WEBVTT

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You're listening to a stage talk titled Reporting

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on Hidden Networks of Online Abuse. In this episode,

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we speak with the reporters behind CNN's investigation

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into the porn website Motherless, a site linked

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to sexual violence and abuse. Rather than focusing

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solely on the findings, we explore the reporting

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process itself, how genderless identify anonymous

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communities, communicate with users operating

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under pseudonyms, verify information and navigate

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the ethical, legal and security challenges of

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investigating private online spaces. From gaining

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access and building trust to protecting sources

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and managing personal risk, this conversation

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offers a behind -the -scenes look at the realities

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of modern investigative reporting in the digital

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age. You can find links to all the resources

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mentioned in the talk in the podcast description.

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This talk was hosted by me, Charlotte Maher on

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Thursday the 11th of June 2026 in the Bellingcat

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Discord server. It is five o 'clock CEST, four

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o 'clock UK, 11am EDT, so let's get started.

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Welcome to the Bellingcat Stage Talk series.

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and this live recording. A quick warning, this

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conversation is going to include discussion of

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sexual assault and abuse. If at any point you

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want to leave this live audience, please, please

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feel free to do so. This will be recorded to

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listen to back later and please also keep mindful

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that within the comments that there may be people

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with lived experiences in our midst. Okay. Today,

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we're joined by journalists from CNN's As Equals

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team, an award -winning reporting initiative

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that over the last eight years has examined gender

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inequality, online harms, LGBTQ +, experiences

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and the systems that shape people's lives around

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the world. Throughout that time, the team produced

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deeply reported investigations into issues that

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often remain hidden from public view, from digital

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abuse and online exploitation to structural discrimination

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and emerging threats in online spaces. One of

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the team's final investigations examined hidden

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online networks linked to sexual violence and

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abuse focused on the Motherless .com sleep community.

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The reporting required months of investigation

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inside anonymous online spaces, conversations

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with anonymous users, and careful navigation

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of complex ethical, legal, and security questions.

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But today we're interested in more than a single

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story. We'll be discussing how journalists approach

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reporting in closed online communities, What

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lessons the team learned from covering gender

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and LGBTQ plus issues around the world and what

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as equals the series meant for long form mission

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driven journalism. You can place your questions

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in the chat accessible on the right hand corner

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of your screen, but please remember that this

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is being audio recorded for the podcast. So if

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you don't want me to mention your username, please

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add that as a note in your question. Thank you

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all for joining us and thank you to Kara Fox,

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Saskya Vandoorne and Niamh Kennedy for being here

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to share your work. The mic is yours. Thanks

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for joining us and thanks for that lovely introduction,

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Charlie. So yes, I think the story that this

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team is going to focus on talking about today

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was the final installation of CNN's as Equals

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series on gender inequality, which, as you said,

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had explored exposing gender inequality around

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the world. The large team that had worked along

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that series for years had worked on pieces from

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Columbia where armed groups touted violent campaigns

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against members of the LGBT community, had looked

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into climate and economic inequality around the

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global south, had looked at digital harassment

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and explored how technology and AI had been used

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to harass and exploit women and girls. But for

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this story, the last piece, it all actually started

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back in 2024. I'm with the Pellicot Trial in France,

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and that was actually not part of the As Equals

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series. our reporting just for the CNN News in

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general. This team was part of the reporting

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that produced an exclusive piece. All Dominique

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Pelicot had organized a mass rape of his wife

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with text showing how he operated. And Saskya,

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I'm gonna turn to her in just a moment because

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Saskya had managed to get exclusive access to

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the technical report that had contained thousands

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of messages that were exchanged by Dominic

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Pelicot. with the men in the chat rooms on Skype

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and over text messages, which was a key driver

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in the reporting that we're talking about today.

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We were able to start looking at what other websites

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were out there that might be doing the same thing

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as what had happened with the Pellico crimes.

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as a result of that reporting, and that was the

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genesis of a lot of this work. So maybe this

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is the right chance to just jump over to Saskya

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and let her talk a little bit more about that.

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Thanks, Kara. Yeah, I thought that was a really

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good intro, and it did all begin really with

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the Giselle Pelicot mass rape trial, because at

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the time, a lot of journalists were, of course,

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interested in finding out more about Dominic

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Pelicot, more about Gisele Pelicot. They wanted

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to know about the man who Dominic Pelicot had

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recruited to rape his sedated wife. We were very

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interested in the how. How did he do it? And

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that's how we came to get exclusive access to

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this technical report. And in this technical

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report, there were thousands of text messages,

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Skype exchanges, And so we were really able to

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see Dominic Pelicot's playbook, how he had organized

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it, how he had vetted the men. And we realized

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that the starting point was Coco, was this platform

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and this forum called Without Her Knowledge.

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And Coco really had kind of functioned as this

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place where the men met, where they built trust,

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built a connection, and then they would go on

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to Skype. send each other text messages, and

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then eventually go to Pelicot Household. During

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the trial, Giselle Pelicot described Coco as the

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weapon of the crime. I think that really stayed

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with us, with Niamh, Kara and myself, because

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we kept thinking, well, if Dominic Pelicot was

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able to recruit over 70 men using this website,

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then there are probably other spaces out there.

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And those were the spaces that we really wanted

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to explore. We came across this other site called

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Bounty, which seemed to have, there were a lot

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of men there that were exchanging non -consensual

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images of their wives, of their girlfriends.

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And so that was one of the first, that was a

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French website. And then from that website, we

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then really looked at what else was out there.

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We came across this reporting by these incredible

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investigative journalists in Germany who had

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done a lot of work on Motherless, this porn site,

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where thanks to the reporting, we suspected that

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there was a lot of non -consensual image sharing

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still going on and that perhaps men were meeting

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there. to plan out the same kind of crimes or

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the same kind of behavior that we saw with Dominic

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Pelicot. So it began going undercover on Motherless.

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We created a male persona. As you can imagine,

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there were a lot of steps that needed to be taken.

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before we created this Mel persona, a lot of

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conversations that needed to be had with our

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legal department, our standards department, you

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know, a lot of the editorial leads at CNN to

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make sure that we had a framework within which

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we would work. Where was, you know, how are we

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going to present ourselves? That was kind of

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the first question. And so we decided to kind

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of keep the male persona's backstory close to

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our own experience. So the persona we created,

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you know, he was my age, I'm half French, half

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English, because we really wanted to keep the

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deception obviously as minimal. And then we wanted

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to remain, of course, a journalist. So we knew

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that in these spaces, like Motherless, that currency

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was exchanging pictures of wife or your girlfriend,

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which was something we were not going to do,

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but we did explore that avenue. And Neve, and

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I remember, kind of brought forward this idea

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of perhaps using an AI -generated image of a

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girlfriend or a wife. And that did not lie with

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various departments at CNN. And so we realized,

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well, we'll just have to remain journalists and

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essentially observe and ask as many questions

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as possible to try and get the men to speak with

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us, to trust us, to share their story with us.

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Um, but it was really difficult. And, uh, I'll

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now pass, pass it over to, uh, to Niamh, who

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can explain kind of what happened after we went

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undercover on Motherless and perhaps, uh, infiltrating

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that Telegram group. Thank you, Saskya. Um, so

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yes, as Saskya was saying, uh, we were tag teaming

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predominantly Saskya and I, um, adopting this

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undercover persona on motherless .com. For those

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of you that aren't familiar with it, I know the

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name alone is horrifying and it really gives

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you an indication of the kind of platform that

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it is. It markets itself as a moral free platform

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where anything hosted there lives forever. And

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it's essentially an amateur porn website with

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the interface, like a lot of porn websites with

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videos where you can browse, but again, From

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looking at work that other investigative journalists

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had done in Germany and Canada, we had, we realized

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that this place kind of had a reputation for

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this sleep content, which is essentially videos

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showing passed out unconscious women, what appeared

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to be passed out unconscious women being raped

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in their sleep. very similar to the Palico case.

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And we spent time getting to grips with the website

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because again, it had lots of different features,

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a live chat room, search tabs. The men that were

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on there, you know, if you were on there for

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more than five years, you'd get like a gold badge

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or a silver badge. And it very much felt like

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a community in the way that like, I know Discord

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is a community. This was a different kind of

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community and quite a disturbing community. And

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it was from there that we kind of leapfrogged

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off into more closed ranks communities, a telegram

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group, which we infiltrated, which kind of became

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the crux of our investigation then. So we were

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going on with the list, like late into the night,

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probably starting around 11 PM London or Paris

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time, chatting with people, getting to grips

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with the hashtags. Like one hashtag we featured

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in our documentary and talked about is this hashtag

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I check, which is when In the video, again, they

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lift up the eyelid of a woman to show that she's

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sedated and unconscious. And those videos are

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available in Telegram groups. They're available

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on Motherless. They're unfortunately very rampant

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and out there. And I was spending a lot of time

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on Motherless and I came across a profile where

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a user was trying to direct people over to this

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Telegram group. And again, just for Pigar and

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I plugged the link into my browser, we were using

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a burner laptop at this stage as well for digital

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hygiene to not be, and we were also using cloud

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browser as well based on guidance that we got

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from our cyber security team at CNN, which was

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really helpful and burner devices as well to

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access Telegram. And this link worked and immediately

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we're in this group and it was a bit of a eureka

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moment where The group was called ZZZ. There

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were a thousand people in this group. It was

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highly organized. That was quite astonishing

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for me as well to see how professional it was.

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There were tiers. It was very categorized in

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the group. There were different chats, a general

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forum chat. There was a chat where they were

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selling content, offering vials of these alleged

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rapes for as little as... $10, $20, there was

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a live stream group tab as well. And from there

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on, we just started chatting with people. There

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were people literally in that group from all

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around the world, the UK, France, Chile. And

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it was quite interesting. The forum, just observing

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in the forum alone, a lot of the messages that

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featured in the interactive piece, which we published,

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the digital article, came from those group chats.

