WEBVTT 00:00:03.777 --> 00:00:08.137 Hi, I'm Paul Vershoorn, together with my colleague Jenna Bednar. 00:00:08.297 --> 00:00:13.377 We're speaking in this episode with Margaret Levy about how people with conflicting 00:00:13.377 --> 00:00:16.437 interests manage to find ways of working together. 00:00:16.797 --> 00:00:21.657 As a director of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and 00:00:21.657 --> 00:00:25.337 professor of political science at the Woods Institute for the Environment at 00:00:25.337 --> 00:00:30.597 Stanford University, Margaret Margaret has worked extensively in the fields of labor politics. 00:00:32.337 --> 00:00:35.677 Margaret, welcome to the podcast. Thank you so much. 00:00:38.077 --> 00:00:44.037 So before we really delve into the questions around collaboration and what that 00:00:44.037 --> 00:00:50.217 means, could you situate us a little bit in your career path that brought us to today? 00:00:52.077 --> 00:00:57.577 Well, it's been a long career. I mean, I've been around for a while, 00:00:57.677 --> 00:01:00.317 but I've always been interested. 00:01:00.817 --> 00:01:04.357 I mean, my dissertation was called Conflict and Cooperation. 00:01:04.657 --> 00:01:12.637 So I've always been concerned with issues of how people who often have countering interests. 00:01:13.617 --> 00:01:19.577 Manage to find a way to work together and develop a cooperative strategy or 00:01:19.577 --> 00:01:20.817 collaborative strategy. 00:01:20.817 --> 00:01:23.977 Strategy so whether i've been working at 00:01:23.977 --> 00:01:27.417 looking at unions which i've done at multiple 00:01:27.417 --> 00:01:30.717 times over my career labor unions or whether 00:01:30.717 --> 00:01:34.097 i've been looking at the relationship between citizens and 00:01:34.097 --> 00:01:39.797 government or members of an organization and their leadership um and with others 00:01:39.797 --> 00:01:45.737 that they have to work with which has been a large part of my career um those 00:01:45.737 --> 00:01:49.837 have been central questions to me is how people cooperate and collaborate and 00:01:49.837 --> 00:01:51.997 the reasons why they don't. 00:01:52.497 --> 00:01:57.137 And I think one of the things to emphasize about that is that a large focus 00:01:57.137 --> 00:02:01.997 of mine has been about the governance or institutional arrangements and rules 00:02:01.997 --> 00:02:07.917 that manage an organization or a group that make that easier 00:02:08.117 --> 00:02:14.697 or harder, that create boundaries or create openings to work with others. 00:02:15.477 --> 00:02:20.237 Right. And so currently you are at Stanford, right? 00:02:22.607 --> 00:02:27.127 Do you have always been at Stanford or you made also a tour through different institutions? 00:02:27.987 --> 00:02:33.167 I was for 40 years at the University of Washington. I'm retired from the University 00:02:33.167 --> 00:02:37.147 of Washington because I took the job at Stanford and I was of the age where 00:02:37.147 --> 00:02:40.367 it was advantageous to retire rather than to just leave. 00:02:41.787 --> 00:02:48.347 So I have been at Stanford since 2014 as the director of the Center for Advanced 00:02:48.347 --> 00:02:51.927 Study in Behavioral Sciences, an old and important organization. 00:02:52.747 --> 00:02:57.307 That encourages collaboration, which is where Jenna is now a fellow. 00:02:57.747 --> 00:03:03.647 And I'm also a professor of political science and a senior fellow in the Woods 00:03:03.647 --> 00:03:05.167 Institute for the Environment. 00:03:06.507 --> 00:03:12.887 Okay, great. Well, so then, Margaret, now that we know a bit of background, 00:03:13.367 --> 00:03:18.187 what is collaboration and what is it good for? 00:03:21.627 --> 00:03:23.507 We're starting small. 00:03:48.187 --> 00:03:51.507 German, which we weren't quite aware of when we started writing this, 00:03:51.627 --> 00:03:53.847 but it has multiple meanings in German. 00:03:53.947 --> 00:03:58.307 So we can go with the positive one as opposed to the sort of Nazi variant. 00:04:00.993 --> 00:04:05.593 And what we were really interested in is why it was that certain unions that 00:04:05.593 --> 00:04:08.513 we observed were able to build, 00:04:08.673 --> 00:04:12.533 and this is the answer to your question, really, were able to build a collaborative 00:04:12.533 --> 00:04:20.473 process that allowed them and made them willing to actually make costly sacrifices, 00:04:20.473 --> 00:04:23.273 if need be, sometimes giving up income, 00:04:23.513 --> 00:04:27.913 sometimes going to prison, possibly even losing their lives or their jobs, 00:04:28.073 --> 00:04:34.673 in order to act in ways that would assist far distant others who could never reciprocate. 00:04:35.053 --> 00:04:40.493 So for me, collaboration is not only about the cooperation between people who 00:04:40.493 --> 00:04:44.693 know each other and have face-to-face or the potential of face-to-face interactions. 00:04:45.153 --> 00:04:49.273 But my interest is really increasingly, I mean, I've studied that a lot, 00:04:49.413 --> 00:04:53.673 but my interest really increasingly is how do you create collaboration across 00:04:53.673 --> 00:05:01.113 distances and geographies and differences that are really much harder to surmount? 00:05:01.313 --> 00:05:09.753 And if we want to answer and address and get some progress on dealing with things 00:05:09.753 --> 00:05:11.873 like climate change or social justice, 00:05:12.213 --> 00:05:17.253 really big issues that matter to us as a world, then we have to think about 00:05:17.253 --> 00:05:22.133 collaboration in that much larger sense and not just in the ways in which small 00:05:22.133 --> 00:05:26.473 group members interact with each other. 00:05:26.573 --> 00:05:31.273 Even slightly larger, in Jenna's case, federated groups interact with each other. 00:05:31.393 --> 00:05:35.133 So I'm even going beyond that and thinking about how do you create collaboration 00:05:35.133 --> 00:05:39.133 with those you'd never meet, you wouldn't interact with, you're not part of 00:05:39.133 --> 00:05:44.973 the same structure as in a federated system you are. Right. 00:05:45.133 --> 00:05:53.413 But then what would you see as, let's say, the defining features of collaboration? 00:05:54.013 --> 00:05:59.093 What are the necessary ingredients to be able to speak of a collaboration? 00:06:01.390 --> 00:06:05.330 Well, Paul, I'm not sure I'll answer your question quite the way you mean it, 00:06:05.370 --> 00:06:10.550 because I haven't been, unfortunately, part of this conversation, 00:06:10.810 --> 00:06:13.330 so I may not understand collaboration the same way. 00:06:13.330 --> 00:06:20.010 But as I said, what I really emphasize is institutions, both formal and informal. 00:06:20.270 --> 00:06:29.190 So the rules of the game that govern a group, as well as the norms that govern the group. 00:06:29.310 --> 00:06:31.130 So both the formal and informal institutions 00:06:31.130 --> 00:06:35.990 are absolutely the critical ingredients to me of collaboration. 00:06:35.990 --> 00:06:43.750 And the issue is that we know a lot about what those formal rules and norms 00:06:43.750 --> 00:06:47.050 look like in a variety of settings, 00:06:47.310 --> 00:06:52.290 but we don't know how to scale them or we have difficulty scaling them. 00:06:52.290 --> 00:06:55.390 And so I think the really big, as I said, 00:06:55.410 --> 00:06:59.570 my interest in collaboration is with those who you might never get to know, 00:06:59.590 --> 00:07:04.950 can never reciprocate, but who you have to act in a cooperative way with and 00:07:04.950 --> 00:07:08.070 about as if their interests are your interests, 00:07:08.330 --> 00:07:10.250 because they are. 00:07:10.930 --> 00:07:16.150 Yes. But how do you get people to recognize that is, for me, the crucial thing. 