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Welcome to episode 5 of our podcast, Waypoints to Nowhere, Navigational Quirks.

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Before we take off into today's episode, we have some exciting updates to share about our MH370

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investigation. We apologize for the delay in releasing this episode, but the past few weeks

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have been dedicated to preparing for and conducting several crucial meetings with high-profile

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companies. These meetings required 100% of our time to ensure we presented our 10 years of research

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based on facts accurately. Welcome back to another episode of Vanished Skies, the MH370 mystery unsolved.

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I'm Ed Skerritt, your operational and flight crew MH370 analysis human errors effect reporting,

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and as always, I'm joined by my co-host, Marilyn Skerritt, a seasoned expert in the travel and

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airline industry. Marilyn has a wealth of experience from running her own travel agency

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back in the 90s until the internet revolutionized the way business was done to working with major

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airlines like Continental and Avalo. She's handled everything from customer service to gate operations,

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ticketing, and ensuring safety and compliance with airline rules. Back in the early days at

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Continental Airlines at Tweed, things were a bit different. I remember one day when a

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boss just walked up to me, pointed at the door, and that was all the direction I got. But the day

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that really stands out was during a heavy snowstorm. I was out there and my boss shouted,

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climb point, shoot. It was on the spot training at its finest. Or maybe it's roughest. There I was,

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in the middle of the storm, being told to spray the plane without much guidance. It was a different

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world back then where you learned by doing, often in the thick of it. These experiences were part of

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the knowledge I gained before aviation safety saw the major changes that we rely on today.

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It's always a pleasure to have you on board while diving deep into the role of waypoints in the MH370

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mystery. So Marilyn, let's start with the basics. What exactly are waypoints and why are they so

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crucial in this investigation? Great question, Ed. Waypoints are essentially coordinates, specific

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points in the sky that a plane's navigation system uses to guide it along its route. Think of them

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like the milestones you see on a road trip. Each waypoint is a stepping stone that keeps the plane

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on its intended path. Right, so they're like the GPS points you follow when you're driving somewhere,

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but in the case of MH370, it seems these waypoints became more than just coordinates on a map. They

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might actually hold the key to understanding what happened that night. Exactly. The waypoints that

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MH370 was supposed to follow were pre-programmed into the flight computer. But here's where it gets

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interesting. The plane didn't stick to its original course. It deviated, and those deviations are what

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we need to focus on. So are you saying that by studying which waypoints were hit and which

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were missed, we can trace the plane's movements and possibly figure out why it went off course?

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Yes, that's right. Each waypoint tells a part of the story. For example, after the plane made that

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sharp left turn over the South China Sea, it started following a completely different set of

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waypoints. These weren't part of the original flight plan to Beijing. The question is why?

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Was it a deliberate change, a system error, or something else?

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And that's where things get complicated. Because if we can figure out why the plane shifted from

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one waypoint to another, we might be able to answer the bigger question of what really happened

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to MH370. But before we continue, I have to say the last two months pretty crazy, or what?

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It's been a challenging yet rewarding process to condense a decade of investigation into just

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an hour. The first 10 minutes alone were spent debunking social media myths. We had to summarize

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the first five episodes of this podcast quickly. Despite the tight deadline, we had a lot of work

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to do. We needed to convert the information stored in our Google Earth program and present our

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findings in the simplest and most efficient way possible. After exploring various meeting applications,

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we narrowed it down to Microsoft Teams and Zoom. We tested various meeting platforms and all agreed

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that Zoom meetings with its whiteboard features allows us to present our findings in the simplest

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format. For an investigation like MH370, we need to show all the details clearly. We found Zoom to

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be the best tool for this stage and we are getting better each time. Our investigation is well-rounded

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with hundreds of interconnected findings that strengthen our conclusions. We're excited to

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continue sharing our progress with you, our listeners. Ed, I remember those predictions you

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made two months after the event. You were convinced that the cause was as simple as human error,

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compounded by several other contributing factors that no one but you considered.

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The conspiracy theories reported by the major media sounded like a major motion picture.

