Hello and welcome to the So What podcast in which political economic analyst JP Landman
discusses the issues uppermost in the minds of South Africans.
You can find a written version of this content on JP's website jplundmann.co.au.
I am Ruda Landman and I am your host.
These first few recordings were done at our dining room table but we will soon be moving
into a studio.
Hello and welcome to a recording to go with JP's latest newsletter.
It's dated the 19th of May 2023 and the title is Coalitions.
I suppose it's unnecessary to ask why this is such a hot topic at the moment.
Well if Johannesburg elects its 8th mayor in about 7 or 8 years and you look at the
dysfunctionality of municipalities all over the country, our experience of coalitions
have not been a successful one, not at all.
We've had coalitions since 2021, 2016 in Jo’burg but 2021 in other parts of the country and
it hasn't been an epic experience.
There's a lot of volatility, a lot of change in leadership all the time and the bottom
line is that the argument goes about who, not about how.
It is just the different digits giving us two very different words and two very different
outcomes.
It's about who occupies position of power and not about how we're going to exercise
power.
And now we've got to have a national election in the years time, in May 2024, 12 months
from now if the election is not postponed and a lot of people are filled with the anxiety
that one party will not get 50% of the vote and that we will then be forced into coalitions
at the national level and that is why it's a pertinent issue.
There's much excitement at the moment around the DA's moonshot pact and a series of small
new parties starting up.
If you look at the numbers what do they tell you?
Well the numbers tell me that the DA will really have a hard time to get to 50% through
a moonshot pact.
There are 14 political parties currently in parliament, four parties of which the DA
is one, command 92.5% of the vote.
The other 10 parties share 7.5%.
So it's not that we don't have small parties in the South African politics or parliament,
we have them.
They're just not that important.
Now the premise of the moonshot pact is that the DA can replace the ANC as the biggest
single party and that I think is wishful thinking.
It is quite possible, it may happen, that the ANC drops below 50% but it's very far
from probable that they will drop to a level lower than the democratic alliance.
Now if you take the small parties in parliament, the parties making up that 7.5% plus the
IFP that the DA is talking to, you can get to a maximum, really a big maximum of 40%
and that is not going to be a game changer.
So I'm not excited about the moonshot.
When it comes to smaller political parties, just remember one statistic from the last
election, the 2019 national elections.
48 political parties registered to participate.
They made it into parliament.
4 commanded 92.5% of the vote.
48, 14, 4.
So they are always in all elections in South African new parties, generating a lot of excitement
and in the end they do not upset the apple card.
And I think it will take quite a huge shift in our politics for the DA to become the biggest
party and therefore for the moonshot to have a chance and for any of the smaller parties
to come in and upset the apple card.
They can do well, they can get 4, 5% of the vote, which is a good number for a party that's
starting out.
But it's not a number that determines power.
What about the stay-away vote?
That is the big uncertainty.
You put your finger on it.
The big question in our electoral politics is the millions of people who over the years
have decided to withhold their vote and not to vote for any party.
That is the big uncertainty.
Will there this time in 2024 step up and vote?
And if they step up and vote, who will they vote for?
And we simply just know we'll have to wait for the votes to be counted.
But you do believe that it is possible for the ANC to actually make it, to get 50 plus
one or a bit more?
Well I think we should not treat it as a forgotten conclusion that they will drop below 50.
I think that would be as reckless as saying that they will get 50.
Why do I feel they have a chance to get 50%?
Two factors.
The first one is that load shedding is probably the single most important factor now in our
national political life.
People are really angry about it.
People are really upset about it.
Now the research that we've done and which we've shared with clients, proprietary work
we've done, indicate quite clearly that enough renewable power will be installed over the
next 18 to 24 months to alleviate load shedding substantially.
You know there's research out not by us but by other people that if as little as 5,000
megawatts of renewables are installed, you can cut load shedding by 60%.
Now our numbers indicate that we're going to get 20,000 megawatts over the next two
years.
The election is going to be in a year's time, not two years so be aware of that.
The point I'm trying to make is the more load shedding gets alleviated after this winter
and the more it gets better, which in due course it will because new capacity is installed,
the more the ANC will get the credit or there's a chance that the ANC will get the credit.
They will also claim it I'm sure.
They will also claim it.
So that's the, now there's of course a big idea at play here.
All these projects that I'm talking about are being driven by the private sector.
They keen to get the job done.
They keen to connect to the grid.
They keen to get the show on the road so to speak.
And the keener they are and the more successful they are, the more the ANC will get the credit.
It's one of those ironies that play out in life.
But I think that is something one must be aware of.
The second thing is simply the social grant system.
At a moment there are 10 million people in South Africa who receive 350 around a month
from the government.
It's a social distress relief grant, the so-called SDR.