00:07:16.410 --> 00:07:21.230 To recognize common interests and then to be able to act on those common interests. 00:07:21.350 --> 00:07:24.190 Those are the two crucial ingredients for a collaboration. 00:07:24.790 --> 00:07:27.190 Recognizing common interests and acting on common interests. 00:07:28.210 --> 00:07:33.830 But now I could argue that that is like a facilitator of the collaboration. 00:07:34.670 --> 00:07:40.790 Like, we might have a common interest, let's say, to contribute to the discussions in our forum. 00:07:41.693 --> 00:07:46.913 But not collaborate in contributing to becoming a success because, 00:07:47.073 --> 00:07:52.833 let's say, I go out for a run, even though I still share your interest, right? 00:07:52.933 --> 00:08:00.353 And the same for institutions, I could argue, well, rules and norms are like mediums, 00:08:00.933 --> 00:08:09.593 or procedures that shape the collaboration, but they don't generate the collaboration itself. 00:08:10.633 --> 00:08:16.493 So would that be correct? So if so, then... Only partially, because what I hear 00:08:16.493 --> 00:08:17.773 you asking is two different things. 00:08:17.813 --> 00:08:20.113 And I said, I've not been part of the conversational collaboration. 00:08:20.233 --> 00:08:24.913 So I had a suspicion that you meant something different than what I was talking about. 00:08:26.413 --> 00:08:30.413 But Margaret... So part of what you're talking about are free riders. 00:08:30.533 --> 00:08:36.293 And I do think the institutional rules can help with free riders, the norms and the rules. 00:08:36.473 --> 00:08:40.193 The other part is actually giving your full contribution. 00:08:40.353 --> 00:08:44.693 So it's one thing to keep somebody in the room and not have them go out for a run. 00:08:45.133 --> 00:08:51.113 It's another thing to get their active participation and their full contributions 00:08:51.113 --> 00:08:52.813 to the collective process. 00:08:53.893 --> 00:08:58.373 And so it's hard for me to talk about that in the total abstract. 00:08:58.633 --> 00:09:00.493 Can I resort to an example? 00:09:01.473 --> 00:09:05.753 Because I really would like to go back to the unions that John Alquist and I 00:09:05.753 --> 00:09:10.053 I studied and then talk a little bit about the problems of scaling that because 00:09:10.053 --> 00:09:15.393 we really did observe, I think, what creates collaboration in your sense, 00:09:15.593 --> 00:09:20.393 but then how to get that to a larger community because it was based on the fact 00:09:20.393 --> 00:09:23.713 that people sort of knew each other who were collaborating even though they 00:09:23.713 --> 00:09:27.373 were cooperating with people far distant than themselves. 00:09:28.493 --> 00:09:36.193 So, Margaret, I know we're going to want to talk a lot about your experience with the unions. And, 00:09:37.192 --> 00:09:41.992 So I want to pause for a moment and make sure we're all understanding, 00:09:42.172 --> 00:09:44.512 as you think about collaboration, 00:09:45.052 --> 00:09:48.032 how is that distinct from other 00:09:48.032 --> 00:09:55.372 kinds of human interaction toward a common goal with a shared interest? 00:09:55.572 --> 00:10:00.752 When you use the word collaboration, this is part of what we're interested in. 00:10:00.812 --> 00:10:04.312 People have different definitions of it. So we want yours. 00:10:05.572 --> 00:10:11.672 When you use the word collaboration, how does that define that activity from 00:10:11.672 --> 00:10:13.612 other kinds of human interaction? 00:10:14.852 --> 00:10:18.752 And if you want to describe it in that union context, that would be terrific. 00:10:20.712 --> 00:10:24.052 Well, in all honesty, we never used the term collaboration. 00:10:24.372 --> 00:10:27.612 It wasn't the term of art for us. We used the term cooperation, 00:10:27.952 --> 00:10:32.592 you know, if there was a term to be used in that way. 00:10:32.592 --> 00:10:35.452 Um so but i hear what paul 00:10:35.452 --> 00:10:38.512 is asking about about this additional sort of 00:10:38.512 --> 00:10:41.732 i think there's an additional ingredient beyond cooperation 00:10:41.732 --> 00:10:48.312 which is simply everybody sort of contributes money or contributes time or is 00:10:48.312 --> 00:10:53.972 in the same room and isn't free riding um so i do think there's another dimension 00:10:53.972 --> 00:11:01.372 there and and if i think about our example i can see collaboration in that sense was created, 00:11:01.412 --> 00:11:07.432 but not on the other end, not with the far-distant others who couldn't reciprocate. 00:11:07.492 --> 00:11:08.852 They weren't collaborating. 00:11:09.952 --> 00:11:13.092 They were receiving the effects of collaboration. 00:11:14.452 --> 00:11:18.872 So I think it's a complicated question. One, you want to create a collaborative. 00:11:20.619 --> 00:11:26.059 Process that gets people to engage in actions that they might not otherwise engage in. 00:11:26.239 --> 00:11:30.419 But on the other hand, it's very hard, I think. I can't even imagine how to 00:11:30.419 --> 00:11:34.139 create the collaboration on the other side. 00:11:34.279 --> 00:11:37.019 I mean, I think that would be a very interesting thing to think about. 00:11:37.179 --> 00:11:40.719 So let me get concrete because this is sounding very abstract. 00:11:41.019 --> 00:11:48.959 So in our union case, which was the longshore workers on the west coast of the US and in Australia. 00:11:49.739 --> 00:11:53.739 So we were looking at unions in the transport sector. 00:11:53.939 --> 00:11:56.919 So we also had longshore workers on the East Coast of the US, 00:11:57.159 --> 00:12:02.399 very different, very economistic, narrowly focused only on economic interest 00:12:02.399 --> 00:12:03.939 and the teamsters of the US. 00:12:04.319 --> 00:12:10.859 So those who drive trucks, longshore workers are, you know, what longshore workers are. 00:12:10.899 --> 00:12:13.159 So they're the ones who load and unload ships. 00:12:13.719 --> 00:12:19.279 Okay. So in these two Two unions of many that one could look at, 00:12:19.359 --> 00:12:25.839 they were able to create this expanded community of fate where they saw beyond 00:12:25.839 --> 00:12:30.199 their immediate members or their immediate interest as union members. 00:12:30.439 --> 00:12:32.579 And several things created that. 00:12:32.879 --> 00:12:35.239 One is they had a constitution. 00:12:35.679 --> 00:12:43.639 When the unions were formed or reformed in the 1930s, they were formed around a constitution, 00:12:43.999 --> 00:12:47.579 the leadership, the sort of Philadelphia moment, as we say in the U.S., 00:12:47.579 --> 00:12:53.039 the founding, created a constitution which was based on participatory democracy 00:12:53.039 --> 00:12:57.759 and based on relatively easy recall of the leadership. 00:12:59.379 --> 00:13:02.999 So there were a series of arrangements that were already put in place, 00:13:03.059 --> 00:13:06.279 very different from the other unions, which were much more top-down. 00:13:08.036 --> 00:13:12.456 Two, the unions recognized, the leadership recognized that if it was to achieve 00:13:12.456 --> 00:13:16.896 anything, it had to be effective as union leaders, right? 