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They're exactly verbatim messages. And you'd

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have one man writing in a message like, I'm interested

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in drugging and raping my girlfriend. Has anyone

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done this before? And someone would be like,

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I've been doing this for four years. I've been

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doing this for five years. And they'd pepper

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the chats with drugs advice. You should use this

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drug. You should use this drug. And then a couple

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of hours later, someone would furnish the results

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of this dialogue that was going on. And obviously

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it was happening in real time. The group was

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going all the time, members by daily, which was

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crazy. And obviously again, I know a lot of people

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here won't necessarily be surprised that this

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was happening on Telegram. You know, we all know

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it is a platform which is scant when it comes

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to moderation and doesn't seem to take seriously.

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the hosting of this kind of content. But it was

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also so interesting to see, and as I said, disturbing

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to see how it was being used and to really coordinate

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and close ranks. Because again, with the Pelicot

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case, we'd seen how Dominique Pelicot used this

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big chat room and like how Motherless is a huge

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website. For example, it gets around over 60

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to 80 million visits a month. And it was from

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these big, big platforms that people were you

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know, taking that to be like, these are my kinds

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of people and this is something that I want to

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do. Let's all get together. And there was a kind

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of brotherhood going on, which was also really

00:15:22.679 --> 00:15:26.179
surprising as well. As I mentioned, there was

00:15:26.179 --> 00:15:28.159
a lot of, there was an e -commerce aspect to

00:15:28.159 --> 00:15:29.960
it as well. There were people that were selling

00:15:29.960 --> 00:15:33.240
things, which were sweep liquids, a term completely

00:15:33.240 --> 00:15:35.860
foreign to me that I'd never heard of before,

00:15:36.000 --> 00:15:40.240
obviously. These were very, very strong sedatives.

00:15:40.509 --> 00:15:44.090
which they promised again for like 150 euro would

00:15:44.090 --> 00:15:46.350
completely immobilize a woman, knock her out.

00:15:47.029 --> 00:15:50.669
These drugs were odorless, tasteless, and they

00:15:50.669 --> 00:15:54.009
were being purchased in ass quantities and by

00:15:54.009 --> 00:15:57.149
a lot of the users. Saskya actually went down

00:15:57.149 --> 00:16:00.549
a hole of talking to the buyers who was trying

00:16:00.549 --> 00:16:04.289
to get her to buy one of the drugs as well. And

00:16:04.289 --> 00:16:05.669
yeah, he was making money from this and people

00:16:05.669 --> 00:16:08.210
were also making money from live streaming the

00:16:08.210 --> 00:16:12.059
rapes as well. As I mentioned, payment was usually

00:16:12.059 --> 00:16:17.480
via $20 or so on cryptocurrency platforms. Again,

00:16:17.679 --> 00:16:19.899
Otsoski mentioned we were throughout all of this

00:16:19.899 --> 00:16:22.840
process, we were constantly feeding back to our

00:16:23.000 --> 00:16:26.419
the rest of our editorial team, to our lawyers,

00:16:26.580 --> 00:16:28.379
to our fat checkers, to our standards team about

00:16:28.379 --> 00:16:31.179
what was and wasn't appropriate. And by and large,

00:16:31.720 --> 00:16:34.320
we were remaining journalists. We were trying

00:16:34.320 --> 00:16:36.159
to ask people questions and try and understand

00:16:36.159 --> 00:16:38.919
this community. And there were some things we

00:16:38.919 --> 00:16:41.080
weren't purchasing. We didn't purchase anything

00:16:41.080 --> 00:16:44.779
ourselves. We didn't want to be engaged in illegal

00:16:44.779 --> 00:16:47.440
activity. Our job was really to observe and to

00:16:47.440 --> 00:16:49.960
try and find a way to expose what was going on

00:16:49.960 --> 00:16:52.460
in this group chat. But Saskya was successful

00:16:52.460 --> 00:16:56.799
in developing a deeper contact with this man,

00:16:57.059 --> 00:17:00.740
Poland, who, as Saskya also mentioned, images

00:17:00.740 --> 00:17:02.980
were very much the currency in this group chat.

00:17:03.659 --> 00:17:07.099
On Telegram, we weren't able to send images because

00:17:07.099 --> 00:17:09.559
of trying to minimize deception and to avoid

00:17:09.559 --> 00:17:12.920
entrapment risks. So there were guys who were

00:17:12.920 --> 00:17:15.920
messaging from Argentina, Brazil. They were telling

00:17:15.920 --> 00:17:18.200
us they had lots of experience. Some of them

00:17:18.200 --> 00:17:19.819
were offering to get on phone calls. Like we

00:17:19.819 --> 00:17:23.819
spent an evening, a whole evening, trying to

00:17:23.819 --> 00:17:25.460
call some of these men because they said that

00:17:25.460 --> 00:17:27.759
they would talk to us because they thought we

00:17:27.759 --> 00:17:29.279
were interesting. They could teach us. There

00:17:29.279 --> 00:17:31.019
was like a student teacher kind of mentality

00:17:31.019 --> 00:17:33.420
going on here, but a lot of them went cold. They

00:17:33.420 --> 00:17:36.140
ghosted us. We really hoped to film this, you

00:17:36.140 --> 00:17:38.380
know, using a male colleague to speak to them

00:17:38.380 --> 00:17:41.019
on the phone, but it completely fell flat. except

00:17:41.019 --> 00:17:43.880
for this man in Poland who Saskya is going to

00:17:43.880 --> 00:17:46.640
talk to you guys a bit now. Thanks, Steve. And

00:17:46.640 --> 00:17:48.420
actually just going back to, because I think

00:17:48.420 --> 00:17:49.720
this might be interesting for this community,

00:17:49.859 --> 00:17:53.299
going back to the user who was selling sleep

00:17:53.299 --> 00:17:58.579
liquid, liquid sedative, when he got in touch

00:17:58.579 --> 00:18:02.299
with me and said that he was selling it around

00:18:02.299 --> 00:18:05.309
the world. I knew that we of course weren't going

00:18:05.309 --> 00:18:07.509
to be able to purchase it, but we wanted to be

00:18:07.509 --> 00:18:11.049
able to prove somehow that this was real, that

00:18:11.049 --> 00:18:14.910
what he was doing wasn't a lie. One of the ways

00:18:14.910 --> 00:18:19.269
that we did that was I sent him a message saying,

00:18:19.569 --> 00:18:22.089
well, how do I know what you're running here

00:18:22.089 --> 00:18:27.049
is real and not a scam? That's when, and it came

00:18:27.049 --> 00:18:32.240
as a surprise frankly to us, he started screenshot

00:18:32.240 --> 00:18:35.440
all of these parcels that he had sent around

00:18:35.440 --> 00:18:37.579
the world. He had obviously clearly a folder

00:18:37.579 --> 00:18:39.599
of all these screenshots of the parcels that

00:18:39.599 --> 00:18:42.960
he had sent around the world with some of the

00:18:42.960 --> 00:18:46.759
addresses on them as proof that this was real,

00:18:46.799 --> 00:18:49.240
that this really was a business that he was running.

00:18:49.819 --> 00:18:54.859
Because of course, at CNN, we have to, when at

00:18:54.859 --> 00:18:57.900
the end of our reporting, it gets scrutinized

00:18:57.900 --> 00:19:01.359
so much by so many people. that if we say, well,

00:19:01.500 --> 00:19:04.599
this user was claiming he was selling liquid

00:19:04.599 --> 00:19:07.099
sedative for 150 euros, the first question we're

00:19:07.099 --> 00:19:09.319
going to be asked is, well, how do we know this?

00:19:09.319 --> 00:19:10.759
How do we know this isn't just a lie? And of

00:19:10.759 --> 00:19:12.660
course, that was the kind of evidence we were

00:19:12.660 --> 00:19:15.880
then able to give, fact checkers, our lawyers,

00:19:16.519 --> 00:19:18.539
standards people, so that they knew we had done

00:19:18.539 --> 00:19:20.759
due diligence and really gone as far as we could

00:19:20.759 --> 00:19:23.059
in showing what this guy was claiming to do.

00:19:24.250 --> 00:19:29.230
Going back then to the Polish user, as Niamh

00:19:29.230 --> 00:19:34.190
said, it was really difficult to continue speaking

00:19:34.190 --> 00:19:36.490
with some of these men. They would just go cold

00:19:36.490 --> 00:19:41.849
because they wouldn't trust you unless you shared

00:19:41.849 --> 00:19:45.910
a picture. And also the way that we, of course,

00:19:46.029 --> 00:19:49.900
were speaking was was not in line with the way

00:19:49.900 --> 00:19:52.039
they were, the way that they would objectify

00:19:52.039 --> 00:19:53.880
women, the way that they would normalize rape.

00:19:54.359 --> 00:19:58.680
We were not going to do any of that. So it was,

00:19:58.680 --> 00:20:01.640
it was hard to get men to speak with us. And

00:20:01.640 --> 00:20:05.460
then there was this one Polish user who in the

00:20:05.460 --> 00:20:07.019
middle of the night and Neve and I would take

00:20:07.019 --> 00:20:09.279
shifts. So, you know, I would maybe go from kind

00:20:09.279 --> 00:20:11.819
of midnight till five or midnight till four,

00:20:11.920 --> 00:20:14.079
then Neve would take over because so much of

00:20:14.079 --> 00:20:17.440
this activity was happening at night. Um, and,

00:20:17.559 --> 00:20:20.440
uh, and we found that it was the best way of

00:20:20.440 --> 00:20:23.039
engaging some of the users, some of the men was

00:20:23.039 --> 00:20:26.640
by just speaking with them at a night. And this

00:20:26.640 --> 00:20:31.279
Polish user, he instantly felt like he just was

00:20:31.279 --> 00:20:33.660
a bit different in that he wanted to speak. He

00:20:33.660 --> 00:20:38.220
wanted to share. He was there to connect with

00:20:38.220 --> 00:20:42.619
other users. Um, and so he and I started DMing

00:20:42.619 --> 00:20:46.859
each other. He told me about his wife and over

00:20:46.859 --> 00:20:51.460
a period of several months, he then started telling

00:20:51.460 --> 00:20:55.059
me that he had been drugging and raping her,

00:20:55.480 --> 00:20:58.259
sharing the names of the drugs that he used on

00:20:58.259 --> 00:21:02.519
her, sharing a lot of photos of videos of her.

