to the public.
Good afternoon. So council
are here for one Donald Trump
versus United States. We're
familiar with your briefs.
We've read them. The
authority cited in them. We've
looked at the portions of the
record that we need review. So
you have limited time this
morning. I'm going to ask you
to be mindful of the red
light. I want you to be
mindful of the red light. It's
time to stop. If you're
finishing an answer to a
question from the court. You
can finish that answer without
losing any rebuttal time. For
the record, I'm going to ask
you to read the record. Thank
you, Your Honor. May it please
the court. So upon Joshi for
the government, the district
court entered an injunction
preventing the government from
using documents that were law
fully seized pursuant to a
lawfully issued warrant in the
course of its criminal
investigation. And that
extraordinary judicial intrusion
into a core executive branch
function should be reversed for
the rest of the court. So
that's the first case. The
second case is the case to
entertain plaintiff's motion in
the first place, as I think the
state panel in this case
recognized. Second, we don't
think plaintiff has
demonstrated and can't
demonstrate likelihood of
success on the merits to
warrant the extraordinary
injunction that was entered.
And third, at all events,
plaintiff hasn't demonstrated
and can't demonstrate any
irreparable injury that would
warrant the extraordinary
injunction. Now I can first
question. I'm sorry. I'm
sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry.
The state panel recognized
precedent for exercising
equitable jurisdiction in a
pre indictment scenario where
there's no showing. That the
seizure itself was on law.
We've been unable to find a
case in which that that has
happened, Your Honor. And I
don't think plaintiff has
demonstrated any irreparable
injury. And I think that's
because of federal criminal
procedure. And so the natural
place to raise that would be in
some kind of criminal
proceeding. And so this court,
uh, the Fifth Circuit binding
precedent that other courts as
well, including the Eighth
Circuit, the Ninth and others
that we've cited in the briefs
have made clear that when
someone is seeking the return
of property pre indictment,
pre initiation of any kind of
criminal process. The
court has recognized that.
It's supposed to be extraordinary.
It's supposed to be rare. And
for that reason, they have
limited the availability and
the exercise of discretion to
cases where there is I think
the case is called a callous
disregard for rights. And I
think this court and binding
precedent has recognized that.
Uh, I think the callous
disregard for constitutional
rights is as a little more of
a
legal issue. I think it could
be debatable whether the
seizure itself was unlawful.
Callous disregard for
constitutional rights is even.
A higher burden. I would think
that my question was, has there
ever been an exercise of this
kind of jurisdiction where
there's no showing that the
seizure itself was unlawful.
And I think that's a very
important question. I think
perhaps no such case exists.
Nor have we found a case in
which this kind of anomalous
jurisdiction was exercised
where the plaintiff couldn't
show a need for the return
materials here. Plaintiff
hasn't even attempted to show
a need for the return
materials. And at all events
plaintiff now has all of the
materials we see except for the
classified documents now
granted copies of them, but he
has not been able to show a
need for the return materials
in the court. So I think that
is a very important question
that we've been able to
formulate.
I have a question about the
callous disregard factor.
We've said that that's an
important factor. Is it
dispositive? Must it always
show to seek this anomalous
jurisdiction a callous
disregard of your rights?
I think that's certainly what
Chapman seems to suggest. And
of course that's binding on
the panel. Now we recognize
that the plaintiff has not
been able to show any of the
factors under the plaintiff.
In this case, I don't think the
panel needs to reach that
question because plaintiff
hasn't been able to show any
of the factors under Richie.
He hasn't shown certainly with
respect to the classified
documents, which I think the
state panel appropriately
analyzed, but even with respect
to the others, he either
hasn't shown a personal
interest in. But even if he
has, he has not even attempted
to demonstrate a need for their
property.
So I think that's a good
question. I think that's a
good point. I think that your
opponent hasn't really made
much of an effort to show
specific need. But what level
of need what level of
specificity and what kind of
things do you think a movement
would need to show that used
to show that they actually had
a need for those documents.
I think one of the examples
that comes up in the case.
The case where you have a
business record, you have a
property and it might be
something like a business
record, but they have an
ongoing business concern. So
they need the business records
in order to keep their business
going during the pendency of
the investigation that might
be even if lawfully seized
that set that factor aside.
But that might be a case where
you could show a need. But of
course, the 41 itself
emphasizes that reasonableness
is the touchstone. And if the
government is able to make a
reasonable accommodation for
the need, then that's a
reasonable accommodation.