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With all your experience working for the railroad, you realized that the details of the events were

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being overembellished. You knew it just doesn't happen that way in the real world. The media would

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often begin an article with valuable news like a crew member entering information into the plane's

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flight computer. That story alone had a probability of 51%. It could have been a great discovery,

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but the author decided to dilute good information with speculation. Yes, a person did input

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information into the plane's computer. This is where the article should have ended. The

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investigators knew something was typed into the plane's computer, but what was missing was who

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did it, what was typed in, and why it was being typed in. Exactly. That was a classic case of

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inline training. Definitely a red flag in today's standards. But I promise you, by the time we wrap

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this up, our listeners will find it hard to dispute our findings. Let's go over our checklist.

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One, flight path. We've mapped it out precisely. Two, supported by analysis. Think of it like a

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combination lock with billions of possibilities. But that lock becomes much easier to crack when

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you consider our analysis, which suggests that the autopilot was engaged at 1752 UTC. And for those

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who want to fact check us, we're drawing straight from the MH370 factual reports. The biggest

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obstacle for MH370 investigators with the lack of debris to examine, the teams were forced

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looked to other avenues like the satellite data. Inmarsat satellite engineers played a crucial

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role by using satellite pings to help communicate with the airplane. Simply put, a ping is like a

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quick check to see if something is there and can respond. Imagine it as sending a small signal or

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message to the airplane to see if it replies. This process helps confirm the airplane's location

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and status. It's a basic tool used in computer networks to verify if a particular address exists

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and can accept requests, similar to checking if a friend is home by sending a text and getting a

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reply. When investigating an accident, we need to focus on identifying the initial trigger,

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the first act in a series of unfortunate events. Imagine a snowball starting small at the top

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of a mountain. As it rolls down, it gathers more snow, becoming larger and more destructive.

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By the time it reaches the town at the bottom, it causes significant damage. The investigators knew

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something was typed into the plane's computer, but what was missing was who did it, what was typed

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in and why it was being typed in. What sets our investigation apart is our unwavering commitment

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to basing our analysis on facts and logic. Most investigators would start looking for answers in

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the damaged town, but the real starting point is the top of the mountain. Our investigation only

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needs to look for that initial problem, the initial trigger. The more contributing factors involved,

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the harder the problem becomes to solve. What was your biggest challenge in finding out what

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happened? We have to different approaches to the disappearance of MH370, different from teams of

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professionals aviation experts. How did your approach differ from the team of investigators?

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To be honest, this whole inline training thing, whether it's two words or three,

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reminds me a lot of what I've seen in railroad training. That's where I started looking, right?

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You know, when similar training errors happen, you're lucky if they end up naming a rule after it.

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For the record, I don't have any rule named after me, but I know people who do.

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We delve into the aviation industry's data to provide a grounded perspective on what might

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have happened to MH370. Here's an essential fact. In the realm of commercial aviation accidents,

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85% of investigations conclude that human error is the primary cause. Of these incidents, 60%

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are attributed to pilot error. This translates to a 51% likelihood that a pilot made an error,

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those statistics form the foundation of our assessment. If we consider the world news reports,

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there's a tendency to highlight that the first officer was the most prone to errors.

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Here's the basis for our assessment. Fact one, it was reported that the first officer was on his

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last day of training with a qualified flight instructor. However, some critical facts are

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often overlooked. During his last five days of training, the previous four days involved a

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qualified flight instructor observing his every move. So the four previous training flights had

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a third person in the cockpit. This third person's job is to observe every action the training pilot

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makes. You could ask yourself if that third person was there to observe. Maybe this would have never

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have happened. A review and discussion of flight management safety reporting systems provided a

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lot of useful information. What we couldn't find was information about training programs. Is there

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a failure rate or does everyone pass? Types of testing, grades, are their guidelines? This training

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program is designed to provide pilots opportunities to advance. In this case, we have a student

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transitioning to a different type of plane from an Airbus to a Boeing, akin to switching from

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Microsoft software to Apple. When dealing with unknowns, it's crucial to consider where the

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most obvious results lie. Our investigation meticulously reconstructs the flight path using

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waypoint data, accounting for potential confusion over similar sounding waypoints and the ICAO's

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efforts to rename them for clarity. So the foundation of our investigation starts with

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collecting all available data and seeing what pieces fit together. We need to take all the

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information we have and store it somewhere. For us, Google Earth serves as our framework. We know

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the plane was instructed to make corrections, cancel the SID, and fly direct. Using this framework,

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we begin to structure our theory. We structured our outline based on the different phases of flight,

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takeoff, climb, cruise, approach, and landing. Using these phases provides us with a clear