00:21:03.599 --> 00:21:06.660
And what was a goal that we had set out at the

00:21:06.660 --> 00:21:10.559
start of this investigation was that we wanted

00:21:10.559 --> 00:21:13.319
to show that these were more than just usernames,

00:21:13.420 --> 00:21:14.740
that these weren't just pseudonyms, that they

00:21:14.740 --> 00:21:20.480
were real people behind these usernames. And

00:21:20.480 --> 00:21:25.660
so we realized that to try and tell Piotr's story,

00:21:26.099 --> 00:21:29.160
we were going to have to identify him. And at

00:21:29.160 --> 00:21:32.180
first we began asking, you know, using the undercover

00:21:32.180 --> 00:21:35.539
persona, if he would meet with the undercover

00:21:35.539 --> 00:21:37.890
persona. The idea was that we were going to you

00:21:37.890 --> 00:21:41.650
know, send a producer there to meet him in Poland.

00:21:41.950 --> 00:21:45.509
He refused. And, you know, this is what we found

00:21:45.509 --> 00:21:48.789
was a common theme was that so much of this world

00:21:48.789 --> 00:21:53.329
was different, was other, and they didn't want

00:21:53.329 --> 00:21:57.630
it to, you know, mess up or mess with their real

00:21:57.630 --> 00:22:04.069
life in a way. And with Piotr, it took a lot

00:22:04.069 --> 00:22:08.839
of kind of speaking, working out where he was

00:22:08.839 --> 00:22:11.440
going to be, what he was doing, what kind of

00:22:11.440 --> 00:22:15.319
events he was attending, and finally he let slip

00:22:15.319 --> 00:22:17.920
that he was going to go to a party. But because

00:22:17.920 --> 00:22:20.400
we wanted to, of course, keep the conversation

00:22:20.400 --> 00:22:22.700
going, but at the same time not reveal that we

00:22:22.700 --> 00:22:26.779
were in fact journalists, questions needed to

00:22:26.779 --> 00:22:29.259
be put to him in a way that he wouldn't find

00:22:29.259 --> 00:22:32.759
them suspicious. If I had asked him five times

00:22:32.759 --> 00:22:34.440
in a row, where are you going to go Saturday?

00:22:34.920 --> 00:22:36.880
Oh, okay. Where's the restaurant? Where's the

00:22:36.880 --> 00:22:40.680
address? That would obviously ring alarm bells.

00:22:41.259 --> 00:22:45.680
So we had to try and find a way to get as much

00:22:45.680 --> 00:22:48.119
information from him as possible, but then do

00:22:48.119 --> 00:22:51.079
our own work to find out where he was actually

00:22:51.079 --> 00:22:53.880
going to be. And you can talk a little bit about

00:22:53.880 --> 00:22:56.220
the planning him in this restaurant, how we did

00:22:56.220 --> 00:23:01.789
that. Yeah, thanks. So basically we had to parse

00:23:01.789 --> 00:23:04.009
through the messages because we couldn't directly

00:23:04.009 --> 00:23:07.529
ask him, where are you going to be? But as the

00:23:07.529 --> 00:23:10.029
trust was built up, he was revealing more about

00:23:10.029 --> 00:23:12.809
his life and sending a lot of photographs as

00:23:12.809 --> 00:23:15.950
Saskya mentioned. And this won't be shocking

00:23:15.950 --> 00:23:18.289
to any of the people on this chat, but we obviously

00:23:18.289 --> 00:23:22.160
use geolocation. tactics, techniques, sorry,

00:23:22.900 --> 00:23:25.440
to identify where he lived based on photographs

00:23:25.440 --> 00:23:28.759
with identifying kind of objects and so on and

00:23:28.759 --> 00:23:32.180
so forth. So we were able to find where he lived

00:23:32.180 --> 00:23:36.019
basically in Poland, the house, the area. And

00:23:36.019 --> 00:23:38.140
then as Saskya mentioned, he let it slip that

00:23:38.140 --> 00:23:41.799
he was going to this event in a restaurant, but

00:23:41.799 --> 00:23:44.279
again, there were a lot of restaurants in this

00:23:44.279 --> 00:23:48.359
area. So spent I spent a lot of time online trying

00:23:48.359 --> 00:23:51.680
to find with Saskya which restaurant this could

00:23:51.680 --> 00:23:55.680
be. Again, we're not product speakers and this

00:23:55.680 --> 00:23:57.599
was a completely foreign area to us, so we didn't

00:23:57.599 --> 00:24:00.480
know what we were doing. But we did manage to

00:24:00.480 --> 00:24:03.200
find a place that was organizing events that

00:24:03.200 --> 00:24:05.759
met all the criteria that he was saying. But

00:24:05.759 --> 00:24:07.500
we still had to take a massive leap of faith

00:24:07.500 --> 00:24:09.640
with our team. It was a three -person team that

00:24:09.640 --> 00:24:12.839
went, myself, Saskya, and a wonderful photojournalist

00:24:12.839 --> 00:24:17.009
named John. who kept us sane throughout because

00:24:17.009 --> 00:24:19.309
we were absolutely terrified that we'd taken

00:24:19.309 --> 00:24:23.089
a gamble and that it would be the wrong town,

00:24:23.269 --> 00:24:25.529
the wrong place, and a complete waste of our

00:24:25.529 --> 00:24:27.769
time. So it was a massive leap of faith. We traveled

00:24:27.769 --> 00:24:31.089
to Poland and we were waiting outside this restaurant.

00:24:32.150 --> 00:24:36.210
In the cold, hoping, stealthily filming. If you

00:24:36.210 --> 00:24:39.009
watch our documentary, you can see Saskya captures

00:24:39.009 --> 00:24:42.210
on camera, him coming into the restaurant. And

00:24:42.210 --> 00:24:45.410
it's quite a moment because for us, it made the

00:24:45.410 --> 00:24:48.329
whole thing real, finally. We'd spent so long

00:24:48.329 --> 00:24:52.009
talking to people all day long. And I can see,

00:24:52.230 --> 00:24:54.470
and honestly, I think because, again, a lot of

00:24:54.470 --> 00:24:57.089
people constantly ask us, how are these men capable

00:24:57.089 --> 00:24:59.750
of doing this, talking like this, doing these

00:24:59.750 --> 00:25:03.549
kinds of acts? The digital remove I think does

00:25:03.549 --> 00:25:06.769
help psychologically for some of these men to

00:25:06.769 --> 00:25:09.109
not feel like it's real. And for us, we had to

00:25:09.109 --> 00:25:11.529
prove that it was real too. And going there and

00:25:11.529 --> 00:25:13.690
seeing him and being in the same room as him

00:25:13.690 --> 00:25:18.369
and his wife made it all very real for us. Maybe

00:25:18.369 --> 00:25:20.450
Saskya, you can just finish off by telling us

00:25:20.450 --> 00:25:22.690
a little bit about what happened next, because

00:25:22.690 --> 00:25:25.690
that kind of sums up how our investigation ended

00:25:25.690 --> 00:25:28.460
really. Yeah, and going back to how this all

00:25:28.460 --> 00:25:31.380
came together, we had discussions before going,

00:25:31.500 --> 00:25:35.099
what do we do? If it is him, do we confront him?

00:25:35.160 --> 00:25:38.880
Do we tell his wife? And we felt that it would

00:25:38.880 --> 00:25:44.079
put his wife in danger if we were to suddenly

00:25:44.079 --> 00:25:46.839
confront him. And in the end, we decided that

00:25:46.839 --> 00:25:49.220
the best course of action would be to pass on

00:25:49.220 --> 00:25:53.240
our findings to the Polish police who eventually

00:25:53.240 --> 00:25:59.700
arrested him and he's now been charged. And I

00:25:59.700 --> 00:26:03.720
think Niamh is right. I'll never forget that

00:26:03.720 --> 00:26:06.859
moment when we were at the restaurant and I sent

00:26:06.859 --> 00:26:10.539
a message to Niamh saying, it's the wrong one.

00:26:10.619 --> 00:26:12.960
It's the wrong one. And of course they were the

00:26:12.960 --> 00:26:19.900
last to arrive because it was an event. And you're

00:26:19.900 --> 00:26:23.089
always going to have that moment of doubt. We

00:26:23.089 --> 00:26:25.930
had done so much work. We had whittled it down

00:26:25.930 --> 00:26:29.089
and we were pretty confident that this was it.

00:26:29.210 --> 00:26:32.369
But it was only one date that we had that we

00:26:32.369 --> 00:26:36.509
knew one opportunity. And it was of course worth

00:26:36.509 --> 00:26:39.869
it because of what came afterwards. So I'll stop

00:26:39.869 --> 00:26:42.250
there because I realize we're at the 26 minutes

00:26:42.250 --> 00:26:44.769
past. No, it's really fascinating. Thank you

00:26:44.769 --> 00:26:47.500
so much for taking us through that and also opening

00:26:47.500 --> 00:26:49.980
our eyes to the level of preparation you had

00:26:49.980 --> 00:26:51.960
to go through for this particular investigation

00:26:51.960 --> 00:26:53.859
as well, which I think is really worth noting.

00:26:54.579 --> 00:26:56.720
We have so many questions coming through in the

00:26:56.720 --> 00:26:59.480
chat, so I'm just going to go straight into it.

