 00:19:53.900 --> 00:19:56.700 economic revitalization. But the human cost of 00:19:56.700 --> 00:19:59.359 these shifts is immense. The policies implemented 00:19:59.359 --> 00:20:01.720 created a system where the very people who had 00:20:01.720 --> 00:20:03.599 lived in and contributed to these communities 00:20:03.599 --> 00:20:06.000 for generations found themselves locked out. 00:20:06.109 --> 00:20:08.390 The drastic reduction in affordable housing, 00:20:08.710 --> 00:20:11.829 soaring rents, stricter rules. It meant that 00:20:11.829 --> 00:20:14.250 the New Orleans was not, in fact, built for the 00:20:14.250 --> 00:20:16.630 old New Orleans, particularly the most vulnerable 00:20:16.630 --> 00:20:19.269 ones. And this systematic process of displacement 00:20:19.269 --> 00:20:22.009 disproportionately affecting low income African 00:20:22.009 --> 00:20:24.490 -American women and their families. It reveals 00:20:24.490 --> 00:20:28.619 how a market driven recovery can deepen. rather 00:20:28.619 --> 00:20:32.019 than alleviate socioeconomic divides. It clearly 00:20:32.019 --> 00:20:35.119 demonstrates a racial and gendered bias in the 00:20:35.119 --> 00:20:37.859 ultimate outcomes of these post -disaster policies. 00:20:38.160 --> 00:20:40.200 Turning recovery itself into a mechanism for 00:20:40.200 --> 00:20:42.980 demographic and economic restructuring that favored 00:20:42.980 --> 00:20:46.140 a different population. That's a harsh but accurate 00:20:46.140 --> 00:20:48.400 assessment of the outcome for many. Speaking 00:20:48.400 --> 00:20:50.539 of market -driven recovery, let's turn our attention 00:20:50.539 --> 00:20:53.079 to the architects of much of this change. The 00:20:53.079 --> 00:20:55.339 developers themselves, and what some have dubbed 00:20:55.339 --> 00:20:59.369 the gentrification is good, The idea that market 00:20:59.369 --> 00:21:01.509 forces will lift all boats, even if some get 00:21:01.509 --> 00:21:04.089 swamped in the process. You had powerful local 00:21:04.089 --> 00:21:06.589 figures like Pres Kabakoff and Sean Cummings, 00:21:06.910 --> 00:21:09.309 both from families with deep roots in real estate, 00:21:09.849 --> 00:21:12.410 who really championed this approach. Kabakoff's 00:21:12.410 --> 00:21:15.309 company, HRI Properties, for instance, specialized 00:21:15.309 --> 00:21:18.400 in inner -city revitalization. often through 00:21:18.400 --> 00:21:20.539 privatizing public housing and creating these 00:21:20.539 --> 00:21:22.440 mixed income communities we've been discussing. 00:21:22.559 --> 00:21:24.640 Exactly. And projects like the New Orleans Healing 00:21:24.640 --> 00:21:27.220 Center or the Bywater Art Lofts, often funded 00:21:27.220 --> 00:21:30.539 by a mix of tax credits and grants, were explicitly 00:21:30.539 --> 00:21:34.240 designed to attract the creative class, ostensibly 00:21:34.240 --> 00:21:36.900 to drive economic growth for the city. It really 00:21:36.900 --> 00:21:39.339 felt like these, I don't know, urban alchemists 00:21:39.339 --> 00:21:42.400 were turning crisis into what they called growth. 00:21:43.059 --> 00:21:45.400 But as we're hearing, this growth wasn't for 00:21:45.400 --> 00:21:48.220 everyone. Not at all. And it's striking to observe 00:21:48.220 --> 00:21:50.640 how these developers weren't merely reacting 00:21:50.640 --> 00:21:53.460 to market forces. They were actively shaping 00:21:53.460 --> 00:21:56.380 them. How so? They actively leveraged their influence 00:21:56.380 --> 00:21:59.579 to modify federal policy in ways that profoundly 00:21:59.579 --> 00:22:01.940 benefited their projects and their particular 00:22:01.940 --> 00:22:04.099 vision for the city. Can you give an example? 00:22:04.380 --> 00:22:07.359 Sure. Take Preskavikov again. He successfully 00:22:07.359 --> 00:22:10.160 lobbied to double the income threshold for affordable 00:22:10.160 --> 00:22:12.779 housing units. Doubling the threshold. What does 00:22:12.779 --> 00:22:15.460 that mean practically? It meant properties could 00:22:15.460 --> 00:22:18.700 qualify for affordable status and the associated 00:22:18.700 --> 00:22:21.119 subsidies even if they were priced well out of 00:22:21.119 --> 00:22:23.880 reach for the city's poorest residents. It broadened 00:22:23.880 --> 00:22:26.380 the definition to include more moderate incomes. 00:22:26.880 --> 00:22:29.420 Making it easier for developers to fill units 00:22:29.420 --> 00:22:32.339 but not necessarily helping those most in need. 00:22:32.559 --> 00:22:35.740 Precisely. He also successfully advocated for 00:22:35.740 --> 00:22:37.920 artists to be eligible for affordable housing 00:22:37.920 --> 00:22:41.630 which, while seeming positive, also served that 00:22:41.630 --> 00:22:44.069 broader goal of attracting a specific creative 00:22:44.069 --> 00:22:47.329 class demographic seen as key to gentrification. 00:22:47.730 --> 00:22:50.369 And Sean Cummings. His reinventing the Crescent 00:22:50.369 --> 00:22:53.650 project involved a massive $300 million transformation 00:22:53.650 --> 00:22:56.269 of the Mississippi Riverfront, and he acquired 00:22:56.269 --> 00:22:58.910 much of the city owned land for it while he was 00:22:58.910 --> 00:23:00.950 concurrently chairing the New Orleans Building 00:23:00.950 --> 00:23:03.150 Corporation. He was chairing the city agency 00:23:03.150 --> 00:23:06.069 selling the land that he was buying. That's what 00:23:06.069 --> 00:23:09.490 the record suggests. It certainly raised significant 00:23:09.490 --> 00:23:12.269 ethical questions about the blurring lines between 00:23:12.269 --> 00:23:21.890 private game and public service. To their substantial 00:23:21.890 --> 00:23:25.670 benefit, yes. This symbiotic relationship between 00:23:25.670 --> 00:23:29.150 powerful developers and governmental bodies further 00:23:29.150 --> 00:23:32.359 solidified a market -first agenda. often at the 00:23:32.359 --> 00:23:35.279 expense of long -established, vulnerable communities. 