But 41 also recognizes and the
government fully accepts that
reasonable accommodation should
be made. So if a plaintiff can
show can make the showing of
the need in addition to the
other factors, the government
should, of course, attempt to
accommodate that while also
making sure the government can
use it in its investigation in
the express text 41 says that.
But what about adequate remedy?
I think some of the cases and
other circuits may go back and
forth on whether, um, whether
some motion to suppress an
eventual criminal trials and
adequate remedy. Do you think
that that will always be an
adequate remedy? Are there some
situations where that might not
be? I think in a situation like
this, we have to consider it
an adequate remedy because I
gather that's what plaintiff
want. And some of the filings
he's made, perhaps not in this
case, but he wants is not
really the documents back. As I
said, he already has them back.
What he wants is to prevent the
government from using the
documents. And I'm not sure
that that would ever be a valid
justification. I think they're
the proper way the proper remedy
at law would be in the criminal
proceeding to file a motion to
suppress, uh, file a motion for
use and, you know, derivative
use suppression of the evidence
through to the poisonous tree.
And I think that's the
appropriate way to address
exactly the concern your honor
raised. And so I think that
would be adequate remedy. Now,
I can see that again in a case
where it was a third party who
just needs documents back to
like run his business or
something like that. You know,
then we would accept that that
a rule 41 would be appropriate.
But obviously, we're very, very
far away from that here in this
case. And I think that
especially. Argued that that
the proper decretal language
would be that we reverse and
remain with instructions to
dismiss. It seemed to me that
because this is an appeal from
an for purposes of appellate
jurisdiction. What we would do
is we would have a
jurisdiction over the
background that there is a lack
of equitable jurisdiction. But
that that would be yet we don't
we what we would have
jurisdiction over is not the
entire case. We have
jurisdiction. If we have
jurisdiction, right? If we
haven't, it's over that order.
Granting an injunction. Isn't
that right? Technically,
there's a lot of jurisdiction
that we have. And we have
jurisdiction. I actually
disagree. Judge prior. So
obviously you do have
jurisdiction. That's common
ground over the order of the
September 5th order granting
the injunction case, right?
Well, so here's where I would
point to moon off against
Garen, a Supreme Court case
that we cite in our brief in
which the court expressly says
that on an interlocutory appeal
from an injunction, the appellate
court does have jurisdiction
over the case. And that's
correct. And so the appellate
court has the power to
evaluate the motion to dismiss
even though that ordinarily
wouldn't be appealable and not
only reverse the order under
review, but we man with
instructions to dismiss the
case and really not reverse
though. It's vacate, isn't it?
Uh I suppose that's correct.
Although I think ordinarily we
vacate is exactly why you would
have to do that. I mean, I
think that's the order to make
clear that you're not vacating
for the purposes of like new
factual findings or
reevaluation of some factor
reversing on the ground that
because there's no
jurisdiction, there's actually
no possibility of there ever
being a valid entry of an
injunction. So I will look at
that case and it would seem to
me that if you're right, then
what we're really talking about
is. A middle position that is I
was right about vacate, but
if a district court lacks
jurisdiction, that's what we
do. We vacate and remain with
instructions to dismiss, right?
Fair enough. And I'm not going
to find you too hard on it. If
if if the language says is
vacate and we man with
instructions to dismiss the
case, I think we'd be perfectly
happy with that with that. And
so what you're saying is we we
in your view, if we decide that
there was not equitable
jurisdiction over this claim in
the first place, we wouldn't
need to go through any of the
process. So I think that's
what you're saying. If we
decide that there was no
jurisdiction over this case or
anything like that, the
dismissal of the lack of
jurisdiction over the case as
it would brought would resolve
all the questions in your mind.
Is that right? I think that's
right, because plaintiff filed
this extraordinary motion to
kick off these proceedings.
It's not even a complaint. It's
just a motion for judicial
oversight of an executive grant
investigation. And if you find
as urging you to that
question, you can't just
reject it. You can't just
reject it. That's exactly so
just to be clear than that. So
that that line of of of
reasoning avoids the
supplemental jurisdiction
issue entirely. I believe it
does. Yes. But of course, as we
point out in our brief, if you
do have to reach that issue, we
think this is clearly in
extricably intertwined as I
think the state panel
recognize with respect to the
classified documents. I think
that's a very good point.
Thank you.