00:26:59.680 --> 00:27:02.160
Porco Rosso actually, great name by the way,

00:27:02.599 --> 00:27:04.680
already had a question that I was going to ask,

00:27:04.720 --> 00:27:07.240
so I'll start with that one. To maintain access

00:27:07.240 --> 00:27:09.559
to the Telegram group and observe its operations

00:27:09.559 --> 00:27:12.019
over several months, did your team have to fulfill

00:27:12.019 --> 00:27:14.880
any requirements to remain in the group? And

00:27:14.880 --> 00:27:17.079
as a follow up to that, did you have any users

00:27:17.079 --> 00:27:20.019
when you were going anonymous, did you have any

00:27:20.019 --> 00:27:24.200
users try to test you or verify you at any point

00:27:24.200 --> 00:27:28.319
to try and reveal your identity? Well, I'm happy

00:27:28.319 --> 00:27:33.359
to take this one. So to stay in the group, well,

00:27:33.460 --> 00:27:35.920
what was interesting was again, this is the group

00:27:35.920 --> 00:27:39.089
that we... finalize on, but it's not the only

00:27:39.089 --> 00:27:41.029
group we found. There are lots of groups out

00:27:41.029 --> 00:27:43.430
there, unfortunately. So we came across other

00:27:43.430 --> 00:27:47.890
telegram groups, which we didn't end up infiltrating

00:27:47.890 --> 00:27:50.490
per se. But in those groups, for example, there

00:27:50.490 --> 00:27:54.210
were tests, you had to send a photograph or there

00:27:54.210 --> 00:27:59.829
are other groups to retain membership of one

00:27:59.829 --> 00:28:03.150
of these acts or evidence. That was not the case

00:28:03.150 --> 00:28:04.950
in this group. So that was why we were able to

00:28:04.950 --> 00:28:08.500
stay in it. And as I say, observe. And there

00:28:08.500 --> 00:28:11.099
were other groups as well where you had to pay

00:28:11.099 --> 00:28:14.059
to gain entrance, more closed off VIP groups.

00:28:14.380 --> 00:28:17.019
Again, that was against our legal guidance, so

00:28:17.019 --> 00:28:20.259
we didn't do that either. In terms of testing,

00:28:20.880 --> 00:28:26.099
absolutely. A lot of the guys did get curious

00:28:26.099 --> 00:28:28.759
over time because as Saskya mentioned, We weren't

00:28:28.759 --> 00:28:31.240
speaking in the coarse language that they were.

00:28:32.140 --> 00:28:35.079
We had to be very careful. The key balance that

00:28:35.079 --> 00:28:39.440
we constantly had was our guideline was basically

00:28:39.440 --> 00:28:44.539
maintaining our journalistic standards and not

00:28:44.539 --> 00:28:47.599
falling into risks of entrapping people, soliciting

00:28:47.599 --> 00:28:50.519
people to carry out things, illegal acts. that

00:28:50.519 --> 00:28:52.880
was like number one concern. And then the other

00:28:52.880 --> 00:28:55.420
balance on the other side was the overwhelming

00:28:55.420 --> 00:28:57.920
public interest argument in exposing what was

00:28:57.920 --> 00:28:59.579
going on in this group. So that was what our

00:28:59.579 --> 00:29:02.420
legal team, we were constantly having to keep

00:29:02.420 --> 00:29:05.599
in factor. So people would ask me and Saskya,

00:29:05.680 --> 00:29:08.500
can you send? me a video, can you send me a pitch

00:29:08.500 --> 00:29:10.119
or just send me a picture of your wife right

00:29:10.119 --> 00:29:15.380
now?" And I'd be like, oh, she's busy or I'm

00:29:15.380 --> 00:29:18.160
spending too much time on the phone. She'll get

00:29:18.160 --> 00:29:22.420
suspicious, but just anything to minimise that.

00:29:23.460 --> 00:29:25.680
I know as well Saskya, when you were talking

00:29:25.680 --> 00:29:30.039
to the man about buying the sleep liquid, he

00:29:30.039 --> 00:29:32.079
was asked, he got quite impatient and was testing

00:29:32.079 --> 00:29:35.259
you and trying to verify. um, why you weren't

00:29:35.259 --> 00:29:38.039
sending him money. That was another instance,

00:29:38.200 --> 00:29:41.000
wasn't it? Yeah. And I think one of the, with

00:29:41.000 --> 00:29:43.720
Piotr, not his real name, of course, the Polish

00:29:43.720 --> 00:29:47.619
man, um, it was just a lot of deflection, you

00:29:47.619 --> 00:29:50.240
know, because he would, he would ask questions

00:29:50.240 --> 00:29:55.500
about my wife a lot. Um, and he would ask, it's

00:29:55.500 --> 00:29:57.740
not like he never asked for videos or photos.

00:29:57.880 --> 00:30:01.599
He did, but it was just constant kind of bringing

00:30:01.599 --> 00:30:04.380
the focus back on him, which is something he

00:30:04.380 --> 00:30:07.880
wanted. He felt to me like he was someone who

00:30:07.880 --> 00:30:12.519
very much needed to share and show off his wife.

00:30:12.599 --> 00:30:14.460
That was a common trait that we found actually

00:30:14.460 --> 00:30:17.539
in a lot of these men was that they were objectifying

00:30:17.539 --> 00:30:24.980
their wives. The thrill came from the act itself.

00:30:25.529 --> 00:30:28.990
of drugging and raping, but also sharing that

00:30:28.990 --> 00:30:33.009
content. So in a way, just being there as, and

00:30:33.009 --> 00:30:36.049
need everybody to do it earlier, this dynamic

00:30:36.049 --> 00:30:39.990
of kind of pupil teacher. I think if other people

00:30:39.990 --> 00:30:42.589
in the group were to remember us, they would

00:30:42.589 --> 00:30:45.839
probably remember us more as in that people category

00:30:45.839 --> 00:30:49.460
because we just kept asking questions. How do

00:30:49.460 --> 00:30:51.519
you do it? How long have you been doing it for?

00:30:51.920 --> 00:30:54.539
And sometimes you'd come across other users that

00:30:54.539 --> 00:30:57.599
were asking exactly the same questions. We did

00:30:57.599 --> 00:30:59.559
wonder, oh, is another investigative journalist

00:30:59.559 --> 00:31:05.599
in the group? But that's why it didn't seem completely...

00:31:05.599 --> 00:31:10.200
It was in line with some of the other questions

00:31:10.200 --> 00:31:12.609
that were being put in the group because... They

00:31:12.609 --> 00:31:15.890
were curious to learn, as were we, just to different

00:31:15.890 --> 00:31:21.089
ends. On to this as well, in terms of the conversations

00:31:21.089 --> 00:31:23.869
about risk that I know that this audience is

00:31:23.869 --> 00:31:26.549
really interested in, one of the things around

00:31:26.549 --> 00:31:30.250
the risk mitigation and the many conversations

00:31:30.250 --> 00:31:33.410
that we had around all of the undercover work

00:31:33.410 --> 00:31:39.079
was whether or not I'm what you have said in

00:31:39.079 --> 00:31:42.700
your observation in this group, where we're there

00:31:42.700 --> 00:31:48.380
to be in an observatory role and engage as ethically

00:31:48.380 --> 00:31:51.779
as possible, would that be available publicly?

00:31:52.279 --> 00:31:55.160
And if that ever went public or that was discovered

00:31:55.160 --> 00:31:59.660
in court, would you be able to stand on as journalists

00:31:59.660 --> 00:32:02.240
for the public interest? And would your words

00:32:02.240 --> 00:32:04.980
be something that would not be able to be seen

00:32:04.980 --> 00:32:07.720
as entrapment as well? And I think for people

00:32:07.720 --> 00:32:11.779
that are also exploring these spaces, keeping

00:32:11.779 --> 00:32:14.420
that in mind when you're doing undercover work,

00:32:14.640 --> 00:32:17.079
especially if you don't have a large, robust,

00:32:17.559 --> 00:32:20.980
amazing legal team like CNN does, to know that

00:32:20.980 --> 00:32:24.630
there is a... possibility that if you were infiltrating

00:32:24.630 --> 00:32:28.509
allegedly criminal networks, that this stuff

00:32:28.509 --> 00:32:30.950
could come out in some sort of legal discovery

00:32:30.950 --> 00:32:32.890
or case. And those are conversations that we

00:32:32.890 --> 00:32:36.309
had a lot. So you have to think about that when

00:32:36.309 --> 00:32:39.009
you're also minding the way in which you're communicating

00:32:39.009 --> 00:32:42.329
in these groups. So again, as Saskya said earlier,

00:32:43.069 --> 00:32:47.569
around sticking with her age and something that's

00:32:47.569 --> 00:32:51.170
not too far away from her name. That was used

00:32:51.170 --> 00:32:55.269
as the alias, for example, or any of the other

00:32:55.269 --> 00:32:59.329
examples that Niamh gave around how to communicate

00:32:59.329 --> 00:33:02.630
with people that wouldn't give a tap off to people

00:33:02.630 --> 00:33:04.769
that you might be a journalist were important,

00:33:04.769 --> 00:33:08.890
but also knowing that that could eventually be

00:33:08.890 --> 00:33:12.470
blasted online, I think is something really important

00:33:12.470 --> 00:33:14.769
to think about when you're going into these spaces.

00:33:15.109 --> 00:33:18.549
And just a huge part of the ongoing conversations

00:33:18.549 --> 00:33:21.539
that we had. And just be aware, obviously, when

00:33:21.539 --> 00:33:25.279
you're accessing material, as mentioned, that

00:33:25.279 --> 00:33:30.759
can also be a risk as well. For example, Bellingcat's

00:33:30.759 --> 00:33:34.279
researcher, Kalina Kultai, she's been in spaces

00:33:34.279 --> 00:33:37.559
where she's been looking into deep fakes and

00:33:37.559 --> 00:33:40.559
she's found CSAM, child sexual abuse material.