00:23:35.539 --> 00:23:38.500 And what's truly striking, almost jarring, is 00:23:38.500 --> 00:23:40.400 that some of these developers were quite candid 00:23:40.400 --> 00:23:42.539 about the consequences of their actions. They 00:23:42.539 --> 00:23:44.940 were surprisingly open at times. Brest Kabakov 00:23:44.940 --> 00:23:48.000 himself, when discussing the effects of revitalization 00:23:48.000 --> 00:23:50.740 efforts, was quoted, say, and I'm quoting directly 00:23:50.740 --> 00:23:53.859 here, in terms of race. Black people in this 00:23:53.859 --> 00:23:56.460 town have less money. When neighborhoods revitalize, 00:23:56.559 --> 00:23:58.779 I think it chases all poor out. And in our city, 00:23:58.900 --> 00:24:00.819 the poor are almost all black, so it's more of 00:24:00.819 --> 00:24:03.359 a coincidence. Coincidence? He continues, and 00:24:03.359 --> 00:24:05.740 there's probably some racism involved in that. 00:24:06.160 --> 00:24:08.000 That's the downside of neighborhood improvement. 00:24:08.660 --> 00:24:11.519 Wow. That's quite an admission. The downside 00:24:11.519 --> 00:24:13.900 of neighborhood improvement is chasing out poor 00:24:13.900 --> 00:24:16.140 black residents. It's an unflinching truth, right? 00:24:16.500 --> 00:24:19.240 A direct acknowledgement of the inherent mechanisms 00:24:19.240 --> 00:24:22.440 of displacement embedded within this model of 00:24:22.440 --> 00:24:24.779 market dread and redevelopment. That statement 00:24:24.779 --> 00:24:28.119 is incredibly revealing. It forces us to ask, 00:24:28.680 --> 00:24:31.240 when neighborhood improvement is openly acknowledged 00:24:31.240 --> 00:24:34.420 to inherently chase out the poor who are disproportionately 00:24:34.420 --> 00:24:37.640 black in New Orleans, is that really a coincidence? 00:24:37.839 --> 00:24:40.740 Or is it an inherent feature? Exactly. Is it 00:24:40.740 --> 00:24:43.319 an inherent and predictable feature of the underlying 00:24:43.319 --> 00:24:46.539 development model being pushed? Such candid admissions 00:24:46.539 --> 00:24:49.259 challenge the often assumed neutrality of the 00:24:49.259 --> 00:24:51.559 market. Right, the market isn't just some natural 00:24:51.559 --> 00:24:54.539 force. No, it reveals the deeply political nature 00:24:54.539 --> 00:24:57.859 of these economic processes. It exposes how policies, 00:24:58.039 --> 00:25:00.839 even when framed in colorblind terms about economic 00:25:00.839 --> 00:25:03.720 efficiency or revitalization, can have profoundly 00:25:03.720 --> 00:25:06.279 racial and class -based outcomes. Especially 00:25:06.279 --> 00:25:08.960 when they prioritize profit and private investment. 00:25:08.910 --> 00:25:11.490 over the fundamental needs and rights of existing 00:25:11.490 --> 00:25:13.950 communities. And this is where the racial and 00:25:13.950 --> 00:25:16.589 gender divides become even more insidious, often 00:25:16.589 --> 00:25:18.910 coded in that seemingly race -neutral language 00:25:18.910 --> 00:25:21.869 about income and work ethic, while systematically 00:25:21.869 --> 00:25:24.170 impacting specific demographics, particularly 00:25:24.170 --> 00:25:26.430 black women and their families. So on one hand, 00:25:26.609 --> 00:25:29.390 the city wants the jazz, the gumbo, the unique 00:25:29.390 --> 00:25:32.210 vibe, the vibrant culture. The very things that 00:25:32.210 --> 00:25:34.630 make New Orleans, New Orleans. But on the other, 00:25:35.069 --> 00:25:37.309 it seems to be actively pushing out the very 00:25:37.309 --> 00:25:40.400 people who create it. It's such a stark contradiction. 00:25:40.420 --> 00:25:42.960 It really is. New Orleans unique culture. It's 00:25:42.960 --> 00:25:46.680 live music, distinctive cuisine, iconic architecture. 00:25:46.880 --> 00:25:49.640 It's absolutely critical to his tourism economy, 00:25:50.099 --> 00:25:53.000 a major industry. Lieutenant Governor Mitch Landrieu 00:25:53.000 --> 00:25:55.700 even lobbied Congress for millions to support 00:25:55.700 --> 00:25:58.420 cultural tourism. Arguing quite rightly that 00:25:58.420 --> 00:26:01.099 Louisiana has an economic asset that other states 00:26:01.099 --> 00:26:04.359 can only dream of. A multifaceted, deeply rooted, 00:26:04.660 --> 00:26:07.559 authentic and unique culture. But the very culture 00:26:07.559 --> 00:26:10.039 bearers. predominantly working -class black residents, 00:26:10.460 --> 00:26:13.039 like musicians, chefs, artisans, they face a 00:26:13.039 --> 00:26:14.880 minefield of obstacles just trying to return 00:26:14.880 --> 00:26:17.420 home and re -establish their lives. It's a profound 00:26:17.420 --> 00:26:20.049 and heartbreaking irony. The city celebrates 00:26:20.049 --> 00:26:23.029 and aggressively markets its culture. Yet systematically 00:26:23.029 --> 00:26:25.630 undermines the ability of the people who embody 00:26:25.630 --> 00:26:28.210 and create that culture to actually remain within 00:26:28.210 --> 00:26:31.670 it. Exactly. The economic realities for these 00:26:31.670 --> 00:26:34.390 culture bearers, predominantly low income African 00:26:34.390 --> 00:26:36.789 American individuals and families, meant that 00:26:36.789 --> 00:26:39.789 as the city rebuilt and costs soared, they were 00:26:39.789 --> 00:26:41.650 being priced out of their own neighborhoods. 00:26:41.849 --> 00:26:45.410 Facing immense financial pressure. Immense. Musicians' 00:26:45.730 --> 00:26:48.069 average earnings, for instance, remain stagnant 00:26:48.069 --> 00:26:52.480 at a meager $17 ,800 per year, according to studies 00:26:52.480 --> 00:26:55.579 from the time. $17 ,000 a year, while the cost 00:26:55.579 --> 00:26:58.220 of living was skyrocketing. Skyrocketing. And 00:26:58.220 --> 00:27:00.940 beyond just economics, they also faced an increasingly 00:27:00.940 --> 00:27:04.000 hostile environment. Hostile how? Stricter noise 00:27:04.000 --> 00:27:06.519 ordinances, zoning regulations for performance 00:27:06.519 --> 00:27:08.339 venues, things like that. Which might be framed 00:27:08.339 --> 00:27:10.460 as quality of life improvements for new, wealthier 00:27:10.460 --> 00:27:13.480 residents. But directly impacted the livelihoods 00:27:13.480 --> 00:27:15.619 and cultural practices of musicians and artists 00:27:15.619 --> 00:27:18.190 who rely on those very spaces barred. clubs, 00:27:18.450 --> 00:27:21.130 even street corners to earn a living and share 00:27:21.130 --> 00:27:23.450 their art. It sounds like a form of cultural 00:27:23.450 --> 00:27:26.970 extraction. That's a good term for it. The aesthetic 00:27:26.970 --> 00:27:29.430 and economic value of a community's heritage 00:27:29.430 --> 00:27:32.190 is embraced and commercialized, but the people 00:27:32.190 --> 00:27:34.849 who create and sustain it are effectively pushed 00:27:34.849 --> 00:27:37.410 to the margins. Unable to participate in the 00:27:37.410 --> 00:27:40.450 revitalization, they are ironically essential 00:27:40.450 --> 00:27:42.849 to. And the very presence of working class black 00:27:42.849 --> 00:27:44.950 residents in these newly gentrified neighborhoods 00:27:44.950 --> 00:27:48.029 was, in essence, sometimes seen as a threat to 00:27:48.029 --> 00:27:51.069 the perceived improvement and the desired demographic 00:27:51.069 --> 00:27:54.029 shift of the city. Let's shift now to what was 00:27:54.029 --> 00:27:56.609 perhaps the most significant state -sanctioned 00:27:56.609 --> 00:28:00.109 divide in the post -Katrina recovery, the massive 00:28:00.109 --> 00:28:03.049 homeownership bias. Yes, this is absolutely critical 00:28:03.049 --> 00:28:05.410 to understanding the unequal recovery. President 00:28:05.410 --> 00:28:07.789 George W. Bush's vision, declared in Jackson 00:28:07.789 --> 00:28:10.210 Square just weeks after the storm, was crystal 00:28:10.210 --> 00:28:13.190 clear. Homeownership is one of the great strengths 00:28:13.190 --> 00:28:15.549 of any community, and it must be a central part 00:28:15.549 --> 00:28:17.369 of our vision for the revival of this region. 00:28:17.589 --> 00:28:20.470 A strong emphasis on owning property. Very strong. 00:28:20.589 --> 00:28:23.910 He even proposed an urban homesteading act for 00:28:23.910 --> 00:28:26.329 renters, supposedly designed to help them become 00:28:26.329 --> 00:28:28.829 homeowners. But that initiative never materialized. 00:28:28.829 --> 00:28:31.309 It just vanished. Interesting. So the talk was 00:28:31.309 --> 00:28:33.589 there, but the action wasn't. Seems that way. 00:28:33.829 --> 00:28:36.569 Instead, the largest federal program, the Road 00:28:36.569 --> 00:28:39.950 Home Program, which allotted $15 billion between 00:28:39.950 --> 00:28:43.329 2005 and 2007. A huge amount of money. Went overwhelmingly 00:28:43.329 --> 00:28:46.789 to homeowners. Can you detail how this program 00:28:46.789 --> 00:28:49.339 created such a dramatic imbalance? This brings 00:28:49.339 --> 00:28:51.599 us to a critical point regarding the state's 00:28:51.599 --> 00:28:54.200 role in actively perpetuating inequality through 00:28:54.200 --> 00:28:56.960 policy design, not just passively allowing it. 00:28:57.920 --> 00:29:00.359 The Road Home Program, despite its massive funding, 00:29:00.640 --> 00:29:03.480 directed a crucial 80 % of its funds to homeowners. 00:29:04.440 --> 00:29:07.630 80%. 80 % to homeowners. Despite renters being 00:29:07.630 --> 00:29:09.829 the majority of New Orleans's pre -storm population, 00:29:09.890 --> 00:29:12.789 it was 55%. Exactly. Renters were the majority, 00:29:12.869 --> 00:29:16.190 55%. Yet homeowners got 80 % of the largest pot 00:29:16.190 --> 00:29:18.950 of aid. This wasn't just an oversight. It was 00:29:18.950 --> 00:29:21.829 a direct policy choice that amplified pre -existing 00:29:21.829 --> 00:29:24.289 disparities based on wealth and race. And homeowners 00:29:24.289 --> 00:29:26.910 got other benefits, too. Yes. To make matters 00:29:26.910 --> 00:29:29.730 worse, homeowners also benefited from the extension 00:29:29.730 --> 00:29:32.609 of federal tax credits, providing further financial 00:29:32.609 --> 00:29:35.130 advantages. And who benefited most from this 00:29:35.130 --> 00:29:38.259 homeowner focus? Unsurprisingly, the vast majority 00:29:38.259 --> 00:29:40.579 of these benefits disproportionately accrued 00:29:40.579 --> 00:29:43.779 to white homeowners who, due to historical inequities 00:29:43.779 --> 00:29:46.799 like redlining and discriminatory lending, were 00:29:46.799 --> 00:29:48.900 much more likely to own property in the first 00:29:48.900 --> 00:29:51.619 place. So the program reinforced historical advantages. 00:29:52.140 --> 00:29:54.859 Absolutely. This program, while presented as 00:29:54.859 --> 00:29:57.599 a neutral disaster relief effort, was in fact 00:29:57.599 --> 00:30:00.099 an extension of historical entitlements that 00:30:00.099 --> 00:30:03.359 inherently favored property owners. It transformed 00:30:03.359 --> 00:30:07.160 disaster aid into a mechanism for transfer, bolstering 00:30:07.160 --> 00:30:09.440 those who already possessed assets rather than 00:30:09.440 --> 00:30:11.960 being a truly equitable recovery effort. And 00:30:11.960 --> 00:30:14.359 it solidified this idea you mentioned, a property 00:30:14.359 --> 00:30:17.099 -based definition of urban citizenship. Precisely. 00:30:17.220 --> 00:30:19.960 Where simply owning property dictated who received 00:30:19.960 --> 00:30:22.839 significant government support and who was largely 00:30:22.839 --> 00:30:25.180 left to navigate a decimated housing market alone, 00:30:25.440 --> 00:30:27.759 particularly renters, overwhelmingly African 00:30:27.759 --> 00:30:31.059 -American renters. So while homeowners were receiving 00:30:31.059 --> 00:30:34.240 the lion's share of aid, what about renters and 00:30:34.240 --> 00:30:36.400 the small renters owners who provided most of 00:30:36.400 --> 00:30:39.500 the city's rental stock. They faced huge disadvantages, 00:30:39.500 --> 00:30:42.200 right? Immense disadvantages and frustrating 00:30:42.200 --> 00:30:45.160 administrative hurdles. The contrast is stark 00:30:45.160 --> 00:30:48.039 and really highlights a systemic issue. How little 00:30:48.039 --> 00:30:51.279 aid went to them. Only a meager 20 % of the road 00:30:51.279 --> 00:30:54.180 home funds went to small rental owners. Just 00:30:54.180 --> 00:30:57.380 20%. Even though they provided over 80 % of the 00:30:57.380 --> 00:30:59.539 city's pre -storm rental stock. That's right. 