Welcome to New Magazine's podcast entitled
Understanding the Steel Friendship.
Today, I had the opportunity and pleasure to host Igor Novakovic,
Research Director of ISAC Fund and Coordinator of Working Group for
the Chapters 30 and 31 within the National Convent of European Union.
We have touched on the issue of foreign policy of Republic of Serbia,
and positioning towards People's Republic of China,
we have also mentioned cooperation between Serbia and China in diverse
fields of diplomatic activities, as well as a triangle composed
of European Union, Serbia and People's Republic of China...
That is to say, to what extent Serbia's cooperation with China
can have an impact on the EU integration processes
of the Republic of Serbia. We invite you to follow our
podcast on You Tube Channel NM New Magazine,
and on all relevant media podcasts, such as Spotify, Deezer and Apple.
This podcast is sponsored by the U.S. Embassy in Serbia.
Good afternoon, Igor, welcome to the podcast of New Magazine.
Good afternoon, thank you for inviting me.
You are here today, so that we could discuss the evolution of
Serbian foreign policy when it comes to its relations towards China.
We will take some modern time frame for our observation period,
but I want to stress that you are here in your several capacities,
but primarily, you are here as Research Director of ISAC Fund,
The International and Security Affairs Center.
What is also important to mention today, you are also Coordinator of
Working Group for Chapters 30 and 31, within the National Convention on
European Union in Serbia (NCEU). I am convinced that few people
here can speak with such competence on the issues of foreign policy, which
are strategically important in the field of foreign policy of the
Republic of Serbia. So, I want to thank you for setting some time
aside to be here with us today. We have an unwritten rule here,
that is that we devote first question to the title of our podcast, namely
Understanding of the Steel Friendship, so in accordance
with that, I have to ask you first what does the phrase Steel Friendship
mean to you and how do you interpret this phrase that is often
being used on the part of the officials of the Republic of Serbia,
but also on the part of some Chinese representatives when
it comes to describing our bilateral relations.
I believe that it is one of the so called traditional approaches
of China when it gives names to some of its initiatives.
For instance, Wolf Worrier diplomatic initiative, those
are titles and names that have a certain color, that do not sound
so well within our geogaphic space, where we do not have such a strong
understanding of those phrases. So, I see it as an attempt on our
part to send certain message to China that we are in a way ready
to accept their approach in international relations, in the
same time, showing great respect for the Chinese culture as well.
Still, in our region, that phrase even sounds a bit ridiculous...
Steel friendship... -Yes, in our country,
it is being tied with the purchase of Ironworks or Steel works Smederevo
back in 2016... -If we want to be cynical,
I believe this is not the reason for calling our friendship 'steel',
but it is primarily suggested how strong this friendship is,
and to what extent it is flexible, so there will be no surprises there.
Okay, let's see how we got to the point to describe cooperation between
those two countries in such words, and I've already mentioned some
modern context of establishing relations, so I would like to focus
to some specific time frame, such as 2008, to this date,
however, I believe that when we talk about foreign policy or even some
historical or symbolic determinants, such as NATO intervention in 1999,
and air raids of Chinese Embassy, but as a focal point, we should go
back to 2008, and the start of contemporary development of relations.
Let's start with 2008, and the declaration of Kosovo's independence,
along with a set of diplomatic activities which the then leadership
carried out back then on the global level, in order to find partners that
could in diplomatic way help slowing down this act itself.
Do you think that this is a valid starting point for understanding
the development of foreign policy of Republic of Serbia towards China?
It certainly is, but there is also an additional element
that is important to mention: the start of economic crisis in 2008.
At that moment, in the first twelve months, let's recall Minister Dinkic's
statement who stated that the crisis will assist Serbian economy, but
we were faced with an opposite, in that period between 2008 and
2010 or 2011, Serbian diplomacy was also very engaged in finding
partners that could potentially invest into Serbia, or that might approve
certain loans as support of our state budget.
So, we witness engaging a series of partners, such as this Russian
loan that was in the end used for the reconstruction of railway
station, which was originally taken in that period of time...
