Creeping across the pasture land. Got dirt on
the boots and a working hand. From the milk house
home to the auction call. These are the folks
standing strong and tall. Yeah, this is... Welcome
back to The Deep Dive, brought to you by The
Bullvine, where we cut through dairy industry
noise to get you the insight that actually matter
for your operation. And today we're peeling back
the layers on a story that is, it's really required
reading for anyone managing genetics in the modern
era. I agree. This feature piece challenges everything
the industry tells us about index rankings and,
you know. price tags, it's got explosive history,
current warnings, and a massive paradox right
at its heart. It truly does. We are deep diving
into the legacy of Carol Prelude M. Toto, the
Italian specialist bull. When he hit the UK market
in, what, 1998? He was a total anomaly. Oh, completely.
He was priced at a painful 40 pounds per straw,
which was, I mean, quite literally four times
the average commercial volume bull at the time.
Yeah. And to add insult to injury, his paper
proof showed moderate, even mediocre production.
And the irony here is just stunning. And it's
really the core thesis of this deep dive. A bull
that looked like a financial mistake on paper
expensive, low ranked for milk yield became the
genetic cornerstone of billion dollar dynasties.
He arguably saved the structural integrity of
the Holstein breed in Europe and well, beyond.
We're going to trace that journey. And critically,
we're going to show you how. That exact history,
that pattern of chasing flashy production while
ignoring durability, it's repeating itself right
now with genomic selection. Okay, let's unpack
this and set the stage for why this matters to
the farmer listening today. We have to rewind
the clock a bit. We do. Back to the late 1990s.
This was the peak era of the production at all
costs mentality. Right. An echo chamber created
by decades of relentless focus on the bulk tank.
Volume, volume, volume. And the stakes for understanding
this history are, they're immense. We talk to
farm consultants constantly. They show us the
hard data that separates the survivors from those
who failed. Think back to the 2008 economic crisis.
Input costs soared, milk prices tanked, and that
volatility just crushed operations. I remember
those times it was absolutely brutal It was.
And the data shows a really clear pattern. Farms
that bought the cheap, high production, high
TPI bulls in the late 90s, the ones that gave
you those spectacular first lactation numbers.
Yeah, the ones that look great on paper. Exactly.
Those were often the ones who couldn't weather
the storm. Their cows just broke down. They fell
apart. Replacement rates skyrocketed right when
money was tightest. They were hemorrhaging cash.
So the high initial yield was essentially a trap.
It was a trap. Exactly. But the farms that...
Invested in Mentodo's survival genetics, paying
that premium for durability, for health and for,
you know, a third or fourth lactation. You were
the one still standing. They were still profitable.
They were still milking these quiet fifth and
sixth lactation cows that were just doing their
job without a vet bill. That investment decision
25 years ago is often the difference between
still farming today and seeing your fields become
suburban development. The fundamental, often
overlooked lesson here is that longevity is the
only true sustainable engine of farm profitability.
And before we dive into all the details, we have
to tackle the most controversial aspect head
on, because it's a bit of a mind bender. It is.
If you look at Bemtodo's current genetic proofs.
Let's say in the August 2025 UK evaluations,
the numbers look like a catastrophe. He shows
negative production traits like minus 18 kilograms
of milk and a profitable lifetime index, a PLI,
of minus 112 pounds. That is the ultimate paradox.
On paper, if you filtered your catalog today
for anything above a neutral PLI, you would skip
him entirely. An AI technician pitching him based
on those raw numbers would be, well, left off
the farm. But we are arguing that the negative
proof is actually a measure of his success, not
his failure. Precisely. His genetics were so
successful at correcting those Bell -era frailties
that they lifted the structural and health baseline
of the entire Holstein population. We're going
to spend time later explaining the base change
phenomenon, but think of it this way. He was
so good at fixing things that the fix became
the new normal. And this leads to our ultimate
warning. The bull that's topping all the genomic
lists today, the one that looks spectacular on
paper, might just be tomorrow's financial disaster
for your operation. Just like the high production.