00:33:41.940 --> 00:33:45.539
And even accessing that can be illegal in some

00:33:45.539 --> 00:33:48.569
jurisdictions. So please, please... make sure

00:33:48.569 --> 00:33:50.849
that you are operating within the law as well

00:33:50.849 --> 00:33:52.950
and take precautions to protect yourself against

00:33:52.950 --> 00:33:56.150
that when doing this kind of research. This might

00:33:56.150 --> 00:33:58.970
be a quick answer or it could be a very interesting

00:33:58.970 --> 00:34:03.269
one. Did you find any women on the platform at

00:34:03.269 --> 00:34:06.690
all? It's impossible to say because obviously

00:34:06.690 --> 00:34:10.070
the usernames were, you know, we weren't able

00:34:10.070 --> 00:34:12.190
to identify every single username that was in

00:34:12.190 --> 00:34:15.929
the Telegram group, but none of them presented

00:34:15.929 --> 00:34:20.519
themselves as women. No. We've had a few questions

00:34:20.519 --> 00:34:23.639
earlier on in the conversation about how these

00:34:23.639 --> 00:34:26.699
conversations first initiate and how you build

00:34:26.699 --> 00:34:29.340
the relationship with these people. Saiba, for

00:34:29.340 --> 00:34:31.179
example, said, I don't understand how these men

00:34:31.179 --> 00:34:33.679
make their initial contact with others on generally

00:34:33.679 --> 00:34:36.519
public platforms without alerting law enforcement.

00:34:36.699 --> 00:34:42.300
How do these conversations get initiated? In

00:34:42.300 --> 00:34:47.019
not very sophisticated ways. As I mentioned in

00:34:47.019 --> 00:34:49.320
the Telegram group, there was the general chat.

00:34:49.820 --> 00:34:52.820
So it was important for us to spend time just

00:34:52.820 --> 00:34:55.579
watching all the messages in there, because again,

00:34:55.880 --> 00:34:58.300
there were key players that kept coming up, some

00:34:58.300 --> 00:35:01.760
very vocal. As we reference again, this student

00:35:01.760 --> 00:35:04.460
master dynamics, some people that, some males

00:35:04.460 --> 00:35:07.000
that were very forthcoming and wanted to chip

00:35:07.000 --> 00:35:11.179
in all the time. So before long, we were amongst

00:35:11.179 --> 00:35:13.480
ourselves developing a list of like, these are

00:35:13.480 --> 00:35:15.719
the big fish. Do you know what I mean? This is

00:35:15.719 --> 00:35:17.579
the admin, this is the guy selling the sleep

00:35:17.579 --> 00:35:21.760
liquid, this is the guy who is doing this right

00:35:21.760 --> 00:35:23.760
now to his wife, this is the guy who's dealing

00:35:23.760 --> 00:35:25.880
it to his ex. So we were getting to Griff with

00:35:25.880 --> 00:35:29.420
the kind of personalities there, but often the

00:35:29.420 --> 00:35:32.199
messages would, the exchanges, because I think

00:35:32.199 --> 00:35:34.739
as well, there was this security that they felt

00:35:34.739 --> 00:35:36.480
that all the men felt from being in the group.

00:35:36.780 --> 00:35:39.420
They were almost like... There was like a trust,

00:35:39.639 --> 00:35:42.300
an implicit trust that no one was going to rat

00:35:42.300 --> 00:35:44.559
on each other. And they were, there were messages,

00:35:44.559 --> 00:35:47.199
you know, sometimes calling out users and being

00:35:47.199 --> 00:35:50.119
like, watch out this guy's a fake or watch out

00:35:50.119 --> 00:35:52.880
this guy's, you know, no good, la la la, or he

00:35:52.880 --> 00:35:55.460
won't pay you or something. But a lot of the

00:35:55.460 --> 00:35:58.099
times, you know, if I was messaging someone,

00:35:58.320 --> 00:35:59.960
the messages would start with like, Hey bro,

00:36:00.739 --> 00:36:05.300
what are you up to? Or someone would write in

00:36:05.300 --> 00:36:08.320
like great video or like, this is great. Most

00:36:08.320 --> 00:36:10.719
of the exchanges started in very banal manners.

00:36:11.179 --> 00:36:14.659
Like, you know, hey man, how long, Amelia and

00:36:14.659 --> 00:36:16.599
I just asked a very basic question. How long

00:36:16.599 --> 00:36:18.199
have you been doing that? Is that your girlfriend?

00:36:18.360 --> 00:36:21.599
Is that your wife? And again, they felt safe,

00:36:21.679 --> 00:36:24.320
a lot of them, and they felt they didn't feel,

00:36:24.440 --> 00:36:26.039
from my perspective, any shame in what they were

00:36:26.039 --> 00:36:27.619
doing. So they would answer. They'd be like,

00:36:27.719 --> 00:36:29.300
yes, this is my wife. How long have you been

00:36:29.300 --> 00:36:31.739
doing this? Three months, do you use this drug

00:36:31.739 --> 00:36:36.139
all the time? Like they were very, because again,

00:36:36.219 --> 00:36:41.500
we weren't using, what's the word, the kind of

00:36:41.500 --> 00:36:43.820
objectifying language. We were asking very straightforward

00:36:43.820 --> 00:36:49.059
questions and the conversation started. Shockingly,

00:36:49.300 --> 00:36:53.679
in very straightforward manners. I think that

00:36:53.679 --> 00:36:55.780
the man that you messaged us, Kia, that wasn't

00:36:55.780 --> 00:36:58.179
his first message just like, Hey, is anyone awake

00:36:58.179 --> 00:37:01.920
right now? And you wrote, yes, I am. Exactly.

00:37:01.980 --> 00:37:03.659
And I think that's what was the most shocking

00:37:03.659 --> 00:37:06.639
revelation of this investigation was that this

00:37:06.639 --> 00:37:10.059
kind of discourse wasn't happening on the dark

00:37:10.059 --> 00:37:14.119
web. That on Motherless itself, which you do

00:37:14.119 --> 00:37:17.820
not need an email address to just look through

00:37:17.820 --> 00:37:20.079
the videos, look through the website, you would

00:37:20.079 --> 00:37:22.699
have comments on some of those videos where they

00:37:22.699 --> 00:37:24.760
would say the kind of drugs that they had used.

00:37:25.039 --> 00:37:27.800
on their wives, on their girlfriends. So it was

00:37:27.800 --> 00:37:32.579
just very much out there in the open. And that's

00:37:32.579 --> 00:37:34.820
what we also wanted to get across in our investigation

00:37:34.820 --> 00:37:36.780
was that there was just this feeling of total

00:37:36.780 --> 00:37:42.280
and utter impunity and that there wasn't this

00:37:42.280 --> 00:37:45.519
sense of shame. Quite the contrary, that they

00:37:45.519 --> 00:37:48.139
were proud of what they were doing and they wanted

00:37:48.139 --> 00:37:50.829
people to know. about it. And I mean, on Motherless,

00:37:50.949 --> 00:37:53.230
you had some of the sleep content, which racked

00:37:53.230 --> 00:37:55.329
up millions and millions and millions of views.

00:37:55.510 --> 00:37:59.469
And as Ni was saying, it acted as a porn site,

00:37:59.489 --> 00:38:01.969
but also as this kind of social media platform,

00:38:02.130 --> 00:38:05.349
because you could friend each other. And that's

00:38:05.349 --> 00:38:07.530
how we were able to identify going back to how

00:38:07.530 --> 00:38:10.130
did we kind of come across the Telegram channel

00:38:10.130 --> 00:38:13.719
or how did we identify some of the users on Motherless

00:38:13.719 --> 00:38:17.000
who were into sleep content was because you could

00:38:17.000 --> 00:38:19.920
go from, you would see one user who had been

00:38:19.920 --> 00:38:24.519
on there for 15 years who had 10 videos of sleep,

00:38:24.760 --> 00:38:27.639
showing sleep content, right, women who appeared

00:38:27.639 --> 00:38:30.480
sedated and sex acts are being performed on them.

00:38:31.000 --> 00:38:34.059
And they would have 10 videos with millions and

00:38:34.059 --> 00:38:35.699
millions of views. And then of course you'd go

00:38:35.699 --> 00:38:37.760
through their friends because whoever their friends

00:38:37.760 --> 00:38:40.719
with probably have the same incarnations, the

00:38:40.719 --> 00:38:43.960
same desires, the same fantasies. And that's

00:38:43.960 --> 00:38:47.119
how we were able to kind of look at the community

00:38:47.119 --> 00:38:51.239
as a whole, find that like telegram, you know,

00:38:51.340 --> 00:38:53.480
user who was selling the Vickla sedative, find

00:38:53.480 --> 00:38:56.599
the telegram group that we then infiltrated.

00:38:56.920 --> 00:39:00.960
So it was about also targeting the right people

00:39:00.960 --> 00:39:03.670
on Motherless, the right users. I think it wouldn't

00:39:03.670 --> 00:39:07.090
be a jump to say that the vast majority of the

00:39:07.090 --> 00:39:09.150
videos, just furthering on the question, because

00:39:09.150 --> 00:39:12.329
I saw there were a few about women, regarding

00:39:12.329 --> 00:39:15.010
women users, while Saskya was saying there's

00:39:15.010 --> 00:39:16.889
no way of really telling the vast majority of

00:39:16.889 --> 00:39:20.170
the videos that were shared on Motherless were

00:39:20.170 --> 00:39:27.329
male on female violence and very hetero appearing

00:39:27.329 --> 00:39:34.599
male on female violence. don't, maybe these two

00:39:34.599 --> 00:39:36.539
could also speak to it, but in the telegram group,

00:39:36.559 --> 00:39:40.139
I don't think there was any, there was any indication

00:39:40.139 --> 00:39:44.119
that women were doing any of these assaults,

00:39:44.119 --> 00:39:48.920
which might be interesting to know as well. Also

00:39:48.920 --> 00:39:52.440
say, you know, one way of you talked about the

00:39:52.440 --> 00:39:56.059
CSAM and trying to avoid, you know, holding or

00:39:56.059 --> 00:40:00.840
potentially being in holding illegal content.

00:40:01.179 --> 00:40:06.119
This team, in addition to some others that with

00:40:06.119 --> 00:40:09.219
some amazing technical skills had tried to scrape.