So, for several years, we didn't know how to use it, so that in that
context, China was also being perceived for potential partner,
but unlike to other countries, China was a permanent Member of the
Security Council, regardless of the fact that the role of China back then
was not on this level in international relations. China was perceived as
very significant country, as China, together with Russia Federation,
could prevent Kosovo's membership in the United Nations, at least.
However, we could have other benefits from it, despite the fact that China's
engagement in international relations until then was not so tight.
Namely, China tends to be neutral, up to 2008, in what it hasn't
perceived as predominant subject of influence.
Therefore, China was not engaged in Yugoslav wars, so we haven't
heard some strong positons on the events that took place, China was
rather lenient when it comes to carrying out air raids on Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, up to the point when Chinese Embassy was hit.
There is a sequence of circumstances that most likely caused it to happen,
however, it was the moment for those who do not support the independence
of Kosovo to somehow be drawn into Serbia's orbit.
The most obvious example is what it was done with Russian Federation,
still at that point, we had China by our side, as well.
Then, it seems to me that it happened back in 2011, the then President of
Serbia, Boris Tadic, defined foreign policy as resting on four pillars.
It represented, actually, a listing at a given moment of permanent
members of the Security Council, as France and Great Britain were
in European Union, USA as the second pillar, followed by China and Russia.
China gained some greater importance there for the first time,
if we neglect the period from 1998 and 1999, when under the influence
of Mira Markovic, China was forced as a new partner in a national discourse.
I find interesting that you've mentioned the four pillar policy,
so I would like to go back to 2009, I should make an introduction to
the whole story. Observing foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia,
and strategic orientation of foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia,
from a research point of view, does not make it easier with
the fact that we do not have any strategic documents.
But we have 2009, and 2019, when we had a defined strategy
of national security. -It was in 2018, actually.
Yes, in 2018 and in 2009. In both these strategies,
we had segments that were directly or indirectly devoted to foreign
policy, along with some goals, or so-called national interests,
or priorities that Serbia is guided by in establishing
cooperation with other countries. China is mentioned indirectly in
those documents, it is mentioned in the statements of the officials.
It is also mentioned in the exposes of Prime Ministers since the year
when modern partnership has been established.
However, in some bigger scheme of setting Serbian foreign policy goals,
where would you position the developlemt of cooperation between
Serbia and China, on the priority list?
Where do you perceive China as dominant and less important,
in defining foreign policy goals of the Republic of Serbia?
I would define China as the third partner according to priority,
while I would define Russian Federation as the fourth partner,
its significance being in decline. The first priority partner of Serbia
is European Union, the second - the United States of America.
Still, China is good as an alternative source of income, that is to say,
in obtaining loans and potential investments, and China serves
as a good leverage in relations with the West,
as we see that actually our overall foreign policy road is defined with
the legacy of Yugoslav wars, or all the events that had taken place
afterwards, along with the fact that Pristina declared independence in
2008, and that we are still fighting against it,
despite the process of normalization through mediation provided by EU.
In that context, China's significance lies in the fact that it also refuses
to recognize Kosovo's independence, and on the other hand...
If we look at the chronology, we are perhaps the first country in Europe
which directed its focus on China at some point of time.
As the Initiative 16+1 was launched in 2013, if I remember it right...
2012 - the Initiative 16+1... -Followed by Belt and Road
Initiative in 2012/2013. -That's right...
So, these two initiatives which shaped China's engagement in
this region as well, but also in others, when it comes to Belt
and Road Initiative, things were not defined back then.
So, Serbia was the first country to sign a kind of agreement
in relation with the investment in the infrastructure domain,
that other countries didn't have, so we were the first to open that
window, without any indications that any serious loans would follow.
But we started things going with signing that agreement.
As things developed at certain points of time, when we faced
with the lack of investment from the European Union,
as since 2008, we witnessed major capital withdrawal from
Eastern Europe, it was the system of joined vessels.