00:30:59.900 --> 00:31:02.480 These were often local individuals or families 00:31:02.480 --> 00:31:05.279 who owned maybe a duplex or a few small properties, 00:31:06.019 --> 00:31:07.980 providing naturally occurring affordable housing 00:31:07.980 --> 00:31:10.259 to their communities. They were a vital part 00:31:10.259 --> 00:31:12.400 of the housing ecosystem. And the hurdles they 00:31:12.400 --> 00:31:15.960 faced getting that 20%. Imagine this, small rental 00:31:15.960 --> 00:31:18.460 owners only received eligibility letters for 00:31:18.460 --> 00:31:20.500 road home funds after they had already rebuilt 00:31:20.500 --> 00:31:23.259 their properties. Wait, after? How could they 00:31:23.259 --> 00:31:26.319 rebuild without the funds? Exactly. It effectively 00:31:26.319 --> 00:31:28.440 disqualified countless individuals who simply 00:31:28.440 --> 00:31:30.359 couldn't afford to front the massive cost of 00:31:30.359 --> 00:31:32.900 reconstruction themselves. It was an impossible 00:31:32.900 --> 00:31:35.599 catch -22 for many, a bureaucratic nightmare. 00:31:35.940 --> 00:31:38.180 That seems designed to fail, almost. It certainly 00:31:38.180 --> 00:31:41.140 had that effect. And on top of that, new requirements 00:31:41.140 --> 00:31:43.619 for improved amenities and adherence to stricter, 00:31:43.779 --> 00:31:46.359 new building codes, while maybe well -intentioned 00:31:46.359 --> 00:31:49.099 for future housing quality, added significant, 00:31:49.339 --> 00:31:51.980 often prohibitive costs and delays for rebuilding 00:31:51.980 --> 00:31:54.339 affordable rental housing. Making it even harder 00:31:54.339 --> 00:31:56.089 and more expensive. for those small landlords. 00:31:56.289 --> 00:31:59.089 Much harder. And the result? Three years after 00:31:59.089 --> 00:32:02.549 the storm, studies showed only 13 rebuilt affordable 00:32:02.549 --> 00:32:05.490 rental units could be directly attributed to 00:32:05.490 --> 00:32:09.470 road home funds. 13 out of a $15 billion program. 00:32:09.769 --> 00:32:12.650 13 units specifically for affordable rentals 00:32:12.650 --> 00:32:15.529 from that main program. It's shockingly low compared 00:32:15.529 --> 00:32:18.230 to the billions poured into homeownership. Meanwhile, 00:32:18.549 --> 00:32:21.130 what was happening to property values in areas 00:32:21.130 --> 00:32:23.839 that didn't flood? Property values in unflooded, 00:32:24.099 --> 00:32:26.640 often wealthier and wider areas, like the historically 00:32:26.640 --> 00:32:28.900 elevated sliver by the river near the Garding 00:32:28.900 --> 00:32:31.460 District in Uptown, they received a huge boost. 00:32:32.019 --> 00:32:34.480 So existing homeowners there saw big profits. 00:32:35.099 --> 00:32:37.740 Significant profits further widening the already 00:32:37.740 --> 00:32:40.500 massive economic chasm between property owners 00:32:40.500 --> 00:32:43.279 and renters and between white and black communities 00:32:43.279 --> 00:32:46.500 in the city. That's such a clear example of how 00:32:46.500 --> 00:32:49.829 housing tenure whether you owned or rented, became 00:32:49.829 --> 00:32:53.049 a gatekeeper for full urban participation. It 00:32:53.049 --> 00:32:55.430 really does seem like there was a tacit property 00:32:55.430 --> 00:32:58.029 -based definition of urban citizenship at play. 00:32:58.529 --> 00:33:01.789 Indeed. It demonstrates a system where your ability 00:33:01.789 --> 00:33:04.910 to return to the city, to find work, to enroll 00:33:04.910 --> 00:33:07.609 your kids in school, to even participate politically, 00:33:08.430 --> 00:33:10.670 was directly tied to whether you owned property. 00:33:10.789 --> 00:33:12.710 How did that play out practically with things 00:33:12.710 --> 00:33:15.200 like temporary housing? Well, homeowners, for 00:33:15.200 --> 00:33:17.220 instance, were allowed to place Federal Emergency 00:33:17.220 --> 00:33:20.799 Management Agency, or FEMA, trailers directly 00:33:20.799 --> 00:33:22.740 on their private property. Giving them a place 00:33:22.740 --> 00:33:25.240 to live, even if basic, right in their neighborhood. 00:33:25.519 --> 00:33:28.059 Exactly. It gave them a crucial advantage immediate, 00:33:28.339 --> 00:33:30.960 albeit temporary, housing. It allowed them to 00:33:30.960 --> 00:33:33.319 return to work sooner, to oversee repairs, and 00:33:33.319 --> 00:33:35.579 importantly, to participate in local reconstruction 00:33:35.579 --> 00:33:37.839 decisions and planning meetings. And renters. 00:33:38.200 --> 00:33:40.400 Renters were not afforded the same right. They 00:33:40.400 --> 00:33:42.839 couldn't just put a FEMA trailer anywhere. Many 00:33:42.839 --> 00:33:45.609 were relegated to vast, often isolated trailer 00:33:45.609 --> 00:33:48.130 camps located outside the city limits. Cut off 00:33:48.130 --> 00:33:50.410 from jobs, transportation, their old communities. 00:33:50.609 --> 00:33:53.390 Completely cut off, often in areas lacking basic 00:33:53.390 --> 00:33:56.670 services or social networks. Others face precarious 00:33:56.670 --> 00:33:59.950 and often temporary hotel stays or struggle to 00:33:59.950 --> 00:34:02.650 find scarce, expensive rental accommodations. 00:34:03.240 --> 00:34:06.319 So this created that de facto citizenship definition 00:34:06.319 --> 00:34:09.980 you mentioned. Yes. A tacit property based definition 00:34:09.980 --> 00:34:13.099 of urban citizenship where without private property 00:34:13.099 --> 00:34:16.039 the majority of citizens particularly low -income 00:34:16.039 --> 00:34:18.340 African -American women and their families had 00:34:18.340 --> 00:34:21.239 no legal or practical claim to return easily 00:34:21.239 --> 00:34:23.860 to their neighborhoods or to meaningfully participate 00:34:23.860 --> 00:34:26.039 in the city's political institutions and decision 00:34:26.039 --> 00:34:28.199 making processes. Their physical displacement 00:34:28.199 --> 00:34:30.559 became a political disenfranchisement as well. 00:34:30.639 --> 00:34:33.659 It absolutely did. Losing your home meant losing 00:34:33.659 --> 00:34:36.219 your foothold in the city in multiple ways. This 00:34:36.219 --> 00:34:38.460 whole discussion brings us to some fundamental 00:34:38.460 --> 00:34:41.079 critiques that seem to resonate across history. 