00:40:10.810 --> 00:40:15.929
motherless, and also scrape a few other telegram

00:40:15.929 --> 00:40:19.570
groups that were of interest at the beginning

00:40:19.570 --> 00:40:23.269
of the reporting to identify and identify users

00:40:23.269 --> 00:40:25.889
that were posting problematic content without

00:40:25.889 --> 00:40:29.469
bringing any images in, and just to see what

00:40:29.469 --> 00:40:31.750
the language was around that. And that was another

00:40:31.750 --> 00:40:35.650
way that we were trying to identify some of the

00:40:35.650 --> 00:40:40.280
kingpins. In this world, ultimately, I think

00:40:40.280 --> 00:40:43.519
the motherless screen didn't go anywhere because

00:40:43.519 --> 00:40:46.059
of the way in which the videos were categorized.

00:40:46.300 --> 00:40:48.800
It wasn't an appropriate way to do it. But just

00:40:48.800 --> 00:40:53.139
to say, there's so many ways to start these sort

00:40:53.139 --> 00:40:56.039
of investigations. And if you're looking to avoid

00:40:56.039 --> 00:40:59.099
bringing in content that you don't necessarily

00:40:59.099 --> 00:41:01.559
want on your computer or whatever you're working

00:41:01.559 --> 00:41:04.440
with, that's one way that we thought. would be

00:41:04.440 --> 00:41:07.880
a good reporting tool as well as just a way of

00:41:07.880 --> 00:41:11.320
seeing what was out there in bulk. Yeah, I have

00:41:11.320 --> 00:41:14.860
to say the scrapes were very helpful. We did

00:41:14.860 --> 00:41:17.900
a scrape in the first investigation. We did the

00:41:17.900 --> 00:41:20.139
one just on the Pelicot case because we looked

00:41:20.139 --> 00:41:23.219
at one website in that investigation, which was

00:41:23.219 --> 00:41:25.739
a copycat website of the one that Pelicot himself

00:41:25.739 --> 00:41:31.099
used, Coco. It's very simple. As you know, then

00:41:31.099 --> 00:41:32.940
you start to get familiar with the key terms

00:41:32.940 --> 00:41:35.539
and you're just going through hundreds and thousands

00:41:35.539 --> 00:41:39.619
of messages, but you again, start to see patterns

00:41:39.619 --> 00:41:43.820
that are really useful then for when you do spend

00:41:43.820 --> 00:41:46.840
deeper time in these spaces. So yeah, indispensable,

00:41:47.360 --> 00:41:50.590
or it's totally right. Sarah's just put in the

00:41:50.590 --> 00:41:52.989
chat, in the US there are no journalistic protections

00:41:52.989 --> 00:41:55.869
if you access CSAM. New York Times did a very

00:41:55.869 --> 00:41:57.789
interesting investigation on how CSAM was passed

00:41:57.789 --> 00:41:59.869
in communities and they build a special browser

00:41:59.869 --> 00:42:02.170
which never showed photos but instead checked

00:42:02.170 --> 00:42:04.510
for known CSAM image hashes for confirmation.

00:42:05.050 --> 00:42:08.929
That's another method to deal with that influx

00:42:08.929 --> 00:42:13.489
of data. We've had a few questions about, because

00:42:13.489 --> 00:42:18.090
obviously you're reporting on very obvious harm.

00:42:19.530 --> 00:42:24.590
about where the investigation lines cross with

00:42:24.590 --> 00:42:28.829
police investigation. A member asked earlier

00:42:28.829 --> 00:42:31.829
if there was any police reports that you found

00:42:31.829 --> 00:42:36.210
on any of the videos found on this site. If anyone

00:42:36.210 --> 00:42:40.349
had ever reported a case from Motherless and

00:42:40.349 --> 00:42:42.929
how you went about finding those. So perhaps

00:42:42.929 --> 00:42:45.110
we can talk a little bit about that first and

00:42:45.110 --> 00:42:48.960
then... Did you at any point feel the need to

00:42:48.960 --> 00:42:51.139
report what you were saying to the police and

00:42:51.139 --> 00:42:55.059
how do you manage that avoiding kind of moving

00:42:55.059 --> 00:42:58.139
away from the genus integrity of kind of being

00:42:58.139 --> 00:43:07.820
that observer? I think in terms of, because we

00:43:07.820 --> 00:43:11.260
should talk about Piotr because this is I think

00:43:11.260 --> 00:43:16.079
linked to this question, which is Piaz had admitted

00:43:16.079 --> 00:43:21.739
that he had drugged and raped his wife, but he

00:43:21.739 --> 00:43:26.300
wasn't saying that he was doing it. And he was

00:43:26.300 --> 00:43:31.420
looking for drugs, he was looking for them to

00:43:31.420 --> 00:43:35.000
do it again, but he wasn't able to get hold of

00:43:35.000 --> 00:43:38.219
them whilst we were having that discussion. Because

00:43:38.219 --> 00:43:42.690
we, again, we were consulting not just our in

00:43:42.690 --> 00:43:46.409
-house lawyer, we had lawyers in Poland, we had

00:43:46.409 --> 00:43:50.630
a lawyer in the UK. We were having discussions

00:43:50.630 --> 00:43:54.409
with all of these lawyers so that what do we

00:43:54.409 --> 00:43:58.650
do if we are then aware that Piotr is on Thursday

00:43:58.650 --> 00:44:01.590
going to buy drugs and this is what he is planning

00:44:01.590 --> 00:44:04.329
on doing to his wife? We always knew that if

00:44:04.329 --> 00:44:06.969
we were faced with that, we would of course have

00:44:06.969 --> 00:44:09.929
to tell the police instantly because that was

00:44:09.929 --> 00:44:12.809
one of the questions that we had is, you know,

00:44:13.210 --> 00:44:15.789
when do we involve the police? And we had decided

00:44:15.789 --> 00:44:19.170
that as soon as we identified Piotr, we would

00:44:19.170 --> 00:44:22.690
have to tell the police because again, you know,

00:44:22.690 --> 00:44:26.630
it's about protecting her and then knowing that

00:44:26.630 --> 00:44:29.349
a crime has either been committed or is about

00:44:29.349 --> 00:44:34.809
to be committed. And that is why it was very

00:44:34.809 --> 00:44:37.869
quick after identifying him to pass our findings

00:44:37.869 --> 00:44:40.590
onto the police. But it is true that at CNN,

00:44:41.050 --> 00:44:47.750
It's rare for journalists at CNN to involve the

00:44:47.750 --> 00:44:51.530
police. But in this instance, we had so much

00:44:51.530 --> 00:44:55.469
evidence that we knew we had good reasons to

00:44:55.469 --> 00:44:59.289
believe that a crime had been committed. We were

00:44:59.289 --> 00:45:03.929
compelled to share that information with the

00:45:03.929 --> 00:45:09.340
authorities. I'll let Niamh actually take the

00:45:09.340 --> 00:45:13.820
question about flagging the content. Yeah, sure.

00:45:14.179 --> 00:45:17.559
One thing that kind of was out of our control

00:45:17.559 --> 00:45:20.420
on one level was that the group actually disappeared

00:45:20.420 --> 00:45:24.340
in the midst of our reporting. So we spent several

00:45:24.340 --> 00:45:26.980
months in it, but then one day I logged in to

00:45:26.980 --> 00:45:30.619
go and do my daily work and it had completely

00:45:30.619 --> 00:45:35.909
disappeared. Obviously at that point, you know,

00:45:36.010 --> 00:45:39.809
we'd already got more than we needed in terms

00:45:39.809 --> 00:45:44.630
of proving that this, you know, we went in with

00:45:44.630 --> 00:45:47.110
our, you know, thesis of these spaces are there

00:45:47.110 --> 00:45:50.769
and we obviously had found that and we'd already

00:45:50.769 --> 00:45:52.809
kind of decided, well, we're going to zero our

00:45:52.809 --> 00:45:55.710
attention in on Piotr, but the group completely

00:45:55.710 --> 00:46:00.730
disappeared off telegram. And that was, so we've

00:46:00.730 --> 00:46:04.349
decided to reach out to Telegram as well and

00:46:04.349 --> 00:46:07.789
flag what we've found. And we sent them a very,

00:46:07.789 --> 00:46:13.429
very, very extensive email message with like

00:46:13.429 --> 00:46:15.610
all of the problematic, the nature of the problematic

00:46:15.610 --> 00:46:19.510
content. Asked them how it was reconciled with

00:46:19.510 --> 00:46:22.750
their terms of service, their policy, their operating

00:46:22.750 --> 00:46:27.250
policy. Kara was really instrumental in doing

00:46:27.250 --> 00:46:32.420
a lot of that reach out with Telegram and If

00:46:32.420 --> 00:46:33.980
you want to talk a bit more about it Carl, but

00:46:33.980 --> 00:46:36.480
it wasn't very fruitful, their response back

00:46:36.480 --> 00:46:40.159
to us when we flagged the content to them and

00:46:40.159 --> 00:46:44.119
what we believed was going on. And Niamh, if

00:46:44.119 --> 00:46:47.800
you remember too, the group had gone away and

00:46:47.800 --> 00:46:50.780
more telegram savvy folks on this call probably

00:46:50.780 --> 00:46:54.320
know what happened here. So the group was the...

00:46:54.960 --> 00:47:00.179
activated, but it still appeared like you could

00:47:00.179 --> 00:47:03.699
still search for it. I am endless to Telegram

00:47:03.699 --> 00:47:06.300
and they did not respond to our questions, but

00:47:06.300 --> 00:47:08.800
after we put this to them and told them about

00:47:08.800 --> 00:47:10.840
that we would be publishing soon and asked for

00:47:10.840 --> 00:47:14.519
multiple requests for comment, then everything

00:47:14.519 --> 00:47:17.820
disappeared. So no trace of the Telegram group

00:47:17.820 --> 00:47:22.679
even existing was ever there. And that was interesting.