The crisis originated in the USA, in order to cover their losses,
the capital is withdrawn from Europe, from Western Europe, more precisely,
the investments that the West had in Eastern and Central Europe
are withdrawn to the West, so the crisis spilled over here.
Apart from that economic outflow, meaning capital withdrawal,
we also witnessed the withdrawal of political interest for our region,
on the part of European Union, i.e. EU member states.
Germany was the only one to maintain certain focus through
the famous Berlin Process, which was launched in 2014.
It was launched without any specific structure whatsoever,
but it was gradually specified. It is interested, though, that in
2010, European Union launched infrastructure development plan,
West Balkan excluded. The only corridor that passed
through our territory was Corridor 7 - Danube River.
It happened simply because Danube flows through our territory.
All other aspects were excluded and only other players got involved here,
in the field of infrastructure development, did we receive
the supplement of that plan on the part of European Union.
So, what I wanted to say is that at certain point of time,
China was simply the only interested party, ready to do something here...
Was it fully in accordance with our interests or not, this is negotiable,
but its engagement certainly resulted in counter reaction of the West.
I'm glad that you've mentioned along the Chinese interest in this region,
and I would like to go back to the issue of cooperation between
Serbia and China in contesting the independence of Kosovo.
So, my question is what is there for China, what's Chinese interest?
Do you agree and to what extent with the standpoint that it is of
utmost importance for China to express its principal standpoint
when it comes to the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty
due to its own internal issues, rather than it is essentially
important to China to protect Serbia's territorial integrity.
The main principle of Chinese foreign policy that was in effect
for decades is that it doesn't get involved too much in the
global events, as it was primarily focused on itself and on sending
signals to its main partner United States of America.
Or better to say, not sending any signals to the USA,
thus maintaining below the radar, laying low...
This all changed now, especially since President Xi came to power,
as we witness a sharp acceleration in China's growth
in all aspects, military, economic, and all others.
I believe that lately, they show greater interest for the events
that take place on the global level, as China gathers that it cannot
remain in its exquisite isolation, self imposed one, so that it had
to have firm standpoints on certain issues.
In what sense? I don't believe that China regards this region
so important, its greatest interest is for Serbia to enter the EU,
as the potential friend of Beijing within the European Union,
and that its support of Serbia's territorial integrity and sovereignty
is a principal support, as you said, due to China's own problem with
Taiwan, but also with Tibet and Xinjiang, although China
control those territories, those are open issues that seem to be
burning issues in public as disputable territories.
In that context only, Kosovo is important to China.
China hadn't carried out a single active engagement of China when
it comes to this issue, unlike Russia, for example.
Russian Federation has engaged in this much more, even assisting
Serbian diplomacy efforts in this derecognition campaign.
However, I would like to point out to one fact.
Namely, China has engaged itself in Balkans for the first time in 2021
regarding one specific issue and that was appointment of High
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when China voted
against this appointment, so it was not neutral in
the Security Council but it voted against the appointment
of the new High Representative. In this respect, we can conclude
that in the long run, certain things will change,
but still, China's main interest is at some regional level, it regards
Balkans a significant partner, but West Europe is in its focus.
Western Europe is the main cause for launching
Belt and Road Initiative, in essence,
as it leads to establishing new roads towards Western Europe.
Easier delivery of goods, among other things...
Yes, that's right, but its main partner is over there, so
if we get priorities straight, then it is evident that in
principle, the priorities of minor partners won't matter much,
in case the agreement hasn't been reached between main partners.
I would like to add something, connected with the WB region,
more specific, due to the issue concerning territorial integrity
and sovereignty, and that is the fact that after the Russian aggression
towards Ukraine broke out, in the statements that went public after
the meetings of the officials of the Republic of Serbia and People's
Republic of China, almost indispensable part of statements
is that China confirmed its principal standpoint regarding Serbia's
territorial integrity and sovereignty, in accordance with the norms of
international law and declarations of European Union.