Low longevity Bell daughters were back in the
late 1990s. We have to learn from this history
or we are absolutely doomed to repeat it. OK,
let's start the investigation by defining the
colossal problem that Makoto was engineered to
solve. And that means we have to talk about the
Bell legacy. Yes. Carlin M. Ivanhoe Bell. He
arrived on the scene in the late 80s and early
90s. And for lack of a better phrase, he just
revolutionized. the bulk tank. He was the definition
of production, putting an average of, what, 1
,700 pounds above the herd average into the tanks?
He was a superstar, no question. Farmers were
ecstatic because they could immediately see the
return. But the phrase, no such thing as a free
lunch, was never more true than with Bell. Right.
That immense production came at an immense physiological
cost, something the farmer only discovered, you
know, a year or two into the daughter's productive
lives. The sources detail what happened next.
The Bell paradox was essentially, production
wrapped in tissue paper. Those genetics drove
structural frailty across the board. And we're
not talking about small things. We're talking
about poorly attached udders that hung low, increasing
the risk of injury and infection. We're talking
about cows prone to... devastating metabolic
disorders, specifically milk fever and ketosis,
because they just couldn't partition the energy
required for that spectacular output. And crucially,
weak legs that simply could not sustain the load
and the relentless production pace. Producers
who managed those bell daughters during that
era described the barn floor as a constant battlefield.
I mean, that sounds exhausting. It was a management
nightmare. You had cows everywhere standing with
splayed rear legs trying to balance these broken
down udders. You had chronic lameness issues
starting in the second lactation, and they were
perpetually struggling to breed back. So the
replacement rate must have been through the roof.
Unsustainable. Research run by major universities
documented that bell daughters live significantly
shorter productive lives, often two to three
years less than cows with more balanced genetics.
Wait, I want to drill down on the economics of
that. If you're getting, say, 1 ,700 pounds of
extra milk in the first lactation, but you lose
two full lactations of productive life, where
does the balance sheet actually land? That's
the million -dollar question, because that's
where the industry got fooled. The spectacular
first lactation production gains were almost
entirely negated or even reversed by the high
replacement costs and the vet bills. Right. The
estimated cost to rear a heifer to first calving
in the late 90s was substantial. It easily offset
the marginal gain in that first year. If a cow
only lasts 2 .5 lactations, you are constantly
pouring money into raising replacements just
to maintain your herd size. You are running on
a genetic treadmill. So the industry had, through
this relentless focus on volume, effectively
bred out the necessary resilience. They had created
these production monsters wrapped in tissue paper.
Precisely. By the time M. Toto was born in 1993,
the industry, especially in Europe where environmental
pressures and longevity demands were higher,
was desperately searching for wearability, for
structural correctives, for genetics that could
handle long -term stress. They needed a fix.
They did. That structural deficiency is what
led enlightened breeders to prioritize traits
like longevity and utter confirmation, because
the most expensive cow is not the one producing
less milk. The most expensive cow is the one
you have to replace too soon. And that desperate
need for correction created the perfect vacuum
for a specialist bull like Emtoto. But the correction
didn't originate from the same production -focused
genetic programs that created the problem. No,
it could. It had to come from a different philosophy
entirely. Which brings us to the unique environment
of our second deep dive segment, the Italian
reality check. This is where conventional wisdom
surrounding U .S. style genetic indices gets
utterly challenged. The question is, why did
Italy's breeding philosophy diverge so sharply
from the North American focus on fluid milk volume?
It all comes down to the end product, doesn't
it? In North America, liquid consumption drove
genetics. In Italy, the sources state that over
80 % of Italian milk was destined for incredibly
high -value, quality -controlled cheese production.
We're talking Parmigiano -Reggiano and Grana
Padano. And these aren't just commodity products.
They are protected designation of origin or PDO
products with exceptionally strict quality requirements.