So I'm wondering about the
appointment of a special
master from sort of the mind
run of cases where a district
court is evaluating a
discovery dispute, something
like that tells one side. Don't
look at these documents until
somebody else has a chance to
review them. Um what
distinguishes this case from
that? The entry of an
injunction, right? That that
sounds like a formality, but
it's actually a very real
case. And I think that the
injunction is something
special. Uh the Supreme Court
held recently in the Tiger
case that the word injunction
brings with it the old soil and
it brings with it all the all
the common law backdrop of what
an injunction is. And so let
me just give you just a
hypothetical and just see if
you see what this means. So
let's say I'm a district court
and I'm adjudicating a dispute
between two parties. It's an
intellectual property dispute.
Okay, just a normal civil
action. And there's a
question that I have for you
that I have a question that I
have for you. I tell the
defendant don't look at these
documents. You were enjoying
from looking at these
documents until the third party
special master that I've
appointed can review these
documents and determine
whether you're supposed to
have them at all. But that
they're privileged. Is that an
appealable order? If I might
answer if an order is entered
with an injunction and it uses
that language, then yes, under
the law. I'm not sure that
that's an injunction.
Thank you. You've saved 3
minutes for a rebuttal. Mister
trustee.
That is my name is Jim trust
represent the pleasure to
meet you. Your as to the issue
of equitable jurisdiction. I
think some context is
necessary. I think that some
actual process here needs to
be done. I'm not sure.
I'm not sure. I'm not sure.
Judge and where we are.
You heard question for your
adversary. Are you aware? Can
you cite me a single decision
by a federal court? Other than
this one where a federal court
has exercised equitable
jurisdiction. I'm not sure
that that's an allegation
that the seizure itself was
unlawful.
Not in the context of an
immediate.
Fully formed motion that
indicates that in fact, we
know this to be an
unconstitutional seizure. I
agree with the court's premise
that there's not case. I would
start with the broader premise
of the case. I think that
there's a great of a
presidential candidate home.
So we have some initial
context. Do you think that
raid is the right term for
execution of a warrant or
execution of a warrant? That's
fine. Your honor. I apologize
for using a more loaded term.
But what I would suggest is
that Judge Cannon looked at
the Ritchie factors and she
ruled obviously that in three
cases, I'm going to come back
and say that I'm going to
look at the
case. I'm going to look at the
case and she found that it
wasn't satisfied in your brief
doesn't even attempt to argue
that it was satisfied.
Understood. And what that
reflects ultimately, your
honor is we're in a position
where we're in a process that
this judge has created. It is
not prejudging that relief
will be available in the grand
scheme of things under rule 41
G under the Fourth Amendment.
It is it is an initial moment
that we're in a position where
the
consequence of this extraordinary
kind of jurisdiction would be
that the seizure itself is
unlawful. And if you if you
can't establish that, then
what are we doing here? We are
in the process of establishing
that that's exactly what this
judge has contemplated is not
immediate protective pleading
for. We're in a position where
it's not a
general warrant. We have a
good perspective and we have
good reason to think that
there's now evidence of
unlawful seizure. I want this
being a general want I want
this being something that
violates the presidential
record act possibly. But you
didn't establish that it was a
general war. But you're on the
point is how can we establish
these things without even
having access to the documents
at first? We're talking about a
process of
unlawful seizure. We're not
able to establish a process
of power to establish a
process where we could fully
explore it instead of filing
on based motions, claiming
constitutional violations. I
said that to be the purpose,
even the purpose that you all
have articulated. You've asked
for a special master to review
the documents for privilege.
That doesn't sound like an
attempt to demonstrate that the
seizure was unlawful. It is a
matter of time. It's a matter
of time. It's not enough to
obtain a warrant. There's still
a whole universe of potential
Frank's type challenges to the
obtaining of this warrant from
the magistrate. So we start
with. Yes, we exercise. There
were 2900 documents that were
taken, most of which
incredibly personal
documents, photographs, thank
you, notes, birthday cards,
golf shirts. We didn't know
that at the time that we
initially met with Judge
McHale. We didn't know that
we were going to be able to
get a warrant. We didn't know
what the purpose of this
warrant. But we still know
what's in the affidavit. So do
you think it's rare for the
target of a want to think that
it's ever reaching? I don't
think that the targets
position was particularly at
issue here. It's the attorneys
assessing the conduct of the
FBI and taking part in this
unprecedented rate. I'm sorry,
search warrant execution and
the search warrant execution,
which is the only way to be
showing it was something that
has been accompanied with
public statements of
transparency. The attorney
general having unprecedented
press conference to say I want
to release the warrant and I
want to release the inventory.