00:13:16.956 --> 00:13:19.556 So it was satisfying people's material needs. 00:13:19.816 --> 00:13:24.656 The union had to do that. It had to get the improved wages, working conditions, 00:13:24.756 --> 00:13:28.876 benefits that people join unions to get. I mean, that's what they get. 00:13:29.396 --> 00:13:33.916 The other thing I should point out about these unions is that they were not, 00:13:34.116 --> 00:13:37.576 you know, all the even though they were all white working class men, 00:13:37.676 --> 00:13:39.516 they had very different political positions. 00:13:39.736 --> 00:13:43.216 It was a very heterogeneous group in that sense. 00:13:43.276 --> 00:13:48.916 Some were communists, some were very right wing, but they somehow managed to work together. 00:13:48.916 --> 00:13:52.336 And how that happened was not just the participatory democracy, 00:13:52.476 --> 00:13:58.216 but educational processes that existed in the union, both to socialize members, 00:13:58.476 --> 00:14:02.716 but also for them to have means of learning about the world around them. 00:14:02.716 --> 00:14:06.156 What it was really like to change their beliefs, 00:14:06.356 --> 00:14:11.076 if you will, about what the world, how the world actually worked, 00:14:11.216 --> 00:14:15.716 who was doing what to whom, and other parts of the world, 00:14:15.716 --> 00:14:23.216 Which became very important when they were asked to stop loading ships that 00:14:23.216 --> 00:14:31.756 were taking scrap iron to Japan because of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. 00:14:31.756 --> 00:14:37.596 Taking it to China because of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in the 1930s 00:14:37.596 --> 00:14:40.336 or the Australians refusing to load ships. 00:14:40.676 --> 00:14:47.096 Indonesian ships, sorry, Dutch ships that were going to put down the uprising in Indonesia. 00:14:47.336 --> 00:14:50.336 They had to know about those things, enough about them. 00:14:50.476 --> 00:14:55.216 But equally important was that when any decision was made to engage in a costly 00:14:55.216 --> 00:15:00.476 action, there was real debate and discussion about it and challenge of the information 00:15:00.476 --> 00:15:01.636 that they were We're receiving. 00:15:02.036 --> 00:15:06.056 So the leadership or whoever was initiating the action may say, 00:15:06.116 --> 00:15:10.736 look, those ships are being loaded to go to Indonesia and they're going to put 00:15:10.736 --> 00:15:13.416 down the rebels. And somebody would say, how do you know that? 00:15:14.489 --> 00:15:17.169 They'd have to discuss it, and they'd have to provide sources, 00:15:17.209 --> 00:15:21.029 and they'd have to convince each other of what the reality was, 00:15:21.309 --> 00:15:25.089 so that when they decided to act, which they did by a vote, 00:15:25.689 --> 00:15:28.349 so it wasn't just that the leadership told them that they did it, 00:15:28.449 --> 00:15:32.909 most of them believed what it was that they were acting about, 00:15:33.169 --> 00:15:38.149 and they believed it was unjust and unfair, and this was the last part. 00:15:38.309 --> 00:15:42.169 They had some agency, so they could do something about it. 00:15:42.549 --> 00:15:47.289 Now, whether they really I mean, I don't think the longshore workers stopped 00:15:47.289 --> 00:15:57.529 the Dutch attack on the Indonesian rebels or stopped Japan from inhabiting Manchuria, 00:15:57.769 --> 00:16:04.149 but they felt that they could act on their feelings about what was unjust here 00:16:04.149 --> 00:16:07.789 and could do something for people that were distant from each other. 00:16:07.789 --> 00:16:13.509 And part of what motivated that was the feeling and the belief, 00:16:13.629 --> 00:16:17.069 if you will, that if it could happen to them, it could happen to us. 00:16:17.169 --> 00:16:22.329 If you don't stand up now, then this could come back to haunt us later. 00:16:22.469 --> 00:16:27.909 And we need to do this because someone else will have to help us when we do that. 00:16:28.449 --> 00:16:34.489 Is this actually not an important defining feature, which is the idea of a common 00:16:34.489 --> 00:16:40.929 goal? So there is a commons at stake, and actually also a common value in this case. 00:16:41.089 --> 00:16:47.049 So isn't it a common goal to group together around achieving a common goal that 00:16:47.049 --> 00:16:49.589 turns cooperation into collaboration? 00:16:50.089 --> 00:16:53.909 Because for cooperation, this might be also more opportunistic, 00:16:53.929 --> 00:16:59.489 right? We transiently work together, but we still pursue different goals, 00:16:59.709 --> 00:17:02.869 but there is sort of an alignment in the sub-goals. 00:17:02.889 --> 00:17:07.449 But when there's alignment on an overall, an overarching goal of the collective, 00:17:07.769 --> 00:17:11.149 we start to speak of a collaboration. Would you agree with that? 00:17:12.311 --> 00:17:18.451 Why not? I mean, I think that's, I mean, I think people are learning from each other. 00:17:18.471 --> 00:17:21.991 It's more than simple cooperation, like we're all paying our taxes. 00:17:22.091 --> 00:17:24.271 It's more than compliant cooperation. 00:17:24.951 --> 00:17:28.631 I mean, there's an engagement here between the leadership and the members and 00:17:28.631 --> 00:17:32.391 among the members themselves, which is an important ingredient in all of this, for sure. 00:17:32.791 --> 00:17:37.231 However, you know, I'm not in your... Just a footnote, Margaret, 00:17:37.391 --> 00:17:43.131 because I think, just a footnote, The enlightenment of our forum is still in the future. 00:17:44.091 --> 00:17:49.071 So it's not that we're in any way representing some consensus view on anything. 00:17:49.731 --> 00:17:54.111 We're really trying to find our way in the dark here, and we hope to figure 00:17:54.111 --> 00:17:55.831 it out also in our dialogue with you. 00:17:56.291 --> 00:18:00.871 Just to be clear about that. Got it. Okay, Jenna, go ahead. Margaret, 00:18:02.251 --> 00:18:07.251 in your work with John Alquist, you use this phrase, and you've introduced it 00:18:07.251 --> 00:18:09.871 already into our conversation, of community of fate. 00:18:11.151 --> 00:18:16.191 F-A-T-E, let's be clear. F-A-T-E. F-A-T-E, fate. 00:18:17.591 --> 00:18:23.811 And I think it would be wonderful if you could share with us why you chose that 00:18:23.811 --> 00:18:27.551 particular phrase, rather than just say that they have a common interest. 00:18:27.551 --> 00:18:30.751 Interest what is it about the phrase community of 00:18:30.751 --> 00:18:33.591 fate that what is it 00:18:33.591 --> 00:18:36.831 that you were observing in this collaborative process 00:18:36.831 --> 00:18:41.671 that caused you to want to use that phrase as opposed to just they have they 00:18:41.671 --> 00:18:46.771 share a common interest well actually the first time i used the term was in 00:18:46.771 --> 00:18:54.191 an earlier paper with david olson um on uh the wto protests the protest against 00:18:54.191 --> 00:18:56.791 the world trade organization in Seattle in 1999, 00:18:57.151 --> 00:19:00.971 in which we both were involved with the longshore workers. 00:19:02.011 --> 00:19:07.851 And what we saw there was some very interesting developments where groups were 00:19:07.851 --> 00:19:12.791 coming together whose economic interests were divergent. 00:19:13.991 --> 00:19:18.751 Some of the industries and some of the unions around the common goal, 00:19:18.991 --> 00:19:22.831 if you will, of dealing with the environment. 