So those market realities completely dictate
the genetic priorities. The Italian National
Association, ANIFI, They didn't use TPI or PLI
in the same way. No, they relied on the ILQM,
the Italian Lactation Quality Merit Index. And
yes, production was 80 % of the weighting, but
that remaining 20 % was heavily focused on type,
with utter confirmation being absolutely central
to their scoring system. But it goes beyond just
structure, right? It's about the milk components
themselves. Absolutely. They weren't just looking
for volume. They needed specific protein quality.
This is where we talk about kappa casein content.
Okay, for the listener, break that down. Why
does kappa casein matter so much for cheese?
It's crucial for efficient and stable curd formation
during cheese making. If you lack the right type
and quantity of this protein, your cheese yield
suffers, and the quality of the final cheese
wheel is compromised. Metodo was bred to boost
protein quality, ensuring high cheese yield efficiency,
a factor that production indices often overlook
in favor of just sheer volume. And they also
needed ruggedness. These cows had to handle the
Po Valley environment and the long, sustained
production cycles required for those high -value
cheese dairies. Right. Functionality, as Italian
judge Gianni Beretta noted, was paramount. You
needed cows that will last four, five, or six
lactations, producing high -quality milk. Longevity
in that environment wasn't nice to have. It was
a non -negotiable economic necessity. So let's
analyze Metodo's pedigree. because it perfectly
illustrates how strategically he was designed
as a corrective tool for the entire breed. He
was built to address the bell flaws without losing
the bell production potential. Exactly. His sire
was Ronnie Burke Prelude, which brought stature,
style, and that essential durability from the
legendary Starbuck line. But the maternal side...
That provided the necessary counterbalance to
the tall, narrow look. His dam was Dixie Lee
Bree Star Betsy, a two -mar Black Star daughter.
And Black Star was the strength and width specialist
of his generation. So Prelude gave Emtodo height
and dairy character. Black Star gave him that
critical width, capacity, and sheer physical
strength. The sources even provide his AAA code,
426. For those unfamiliar, AAA is a system focusing
on physical balance. Walk me through why that
specific code was the logical corrective fix
for the narrowbell daughters who just lacked
capacity. Okay, so the code 426 perfectly signaled
a corrective bull for the common structural deficits
of the time. The 4 means strength and width.
That's targeting heart growth capacity, front
end width, and overall body depth, counteracting
the narrowness that Bell introduced. And the
2 and the 6. The two signal stature, so he kept
the frame, and the six indicates refinement adding
dairy quality and clean bone, making sure the
strength wasn't just brute force. Essentially,
he was bred to take a frail, high -production
cow and wrap it in a durable, robust frame. But
the real genetic masterstroke, the thing that
fixed the bell udders, was what they called the
chief mark correction. Yes. The structural weaknesses
and low -hanging udders that Bell transmitted
were deep in the pedigree of so many cows. Matodo's
maternal grand dame was sired by walkway chief
Mark. And chief Mark was famous for one thing,
transmitting superior, tightly attached udders
with correct teat placement. This Belex Chief
Mark cross, facilitated through Matodo's lineage,
is cited as one of the most successful nicks
in Holstein history. So what you're saying is
Matodo was able to carry the high production
potential that was locked in the bell line. Yes,
but the physical deficiencies, the utter flaws,
were corrected and packaged with the superior
structure provided by Chief Mark. The pharma
translation here is just powerful. Matodo was
literally bred. to repair the physical damage
inflicted by the previous generation's production
obsession. And the key difference in philosophy
was longevity, all driven by that PDO cheese
market. Think about the impact of mastitis in
a quality market. If your milk has high somatic
cell counts, indicating infection or inflammation,
the cheese factory won't just penalize you. They'll
reject it. They reject the milk outright. You
lose the sale entirely. Mastitis resistance in
this context wasn't some health bonus. It was
a hard economic requirement for survival in a
quality -driven market. This is why Matodo's
greatest strengths were invisible traits, utter
health, and somatic cell score. That brings us
perfectly to our third deep dive segment, Follow
the Money. We need to quantify the invisible
economics of utter health, which ultimately proved
that the price tag of 40 pounds was actually
a bargain. You mentioned the defining physical
trait of Matodo's daughters, tight teat sphincters.