00:34:41.800 --> 00:34:43.960 We can look back to Friedrich Engels' seminal 00:34:43.960 --> 00:34:46.539 work from the 19th century, The Housing Question, 00:34:47.199 --> 00:34:49.980 and see some startling parallels in post -Katrina 00:34:49.980 --> 00:34:52.679 New Orleans. It's surprising how relevant those 00:34:52.679 --> 00:34:55.139 19th century critiques still feel, isn't it? 00:34:55.300 --> 00:34:58.519 It really is. Engels argued that framing housing 00:34:58.519 --> 00:35:02.039 solutions purely on rights and justice can be 00:35:02.039 --> 00:35:04.380 insufficient if it doesn't fundamentally address 00:35:04.380 --> 00:35:07.460 the underlying economic relations and power structures. 00:35:07.840 --> 00:35:10.099 Right. The focus on abstract rights can sometimes 00:35:10.099 --> 00:35:13.239 obscure the concrete economic realities. So in 00:35:13.239 --> 00:35:16.059 New Orleans, how did the legal framework of property 00:35:16.059 --> 00:35:18.670 rights? maybe designed decades ago for different 00:35:18.670 --> 00:35:21.550 circumstances, becomes such an unquestionable 00:35:21.550 --> 00:35:24.690 force, pushing out the very idea of a universal 00:35:24.690 --> 00:35:27.309 right to housing after a disaster. That's a crucial 00:35:27.309 --> 00:35:29.869 connection. Engel's critique helps us understand 00:35:29.869 --> 00:35:32.309 that legal frameworks, even when presented as 00:35:32.309 --> 00:35:35.170 neutral or universal, are often deeply rooted 00:35:35.170 --> 00:35:37.710 in existing economic relations and can serve 00:35:37.710 --> 00:35:40.329 to mask and perpetuate inequalities. How did 00:35:40.329 --> 00:35:42.760 that play out with federal aid? In post -Katrina 00:35:42.760 --> 00:35:44.960 New Orleans, federal aid for private property 00:35:44.960 --> 00:35:47.579 losses became almost automatically legitimized 00:35:47.579 --> 00:35:50.519 through historical precedent. It became a kind 00:35:50.519 --> 00:35:54.119 of policy doxa, an unquestioned belief or common 00:35:54.119 --> 00:35:56.940 opinion within policy circles that property rights 00:35:56.940 --> 00:35:58.880 were paramount. So it didn't even need debating 00:35:58.880 --> 00:36:02.349 anymore. It felt like it no longer required serious 00:36:02.349 --> 00:36:05.769 legislative deliberation. This uncritical acceptance 00:36:05.769 --> 00:36:08.590 of property rights as the primary frame meant 00:36:08.590 --> 00:36:11.869 that aid flowed predominantly to homeowners without 00:36:11.869 --> 00:36:14.809 a deeper critical examination of who those homeowners 00:36:14.809 --> 00:36:17.570 were, who they weren't, and what that meant for 00:36:17.570 --> 00:36:20.170 broader social equity. And this sidelined other 00:36:20.170 --> 00:36:22.110 ways of thinking about recovery. Absolutely. 00:36:22.250 --> 00:36:24.730 It supplanted a much needed broader discussion 00:36:24.730 --> 00:36:27.550 of inequality and the potential for, say, a right 00:36:27.550 --> 00:36:30.230 to return or a right to housing for everyone 00:36:30.230 --> 00:36:33.030 affected, it effectively marginalized the political 00:36:33.030 --> 00:36:35.210 responses of community groups advocating for 00:36:35.210 --> 00:36:37.730 renters. Like Acorn, the Association of Community 00:36:37.730 --> 00:36:40.329 Organizations for Reform now. They were big in 00:36:40.329 --> 00:36:42.369 New Orleans, right? They had their largest chapter 00:36:42.369 --> 00:36:45.820 in the city, yes. Their efforts to advocate for 00:36:45.820 --> 00:36:48.519 a more equitable recovery for renters were often 00:36:48.519 --> 00:36:51.579 dismissed or sidelined because the dominant legalistic 00:36:51.579 --> 00:36:54.639 approach effectively depoliticized the discussion. 00:36:54.920 --> 00:36:57.340 Making it seem like the government was just upholding 00:36:57.340 --> 00:37:00.320 established rights. Rather than making a strategic 00:37:00.320 --> 00:37:02.739 choice that dramatically favored one segment 00:37:02.739 --> 00:37:05.579 of the population, largely more affluent white 00:37:05.579 --> 00:37:08.460 residents over another predominantly low -income 00:37:08.460 --> 00:37:11.349 African -American women and their families. Beyond 00:37:11.349 --> 00:37:13.409 the legal framework, there was also a significant 00:37:13.409 --> 00:37:15.670 moral component to how the housing crisis was 00:37:15.670 --> 00:37:18.510 framed, wasn't there? Again, echoing Engel's 00:37:18.510 --> 00:37:20.590 critique of those who linked housing shortages 00:37:20.590 --> 00:37:23.699 to the supposed moral failings of the poor. Yes, 00:37:23.739 --> 00:37:26.119 that narrative was unfortunately quite prevalent. 00:37:26.480 --> 00:37:28.739 In post -Katrina, New Orleans, there was a discourse 00:37:28.739 --> 00:37:30.900 that associated poor people and public housing 00:37:30.900 --> 00:37:33.940 residents with things like laziness, welfare 00:37:33.940 --> 00:37:36.820 drainage, a lack of investment in their own neighborhoods. 00:37:37.139 --> 00:37:39.119 This is where the racial and gender divides become 00:37:39.119 --> 00:37:41.960 even more insidious, often coded in that seemingly 00:37:41.960 --> 00:37:44.840 race neutral language about income and work ethic, 00:37:45.239 --> 00:37:48.079 but clearly targeting specific groups. Can you 00:37:48.079 --> 00:37:50.400 give some examples of this moralizing rhetoric? 00:37:50.800 --> 00:37:54.199 Well, this Deserving versus undeserving poor 00:37:54.199 --> 00:37:57.019 narrative effectively demonized those who were 00:37:57.019 --> 00:38:00.019 most vulnerable and conveniently justified their 00:38:00.019 --> 00:38:02.860 exclusion from recovery efforts. For instance, 00:38:03.019 --> 00:38:05.460 the New York Times columnist David Brooks infamously 00:38:05.460 --> 00:38:08.059 advised integrating people who lack middle -class 00:38:08.059 --> 00:38:10.420 skills into neighborhoods with people who possess 00:38:10.420 --> 00:38:13.039 these skills, which subtly blames the poor for 00:38:13.039 --> 00:38:15.219 their own situation, implying they just need 00:38:15.219 --> 00:38:18.000 exposure to better people. Exactly. It locates 00:38:18.000 --> 00:38:20.440 the problem within the individual, not the system. 