00:19:23.051 --> 00:19:28.951 So some of the workers who who were working for Kaiser and Kaiser, were coming together. 00:19:30.411 --> 00:19:36.971 And that fascinated us. And what was driving that was a recognition that on 00:19:36.971 --> 00:19:38.631 these larger set of questions, 00:19:39.691 --> 00:19:46.291 their fates, their destinies were entwined, that there was a larger set of issues about the world. 00:19:47.451 --> 00:19:53.571 Where there really was a common destiny that was at stake, which was beyond 00:19:53.571 --> 00:19:58.551 their immediate economic interest of, you know, how do we distribute the profit? 00:19:58.651 --> 00:20:01.111 What's the share between the company and the workers? 00:20:01.311 --> 00:20:05.411 Right. That's one set of interests. But this was something that was even bigger 00:20:05.411 --> 00:20:09.531 where they could recognize that they had to ally in some way. 00:20:10.646 --> 00:20:16.546 Um, where, and, and what we saw at the, uh, protests were the people that were 00:20:16.546 --> 00:20:21.386 the environmentalists and some of the unions coming together around these kinds 00:20:21.386 --> 00:20:25.386 of common issues, as well as some of the unions working with some of the companies. 00:20:25.586 --> 00:20:31.626 So we reintroduced that term, uh, John Alquist and I, when we started looking 00:20:31.626 --> 00:20:35.766 at these questions, because again, we were looking at, so there are lots of 00:20:35.766 --> 00:20:40.166 questions you could study about unions and we weren't studying the question, which many have. 00:20:40.646 --> 00:20:45.186 And done well, on under what conditions can you create collective action and 00:20:45.186 --> 00:20:51.126 therefore an effective union around winning wages, working conditions, 00:20:51.146 --> 00:20:52.846 and benefits from the employer. 00:20:53.026 --> 00:20:55.906 That's one kind of common interest. 00:20:56.226 --> 00:21:02.566 We were looking for things where there really was this larger sense of entwined 00:21:02.566 --> 00:21:05.506 destinies around big questions. 00:21:06.726 --> 00:21:13.766 Jenna is involved with a program at the Center for Advanced Study on the Moral Political Economy. 00:21:14.006 --> 00:21:19.886 And you can see how these ideas become the moral political economy idea because 00:21:19.886 --> 00:21:25.366 it really is about these big, socially significant questions and how we create, 00:21:25.506 --> 00:21:27.586 whether we call it cooperation or collaboration. 00:21:28.566 --> 00:21:31.066 Around these larger issues. 00:21:31.326 --> 00:21:38.886 So I often exhort Martin Luther King talking about exhorting us to wrap ourselves 00:21:38.886 --> 00:21:43.566 in a single garment of destiny around social justice issues. 00:21:43.706 --> 00:21:48.366 And it's really that kind of question where we're coming above the common interest 00:21:48.366 --> 00:21:53.326 where we could create a collective action process to really think about these 00:21:53.326 --> 00:21:56.466 larger sets of questions and how that could be achieved. 00:21:56.866 --> 00:22:00.866 But now if you speak of a community of faith, which is extremely interesting, thing. 00:22:01.686 --> 00:22:09.706 Still, from a prospective point of view, fate might look very different as from 00:22:09.706 --> 00:22:11.686 a retrospective point of view. 00:22:11.866 --> 00:22:15.106 In a retrospective point of view, you have seen the convergence, 00:22:15.406 --> 00:22:19.986 you know the endpoint, and you can interpret what came before as some complex 00:22:19.986 --> 00:22:21.306 self-organizing process. 00:22:21.806 --> 00:22:27.146 But once that self-organizing process is still running, it might be actually 00:22:27.146 --> 00:22:31.466 more difficult to predict what it will converge towards, right? 00:22:31.566 --> 00:22:37.166 So in that sense, isn't the community of fate creating an interpretational risk? 00:22:37.406 --> 00:22:41.226 Is this by necessity a retrospective point of view? 00:22:45.198 --> 00:22:50.818 Yeah, I think there's always a risk. I mean, you could get you could get it badly wrong. 00:22:51.018 --> 00:22:55.978 I mean, community of fate, as I mentioned, is, you know, we don't want to create fascism. 00:22:55.978 --> 00:22:59.278 Um so we've increasingly called 00:22:59.278 --> 00:23:03.018 it an expanded and inclusive community of 00:23:03.018 --> 00:23:06.118 fate in order to sort of speak beyond 00:23:06.118 --> 00:23:08.918 the kinds of communities of fate that we 00:23:08.918 --> 00:23:12.178 all have with our families or with certain 00:23:12.178 --> 00:23:15.498 others and we're not you know they're that a community 00:23:15.498 --> 00:23:20.678 of faith can be negative or positive i mean so our interest is in creating one 00:23:20.678 --> 00:23:26.078 that has the potential we believe you know Where we're really thinking about 00:23:26.078 --> 00:23:33.678 issues where all of us as humans are engaged and could be hurt or could be affected, 00:23:33.838 --> 00:23:36.898 even if not everybody recognizes that, like climate change. 00:23:37.298 --> 00:23:43.558 Right. Now, earlier you mentioned key features, which are psychological features, 00:23:43.778 --> 00:23:50.118 such as to reciprocate or to share interests or to recognize the interests of others. 00:23:50.118 --> 00:23:55.458 So in some sense, we start to look also at the psychological side of collaboration. 00:23:56.058 --> 00:24:03.558 So what would you see as the key psychological processes that make collaborations happen? 00:24:05.064 --> 00:24:10.364 Well, I want to parse that question a little bit because some of it is psychological, 00:24:10.404 --> 00:24:15.484 but some of it is informational, and some of it is just understanding, 00:24:15.864 --> 00:24:19.444 reaching a common understanding about facts. 00:24:20.764 --> 00:24:25.384 And I think that in our current world, that's a crucial thing to do. 00:24:25.464 --> 00:24:29.704 And I think the mechanism for that, which may have a psychological piece to it, 00:24:29.764 --> 00:24:35.464 is really allowing challenge and discussion in a relatively civil way and structuring 00:24:35.464 --> 00:24:39.704 that so we can hear each other and we can hear what people's objections are 00:24:39.704 --> 00:24:44.504 to a particular set of truths or facts or interpretations of the world. 00:24:45.064 --> 00:24:51.044 The psychological piece of it really has to do with, I think, a couple of things. 00:24:51.384 --> 00:24:56.584 One is establishing enough competence among the group that is trying to collaborate, 00:24:56.884 --> 00:24:59.844 trust, if you will, among the various members. 00:25:00.104 --> 00:25:06.584 So you have confidence, one, that you trust them to be telling you as close 00:25:06.584 --> 00:25:08.544 to the truth as they understand it. 00:25:10.024 --> 00:25:15.604 Always room for debate and challenge. Two, that there will be some civility in the process. 