So, this is something that was not present on that level until 2022,
especially starting with the second half of 2022, this is part of every
single announcement or statement. -Yes, it is, but for the last year and
a half we have seen growing instability when it comes to
this, so it's in mutual interest to point out such things,
as what's valid for one party, should be valid for the other.
In this way, China shows its intent when it comes to the Taiwan issue,
although there would be no intervention, it is still significant
for China to make things clear, that Taiwan is integral part of China.
What we often witness, if West Balkan comes into the focus of international
community, this is mainly due to some crisis or in the period of
intense possibility of conflict arising per chance in BiH,
but we should mention Serbia and Kosovo, in that particular context.
If we are given space to present certain standpoint on a global scene,
this is in those times, and that is why Chinese position has been
underlined so strongly. -It is still questionable
whether and to what extent it will be instrumentalized,
or whether Serbia can really count on the help of China,
other than taking this principal standpoint.
We have this principle position for years, it's just underlined now.
My opinion which is disputable is that China will follow the position
of Serbia when it comes to Kosovo. -Of course.
If the Normalisation Process comes to the agreement that could be
implemented, China will surely support that agreement...
Unlike Russian Federation that won't support it... We had already
a statement of Sergei Lavrov, the other day in Skopje,
on the OSCE meeting, and Russian Federation is more willing to trade
with the West on this issue. China does not try for now,
nor is it willing to instrumentalize this issue in any way, apart from
underlying its firm position on this linked to their internal problem...
That is the issue of Taiwan. -Igor, in this final part of our
conversation, I would like if we could shed some light to
an important thing. You mentioned European Union in your exposition,
I say exposition, while we are trying to talk to each other...
However, Serbia as a country with the status of an EU candidate,
is obliged, prior to joining it, to fully align with the EU foreign
policy declarations and its restrictive measures...
As we often hear from our state officials, as a sovereign state,
Serbia still has the right to lead its own foreign policy,
but it is unquestionable that as EU candidate member, Serbia
should align with EU's procedures to the greatest extent possible.
ISAC Fund has been monitoring the level of compliance for years,
with EU policy declarations and its restrictive measures...
There is a dominant factor in the level of Serbia's
non-compliance with EU, and that's Russian Federation.
What you indicate in your reports is the fact that there are certain
number of declarations and restrictive measures, a multi-year trend, that is,
where Serbia didn't comply with EU due to its cooperation with China.
Can this present a challenge for the overall integration process,
but for the process of complying with EU policy declarations
and its restrictive measures, too... Maybe you could indicate which
are declarations Serbia doesn't comply with and why?
What are the disputed issues? -First of all, I don't believe that
non-compliance with EU declarations and restrictive measures that
concerns China won't be a problem, as it represents problem already.
Whenever China is mentioned, we are not aligned, but the number
of those declarations is not huge, compared to the number of
declarations concerning Russian Federation...
It actually concerns Russia's involvement in the war in Ukraine,
and related topics, to which we are also not aligned with.
So, this is absolutely out of focus.
So, I don't believe that this will present a problem...
I think that till the moment of joining the EU, Serbia won't
be asked to firmly comply with the EU's stance towards China,
although it could happen twelve months prior to EU accession,
when it will be expected that we fully comply with EU's perspectives.
It is the worst case scenario. It would be better to happen now.
Full focus is now on Russian Federation,
primarily because Russia's aggression on Ukraine presented
quite a shock for the European Union itself.
How shall I put it... Reviewing security system of the entire Europe
on the part of EU has been completely shattered.
Principles of inviolability of the state borders and territorial
integrity, along with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution have
been undermined, so they all felt a tremendous responsibility
with the Ukraine being assaulted, while European Union did not
offered assistance it should have offered.
EU has taken a rather strict stance towards Russia, strengthened by
member states, former members of Warsaw Pact,
Baltic states that were occupied from the Soviet Union back then
throughout the post-war period as they didn't willingly joined.
I mean Poland, Czech Republic and others.
Due to such a focus on Russian Federation, i.e. its operations in
Ukraine, China won't be such a big issue,
but when it comes to declarations, that were issued in the recent past,
those mainly concern specific agreements that China had made,
both with other players on the international scene and with
parts of its own country, so to speak...