00:38:21.420 --> 00:38:23.460 More explicitly, the New Orleans City Council 00:38:23.460 --> 00:38:25.719 president at the time made a highly problematic 00:38:25.719 --> 00:38:28.280 comment suggesting public housing should be reserved 00:38:28.280 --> 00:38:31.340 for those willing to work and not for soap opera 00:38:31.340 --> 00:38:34.400 watchers. Wow. Directly linking housing insecurity 00:38:34.400 --> 00:38:37.099 to perceived moral failings or lack of effort. 00:38:37.400 --> 00:38:40.360 Just blatant. Blatant. This moralized discourse 00:38:40.360 --> 00:38:42.440 served to deflect attention from the systemic 00:38:42.440 --> 00:38:45.079 causes of poverty and housing insecurity. Things 00:38:45.079 --> 00:38:48.719 like low wages, lack of affordable child care, 00:38:49.239 --> 00:38:51.500 historical discrimination, and place the blame 00:38:51.500 --> 00:38:54.340 instead on individuals. It's a powerful tool 00:38:54.340 --> 00:38:56.340 for maintaining existing hierarchies, isn't it? 00:38:56.409 --> 00:38:59.250 Incredibly powerful. It allows policymakers and 00:38:59.250 --> 00:39:01.329 perhaps segments of the public to rationalize 00:39:01.329 --> 00:39:04.730 decisions that deepen inequality by framing them 00:39:04.730 --> 00:39:07.949 as the natural consequences of individual choices 00:39:07.949 --> 00:39:11.110 rather than the result of deliberate policy. 00:39:11.389 --> 00:39:13.750 And what about the grassroots recovery efforts 00:39:13.750 --> 00:39:16.110 led by nonprofits and philanthropists? Didn't 00:39:16.110 --> 00:39:18.630 that help? While there was a visible push for 00:39:18.630 --> 00:39:20.570 that and many groups did amazing work on the 00:39:20.570 --> 00:39:24.130 ground, the overall structure often masked systematic 00:39:24.130 --> 00:39:27.630 inequalities in resource distribution. Wealthier, 00:39:27.829 --> 00:39:29.889 predominantly white, homeowner groups were often 00:39:29.889 --> 00:39:32.269 better connected, had more resources, and were 00:39:32.269 --> 00:39:34.590 simply more effective at capturing and benefiting 00:39:34.590 --> 00:39:37.010 from the available aid and philanthropic dollars. 00:39:37.130 --> 00:39:38.929 Where even the grassroots efforts could reflect 00:39:38.929 --> 00:39:41.150 the existing power dynamics. To a large extent, 00:39:41.389 --> 00:39:43.989 yes. The moral framing effectively served as 00:39:43.989 --> 00:39:46.449 a smokescreen for the continued advance of urban 00:39:46.449 --> 00:39:49.110 neoliberalism, blaming the poor for their own 00:39:49.110 --> 00:39:51.150 displacement while facilitating market -driven 00:39:51.150 --> 00:39:53.789 redevelopment. And finally, we have to look at 00:39:53.789 --> 00:39:55.769 the housing question through the lens of urban 00:39:55.769 --> 00:39:59.449 development itself. How post -Katrina redevelopment 00:39:59.449 --> 00:40:02.289 was often framed as just urban development as 00:40:02.289 --> 00:40:05.050 usual. Right, as if a catastrophic disaster didn't 00:40:05.050 --> 00:40:08.010 fundamentally change the context. Ingalls critiqued 00:40:08.010 --> 00:40:10.929 how modernized housing projects in his time often 00:40:10.929 --> 00:40:13.030 benefited capitalists more than the poor they 00:40:13.030 --> 00:40:16.110 were supposedly built for. Here we saw what's 00:40:16.110 --> 00:40:19.110 been called an unprecedented supply side policy. 00:40:19.289 --> 00:40:22.130 Creating essentially a free enterprise zone with 00:40:22.130 --> 00:40:24.710 extensive tax exempt financing, depreciation 00:40:24.710 --> 00:40:27.469 benefits, things designed to spur private investment. 00:40:27.769 --> 00:40:29.230 And what was the outcome of this approach? What 00:40:29.230 --> 00:40:31.829 got built? The outcome was a dramatic surge in 00:40:31.829 --> 00:40:34.409 luxury condos and high end apartments catering 00:40:34.409 --> 00:40:36.989 primarily to wealthier new residents or investors, 00:40:37.429 --> 00:40:39.769 while deeply affordable housing remained incredibly 00:40:39.769 --> 00:40:42.389 scarce. So the subsidies ended up fueling luxury 00:40:42.389 --> 00:40:45.110 development. To a significant degree, yes. The 00:40:45.110 --> 00:40:47.190 expensive tax cuts and incentives associated 00:40:47.190 --> 00:40:50.369 with this free enterprise zone effectively masked 00:40:50.369 --> 00:40:53.369 the state's significant hand in subsidizing private, 00:40:53.710 --> 00:40:56.449 often luxury development, not affordable housing 00:40:56.449 --> 00:40:59.369 for those displaced. It's truly paradoxical then 00:40:59.369 --> 00:41:02.590 that in 2009, when the city was still desperate 00:41:02.590 --> 00:41:05.769 for affordable housing, the Louisiana State Bond 00:41:05.769 --> 00:41:08.489 Commission actually stalled affordable housing 00:41:08.489 --> 00:41:11.489 subsidies for over a year. Stalled them? Why? 00:41:12.070 --> 00:41:15.090 Citing fears of too much affordable housing, 00:41:15.630 --> 00:41:18.070 their stated concern was that an abundance of 00:41:18.070 --> 00:41:20.110 affordable units would detract from the demand 00:41:20.110 --> 00:41:22.690 for market rate housing and thus hinder private 00:41:22.690 --> 00:41:24.829 development profits. Let me get this straight. 