But nothing else and our
situation as the attorneys for
the president saying, are we
going to file some sort of
protective rule 41 claim
without actually having
evidence developed? We're going
to file a case that's going to
be a case that's going to be
a case that's taken part in a
historical event. And what this
judge decided in her use of
discretion was that even in the
absence of callous disregard
that that did not completely
control that was not a
predicate to the to the
important use in the limited
use of this anomalous power.
But it was wrong. I know our
president was she allowed to
take that type of judge's
second with the
You.
says that in the context of equity, although we look at these four factors, even they are
not exclusive.
What do you make of Chapman?
I think Chapman, I will say, Chapman uses the word foremost.
It certainly gives some elevation to callous disregard, but it cites Hunsucker in saying
that.
It even cites page 34 of the Hunsucker opinion.
It says this is where we get this notion from of the elevated stature of callous disregard.
You go to page 34, it's not there.
I'm not sure what was going on, how they kind of paraphrased foremost into citing something
in Hunsucker that seems...
Well, the concept of use is indispensable.
Hunsucker refers to...
I'm sorry, Chapman refers to the test as being indispensable.
I think later after saying it was foremost, graduates indispensable, like he said.
I think it's a misread of Ritchie and Hunsucker for Chapman to kind of elevate it to that
point.
I'm not suggesting...
Does it matter?
I mean, if it's our circuit president, it binds us.
No, I understand what the court is saying.
If the court has...
But again, we're talking about an extreme situation with the exercise of limited equitable
jurisdiction by Judge Cannon.
I think the fact that Chapman overstates the law for whatever reason, either in error or
trying to make a move towards a more restrictive regime when it comes to equitable jurisdiction,
I don't know.
But it's clearly misstating the law when it describes Hunsucker as standing for that proposition
that it is a one and all.
And there's still case law.
There's no case that has ever said you can't consider other broader equitable concerns.
And in fact, that's what this judge did on page 11 of her order.
She rattles off seven or eight very genuine concerns about faith in the criminal justice
system.
And that's really...
If you set aside, which I understand that you won't want to do, but if you do for the
purposes of this question, set aside the fact that the target of the search warrant was
a former president.
Are there any arguments that would be different than any defendant who...
Or any target of a warrant who wished to challenge a warrant before an indictment?
Your Honor, what I would say is that we're not looking for special treatment for President
Trump.
I'm just realizing there is a context here where no president has been...
I don't know that that's particularly responsive.
The question was set aside the fact that the subject of the warrant is the president.
What's to distinguish this from any other subject of a criminal investigation?
Other subjects of criminal investigations have the exact same Fourth Amendment rights
as executed through Rule 41.
Your answer is there is no difference.
Correct.
But what I would indicate is Rule 41 is the enforcement mechanism for any civilian, any
citizen's Fourth Amendment complaint or violations.
Now, maybe the difference in this case is that we didn't come to the table and immediately
announce that we have the following grounds for suppression.
There's no real secret we've had concerns about whether to general warrant.
There's no real secret that we have concerns about the Presidential Records Act and that
there's executive privilege.
That might be a secret to this record.
I mean, I don't see where that argument or case has been made.
So for our purposes, it sounds like a secret.
Your Honor, what I would indicate, and again, I think that the briefing distorts the process
a little bit.
This is a judge who's giving us an opportunity.
She is initially creating a carve out of limited equitable jurisdiction for us to explore whether
or not there's a valid claim.
The case could fizzle out in a couple of different ways.
It could fizzle out with the court saying, I've seen the Rule 41 pleading and I'm no
longer exercising equitable jurisdiction because you have no claim.
It could fizzle out with attorneys looking at it and saying, we are no different than
anybody else in the world and we can't come up with a basis.
The problem is we have to determine when it's proper for a district court to do this in
the first place, which is what we're looking at now.
And the last question was one posed that makes clear that basically, other than the fact
that this involves a former president, everything else about this is indistinguishable from
any pre-indictment search warrant.
And we've got to be concerned about the precedent that we would create that would allow any
target of a federal criminal investigation to go into a district court and to have a
district court entertain this kind of petition, exercise equitable jurisdiction and interfere
with the executive branch's ongoing investigation.