Yes. They were renowned slow milking transmitters.
In a high throughput, modern rotary parlor environment
where the manager is judged on how many cows
they get through per hour, slow milking is viewed
as a serious defect. Because speed is king. Speed
is prioritized above all else. But the source
analysis explains the precise physiological tradeoff.
And this is crucial for understanding the economic
mistake the industry was making. Loose finkters
mean fast making, which parlor managers love.
But that loose tissue leads the door wide open
for bacteria to enter the udder post -milking,
turning those cows into mastitis magnets. And
Matodo's genetics transmitted the opposite. Tight
teat sphincter muscles. This made them snow milkers,
yes, which frustrated the staff. But those tight
sphincters created a natural physical barrier,
an impenetrable defense mechanism against bacterial
invasion immediately following milking. And this
resulted in Matodo achieving health proofs that
were just utterly superior. His UK proofs showed
an elite somatic cell score of NERIG of 13, a
healthy cow index of plus 17, and a lame disadvantage
of plus 0 .7. Let's pause and define what NERIG
of 13 SCC means for the practical farmer. OK,
so when we talk about SCC scores, a negative
number is good, meaning the bull reduces SCC
in his daughters. A Nader 13 in the UK system
is considered elite. It translates directly to
fewer chronic infections, fewer subclinical cases,
and therefore higher quality milk checks and
far less dumping of unusable milk. I want to
challenge the economics here, though. A lot of
farmers here slow milker and they immediately
think labor costs. If Mitoto's daughters are
adding 30 seconds to the milking time for 200.
cows, that's real labor money being spent. How
do we balance that tangible cost against the
invisible savings? That is the perfect question,
and it illustrates why traditional spreadsheets
failed to value mTOTO correctly. The parlor manager
sees the tangible cost. A hard milker costs maybe
30 or even 50 nevers a year in extra labor because
of slower throughput. That's a definite calculated
loss. Okay, so a 50 devery loss per cow per year.
That's one bad. Now, let's look at the profit
from what the sources call the invisible cow.
What is the cost of a single severe mastitis
case? Conservatively, you lose the milk from
the infected quarter, you spend on the vet visit,
you spend on antibiotics, you spend time on labor
for treatments. Three times a day for a week.
Right. And you have milk withholding. Yeah. That
total cost for a single severe case can easily
run 300 to 500 euros. The bold daughter might
have three or four severe cases in a short career.
Exactly. So now... Combine the avoided vet bills,
the avoided labor, the avoided milk loss, the
avoided permanent damage to the udder, and then
add the biggest saving of all, avoided culling.
By avoiding those problems and getting just two
or three extra profitable lactations, which metodo
daughters routinely did, you generate 2 ,000
to 3 ,000 in additional pure profit per cow over
her lifetime. So we're comparing a certain 50
annual labor cost against a potential 3 ,000
lifetime profit increase from avoided disaster.
The spreadsheet's were dead wrong when they only
focused on fast milking and volume. They were
catastrophically wrong. The mtoto cow wasn't
spectacular. She was profitable because she was
quiet. She cost nothing to keep running. She
was the definition of functional resilience.
And that ultimately justifies the famous 40 -pound
question. When Avoncroft introduced him in 1998,
he was 40 pounds per straw when competitors like
Ulma Prelude Tugelo were 20 pounds and General
Purpose Volume Sires were, what, 10 pounds, 15
pounds? It required a philosophical leap to stid
that money. It was a strategic investment, not
an expense. Farmers weren't paying 40 pounds
for production volume. They were paying 40 pounds
for an insurance policy. They were buying a targeted
solution to expensive systemic problems, mastitis,
high replacement rates, structural breakdown
that were bleeding their operations dry. That
premium price reflected his specialty status
and his ability to fix problems that cost 10
times that much to manage. Forward -thinking
producers recognize that value, even if his production
proofs were just moderate. And that strategic
contrarian application of M -Toto is perfectly
illustrated in our fourth deep dive segment.