00:41:25.090 --> 00:41:27.409 They were worried that helping the poor too much 00:41:27.409 --> 00:41:29.880 would hurt the market for the rich. in the middle 00:41:29.880 --> 00:41:32.719 of a housing crisis after a disaster. That was 00:41:32.719 --> 00:41:35.360 the explicit logic presented. It reveals the 00:41:35.360 --> 00:41:38.179 deeply ingrained market first agenda. Any other 00:41:38.179 --> 00:41:40.039 examples of that thinking? The speaker of the 00:41:40.039 --> 00:41:42.199 Louisiana House of Representatives at the time 00:41:42.199 --> 00:41:44.920 even expressed concerns about the concentration 00:41:44.920 --> 00:41:47.619 of low and moderate income people all over the 00:41:47.619 --> 00:41:50.619 city and its potential major impact on employment 00:41:50.619 --> 00:41:53.960 and lifestyle. Wow. that powerfully reveals the 00:41:53.960 --> 00:41:56.679 underlying social anxieties and biases against 00:41:56.679 --> 00:41:59.260 lower -income residents, framing their very presence 00:41:59.260 --> 00:42:01.739 as a problem for the city's desired image and 00:42:01.739 --> 00:42:04.360 economy. It demonstrates how the state, under 00:42:04.360 --> 00:42:07.960 the guise of market -led recovery, actively intervened 00:42:07.960 --> 00:42:10.860 to protect and expand the interests of the property 00:42:10.860 --> 00:42:13.860 class. The decisions made by institutions like 00:42:13.860 --> 00:42:16.940 the Bond Commission, cloaked in economic rationale, 00:42:17.500 --> 00:42:20.760 had direct detrimental consequences for low -income 00:42:20.760 --> 00:42:23.420 residents. Particularly low -income African -American 00:42:23.420 --> 00:42:26.400 women who relied disproportionately on affordable 00:42:26.400 --> 00:42:29.000 housing. Exactly. It reveals how the language 00:42:29.000 --> 00:42:31.659 of urban development can be manipulated to serve 00:42:31.659 --> 00:42:34.659 specific economic interests, transforming the 00:42:34.659 --> 00:42:37.880 city itself into a commodity where the perceived 00:42:37.880 --> 00:42:40.619 value of property and attracting higher -income 00:42:40.619 --> 00:42:43.219 residents take precedence over the fundamental 00:42:43.219 --> 00:42:45.880 human right to adequate housing for all. In the 00:42:45.880 --> 00:42:47.659 face of all these systemic challenges, though, 00:42:47.719 --> 00:42:49.460 it's incredibly important to remember that there 00:42:49.460 --> 00:42:52.199 was and continues to be significant resistance. 00:42:53.039 --> 00:42:55.239 People didn't just accept this. No, absolutely 00:42:55.239 --> 00:42:57.760 not. There was incredible organizing and pushback. 00:42:58.039 --> 00:43:00.440 Social justice activists and post -Katrina New 00:43:00.440 --> 00:43:03.059 Orleans adopted the powerful framework of the 00:43:03.059 --> 00:43:05.400 right of return for displaced residents. And, 00:43:05.460 --> 00:43:08.099 importantly, extended it to argue for a fundamental 00:43:08.099 --> 00:43:10.329 human right to housing. Where did that framing 00:43:10.329 --> 00:43:13.489 come from? It was firmly grounded in international 00:43:13.489 --> 00:43:16.389 human rights treaties, specifically citing things 00:43:16.389 --> 00:43:19.690 like the guiding principles on internal displacement. 00:43:19.949 --> 00:43:23.849 It tried to elevate the issue beyond local politics 00:43:23.849 --> 00:43:26.469 to universal principles. And they took legal 00:43:26.469 --> 00:43:29.909 action, too. Yes, they filed a major class action 00:43:29.909 --> 00:43:31.710 lawsuit against the Department of Housing and 00:43:31.710 --> 00:43:34.730 Urban Development HUD, known as the NOAA case, 00:43:35.170 --> 00:43:37.110 representing public housing residents who had 00:43:37.110 --> 00:43:39.010 lost their homes and were being denied return. 00:43:39.159 --> 00:43:42.159 So, a powerful attempt to challenge the established 00:43:42.159 --> 00:43:44.460 narrative and the legal frameworks that were 00:43:44.460 --> 00:43:46.900 facilitating displacement using a human rights 00:43:46.900 --> 00:43:49.880 lens. A very powerful attempt. But it illustrates 00:43:49.880 --> 00:43:52.880 the formidable obstacles faced when trying to 00:43:52.880 --> 00:43:55.659 challenge entrenched power structures and dominant 00:43:55.659 --> 00:43:57.760 ideologies. Especially when those structures 00:43:57.760 --> 00:44:00.059 are clearly benefiting from the very crisis they 00:44:00.059 --> 00:44:02.420 are supposedly addressing. Right. Human rights 00:44:02.420 --> 00:44:05.900 organizations, or HROs, faced significant difficulties 00:44:05.900 --> 00:44:08.139 in actually advancing these human rights frames 00:44:08.489 --> 00:44:10.510 within the established housing and community 00:44:10.510 --> 00:44:13.690 development field, the HCD field. Why with that? 00:44:14.210 --> 00:44:16.210 Weren't people receptive? It was complicated. 00:44:16.610 --> 00:44:19.309 Many chose an inside strategy, trying to work 00:44:19.309 --> 00:44:21.710 within existing institutional channels to affect 00:44:21.710 --> 00:44:25.190 change, lobbying legislators, working with agencies. 00:44:25.369 --> 00:44:26.969 Trying to get incremental change from within 00:44:26.969 --> 00:44:29.750 the system. Exactly. But these channels often 00:44:29.750 --> 00:44:32.210 prioritized what they called resonant frames, 00:44:32.510 --> 00:44:34.650 language they thought would appeal to policymakers. 00:44:35.309 --> 00:44:38.070 Like what? Things like housing opportunity or 00:44:38.070 --> 00:44:41.349 choice. These were perceived as more palatable, 00:44:41.590 --> 00:44:44.110 less confrontational than what were deemed more 00:44:44.110 --> 00:44:47.309 radical frames like human rights or right to 00:44:47.309 --> 00:44:49.889 return. So the human rights language was seen 00:44:49.889 --> 00:44:52.530 as too challenging? By some key players, yes. 00:44:52.760 --> 00:44:55.579 Research suggests that some organizations, like 00:44:55.579 --> 00:44:58.239 a prominent national affordable housing advocacy 00:44:58.239 --> 00:45:01.599 group referred to as Housing Org in some analyses, 00:45:02.400 --> 00:45:04.559 actively marginalized the human rights message. 00:45:05.559 --> 00:45:07.260 Fearing it would damage their legislative agenda 00:45:07.260 --> 00:45:09.679 in Washington, maybe compromise their relationships 00:45:09.679 --> 00:45:12.440 with funders, or make it harder to get bipartisan 00:45:12.440 --> 00:45:15.760 support for policy changes. They saw it as potentially 00:45:15.760 --> 00:45:18.019 counterproductive to their more mainstream goals. 