Including the issues tied to the issue of human rights.
When it comes to the latter, I primarily had Hong Kong in mind,
everything that was going on in Hong Kong from 2018 onwards,
elections related issues, the new security law, and
other issues, upon which EU reacted, while Serbia
did not comply, of course, including the issues such as
human rights violations of dissidents in China,
along with the minority groups, such Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking people.
I think it was rather problematic at one point that Serbia hadn't
complied with the EU positions, followed by some statements of
Serbian officials that could be interpreted as an open support
to China in its efforts, both in Hong Kong and in Xinjiang,
but Russia is still dominant when it comes to the number of
non-compliances with EU... -With Russia's invasion of Ukraine,
the issue of Serbia's relations with China had fallen out of focus,
at least from the EU perspective. So, for the United States,
China presents the biggest challenge, this rivalry will only grow in future,
but at this moment, that was in the focus of the public,
especially after President's statements that were focused
on supporting, I would say deliberately, territorial integrity
and sovereignty of China, all attention was directed to this.
This is now out of focus as we have a bigger issue,
that concers directly all of us, and that is the biggest war in
Europe since the Second World War that can spill over here...
I would like to conclude this conversation with something
that calls for a separate interview. Namely, it is the fact that European
Union as such, it is of vital interest for Serbia, due to
our aspiring accession, and given our candidacy status,
that European Union is also in the process of redefining its policy,
reflecting on the fact that there's no homogeneous policy
of EU, or its member states, towards People's Republic
of China, while United States of America openly advocate policy
of full separation, so-called decoupling,
while such policy isn't currently in the interest of some EU members,
so we have redefinition from decoupling to risk reduction
in the cooperation with China, or the so-called de-risking,
so it remains to be seen, in the context of Serbia's
efforts to EU accession, in what way will present form of cooperation
with China be aligned with EU, with making it less risky, as
defined by the EU. Those are themes to be treated in the years
to come, so it doesn't have impact on the current position
of Serbia towards China, and towards European Union,
and it could certainly be an aggravating factor in
Serbia's EU accession process, but we can discuss this later...
Of course, there are also other issues, among the first, those
IT related, Internet, or cyber space in general.
European Union perceives that it is between the two
major players, the United States and China, so EU is out of that
league, so it is a question which kingdom it will support,
but it seems that EU prefers USA, so in that context, any
engagement with China is regarded as challenging.
Primarily, in the field of IT equipment, IT applications
and other issues, so in this aspect as well, Serbia should be cautious,
as if we misjudge the situation, in case of strategic investments
in this domain, we could pay a high price in future,
not in the context that we will be punished, but someone will
refuse to cooperate with us due to security reasons.
So, I think that Serbia should weigh its foreign policy position,
determining our current position carefully.
Our problem, I mean 'problem', as it isn't actually a problem...
Let's call it challenge... -That's right, challenge.
As a matter of fact, we are deeply in the jaws of the European Union
and NATO, we're surrounded with NATO members, so our
geopolitical position is quite clear. Having that aspect in mind,
we should weigh our position cautiously, even if we remain
in this position of self-proclaimed military neutrality status, and if
we don't join the EU, we will be forced to cooperate with them.
This is just how things stand.
This is the most cynical outlook to the issue of cooperation with
the West, but this is as simple as that.
So, in this context, establishing cooperation with any other
partner outside of our closest neighbourhood, which present,
as I said, NATO and EU, can involve certain risks.
Instead of making decisions out of the whim and ad hoc,
we should have somewhat deeper strategic reflection
what our future position should be and what are our interests.
Thank you for concluding our today's conversation with this
message or recommendation, so I would like to thank you
for being my guest in the podcast Understanding the Steel Friendship.
I am certain that the views you shared today with us
would contribute to helping people better understand these foreign
policy aspects of cooperation between the two states.
Thank you.
Produced by: New Magazine
Implemented with the support of the U.S. Embassy