The case studies and examples which led to the
birth of the shuttle dynasty. This story is the
ultimate example of defying the conventional
wisdom of the AI industry. We're talking about
the Pickford family in the UK and their cow,
Condon Arrow Sharon, classified EX91. The year
is 1999, and Sharon is eight years old. Eight
years old. Think about that in terms of genetic
turnover. The industry had fully filtered her
out. She was, by all accounts, a genetic antique.
Obsolete. Yeah. AI companies want young, high
-genomic heifers to breed from because progress
moves so fast. Sharon was considered completely
obsolete. But the Pickfers looked past the hype.
They recognized that Sharon possessed the most
important genetic trait you can't get from a
genomic test. durability. She had survived eight
years of high production, maintained a high classification,
and kept breeding back. She was a proven survivor.
Their decision was a calculated wager. They bred
this proven survivor, Sharon, to the durability
specialist, Mentoto. The goal wasn't just maximizing
milk. It was locking in that longevity and adding
Mentoto's elite low SCC and utter refinement,
specifically to counter the prevailing industry
age bias. And that decision created a dynasty.
On July 23, 1999, Pixton Schottel was born. The
sources describe Schottel as a perfected mtoto.
He successfully retained the elite low SCC and
the functional correct type of his sire, but
he gained the necessary increased milk flow and
powerful frame from his dam's high -producing
lineage. The phenomenon that followed was unprecedented,
and it confirms the economic theory of the invisible
cow. Farmers didn't notice shottle daughters
for their spectacular production. I mean, they
were good, but not record breakers. They noticed
them for their total lack of drama. The invisible
cow. Yes. The shottle daughters rarely needed
vet treatment. They bred back easily. They quietly
produced for five, six, even seven lactations.
This complete lack of management headaches drove
what industry analysts called unprecedented reorder
rates. I remember reading about that. It wasn't
just a bull selling well. It was repeat business
based on actual farm level performance. Exactly.
The process was a farmer would try 10 straws,
see the functional results, the easy calving,
the clean, utter health, and they would immediately
call wanting hundreds more. That right there
is the real metric of a bull's value. Customer
satisfaction and reorder rates based on durability,
not just the initial glossy index ranking. Schottl's
dominance then went global. In 2008, he achieved
the number one TPI ranking in the United States.
I mean, think about that. A UK bred bull from
an Italian sire focusing on cheese genetics and
an old cow. dominating North American genetics,
which was focused on volume. It just demonstrates
the desperate global need for that kind of correction.
His legacy is difficult to quantify fully. Over
1 .17 million doses sold globally and an estimated
economic impact in the billions, predominantly
through saved costs. Reduced mastitis treatments,
fewer involuntary calls, and extended productive
lives. I'm Toto in shuttle. proved that durability
and consistency are the fundamental drivers of
long -term profit, not the spectacular short
-term production highs. No doubt. So, we've established
that Memtoto was a genetic giant, a revolutionary
for his time, but we have to return to the elephant
in the room that we teased earlier. Why are Memtoto's
2025 proofs negative? Milk minus 18 kilograms.
PLI minus 112 pounds. Why does the bull that
saved the breed look like a disaster on today's
catalog? This is where we need to slow down and
really understand the concept of base change
reality. The Holstein breed average, which determines
the genetic proof rankings, resets approximately
every five years to reflect the progress made
by the entire population. Okay, think of it like
Olympic records. Every four years, the average
performance of top athletes gets better, so a
gold medal performance from 1998 might not even
qualify for the finals in 2025. That's a perfect
analogy. Matodo's genetics were so successful
at introducing health, longevity, and structural
soundness that they lifted the floor of the entire
population. The cow that was the exceptional
standard bearer for utter quality and structural
correctness in 1998 is, by today's standards,
merely average. Because the average cow today
is just structurally and functionally superior
to the average cow 30 years ago. Largely thanks
to Matodo's influence. So those negative production
figures reflect 30 years of intense, successful
selection pressure on the breed as a whole. It
means the breed has successfully caught up to
and surpassed Matoda's production capability
while retaining the durability he provided. And
you have to look at his health traits. They're
still there. Critically, yes. Look at his health
traits. His SEC score still sits at negative
13. Those functional genes survived 30 years
of selection because they work. Genomic analysis
confirms his foundational influence. His genetics
consistently show up in analyses of genes in
common with the current elite population, making
up 6 .44 % of the shared genetics. That is incredible.