00:47:23.610 --> 00:47:25.329
you know, that was something interesting that

00:47:25.329 --> 00:47:30.889
we noticed in that response. And from them, obviously,

00:47:31.050 --> 00:47:35.650
we also never received any response from Motherless

00:47:35.650 --> 00:47:38.329
about their content. But this could be like a

00:47:38.329 --> 00:47:41.150
good segue of saying that since the reporting

00:47:41.150 --> 00:47:45.789
has come out, Motherless appears to have taken

00:47:46.510 --> 00:47:49.210
significant steps to remove the vast majority

00:47:49.210 --> 00:47:51.210
of the so -called sleek content off of their

00:47:51.210 --> 00:47:55.889
site. There is an investigation opened in the

00:47:55.889 --> 00:47:59.130
Netherlands and to the Dutch server, their servers

00:47:59.130 --> 00:48:02.929
are in the Netherlands. And so the Dutch prosecutors

00:48:02.929 --> 00:48:09.369
has opened an investigation into what they said

00:48:09.369 --> 00:48:12.510
was not necessarily what was on motherless, but

00:48:12.510 --> 00:48:15.409
into any people who had uploaded content that

00:48:15.409 --> 00:48:18.769
was illegal there. And we've seen in recent reporting

00:48:18.769 --> 00:48:21.550
and local reporting there in the last few days

00:48:21.550 --> 00:48:24.809
that there's been some arrests made. They didn't

00:48:24.809 --> 00:48:28.329
cite this investigation and the authorities are

00:48:28.329 --> 00:48:30.519
nine. I'm speaking much on that, but I think

00:48:30.519 --> 00:48:33.739
it's work how we've talked a lot about accountability

00:48:33.739 --> 00:48:38.380
of these platforms and the responses that Telegram

00:48:38.380 --> 00:48:42.079
gave to us, for example, saying that they don't

00:48:42.079 --> 00:48:44.860
allow this sort of content and we do everything

00:48:44.860 --> 00:48:46.559
we can to take it down. And they've given us

00:48:46.559 --> 00:48:48.719
a blanket statement about that, which we published.

00:48:49.840 --> 00:48:53.440
But when it comes to the wider accountability

00:48:53.440 --> 00:48:57.530
question, even even with motherless having some

00:48:57.530 --> 00:48:59.989
of this content removed and Dutch authorities

00:48:59.989 --> 00:49:03.349
doing what they can from their side, there doesn't

00:49:03.349 --> 00:49:06.909
seem to be any changes within these platforms

00:49:06.909 --> 00:49:11.230
to push for consent at the get. So that consent

00:49:11.230 --> 00:49:14.449
is an integrated part of their operating model.

00:49:14.690 --> 00:49:18.909
Instead, a lot of them rely on privacy laws that

00:49:18.909 --> 00:49:22.449
exist in the US or in other countries that intentionally

00:49:22.449 --> 00:49:28.900
obscure the ability for accountability, essentially.

00:49:29.800 --> 00:49:32.239
We know that this, for the example of Motherless,

00:49:32.400 --> 00:49:35.519
their servers were in the Netherlands. Their

00:49:35.519 --> 00:49:41.159
parent company has paperwork registered also

00:49:41.159 --> 00:49:46.860
in Costa Rica. These are intentional obfuscations

00:49:46.860 --> 00:49:52.480
of these companies, we believe, to avoid any

00:49:52.519 --> 00:49:56.380
our responsibility in being a part of some of

00:49:56.380 --> 00:49:59.300
this work or what's happening on our platforms

00:49:59.300 --> 00:50:03.960
rather. Yeah, I'm conscious of time, but I wanted

00:50:03.960 --> 00:50:06.659
to quickly ask because Sarah asked earlier in

00:50:06.659 --> 00:50:09.659
the chats about the transactions for the sales,

00:50:09.719 --> 00:50:13.679
the files of sexual abuse material. And you mentioned

00:50:13.679 --> 00:50:16.239
that people were selling products as well on

00:50:16.239 --> 00:50:20.760
there. Were they using mainstream payment providers

00:50:20.760 --> 00:50:24.820
to manage those payments? You could either pay

00:50:24.820 --> 00:50:28.679
in crypto or in PayPal. Of course, again, we

00:50:28.679 --> 00:50:32.539
didn't pay Bright, never got any of that content

00:50:32.539 --> 00:50:35.159
because we wouldn't, but on the Telegram channel,

00:50:35.699 --> 00:50:40.159
they were just sharing videos morning, noon and

00:50:40.159 --> 00:50:45.400
night. Same on Motherless. Honestly, at Bellingcat,

00:50:45.519 --> 00:50:48.000
we often find that targeting the wallet of these

00:50:48.000 --> 00:50:51.539
sites creates the most impact. And if you read

00:50:51.539 --> 00:50:55.059
any of our work in this space, you'll see that

00:50:55.059 --> 00:50:58.039
that's often the target. We've had a question

00:50:58.039 --> 00:51:02.579
from Sumi DH, which I think is really nice and

00:51:02.579 --> 00:51:05.980
brings us into maybe looking from a wider perspective

00:51:05.980 --> 00:51:08.679
now, a little bit away from the investigation.

00:51:09.599 --> 00:51:11.860
When you are done with the case, how do you wash

00:51:11.860 --> 00:51:16.239
it away from your mind? Obviously a lot of people

00:51:16.239 --> 00:51:19.300
within this space may be conducting investigations

00:51:19.300 --> 00:51:22.960
that are similar, perhaps without a newsroom

00:51:22.960 --> 00:51:26.300
team behind them. How do you deal with kind of

00:51:26.300 --> 00:51:29.179
moving on after you've kind of been undercover?

00:51:30.639 --> 00:51:34.239
I don't think you do move on. I think in terms

00:51:34.239 --> 00:51:37.940
of, you know, especially with this one, because

00:51:37.940 --> 00:51:43.989
it had quite an impact and a lot of survivors

00:51:43.989 --> 00:51:48.409
reached out to all of us on Instagram, on email,

00:51:49.150 --> 00:51:54.849
on Twitter, on X. I think we found the response

00:51:54.849 --> 00:51:57.690
extraordinary and I don't think, and I'm speaking

00:51:57.690 --> 00:51:59.489
for Niamh and Kara, but I don't think any of

00:51:59.489 --> 00:52:03.550
us expected that response and to see so many

00:52:03.550 --> 00:52:10.860
survivors come forward. that in a way that the

00:52:10.860 --> 00:52:12.360
darkness, I've spoken about this before, but

00:52:12.360 --> 00:52:15.880
like the darkness of the investigation, you know,

00:52:15.880 --> 00:52:18.480
it's all a kind of, you know, you have to find

00:52:18.480 --> 00:52:22.440
the light. And in this instance, we felt that

00:52:22.440 --> 00:52:25.880
the survivors were the light and all of those

00:52:25.880 --> 00:52:30.800
months spent having to watch and look at this

00:52:30.800 --> 00:52:37.460
really harrowing content. to hear from the survivors,

00:52:38.059 --> 00:52:41.519
it was worth it anyway because of what we were

00:52:41.519 --> 00:52:44.019
able to reveal, but it made it that much more

00:52:44.019 --> 00:52:46.559
worth it because you really felt that you were

00:52:46.559 --> 00:52:49.840
helping them and that they felt seen and that

00:52:49.840 --> 00:52:51.480
they felt that they weren't alone and that they

00:52:51.480 --> 00:52:53.440
were able to connect with those survivors. And

00:52:53.440 --> 00:52:55.820
that has been the greatest privilege of this

00:52:55.820 --> 00:52:59.159
work has been to be able to connect these survivors

00:52:59.159 --> 00:53:05.179
or to give these survivors the links, the contact

00:53:05.179 --> 00:53:08.260
numbers, the emails to reach out to, to get help.

00:53:09.820 --> 00:53:12.360
And two of the survivors we interviewed, two

00:53:12.360 --> 00:53:14.079
of the three that we interviewed for this piece

00:53:14.079 --> 00:53:19.679
have now launched their own campaign. And so

00:53:19.679 --> 00:53:22.300
how do you move on? I just don't think you do.

00:53:22.420 --> 00:53:26.679
I think it's something you carry with you. But

00:53:26.679 --> 00:53:29.559
speaking about it to other journalists, I have

00:53:29.559 --> 00:53:34.159
found has really helped. Neven was in those dark

00:53:34.159 --> 00:53:37.519
spaces in the first piece. We're currently working

00:53:37.519 --> 00:53:39.659
on a second piece of car. He's been in those

00:53:39.659 --> 00:53:42.300
dark spaces too, but to be able to kind of always

00:53:42.300 --> 00:53:45.619
feel like we weren't alone. And I hear what you're

00:53:45.619 --> 00:53:47.760
saying, Charlie, that of course there will be

00:53:47.760 --> 00:53:52.369
journalists on this call who do work. alone.

00:53:52.650 --> 00:53:56.630
And I think my advice would be reach out and

00:53:56.630 --> 00:54:01.090
speak to other journalists, other women or men

00:54:01.090 --> 00:54:03.829
who have worked in these spaces, just so that

00:54:03.829 --> 00:54:07.010
you can feel that there is a kindred spirit out

00:54:07.010 --> 00:54:09.969
there who knows what you're going through. And

00:54:09.969 --> 00:54:11.769
I think we were really fortunate, Niamh and I,

00:54:11.809 --> 00:54:13.789
because we were going through it at exactly the

00:54:13.789 --> 00:54:17.150
same time. And it just never felt like we were

00:54:17.150 --> 00:54:20.269
carrying that load alone. Sorry, Niamh, I don't

00:54:20.269 --> 00:54:25.389
want to speak for you. And I think the thing

00:54:25.389 --> 00:54:27.389
that I just like to bring up all the time is

00:54:27.389 --> 00:54:31.170
like, don't feel ashamed if it is impacting you

00:54:31.170 --> 00:54:35.250
in a way, like you should. The hard thing is.