00:25:16.124 --> 00:25:19.324 And three, that if you lose, you have a chance to win in the future, 00:25:19.424 --> 00:25:21.464 that it's not all set up against you. 00:25:21.544 --> 00:25:25.544 And that's both institutionally protected, but that also depends on the people 00:25:25.544 --> 00:25:31.564 who are engaged that they're not going to try to take advantage of the situation um in that regard, 00:25:32.504 --> 00:25:37.344 okay so those are things that are internal to the group in a sense the other 00:25:37.344 --> 00:25:45.524 thing that i think is really crucial here and i often um cite elizabeth wood here is about uh. 00:25:48.663 --> 00:25:52.863 The passion and the emotion that comes from feeling effective, 00:25:53.303 --> 00:25:59.083 that there is a real emotional benefit from feeling that you can act on what 00:25:59.083 --> 00:26:02.063 you think is the right thing to do. 00:26:02.963 --> 00:26:08.463 And we see that in all kinds of social movements as well as all kinds of actions, 00:26:09.343 --> 00:26:15.443 that people need to feel like they can act and that that's a crucial part of 00:26:15.443 --> 00:26:20.403 trying to achieve a goal and getting them to move beyond their immediate self-interest. 00:26:21.523 --> 00:26:27.063 So, but would you then, are you suggesting that there is also an intrinsic motivation 00:26:27.063 --> 00:26:30.523 to collaborate beyond self-interest? 00:26:31.623 --> 00:26:36.843 Absolutely. But that doesn't necessarily, people don't necessarily know how 00:26:36.843 --> 00:26:39.263 to access that intrinsic motivation. 00:26:39.623 --> 00:26:44.163 So I think the structure helps to create a setting in which it's comfortable 00:26:44.163 --> 00:26:47.983 to, you You know, if you feel like you're going to be, you don't want to be, 00:26:48.143 --> 00:26:51.963 you don't want to have people free riding around you. 00:26:52.003 --> 00:26:54.543 You don't want to be treated like the weird one. 00:26:56.183 --> 00:27:00.203 You know, so you need to feel comfortable to express your intrinsic motivation 00:27:00.203 --> 00:27:05.063 within a group like a union, which is focused or a country, 00:27:05.183 --> 00:27:10.183 which is focused on the economic self-interest and well-being of its members 00:27:10.183 --> 00:27:14.723 and not necessarily on evoking those intrinsic motivations. 00:27:15.543 --> 00:27:19.363 So a lot of my work has been on intrinsic motivation and on how to, 00:27:19.563 --> 00:27:26.903 so probably my best known piece of work is A Rule in Revenue, 00:27:27.003 --> 00:27:29.703 which talks about how citizens, 00:27:29.943 --> 00:27:38.343 how the state evokes from citizens compliance with extractive taxes and why 00:27:38.343 --> 00:27:41.303 different kinds of tax systems develop over time. 00:27:41.303 --> 00:27:47.123 What I learned from that book is a crucial part of the story was really about states, 00:27:47.343 --> 00:27:51.903 but I really learned that a crucial part of that story was motivating citizens 00:27:51.903 --> 00:27:58.803 to want to contribute to government and then putting them in situations where willing compliance. 00:27:59.683 --> 00:28:03.563 Was a good thing to do and not a stupid thing to do, 00:28:03.643 --> 00:28:08.743 so that their ethical motivation or intrinsic motivation or whatever you want 00:28:08.743 --> 00:28:13.963 to call it, but I think it's also an ethical commitment was allowed to be an 00:28:13.963 --> 00:28:17.483 important part of and a recognized and rewarded, 00:28:17.863 --> 00:28:20.863 in some sense, part of their behavior. 00:28:20.983 --> 00:28:26.443 I then went on to study the way in, because the tax thing, I could only look 00:28:26.443 --> 00:28:29.903 really from the state's perspective, because it's hard to know who's really 00:28:29.903 --> 00:28:31.063 complying and who's not. 00:28:31.403 --> 00:28:37.623 So I then went on to look in consent, dissent, and patriotism at military service 00:28:37.623 --> 00:28:41.263 and the conditions under which citizens did actually, 00:28:41.866 --> 00:28:46.986 actually comply with extractive demands of government, like volunteering or 00:28:46.986 --> 00:28:52.606 being conscripted into military service, where you're going to pay a very high cost for it. 00:28:53.066 --> 00:28:57.346 And it became, you know, and I was trying to show or understand the conditions 00:28:57.346 --> 00:29:01.746 under which it was simply a question of coercion or material benefits, 00:29:01.806 --> 00:29:07.026 as we know is true in some voluntary military circumstances, 00:29:07.026 --> 00:29:08.826 circumstances and even in conscripted ones. 00:29:09.206 --> 00:29:13.746 And when it was a commitment to the collective good and yes, 00:29:13.826 --> 00:29:17.946 I'm willing to sacrifice myself because we'll be protecting the country or whatever. 00:29:18.946 --> 00:29:21.946 As I wrote in the foreword to that book, I just have to say this. 00:29:22.586 --> 00:29:28.326 My father willingly served in one war and my husband refused to serve in a different war. 00:29:28.526 --> 00:29:32.266 And both of them are among the most ethical and moral people that I know. 00:29:32.886 --> 00:29:36.626 Right. But that's also an interesting example 00:29:37.026 --> 00:29:40.006 because in some sense there 00:29:40.006 --> 00:29:43.766 if you want willing compliance got shaped 00:29:43.766 --> 00:29:47.926 into opposite decisions correct 00:29:47.926 --> 00:29:55.226 right and so so how do you explain that well because it is a relationship between 00:29:55.226 --> 00:30:02.206 government and citizens and if citizens believe that the war is just the common 00:30:02.206 --> 00:30:05.426 the goal the entwined destiny is at stake. 00:30:06.326 --> 00:30:09.846 That's one thing. If they think it's violating that, that's another thing. 00:30:11.502 --> 00:30:16.142 So I think that context really matters in these cases. You could not get the 00:30:16.142 --> 00:30:18.702 longshore workers to close the ports for absolutely anything. 00:30:19.342 --> 00:30:23.222 I mean, it had to be something they were convinced that there was an actual 00:30:23.222 --> 00:30:27.222 community of fate involved, that it really mattered to the world. 00:30:27.642 --> 00:30:33.202 But now we see two processes, right? So on the one hand, there is an individual 00:30:33.202 --> 00:30:38.582 process of intrinsic motivation, of a willing compliance to also, 00:30:38.782 --> 00:30:43.362 if you want, identify with the collective and pursue, 00:30:43.622 --> 00:30:48.762 if you want, a common good, however that is defined by the government. 00:30:48.982 --> 00:30:56.102 But in parallel to that, we have institutions and rule that also try to shape 00:30:56.102 --> 00:30:57.402 that individual process. 00:30:57.402 --> 00:31:03.742 And in some sense, if you want, these institutional mechanisms are also put 00:31:03.742 --> 00:31:06.562 in place to, if you want, shape the collective, 00:31:06.802 --> 00:31:11.322 to make the collective move in a certain direction that, if you want, 00:31:11.362 --> 00:31:16.942 the nation state might choose as being a priority. 00:31:17.942 --> 00:31:26.482 But to what extent do you see these processes as competitive or even conflicting? 00:31:28.162 --> 00:31:31.322 Well, I think they can be both. 00:31:32.022 --> 00:31:39.002 So one of the things in the book on military service that I saw and documented 00:31:39.002 --> 00:31:45.322 had to do with conscientious objectors. 00:31:46.102 --> 00:31:50.762 So when the costs of being a conscientious objector are extremely high, 00:31:50.922 --> 00:31:55.562 which is an institutional decision, you see a lot fewer of them, 00:31:55.582 --> 00:32:00.122 no matter, even if you see the same ethical distribution in the society. 00:32:00.682 --> 00:32:05.242 So for example, in the, just to take the US, well, I'll take France as an example. 00:32:05.442 --> 00:32:08.182 In World War I, I believe I found one. 00:32:09.593 --> 00:32:15.693 Conscientious objector. It's not that French aren't moral or ethical or aren't 00:32:15.693 --> 00:32:20.373 concerned about war, and it isn't that there wasn't a strong left wing that 00:32:20.373 --> 00:32:23.553 was arguing that this was a capitalist war, et cetera, et cetera. 