That level of persistent influence is the ultimate
proof of value. This historical perspective gives
us a critical warning for the present moment.
If Intoto represented the correction for the
disastrous Bell era, are we now... today facing
bill 2 .0 we are and we are repeating the mistake
at warp speed because of the power of genomics
in the 1980s it took years of progeny testing
to realize the bill daughters were breaking down
today we can saturate the breed with similar
high production low resilience genetics in 18
months. We are aggressively selecting for high
TPI, which is heavily skewed toward production
and component yield, while dangerously underweighting
the survival traits that are often harder to
predict accurately from a calf's DNA. We've seen
the consultants' reports, and they paint a terrifyingly
familiar picture. They quote the exact same pattern.
Herds using only the top 10 TPI bulls see absolutely
beautiful, spectacular first lactations. Then
structural or metabolic problems emerge by the
second, and those high TPI cows are often gone,
culled, or struggling by the third. Genomic selection
has simply created fragility at a much faster
rate. Wait, I need more detail on that frailty
problem. What specifically is breaking down in
these modern top -indexed cows? It's the same
bill era mechanics, just expressed differently
due to, you know, modern environmental pressures.
We see early metabolic collapse when the cow's
energy partitioning system can't keep up with
the component yield demand. That leads to poor
fertility and an increased risk of milk fever
or ketosis. We see foot and leg issues, specifically
digital dermatitis, because their frame is pushed
too hard. And worst of all, reproductive failure
is soaring, meaning they simply fail to breed
back, forcing involuntary culture. after the
first or second lactation. And this fragility
is compounded by the diversity crisis, isn't
it? Exactly. The research is scary. It shows
the Holstein breed's effective population size
has collapsed to maybe 50 to 100 animals. We
are increasing the risk of inbreeding and disease
susceptibility while still chasing that singular
high TPI metric. We're putting all our genetic
eggs into a single fragile basket. So we're forgetting
the lesson Imtoto taught us. It seems like it.
mToto taught us to diversify and prioritize resilience.
The industry seems to be forgetting that lesson
in the pursuit of a higher index rank. So if
we need to apply the brakes on this genetic speedrun
and diversify our selection, where do we find
today's mToto? We know he's not going to be topping
the TPI list, he'll probably be expensive, and
his production will look moderate. The contrarian
argument is powerful. The most profitable bull
in the catalog for many commercial operations,
the one who will keep your farm running until
2040, is likely hiding down at TPI rank, hashtag
300, hashtag 400. That low? Yeah. He misses the
spectacular production metrics that grab the
headlines, but he possesses the comprehensive
durability traits that actually make you money.
Okay, so I'm the farmer listening right now.
I'm skeptical of paying premium prices for moderate
production. Walk me through the criteria. What
specific survival genetics define the 2025 mTOTO
profile needed for the modern dairy environment?
Volatile input costs, climate change, robotic
milking demands. We need to define the survival
traits with precision. First, reproductive efficiency.
That bull needs daughter pregnancy rates, DPR,
at plus 3 .0 or better. Why that number specifically?
Because a cow that breeds back easily is a cow
that stays in the herd. It's that simple. For
robotic systems, consistent breeding is non -negotiable
for parlor flow and efficiency. What about health?
Metodo specialty. We need elite SCC scores. Definitely
under 2 .7 in the U .S. system or the equivalent
of mTOTO's negative 13 in the U .K. system. This
means mastitis resistance. Second, we need metabolic
resilience cows that don't crash in early lactation
when pushed for high components. They manage
their energy demand without resorting to chronic
negative energy balance. And finally, structure.