The greater context of this case, and again, it's not special treatment.
It's just basic facts of where we are.
This is a situation where a political rival has been subjected to a search warrant where
thousands of personal materials have been taken.
We can't ignore that in the context of equity, which considers certain things such as the
impact on the community when it comes to their view of the criminal justice system.
And again, it ignores.
I understand as an endpoint, it's a concern.
We don't want to open up floodgates.
It's not just an endpoint.
It's a beginning point.
You know, and you've talked about all these other records and property that were seized.
The problem is, you know, the search warrant was for classified documents and boxes and
other items that are intermingled with that.
I don't think it's necessarily the fault of the government if someone has intermingled
classified documents in all kinds of other personal property.
Yeah, actually, the warrant goes on to allow for authorization to search any materials
in the vicinity of those commingled items.
So this was carte blanche.
This is why they took golf shirts and pictures of Celine Dion and things that were pre-presidential,
things that were post-presidential.
The reason they did that, from how we look at it at this point, is because they had carte
blanche from a magistrate to do a general warrant.
It required no real discretion in their seizures.
So there is a viable initial Fourth Amendment concern.
The reason that's not on the table is by design, which is this court said, let's go through
the process.
Let's identify documents that might have issues.
Let's identify whether there are theories to pursue from the appellant side.
Here's why I didn't see anything like that was in an argument from you all that this
search was undertaken in a callous disregard of the target's rights.
Right.
As I've said, I understand we are kind of stuck with the record from September 5th,
which was when the judge made a finding that there was not a callous disregard.
My starting point is things have changed.
You haven't changed.
You haven't challenged it.
We were not in a position to challenge it at that point.
But you had made a record that would allow for a challenge for it.
Right.
And what this vehicle has done in extremely unusual circumstances, because I don't think
that a ruling allowing the limited discretion of appointing a special master to sift through
documents and entertain a rule 41 mission.
Well, the issue here is the injunction on the government's use of the documents, right?
It's not necessarily the special master appointment, but it's the fact that the government hasn't
been enjoined from using the materials that it collected pursuant to a search warrant.
And the injunction, frankly, is almost the most overblown part of the litigation, because
from the government's side, when you just step back and think about this, they had 100
or so classified documents.
They indicated, we want to be able to continue our investigation.
OK.
That was allowed through the stay.
So they lost very little time on the stay based on that.
We're talking about whether there's somehow prejudice in building whatever case you're
trying to build by not having access to the Celine Dion photos, the thank you notes, the
other things.
And it is not realistic for the government to complain that this has hobbled their ability
to investigate.
They've had months before the seizure, months after.
They know what's in that collection of items that were seized.
They've even just recently appointed a special prosecutor, which generally means it's not
going to be resolved in the next couple of days.
So the prejudice is so overstated.
Now, it's not to say that you don't have jurisdiction to talk about the injunction, that you don't
have the ability to even overturn the injunction.
But there's literally no harm to the government from not being able to access those documents.
And so if this court reaches a conclusion that the injunction, I'm sorry, I see I'm
out of time, but if I can just finish the answer.
You're answering a question from the court.
Thank you.
If the injunction is the heart of this court's involvement, then we're all going to be able
to live with it.
But what we're trying to prevent is the amputation of a thoughtful process based on some of the
factors in which you which is not exclusive under the 11th Circuit and other factors are
particularly articulated by this judge that allow for this incredibly unusual case to
permit that limited moment.
It may fall apart.
She may reject jurisdiction at the end.
The problem with all of that, though, is that you viewed the injunction as the most overblown
part of this.
But think of the extraordinary nature from our perspective of an injunction against the
executive branch and a pre-indictment situation under the separation of powers.
The judiciary doesn't interfere with those kinds of prosecutorial and investigatory decisions,
right?
I understand the whole nature of this kind of jurisdiction is it has to be extraordinary,
which is why I was asking.
Are you aware of any authority where it's ever exercised where there's not at least
an initial showing that the seizure itself was unlawful?
My answer to that, Your Honor, is simply this is an extraordinary case to start with.
It is deep in the process of using the special master to resolve these issues with a hearing
in 9 days and a scheduling deadline of filing any Rule 41 by the middle of December.
That net effect is maybe 100 days of delay to the executive branch when it comes to the
access of literally the 2,900 mostly personal types of documents.
The harm is little.