00:54:35.500 --> 00:54:38.059
not becoming, because again, you're trying to

00:54:38.059 --> 00:54:42.199
do this job and remain objective and be a journalist,

00:54:42.480 --> 00:54:46.559
but also nobody, this is horrible stuff and it

00:54:46.559 --> 00:54:49.340
is going to, you wouldn't be human if you didn't

00:54:49.340 --> 00:54:52.420
feel a sense of horror and disgust and indignation

00:54:52.420 --> 00:54:54.119
and that's not wrong. And you shouldn't feel

00:54:54.119 --> 00:54:57.039
ashamed for feeling those feelings. Like that's

00:54:57.039 --> 00:55:00.179
the thing I had to kind of make peace with myself

00:55:00.179 --> 00:55:04.039
was just, you never, when you do, reporting,

00:55:04.159 --> 00:55:05.940
which I'm sure lots of wonderful people on this

00:55:05.940 --> 00:55:08.440
call do. You're not going to come out the same

00:55:08.440 --> 00:55:11.500
person as you were at the beginning of the reporting.

00:55:11.619 --> 00:55:13.659
You are going to change because of what you're

00:55:13.659 --> 00:55:16.139
exposed to. And you can change for the better

00:55:16.139 --> 00:55:18.420
in terms of, as Saskya talks about, positive

00:55:18.420 --> 00:55:22.420
impact, meeting really courageous and brave people,

00:55:22.440 --> 00:55:24.219
like the women that we interviewed, the women

00:55:24.219 --> 00:55:26.639
that are still coming forward and that are speaking

00:55:26.639 --> 00:55:28.719
about this topic. But yeah, it's going to leave

00:55:28.719 --> 00:55:31.559
a mark on you and that is the price you have

00:55:31.559 --> 00:55:35.630
to pay. But, but don't be ashamed about that.

00:55:35.750 --> 00:55:38.190
You know, don't like talk about it. Like as Saskya

00:55:38.190 --> 00:55:41.769
says, talk about if it's just, just, just, just

00:55:41.769 --> 00:55:44.769
don't be feel alone. And, and, and I'm always

00:55:44.769 --> 00:55:47.989
happy to talk to anybody who ever wants to get

00:55:47.989 --> 00:55:50.190
a, you know, on a caller about this stuff. Cause

00:55:50.190 --> 00:55:53.289
I think it's really important to just conversation

00:55:53.289 --> 00:55:57.449
when it comes to mental health, very proactive.

00:55:57.809 --> 00:56:00.289
Cause I, I, I like counseling throughout the

00:56:00.289 --> 00:56:03.739
whole thing and still do. Thank you so much for

00:56:03.739 --> 00:56:06.960
sharing that amazing tips there. We actually

00:56:06.960 --> 00:56:09.380
have a resource and maybe one of the mods can

00:56:09.380 --> 00:56:12.860
pop it in the chat about maintaining mental hygiene

00:56:12.860 --> 00:56:15.739
when doing open source research. And there's

00:56:15.739 --> 00:56:19.480
also a guide to reporting on sexual and gender

00:56:19.480 --> 00:56:23.119
-based violence as well that was written by my

00:56:23.119 --> 00:56:26.460
colleague a few years ago and is still very much

00:56:26.460 --> 00:56:28.699
up to date. Somebody also mentioned the Berkeley

00:56:28.699 --> 00:56:31.159
protocol earlier today. That's also a really

00:56:31.159 --> 00:56:34.050
good resource. and that Dr Alex Koenig shared

00:56:34.050 --> 00:56:36.409
on her stage talk, which we can also link in

00:56:36.409 --> 00:56:39.030
the chat in a second. Saskya just mentioned that

00:56:39.030 --> 00:56:41.269
you might want to speak to people. We actually

00:56:41.269 --> 00:56:43.510
have spaces within here. This is kind of the

00:56:43.510 --> 00:56:46.690
point of this community is that you guys can

00:56:46.690 --> 00:56:50.909
talk and you can find a hashtag gender -based

00:56:50.909 --> 00:56:55.329
violence and misogyny and anti -LGBTQ plus monitoring

00:56:55.329 --> 00:56:58.369
is two spaces that relate to this talk that you

00:56:58.369 --> 00:57:00.329
might find useful if you're working on those.

00:57:00.639 --> 00:57:04.840
I wanted to end because we'd mentioned already

00:57:04.840 --> 00:57:10.699
that the As Equals project is coming to an end.

00:57:11.159 --> 00:57:13.039
I wanted to ask, we've spoken about the legacy

00:57:13.039 --> 00:57:15.920
of Motherless investigation, but what is the

00:57:15.920 --> 00:57:20.000
legacy in your opinion of the As Equals project?

00:57:20.320 --> 00:57:23.860
What did that particular series allow you to

00:57:23.860 --> 00:57:26.460
do that you might not have been able to do? in

00:57:26.460 --> 00:57:29.800
a normal newsroom beat? And what lessons can

00:57:29.800 --> 00:57:33.480
people take from it? The funding for that ended

00:57:33.480 --> 00:57:38.679
actually in December of this past year. So we

00:57:38.679 --> 00:57:43.500
are still, as Saskya said, we're still working

00:57:43.500 --> 00:57:45.699
on a second piece around this at the moment.

00:57:46.519 --> 00:57:50.320
And we're doing that without the outfit of the...

00:57:50.170 --> 00:57:54.190
as equals purview. I mean, I think the legacy

00:57:54.190 --> 00:57:58.690
of having a dedicated reporting project such

00:57:58.690 --> 00:58:02.809
as as equals in a large newsroom really helps

00:58:02.809 --> 00:58:05.829
everyone that might not necessarily be thinking

00:58:05.829 --> 00:58:13.980
about gendered inequality reporting to... But

00:58:13.980 --> 00:58:16.980
think about potentially putting a frame on that

00:58:16.980 --> 00:58:19.780
for other stories and to find intersectionality

00:58:19.780 --> 00:58:22.380
within other stories, whether you're reporting

00:58:22.380 --> 00:58:24.800
on the climate or you're reporting on conflict,

00:58:24.900 --> 00:58:27.059
you're reporting on anything like that. I think

00:58:27.059 --> 00:58:30.219
that that really helped the wider newsroom as

00:58:30.219 --> 00:58:33.719
a whole consider gender -based violence stories

00:58:33.719 --> 00:58:36.000
in a different light and realize that it doesn't

00:58:36.000 --> 00:58:40.719
have to be within a remit of a grant to report

00:58:40.719 --> 00:58:45.360
on those stories. So I think the positivity around

00:58:45.360 --> 00:58:50.139
continuing this work and continuing work. that

00:58:50.139 --> 00:58:52.840
doesn't need to be siloed into this is an ad

00:58:52.840 --> 00:58:55.480
equal story is that people just know that these

00:58:55.480 --> 00:58:57.280
are just stories that need to be told no matter

00:58:57.280 --> 00:59:02.000
what. And that's important with the more people

00:59:02.000 --> 00:59:05.300
that are advocating for reporting in this space

00:59:05.300 --> 00:59:10.880
in newsrooms will ensure that we don't need to

00:59:10.880 --> 00:59:14.829
necessarily have. grants or special projects

00:59:14.829 --> 00:59:17.110
dedicated to them. Although, of course, that's,

00:59:17.110 --> 00:59:22.730
you know, we wouldn't say no to another way of

00:59:22.730 --> 00:59:26.170
accessing more time and funds to specifically

00:59:26.170 --> 00:59:27.769
report on these things. I mean, this project

00:59:27.769 --> 00:59:30.710
alone was a seven, eight month investigation

00:59:30.710 --> 00:59:35.010
with a crew far larger than that. So obviously,

00:59:35.030 --> 00:59:38.400
you know, there's so many people. that we already

00:59:38.400 --> 00:59:41.159
talked about that helped allow this reporting

00:59:41.159 --> 00:59:46.699
to come to light. And that's the power of people

00:59:46.699 --> 00:59:50.900
that are interested in driving positive change

00:59:50.900 --> 00:59:53.239
and impactful, accountable journalism forward.

00:59:54.480 --> 00:59:56.519
It's nice to see there's so many people that

00:59:56.519 --> 01:00:01.449
were interested in getting involved. Amazing.

01:00:01.789 --> 01:00:05.409
While we are at time, everybody in the chat has

01:00:05.409 --> 01:00:08.110
been saying thank you so much for your incredible

01:00:08.110 --> 01:00:11.230
reporting. And thank you again for coming in

01:00:11.230 --> 01:00:14.210
today and sharing some behind the scenes information

01:00:14.210 --> 01:00:18.030
about the investigation and how it came about.

01:00:18.369 --> 01:00:20.969
I think it's super important for people to understand

01:00:20.969 --> 01:00:24.150
the levels of work that goes into these kinds

01:00:24.150 --> 01:00:28.090
of pieces and why investment in journalism is

01:00:28.090 --> 01:00:31.500
so important. So thank you again and thank you

01:00:31.500 --> 01:00:34.139
to everyone who's joined us today. There will

01:00:34.139 --> 01:00:37.119
not be a stage talk in two weeks time. That is

01:00:37.119 --> 01:00:39.460
partly due to the fact that I'm going on holiday.

01:00:40.039 --> 01:00:43.260
But there will be one in three weeks time. So

01:00:43.260 --> 01:00:47.500
please keep your eyes open in the events tab

01:00:47.500 --> 01:00:51.199
for that. It will be slightly related to this

01:00:51.199 --> 01:00:54.380
talk on a similar subject. So if you're interested

01:00:54.380 --> 01:00:57.199
in this talk, please keep your eyes peeled for

01:00:57.199 --> 01:01:01.619
the events tab. But for now, thank you very much.

01:01:01.920 --> 01:01:05.340
Thank you. Thank you for listening to the stage

01:01:05.340 --> 01:01:08.599
talk. If you'd like to catch a stage tour live

01:01:08.599 --> 01:01:11.699
where you can ask the guest questions, join the

01:01:11.699 --> 01:01:16.579
Bellingcat Discord server by visiting www .discord

01:01:16.579 --> 01:01:20.840
.gg slash Bellingcat. The music you've heard

01:01:20.840 --> 01:01:24.519
is titled Dawn by Newer Self and is courtesy

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of Artlist.