This grant goes as I've said to 10 million people.
It was instituted during COVID, right?
It was instituted during and just after COVID to try and alleviate COVID distress.
It is scheduled to end at the end of March 2024.
Now the chances of that grant being terminated in March, which is two months before the election,
must be absolutely null.
I can't see that happening.
What I can see happening is that the grant will be renamed.
It won't be called the social distress grant.
It will be called the basic income grant or something.
It will be made permanent.
It will probably be increased a little bit within what the fiscus fines it can afford.
And the government will say, look what we've done for you.
We've given a permanent grant, permanent social relief to 10 million people.
We've taken away the uncertainty that the grant may end and they even may increase the
budget.
I think they will increase it.
So that will have a huge impact.
Many of those people may be part of the stay away group, if I can call it that.
Absolutely.
And that move may encourage them to actually go out and stand up and vote and then vote
for the ANC again.
It'll also solidify ANC support.
Many people are wavering.
We'll then say, okay, you know what the party is looking after us.
Let's give our vote to them again.
So I think these two factors can add up to pushing the ANC over the line.
But of course, against that, you've got a couple of factors.
You've got the anger about load shedding, which may carry on and keep on damaging the
ANC.
The ANC itself admits that it's damaging them.
Secondly, there's the utter dysfunctionality at the municipal level, which is getting worse
by the day.
Potholes, sanitation works, water supply, that sort of thing.
And thirdly, there is just the ongoing reports on corruption that keeps on dropping, dropping,
dropping like water dropping through the roof.
And I think, so where is the balance?
Where is the balance?
Will it be over 50 or below 50?
I honestly don't know.
None of us know.
We will have to wait for the votes to be counted again.
Okay.
So let's turn to the possibility that the ANC does not get 50 plus one.
What do you think will happen?
What do we know of the major parties and the attitude to coalitions?
Well, in that sense, April was a very, very interesting month because the three big parties,
the ANC, the DA and the IFP, three of the four big parties, have shown their hands.
And if I can just take them in sort of cronological order.
On the 2nd of April, John Steenhuizen made his acceptance speech when he was re-elected,
his leader of the DA.
It was a speech of 1,440 something words.
He used the word values once.
What he emphasized in the speech was not values, but who is excluded from his moonshot coalition.
Not so much who is included, but who is excluded.
And he made two points very strongly.
The first was that he is absolutely against the EFF.
Okay.
Fine.
There's no news there.
But then secondly, he said that anybody, any organization, any political party who has
tethered themselves to the ANC will also not be welcome.
Now in my view, that is clearly painting the DA and himself into a corner.
By emphasizing those who are excluded and not those who can be included, you're limiting
your spatial vulnerability.
So that was the DA.
Not so much emphasis on values, a very strong emphasis on who's in and who's out.
Then a few days later, on the 8th of April, and maybe it wasn't in response, I don't
know, the IFP showed their hand.
And Mr. Hlengwa, who was a chair of the parliamentary committee on public accounts,
SCOPA, and a very strong IFP leader, came out with a clear statement with five succinct
values, emphasizing the importance of values, saying that the IFP can't go with parties,
that they do not agree basic values on.
And those five values are very straightforward.
It's democracy, it's social equity, it's ethical leadership, really things that most
of Africans certainly will be able to relate to.
But then he made a second point.
And the second point was the way in which parties conduct themselves in a run up to
the election in 12 months time.
That's being such a way that you can include other people in a possible coalition.
Should, and that's the way you put it, should it happen that the electorate doesn't give
one party 50% plus one?
So not only was it emphasizing values and talking about values, which I think is a critical
foundation, but it was also talking process and our politics should be conducted.
And I find those two pillars quite useful.
A couple of days later, towards the end of April, the ANC at the National Executive Committee
meeting adopted a framework on local government coalitions.
It talks about local government coalitions.
Presumably the framework will also apply to a national government coalition.
And essentially they made the same point as the IFP.
They must agree on basic values.
Just as the IFP has said.
They then listed 12 of those values and again it's stuff that everybody can agree with.
There's nothing there which is objectionable.
And they then listed a number of other principles as well.
Important principles for a coalition.
They've clearly given some thought to it.
However, less than a week or so later, a new mayor was elected in Johannesburg, as I've
said, the 8th mayor and the ANC just basically ignored all those guidelines.
So yes, they do have a framework, but yes, they didn't apply the framework.
And that tells us something about the ruling party.
So all three parties, all three major parties have shown their hand.
And if you look at it and you assume for the moment that most DA members can go along with
the values as articulated by the IFP and as articulated by the ANC, then it seems to me
values is not a stumbling block.
And it's possible for the three main parties to come together.