00:32:23.873 --> 00:32:28.533 But the cost of being a conscientious objector were unbelievably high. 00:32:28.773 --> 00:32:32.753 I mean, that person wrote a book, right? Because he was in prison for almost 00:32:32.753 --> 00:32:36.833 almost his whole life until he was finally let out at some point. 00:32:37.093 --> 00:32:42.033 As the rules changed, you saw more conscientious objectors, and who were seriously 00:32:42.033 --> 00:32:43.313 conscientious objectors. 00:32:43.633 --> 00:32:48.293 So I think the institutions shape in two different ways. 00:32:48.773 --> 00:32:52.913 One is they affect the cost of certain kinds of behaviors. 00:32:53.433 --> 00:32:56.313 You can see that with the unions. You can see that with governments, 00:32:56.313 --> 00:32:58.333 as I'm giving in this example. 00:32:58.653 --> 00:33:05.313 The other way they shape it is, as I said, with both information and with education. 00:33:06.093 --> 00:33:11.853 So getting people aware of the world, getting people aware of the social injustices 00:33:11.853 --> 00:33:14.613 that exist in the world, framing those. 00:33:15.273 --> 00:33:20.573 I mean, I think the unions that I studied that were, and one of the reasons 00:33:20.573 --> 00:33:25.113 I admire them so much is they really, it was not a top-down imposition. 00:33:25.113 --> 00:33:31.493 It was shaped, but people really argued about that and what they thought was 00:33:31.493 --> 00:33:37.653 worth making sacrifices about varied over time as the group changed. 00:33:37.873 --> 00:33:41.273 And it wasn't just leadership didn't always get its way on this. 00:33:41.413 --> 00:33:44.273 And sometimes things were bottom up. 00:33:44.893 --> 00:33:49.273 Now, our governments tend to be more top down, and that's often been a problem. 00:33:49.613 --> 00:33:54.173 And don't really allow, I mean, think about the Iraq war in the United States. 00:33:54.173 --> 00:33:57.393 We were given terrible information. Right. 00:33:58.353 --> 00:34:01.133 And then people thought they had to act. 00:34:01.273 --> 00:34:08.393 They thought that was the world. So not allowing a challenge of that information is also shaping. 00:34:08.653 --> 00:34:11.653 I thought Jenna was about to jump in there. It was. 00:34:12.633 --> 00:34:17.413 So this is so interesting, as you know. 00:34:18.493 --> 00:34:24.653 So how is it that, so we're talking about institutions as things that shape 00:34:24.653 --> 00:34:29.593 incentives and also the information that's flowing, but you also said that people 00:34:29.593 --> 00:34:32.333 need to be in a position where they believe the information. 00:34:32.713 --> 00:34:36.653 And part of believing that information, and this is, I'm inviting you to tie 00:34:36.653 --> 00:34:43.193 together the extrinsic motivation with the intrinsic in the sense that you need 00:34:43.193 --> 00:34:46.653 to believe not the information guiding your action, 00:34:46.753 --> 00:34:50.893 your own action, but also that others are going to be in the same place, right? 00:34:50.953 --> 00:34:56.533 So there is this sort of social element to it getting us back to the community of faith. 00:34:56.693 --> 00:35:04.133 So the question is, what role do institutions play in building that community of fate. 00:35:06.389 --> 00:35:10.929 Well, that's where the scaling is hard for me because I can see how the unions did it. 00:35:12.189 --> 00:35:19.469 First of all, people were members of this organization because they had common economic interest. 00:35:20.049 --> 00:35:26.229 So there was already a commitment to cooperate with each other around those 00:35:26.229 --> 00:35:27.749 common economic interests. 00:35:27.889 --> 00:35:32.709 So that gives them a baseline of confidence in each other, trust in each other, 00:35:32.749 --> 00:35:37.889 working together with each other. Also, the work, at least in the 1930s before 00:35:37.889 --> 00:35:40.969 the containers came in, required cooperation. 00:35:43.389 --> 00:35:48.209 So there were multiple, and there were water coolers, and they have a hiring hall. 00:35:48.429 --> 00:35:53.549 I mean, there were all kinds of things that enabled the workers to engage with 00:35:53.549 --> 00:35:57.249 each other and to learn enough about each other to feel somewhat comfortable 00:35:57.249 --> 00:36:01.109 with each other and with their leadership who was not distant from them. 00:36:03.609 --> 00:36:06.769 That's harder to achieve in government 00:36:06.769 --> 00:36:10.069 and that's part of what the institution did was 00:36:10.069 --> 00:36:12.749 to shape those all of those were 00:36:12.749 --> 00:36:18.129 institutions the hiring halls an institution the you know the bargaining is 00:36:18.129 --> 00:36:23.269 an institution the relationship between the governed and the governed is an 00:36:23.269 --> 00:36:28.869 institution in my terminology so all of those things were there and shaping 00:36:28.869 --> 00:36:31.829 it and we can pay attention to those and think about how to scale that. 00:36:32.489 --> 00:36:38.029 The piece that I can't figure out how to scale is this social connective tissue 00:36:38.029 --> 00:36:44.709 that comes from being part of this other common enterprise and interacting with each other. 00:36:44.829 --> 00:36:51.649 I mean, the longshore union in most parts of the West Coast has refused to allow 00:36:51.649 --> 00:36:56.929 cell phones to be used instead of coming to the hiring hall. 00:36:57.918 --> 00:37:01.798 To get your assignments because they want people to know each other. 00:37:01.858 --> 00:37:04.078 They see that as part of the glue there. 00:37:04.498 --> 00:37:08.738 Well, we're living in a world where that's going to become harder and harder to do. 00:37:08.838 --> 00:37:12.918 So we really do have to find other ways of creating connective tissue. 00:37:13.058 --> 00:37:16.258 And that connective tissue then helps people 00:37:16.258 --> 00:37:20.118 come to at least listen to each other about 00:37:20.118 --> 00:37:23.458 the information that's being provided and about their disparate 00:37:23.458 --> 00:37:27.638 views about that information and encourages them 00:37:27.638 --> 00:37:30.618 to engage with each other until they reach some kind 00:37:30.618 --> 00:37:33.498 of you know one persuades the other or they see 00:37:33.498 --> 00:37:36.498 a third way they're about what's actually going 00:37:36.498 --> 00:37:39.958 on in the world julia all of 00:37:39.958 --> 00:37:46.278 information is very important because just as you say they're they're not allowing 00:37:46.278 --> 00:37:52.818 um hiring via by a telephone they want people in the hall itself to engage with 00:37:52.818 --> 00:37:56.778 each other the role of information be it on social media, 00:37:57.058 --> 00:38:03.858 et cetera, et cetera, is going to have to affect the participatory process by 00:38:03.858 --> 00:38:08.138 which they make their decisions, by which they decide what is important, 00:38:08.398 --> 00:38:11.758 not only from the pragmatic point of view for their own material gain, 00:38:11.898 --> 00:38:16.858 but in this global identity of what you gave the example of the Dutch and the Indonesians. 