And finally, functional structure, robust feet
and legs that can handle concrete floors and
the specific movement demands of robotic gates.
If that bull is ranked half -tech 350 in TPI,
his price might still be high, say $50 or $60
a straw, because the AI companies know the functional
value is premium. This means the farmer still
has to overcome the exact same psychological
barrier the Pickfords faced with the 40 -pound
M. Toto straw back in 1998. That's the key takeaway.
You must recognize that paying a premium for
a moderate production bolt isn't an expense.
It's the lowest cost insurance policy you can
buy against metabolic and structural breakdown.
The price reflects the avoided disaster. Emtoto
and Schottl prove that durability and consistency
lasting six or seven lactations are the real
quiet engines of long -term profit, entirely
outweighing the spectacular short -term production
highs. It's about shifting the focus from income
maximization to cost minimization. The bull that
costs you the least in vet bills and replacement
heifers is the most profitable bull. At the end
of the day, that's it. All right. This has been
a profound historical and current analysis. The
farmer listening just finished morning milking.
They're heading to the feed store, catalog open,
or perhaps they're logging into their breeding
software. What are the three structured, actionable
insights they need to take from this deep dive
into Mentoto's legacy? OK, we need to structure
this into immediate, medium and long term actions
to make this knowledge practical. Let's start
with immediate action. What should they review
this week? Immediately, you need to review your
current bull filtering system and your internal
culling reports. Stop filtering exclusively for
the top 50 TPI list, which is often just chasing
vanity metrics. So change the search parameters.
Exactly. Start screening the entire catalog for
the mToto profile. Bulls with elite health traits,
specifically low SCC, utter health, and lameness
advantage, even if the overall PLI or TPI rank
is moderate, like in the hashtag 200 to hashtag
400 range. If you're struggling with mastitis
or fertility, that bull at hashtag 350 might
be the one saving your farm in 2028. You need
to identify your weakest link and start searching
for the corrective tool. OK, medium term strategy.
What strategic changes should they implement
over the next three to six months? Implement
corrective mating strategically. Remember, mToto
was marketed as a high -price corrective tool,
not a general -purpose sire for the entire herd.
Identify specific cow families or individual
cows that exhibit the Bell -era flaws, poor udders,
chronic mastitis, or poor fertility. Target the
problem, Cass. Right. Use the premium specialized
sires, the ones that cost more, but offer high
DPR or SCC only on those specific cows that need
that targeted structural correction. Use the
cheaper volume bulls only on your genetically
sound cow families. Don't waste the specialist
genetics on cows that don't need the correction.
And finally, long -term positioning. How do they
align their operation for the next one to two
years? You must redefine your profit drivers.
Make longevity metrics productive life. Healthy
cow index and daughter pregnancy rate, the primary
factors in your breeding index. You have to recognize
that two extra profitable lactations from an
invisible cow are worth far more than 500 pounds
of extra milk in the first. And what if you're
using robots? If your operation is moving toward
or already uses robotic milking, mTOTO's functional
type, specifically the tight udder attachment
and correct... centrally placed teat position
is non -negotiable for system efficiency. Align
your breeding objectives with the reality of
your farm management, not the glossy magazine
rankings. This has been another deep dive from
the Bullbine podcast, reminding us that genetic
value depends entirely on context. The bull that
looks like an expensive failure on paper can,
in fact, be the essential specialist who saves
your herd from economic disaster. If this kind
of impartial, no -BS industry analysis helps
your operation, head to www. And seriously, subscribe
wherever you get your deep dives. We're releasing
episodes twice weekly now, and trust me, you
don't want to miss what we've got coming next
week. We're doing a comprehensive deep dive into
the genetic revolution, how record -breaking
milk components are reshaping dairy's future.
We will focus heavily on the new net merit 2025
formula, why the industry is pivoting hard toward
butterfat and protein yield. and why feed efficiency
is not just a secondary metric anymore, but the
single most crucial factor for surviving volatile
input costs in the coming decade. We'll see you
next time.