The hesitation is completely understandable in terms of creating precedent that allows
for injunctive relief to freeze the government in its tracks.
I understand that.
I would just suggest that equity, you know, the good and the bad of equity is that it
has flexibility to address the problems at the table.
My final point on that is simply that we're in a position where we could not in good faith
file all of the things that might ultimately be filed without developing a record.
And that's what's happened since September 5th.
And that's where we are.
May I ask you a question about the timing?
So you laid out a little bit about the timing leading up to this moment.
What is going to happen going forward with the special master's review?
And I guess to put a point on this, when would this appeal of the injunction be mooted?
When could it be mooted by something that would happen in the underlying special master
review or litigation in front of the judge?
So the special master has summoned us to Brooklyn again on December 1st.
And that is called a status conference, but that basically means a resolution of the remaining
documents.
We had about 2,900 documents.
We're down to, I think, 930 where we disagree.
The big swaths of that will be decided with a legal ruling rather than kind of a one-by-one
look at the document.
So I think that that-
When you say disagree, where you disagree about what?
Whether or not executive privilege applies, whether or not attorney client applies on
one document, whether something can be deemed personal or presidential.
And I understand some of that doesn't affect trial usage, but some of it will affect access
by the trial team.
The judge, Judge Cannon set a tight deadline for Judge Deary to make reports and recommendations
by December 16th.
So my understanding is right around late December is when you'd have resolution of all these
documents.
I hope that answers Judge Brasher's question.
Thank you.
So if there's no other questions, I'll step down.
Okay.
Thank you.
Roberto?
Thank you, Your Honor.
Just a few very quick points.
First as to the timeline and delay, I just want to make clear that yes, Judge Deary should
be issuing his final recommendation in the middle of next month.
But of course then parties will lodge objections before the district court.
Presumably there'll be more briefing on that.
You know, perhaps an argument, then a decision.
And then of course I assume the agreed party would have a strong incentive to appeal to
this court and then we'll be right back here.
But that could take many, many months.
And I can't do better than Justice Frankfurter in Cobbledick in which he said, you know,
delay is fatal to the vindication of the criminal law.
And I think that applies in spades over here.
As far as the irreparable injury from the injunction, remember, will on an appeal from
a PI granted in plaintiff's favor.
And so it's really, it was plaintiffs willing to show irreparable injury and he has still
yet to show exactly what injury he suffers from the lack of return of the documents.
And as I keep emphasizing, he's had the documents or at least copies of all of them returned
to him except for the classified ones, of course.
What do you say about the argument that your friend on the other side of the case just
made about this being a general warrant?
I couldn't disagree more.
I know plaintiff emphasizes that he just wants judicial oversight of this.
But remember, we've had judicial oversight and we've had exactly the judicial oversight
that the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court have called for, which is we have a
neutral magistrate judge in Article 3 who reviewed the affidavit and then issued a search
warrant based on that.
The search warrant described the places to be searched with particularity, the office
and the storage room.
It described the items to be seized with particularity.
And those are exactly the items that we seized.
The detailed property inventory is in the record, document 116-1.
It shows 33 boxes or items that were taken, seven from the office, 26 from the storage
room.
And that's exactly what we seized.
And I just think to me, I haven't had as much familiarity with the case as my colleagues
here, but it seemed to me that that was also a new argument.
Yes, I think that's exactly right.
And that was the second point I was going to mention is this really has been shifting
sands of the argument.
I think before Judge Cannon, when the motion was filed, the initial claim was, well, attorney-client
privilege in all the cases.
And that's what Judge Cannon described, attorney-client privilege.
And then executive privilege was introduced, even though I'm not sure why that would preclude
our use of the executive branch's own use of the documents in an investigation.
And then before the Supreme Court, plaintiff then described the core of the dispute is
what he told the Supreme Court was whether the classified documents had been declassified.
Then in this court, in his brief on appeal, for the first time we see this big dispute
over the PRA, whether it's presidential or personal, which hadn't been raised before.
And now today at argument, I hear about a France hearing, which is the first time I've
heard it in these appellate papers anyway.
So I think in general, this just sort of emphasizes how anomalous and extraordinary what the district
court did here was.
And I heard Mr. Trustee agree that there was no difference between this and other defendants.
And I think that just emphasizes how the anomalous could become commonplace, and we think the
court should reverse.
Thank you.
We are adjourned, as well argued by both sides, and very helpful.
Thank you.
Now, argue.