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time frame for various workload periods. For example, during takeoff and climb, the workload

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is heavy until the autopilot is engaged, after which it becomes lighter. We also divided our

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analysis into three different areas based on available information. The first area covers

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the flight from the gate to Aigari, which includes most of our information from A-cars and Rolls-Royce

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Engine Monitoring Reports, ATC Communications, and radar. The next section has less information

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and covers the flight from Aigari to the Straits of Malacca. What's interesting here is how different

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approaches were taken with the information available. Let's start with the basics. We had the lost

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A-cars signal. Fact check that with the MH370 factual reporting for the exact time. Then the

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lost transponder, again, fact check that, and the turn that happened within the first 12 minutes.

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This is where the media started to miss key clues. So what did they miss? Inline training and the

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errors that come with it. If you look back at all the media coverage, when did they actually mention

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the cancellation of the SID? Let me pause you right there, Ed. I don't want our listeners to get

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confused. The cancellation of the SID. While it's not crucial right now, it's going to be very

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important when we dive deeper into the waypoints. And consider the first officer. He had only four

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days of training with third-person observation before that. Five days in total. Before exams

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and testing were supposed to be done. At that time, we had what? Three or four key clues? But no

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mention from the media. You have to wonder, if they had started with an inline training approach,

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they would have thrown out three basic assumptions to see what happened. And really,

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the first officer's ability has to come into question. Just a little bit, yes or no. But

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without the test results that were never completed before his first solo trip, that question lingers.

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Just to be clear, this isn't about blaming anyone. It's about recognizing how a combination of the

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most subtle changes in the environment can create what we call a toxic environment. And on that note,

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I'm going to read from the report we prepared for the OIF third-party file. This is where the case

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of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, MH370, comes into play. The disappearance of MH370 is one of the most

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perplexing and tragic events in modern aviation history. As we analyze the conditions that led

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to this event, we see how the environment in the cockpit could have transitioned from sterile to toxic.

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The very principles underlying the sterile cockpit rule, such as minimizing distractions,

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ensuring clear communication, and maintaining focus, were compromised, leading to a situation where

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small errors, missed communications, and potential lapses in protocol could have escalated into a

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larger catastrophe. The essay then ties this historical and procedural understanding to the

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specific circumstances surrounding MH370. We discuss how the environment on that flight may have

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deteriorated, influenced by factors like unsupervised training, communication breakdowns, and nighttime

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conditions. These elements, which should have been managed within a sterile framework,

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instead contributed to creating a toxic environment, one where small issues were allowed to snowball

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into an uncontrollable situation. Connecting points, sterile cockpit rule, established to

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prevent distractions and maintain focus during critical flight phases, historical context,

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key incidents where the rule was violated, leading to tragic outcomes, modern application,

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how the rule is integrated into contemporary aviation practices and challenges. MH370, analysis,

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the transition from a sterile to a toxic environment on MH370, where lapses in adherence

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to sterile cockpit principles may have contributed to the flight's disappearance. As we transition

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from our discussion on sterile environments and the toxic elements that can creep into the cockpit,

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it's important to circle back to a key concept we've touched on today, waypoints. Waypoints are

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essentially the coordinates or markers that aircraft use to navigate along their flight path.

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Think of them as invisible signposts in the sky, guiding the plane from one point to another,

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ensuring it stays on course. In this episode, we've only scratched the surface of how crucial

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these waypoints are, not just in navigation, but in understanding how MH370's flight path might

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have been influenced or altered. We've discussed how misinterpretations or errors related to

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waypoints could contribute to confusion and even tragedy within the complex systems of modern aviation.

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You've been listening to Vanished Skies, the MH370 mystery unsolved. I'm Ed Skerritt, here with

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my co-host, Marilyn Skerritt. If you have any questions or thoughts you'd like to share,

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please don't hesitate to reach out. We're committed to finding the answers you're looking for.

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Email us at vanishedskiesmh370@gmail.com. That's all one word. We're always eager to hear from

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our listeners. We're excited for our next episode, where we'll be taking a deep dive into the complex

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effects of a toxic environment and how it influences the processing of navigation waypoints between

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Boeing and Airbus. There's a lot to uncover, and we're sure you'll find it fascinating.

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Thank you for listening, and we look forward to having you with us again for episode 6.