00:38:18.538 --> 00:38:25.038 How is that going to be, or how is it managed today with information, information flow and. 00:38:27.410 --> 00:38:31.750 Yeah, I can't really fully answer that. 00:38:31.830 --> 00:38:35.370 I mean, I could for the unions, I guess, but for the society as a whole, 00:38:35.470 --> 00:38:40.590 except that one of the great, we focus a lot now, as we should, 00:38:40.630 --> 00:38:43.550 on the problems that social media is creating. 00:38:43.550 --> 00:38:47.930 But there are also some great advantages that social media is creating. 00:38:48.050 --> 00:38:50.450 It does make information much more accessible. 00:38:50.950 --> 00:38:56.050 What we haven't figured out is the right ways to curate that and manage it so 00:38:56.050 --> 00:39:00.770 that we're actually encouraging this kind of civil debate and challenge. 00:39:00.770 --> 00:39:03.490 Challenge i mean there are a lot of as as we all 00:39:03.490 --> 00:39:06.770 know there are a lot of people working on that problem right now 00:39:06.770 --> 00:39:09.430 and we have to find a solution to it 00:39:09.430 --> 00:39:12.410 because that is going to be a major source of information for a 00:39:12.410 --> 00:39:16.730 lot of us and we all deal with in the classroom like it drove me crazy when 00:39:16.730 --> 00:39:19.410 a student would come up and say i don't believe what you're saying because i 00:39:19.410 --> 00:39:24.830 found on this website which is some weird you know some piece of information 00:39:24.830 --> 00:39:30.450 that was totally wrong and then And I would try to get them to look back to 00:39:30.450 --> 00:39:32.130 see where that information came from. 00:39:32.730 --> 00:39:36.430 But, you know, hopefully we're past that now. That was 10 years ago. 00:39:36.510 --> 00:39:38.530 But we still have those problems. 00:39:38.850 --> 00:39:46.650 Oh, yeah. But I feel there is something hidden in the point where we are in 00:39:46.650 --> 00:39:49.770 the discussion that has not been sufficiently articulated. 00:39:49.770 --> 00:39:54.290 Articulated, because we speak about institutions and about also the structuring 00:39:54.290 --> 00:40:00.290 role of institutions in the end as an information architecture, if you want. 00:40:00.410 --> 00:40:05.090 This is actually what we're implicitly talking about. But then we jump to very 00:40:05.090 --> 00:40:09.110 concrete implementation examples, no telephones in the hiring hall. 00:40:09.864 --> 00:40:16.124 But that's not really defining the protocols and the representational formats 00:40:16.124 --> 00:40:23.424 of information that actually is then supporting and shaping this complex collaborative process. 00:40:24.064 --> 00:40:29.624 So, for instance, that means indeed a union has rules and these rules you have 00:40:29.624 --> 00:40:31.424 to just obey in order to be a member. 00:40:31.424 --> 00:40:40.284 As a member, you have certain incentives that it actually is to your benefit to be a member. 00:40:40.444 --> 00:40:46.984 So these are all elements of an informational architecture that makes that union 00:40:46.984 --> 00:40:51.564 effective in allowing people to collaborate in that context. 00:40:51.764 --> 00:40:57.584 But I'm not sure we have articulated that sufficiently from the perspective 00:40:57.584 --> 00:41:02.904 of the institutions that you really put in the foreground of shaping collaboration. 00:41:03.504 --> 00:41:13.364 So what do you see as the key protocols for organizations and also governments in that sense? 00:41:13.964 --> 00:41:19.784 Well, as I said, I thought, but let me reemphasize. I'm just slow. 00:41:19.904 --> 00:41:21.684 Don't worry about it. No, no, no. 00:41:21.824 --> 00:41:26.024 I just said I was throwing a lot of stuff at you and you're asking it in a slightly 00:41:26.024 --> 00:41:31.104 different way. So, you know, what is really crucial to these unions that has 00:41:31.104 --> 00:41:35.024 to do with the information flow that we're talking about are a couple of things. 00:41:35.164 --> 00:41:40.784 One is that they have all kinds of educational processes and socialization processes 00:41:40.784 --> 00:41:45.244 within the union, and they're not necessarily required. There were all kinds 00:41:45.244 --> 00:41:50.144 of, you know, some of it comes from what's in the union newspaper. 00:41:50.304 --> 00:41:54.444 Who knows if everybody reads it? I doubt it, but a lot do. 00:41:54.984 --> 00:41:59.024 Some of it comes from various kinds of schools that they provide, 00:41:59.224 --> 00:42:01.864 which people can choose to be in or not. 00:42:03.224 --> 00:42:08.824 Some of it comes from, I don't, the Australian dock workers had a film unit that. 00:42:09.487 --> 00:42:13.647 Which they produced all kinds of material, which told the history of the union 00:42:13.647 --> 00:42:18.927 about certain struggles and ultimately about the world around them. 00:42:19.207 --> 00:42:24.487 There are various mechanisms of educating people and trying to figure out how 00:42:24.487 --> 00:42:29.587 they hear stuff and how they learn and what's attractive to them. 00:42:30.047 --> 00:42:35.227 It's not making it required. It's making it available in an attractive form 00:42:35.227 --> 00:42:40.587 so that people want to consume that kind of information. 00:42:40.907 --> 00:42:46.147 And then the other critical piece of it was this debate, that it is really a 00:42:46.147 --> 00:42:51.167 deliberative process and people are challenging each other about the information that they have. 00:42:51.527 --> 00:42:54.307 And I think that's a critical piece of it. 00:42:54.367 --> 00:43:00.587 We really do come to these questions with different sources of information that's been made even, 00:43:00.607 --> 00:43:06.967 that's even stronger now than it was in the 1930s through 80s or 90s or whenever 00:43:06.967 --> 00:43:10.047 social media became so big, right? 00:43:10.387 --> 00:43:17.287 But in your example of the French conscientious objector in the First World 00:43:17.287 --> 00:43:24.947 War, that was not the case of education and joining in the education program or not. 00:43:24.947 --> 00:43:33.767 That was also very strongly directed top-down propaganda to create a common 00:43:33.767 --> 00:43:38.707 national identity and objective, for which it was very difficult to escape, I would assume. 00:43:38.907 --> 00:43:41.627 That's why, Anita, you only found one example. No, it wasn't. 00:43:41.627 --> 00:43:44.587 It wasn't. It wasn't difficult to escape at all. 00:43:45.267 --> 00:43:49.867 There were so many debates during World War One. I mean, Rosa Luxemburg ended 00:43:49.867 --> 00:43:54.527 up in the canal after World War One. I mean, because they had in the Germans, 00:43:54.647 --> 00:43:57.487 as you know, had been arguing about World War One. 00:43:57.567 --> 00:44:02.107 That was true in the Western, you know, in the other countries as well that 00:44:02.107 --> 00:44:03.307 were engaged in that struggle. 00:44:03.367 --> 00:44:07.647 There were debates going on. But there were rules that government had. 00:44:07.747 --> 00:44:12.407 So let's separate out the incentive rules from the informational process. 00:44:13.207 --> 00:44:18.407 The incentives of governments were very tough on conscientious objectors. 00:44:18.547 --> 00:44:24.107 They did not accept that as a reasonable reaction to citizens. 00:44:24.107 --> 00:44:26.867 That took a campaign to change that. 00:44:27.007 --> 00:44:29.787 And it changed in all of the countries. All of the 00:44:29.787 --> 00:44:33.167 countries that were engaged in World War I ultimately changed 00:44:33.167 --> 00:44:38.387 their rules about conscientious objection and made it a little easier for people 00:44:38.387 --> 00:44:44.607 who were of a dissenting religion and ultimately people who just really hated 00:44:44.607 --> 00:44:50.427 a war to try to become conscientious objectors. 