And that raises the very intriguing possibility that we can move into a politics where the
three, what I want to call the three parties of the center, where they come together and
form a grand coalition.
At the end of the day, the differences between the DA, the IFP and the ANC are really not
that fundamental.
Yes, there are people in each party who hate people from another party.
There are people in each party who are ideological about certain points and they wouldn't like
to go with other parties.
Surely that's more true of the ANC.
If you say the ANC agree about most values with the DA and the IFP, I don't think so.
Not the whole of the ANC.
No, not the whole of the ANC, but certainly majority, certainly the majority.
The ANC who accepted that framework and the values in that framework, the RET faction that
supports the coalition of the EFF can be found in Gauteng and they can be found in KZN, but
not necessarily in the rest of the party.
So they are there, they are important, but I think you can undercut the KZN faction with
the IFP coalition and in Gauteng, well, in the N numbers we'll talk and I doubt whether
they can get the numbers.
So I think it's possible for the three parties of the center to come together.
This is a different kind of moonshot idea.
I think that's a real moonshot.
What do we know about South Africans?
We know that the majority of South Africans, three quarters at least, 80%, are not radical
in their outlook or the way they live and relate to other South Africans.
They're not extremists.
But our politics does not reflect that.
Our political party makeup does not reflect that.
So I think it's time for the central forces to come together.
At the end of the day, the differences between the non-RET faction of the ANC, the IFP and
the DA, the non-ideological part of the DA are not that big.
And if the Germans can work together in a grand coalition where there are very clear
differences delineated between parties, I can't see why we can't do it.
But if the ANC gets a 46 or 47% and the IFP gets what, 5?
4 or 5%.
4 or 5, then won't they just get together and run the country?
Yes, I think that's what will happen.
And then you can throw in a small party like Good and you can probably throw in a small
party like Aljamar.
They have consistently voted with ANC in the lifetime of this parliament, the current
parliament.
So those small parties will come together with the IFP and ANC in their life more than
50%.
But the question we have to ask is, can the big problems of South Africa really be solved
by a government that is supported by only 50, 51, 52% of the people?
Don't we have a better chance of solving the problems of the country with a government
that's supported by 70% of the citizens?
And what are the big problems of the country?
Well, it's the issues we know.
It's poverty.
It's unemployment.
It's our education system.
It's housing.
To summarise it in one sentence, it is to restore the dignity of all South Africans in their
daily existence.
Not just in theory, not just in terms of access to the right to vote or the right to mobilise
all the rights that our constitution gives us, but it's to fulfil the promise of the
constitution that the dignity of all South Africans in their daily existence will be
restored or at least be installed.
And I think that is a mammoth task.
That is not something that one party can do in its own, not in a democracy.
You can try to do it under the dictatorship, but that's not where we are.
So I think it is better to have a democracy supported by 70% of the people that can have
this national goal of let's uplift all South Africans.
And that's why I think even if the ANC gets 51% of the vote, it may be better for everybody
the ANC included to pursue a route of a 70-75% government with healthy differences and so
on between them, but not so healthy that you can't govern.
I think it's a possibility and you're quite right, that is the real moonshot.
In summary, so what?
Look I think if you look at the mess with loadshedding, you look at the stagnant economy, you look
at the dysfunctionality of municipalities, you look at the potholes, you look at the
general discontent of the population, then I think we run a real risk that the South
African democracy will become delegitimised.
And we see in several countries around the world where democracy is being delegitimised.
We run that risk too if we cannot fulfil the promise of our constitution of a quarter
of a century ago.
And that's really what is at stake here.
The failure not just of local government and particular departments and so on, but the
failure to live up to the promise of our constitution can delegitimize our constitutional project,
our democracy project.
In other words, that people simply think it wasn't worth it?
It wasn't worth it.
It's time to turn to some kind of the data.
It's time to yield power to a populace to make all kinds of warm promises.
Developments that we see elsewhere in the world, that's the risk we run.
And I think it's a risk that can be avoided by having a strong 70% government in charge.
Also, I think the countries in many ways now, where it was in the 1980s, there are obvious
lift differences.
Of course, we then had a semi-civil war.
We don't have that now.
We then had apartheid.
We don't have that now.
We then had a huge degree of repression.
We don't have that now.
Yes, there are obvious differences.
What are the similarities?
Well, the similarities is a stagnant economy, huge poverty and deprivation, the politics
that is stagnant and not bringing hope to people.
Those are the similarities of the 80s.
And what happened in the 80s?
We now know that today we've got the benefit of hindsight.
What we got was a political initiative that unlocked what we had in South Africa and we
moved towards a democracy.
And I think we need a similar kind of initiative that bring together the parties of the center
to form a government that is supported by 70, 75% of the people.
You're surely leaving us with much food for thought.
Thank you very much.
My pleasure.
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