00:45:18.300 --> 00:45:20.719 So it forces this incredibly tough choice for 00:45:20.719 --> 00:45:23.760 activists, doesn't it? It's a real bind. Do you 00:45:23.760 --> 00:45:26.239 stick to your radical principles, speak truth 00:45:26.239 --> 00:45:28.619 to power using the strongest moral language, 00:45:28.940 --> 00:45:32.400 and risk being ignored or sidelined? Or do you 00:45:32.400 --> 00:45:35.000 soften your message, use the resonant frames 00:45:35.000 --> 00:45:37.760 to gain a seat at the table, potentially diluting 00:45:37.760 --> 00:45:40.219 your original transformative impact, but maybe 00:45:40.219 --> 00:45:43.500 achieving small wins? It's a constant, difficult 00:45:43.500 --> 00:45:46.739 negotiation between principle and pragmatism 00:45:46.739 --> 00:45:49.480 that grassroots groups face all the time. And 00:45:49.480 --> 00:45:52.039 it speaks to the ongoing complex struggle for 00:45:52.039 --> 00:45:54.719 equitable and humane reconstruction in New Orleans 00:45:54.719 --> 00:45:57.559 and really beyond. The fight for these principles 00:45:57.559 --> 00:46:00.340 continues. It does. With some struggles expanding 00:46:00.340 --> 00:46:03.159 into what's known as the right to the city, a 00:46:03.159 --> 00:46:05.320 broader concept advocating for all residents, 00:46:05.559 --> 00:46:07.960 especially the marginalized, to have a say and 00:46:07.960 --> 00:46:10.119 a stake in how their urban environment is shaped 00:46:10.119 --> 00:46:12.119 and governed. And there's also a significant 00:46:12.119 --> 00:46:15.260 shift or at least an attempt towards overhauling 00:46:15.260 --> 00:46:17.880 federal disaster response legislation. Like the 00:46:17.880 --> 00:46:19.840 Stafford Act. Right. The Stafford Act typically 00:46:19.840 --> 00:46:21.739 governs how the government provides disaster 00:46:21.739 --> 00:46:24.320 relief and dictates federal resources after major 00:46:24.320 --> 00:46:27.619 emergencies. And the goal is to incorporate human 00:46:27.619 --> 00:46:30.320 rights principles directly into those foundational 00:46:30.320 --> 00:46:33.539 laws. That's the push. To make equity and human 00:46:33.539 --> 00:46:36.079 rights central to disaster response from the 00:46:36.079 --> 00:46:38.940 outset, not an afterthought. It shows that while 00:46:38.940 --> 00:46:41.159 the battles are hard fought, often involving 00:46:41.159 --> 00:46:43.820 difficult compromises, the fundamental questions 00:46:43.820 --> 00:46:46.679 are still being asked. questions about who gets 00:46:46.679 --> 00:46:49.860 to rebuild, who truly benefits, and who has a 00:46:49.860 --> 00:46:52.519 right to return and a right to the city, they're 00:46:52.519 --> 00:46:54.920 still very much alive and evolving. And this 00:46:54.920 --> 00:46:58.039 underscores the critical need for deep, rigorous 00:46:58.039 --> 00:47:00.599 practice and scholarship that actively confronts 00:47:00.599 --> 00:47:03.480 the persistence of racial and gender inequality 00:47:03.480 --> 00:47:06.559 in urban contexts, especially now in the wake 00:47:06.559 --> 00:47:09.340 of increasing climate related disasters. Because 00:47:09.340 --> 00:47:11.559 the New Orleans experience, particularly for 00:47:11.559 --> 00:47:14.099 low income African American women and their families, 00:47:14.559 --> 00:47:16.679 vividly illustrates how natural disasters are 00:47:16.679 --> 00:47:19.719 not just physical events. They are profound social 00:47:19.719 --> 00:47:22.800 and economic reconfigurations that expose and 00:47:22.800 --> 00:47:25.889 exacerbate pre existing racial and gender inequalities. 00:47:25.929 --> 00:47:28.929 It's not an isolated case. Not at all. It serves 00:47:28.929 --> 00:47:31.670 as a powerful canary in a coal mine for other 00:47:31.670 --> 00:47:34.130 communities grappling with the increasing frequency 00:47:34.130 --> 00:47:37.210 and intensity of climate related disasters and 00:47:37.210 --> 00:47:40.010 the complex urgent issues of achieving truly 00:47:40.010 --> 00:47:42.570 equitable recovery. And that wraps up another 00:47:42.570 --> 00:47:45.130 illuminating exploration here on meteorology 00:47:45.130 --> 00:47:48.030 matters. We hope this look at post -Katrina New 00:47:48.030 --> 00:47:50.170 Orleans gave you a lot to think about regarding 00:47:50.170 --> 00:47:52.789 the long -term impacts of hurricanes and these 00:47:52.840 --> 00:47:56.000 crucial issues of equitable recovery. It raises 00:47:56.000 --> 00:47:58.880 fundamental questions. It really does. When the 00:47:58.880 --> 00:48:00.980 market's the market, as one official put it, 00:48:01.300 --> 00:48:03.480 but if that market consistently pushes out the 00:48:03.480 --> 00:48:06.159 most vulnerable, then what is our collective 00:48:06.159 --> 00:48:08.820 responsibility? Should housing be treated purely 00:48:08.820 --> 00:48:11.480 as a commodity or as a fundamental human right 00:48:11.480 --> 00:48:14.369 for everyone? something to really ponder. A crucial 00:48:14.369 --> 00:48:16.590 question for our times. You can continue this 00:48:16.590 --> 00:48:18.789 conversation by hitting that like button, subscribing, 00:48:18.949 --> 00:48:21.050 and leaving a review for the Meteorology Matters 00:48:21.050 --> 00:48:23.449 podcast. Your feedback really helps us reach 00:48:23.449 --> 00:48:25.670 more listeners. We appreciate the support. To 00:48:25.670 --> 00:48:27.869 keep up with all things weather and beyond, you 00:48:27.869 --> 00:48:30.670 can follow meteorologist Rob Jones on Instagram, 00:48:30.929 --> 00:48:34.710 at, at, meteorologist. That's all one word, meteorologist. 00:48:34.809 --> 00:48:38.150 And on TikTok. On TikTok, he's at TV Meteorologist. 00:48:38.670 --> 00:48:41.429 And on YouTube, just search for Rob Jones Hurricane. 00:48:41.719 --> 00:48:44.880 Again, all one word, where you'll also find the 00:48:44.880 --> 00:48:47.280 Meteorology Matters podcast playlist with all 00:48:47.280 --> 00:48:49.760 our deep dives. Great resources there. We look 00:48:49.760 --> 00:48:52.199 forward to our next exploration together on Meteorology 00:48:52.199 --> 00:48:52.699 Matters.