00:44:50.427 --> 00:44:56.407 So you know the the the the difficulty of becoming a conscientious objector 00:44:56.407 --> 00:45:01.067 had nothing to was not the informational structure architecture it had to do 00:45:01.067 --> 00:45:03.327 with rules that punished people who were, 00:45:04.107 --> 00:45:07.887 conscientious objectors the informational structure you know. 00:45:09.064 --> 00:45:12.244 Is a different problem. And that is really, 00:45:12.324 --> 00:45:16.764 it's hard to figure out how to do that with a country with multiple sources 00:45:16.764 --> 00:45:23.044 or a world with multiple sources of information coming at us and no deliberative, 00:45:23.084 --> 00:45:28.724 no adequate deliberative forums to challenge that information and to allow those 00:45:28.724 --> 00:45:30.824 alternative perspectives to come through. 00:45:31.044 --> 00:45:35.324 I mean, in principle, parliaments and legislatures are supposed to do that. 00:45:35.464 --> 00:45:42.264 But we've seen them failing at that tremendously from, let's take World War I on. 00:45:42.404 --> 00:45:44.704 Well before that, but World War I on. 00:45:45.244 --> 00:45:51.164 I understand. Can I follow up on this? So I'm hearing two things. 00:45:52.524 --> 00:45:58.284 On the one hand, in building the community of faith, information plays a role 00:45:58.284 --> 00:46:00.584 in coming to a shared understanding. 00:46:01.544 --> 00:46:06.964 And so we would want to highlight elements of the institutional structure that 00:46:06.964 --> 00:46:08.204 would build common knowledge. 00:46:08.424 --> 00:46:13.504 That is not just the personal receipt of information, but witnessing the receipt 00:46:13.504 --> 00:46:15.124 by others and their agreement. 00:46:15.364 --> 00:46:19.064 So you have a shared understanding. And then on the other hand, 00:46:19.684 --> 00:46:24.644 you're talking right now about the importance of divergent perspectives. 00:46:26.624 --> 00:46:35.384 So, to what extent do divergent perspectives, does diversity play a role in 00:46:35.384 --> 00:46:37.384 helping to build a community of faith? 00:46:39.284 --> 00:46:44.884 Yeah, I'm not sure I've thought that well enough through to give a very good 00:46:44.884 --> 00:46:47.204 response, Jenna. I think it's a really important question. 00:46:47.404 --> 00:46:52.364 And certainly, I'm thinking about, so even though the unions that we studied 00:46:52.364 --> 00:46:58.164 were heterogeneous politically, The members were not so different from each other. 00:46:59.504 --> 00:47:04.864 There were fisticuffs at times, just as there have been in other settings, 00:47:05.044 --> 00:47:14.704 but they were also bound by the cooperation around winning good contracts. Right. 00:47:14.944 --> 00:47:19.124 So there was already a baseline there. What happens when there isn't a baseline, 00:47:19.304 --> 00:47:22.804 but there is a lot of diversity and divergence of views? 00:47:22.964 --> 00:47:26.504 And how do you bring that together in a way that really, I mean, 00:47:26.524 --> 00:47:30.464 I think it was incredibly important, even in the union setting, 00:47:30.604 --> 00:47:35.764 that there was diversity of views, that not everybody felt exactly the same way. 00:47:35.764 --> 00:47:41.804 Um but where they agreed was on some fundamental principles which i think we 00:47:41.804 --> 00:47:43.264 could so maybe this is a way to 00:47:43.264 --> 00:47:48.964 get at it i'm not sure i'm i'm talking trying to figure it out as i go um. 00:47:51.537 --> 00:47:54.317 That there were some fundamental principles that were appealed to. 00:47:54.737 --> 00:48:02.277 You know, is there something big at stake here that really trans goes above our differences? 00:48:02.657 --> 00:48:06.917 That was one. Two, is what's being done fair? Is it just? 00:48:08.337 --> 00:48:10.417 And do we all agree that it isn't? 00:48:12.937 --> 00:48:18.697 I think those two things really were what ultimately people relied on to make a decision. 00:48:18.697 --> 00:48:22.697 So, the kind of information they needed was, 00:48:22.997 --> 00:48:27.797 you know, they weren't debating over whether this particular piece of the infrastructure 00:48:27.797 --> 00:48:34.337 bill would actually work or would cost too much or, I mean, it wasn't at that level. 00:48:34.337 --> 00:48:38.877 It was really, is this really an instance of injustice? 00:48:39.737 --> 00:48:45.777 And is this really something that matters to the world, that you better take 00:48:45.777 --> 00:48:49.837 a stand here because, God forbid, it could happen to us? 00:48:51.077 --> 00:48:58.077 But now, Margaret, I also feel that regularly you're pushing towards this current 00:48:58.077 --> 00:49:00.537 challenge you look at of scaling, right? 00:49:00.537 --> 00:49:06.377 How do we scale it in a more complex, large-scale form of collaboration? 00:49:06.817 --> 00:49:12.717 But before we get there, maybe it's also relevant to really understand why the 00:49:12.717 --> 00:49:16.877 kinds of collaborations that we know today, as your union example, 00:49:17.217 --> 00:49:19.437 under what conditions would they fail? 00:49:19.717 --> 00:49:25.317 Do we know that? Do we know the limiters in that process that are really the 00:49:25.317 --> 00:49:28.597 critical nodes in the process that can disrupt it? 00:49:29.897 --> 00:49:36.017 So sorry paul i i that so where the unions would fail or where the larger well 00:49:36.017 --> 00:49:41.177 as an example you could take the union but just collaboration as such where 00:49:41.177 --> 00:49:44.957 are the brittle the brittle breaking points. 00:49:46.892 --> 00:49:51.952 When does it fail? I think there are a couple of brittle breaking points. 00:49:52.272 --> 00:49:56.992 And this is just, you know, even thinking about the union example. 00:49:57.392 --> 00:50:01.992 One is that the one is the Constitution could change. 00:50:02.172 --> 00:50:07.732 So leadership could decide to be more authoritarian, less participatory. 00:50:07.972 --> 00:50:12.972 I mean, that happens. That happens in governments, says a member, 00:50:13.152 --> 00:50:14.752 a citizen of the United States. 00:50:14.752 --> 00:50:18.672 Um, so we know that that's a real danger, 00:50:18.812 --> 00:50:22.792 uh, no matter how you set up the constitution that people, that there can be 00:50:22.792 --> 00:50:29.132 leaders and cadres that are counter the norms that we thought we had established 00:50:29.132 --> 00:50:31.572 about what, how you govern, 00:50:31.732 --> 00:50:34.752 um, and are fundamentally changing the constitution. 00:50:34.792 --> 00:50:39.232 So that's a, that's a brittle, that's a place of brittleness. 00:50:40.092 --> 00:50:43.072 Another is we've been talking about really, 00:50:43.152 --> 00:50:48.252 which has to do with the information and how we actually create a process where 00:50:48.252 --> 00:50:55.792 people can come to share some common views about what reality is and what truth 00:50:55.792 --> 00:50:58.472 is and what's really going on in the world. 00:50:58.472 --> 00:51:04.012 And that's proved to be very difficult in this current world because of the 00:51:04.012 --> 00:51:08.372 multiple sources of information and the ways in which people create echo chambers 00:51:08.372 --> 00:51:09.552 and other kinds of things. 00:51:09.852 --> 00:51:14.012 Always been a problem, I don't want to say, and it's always been a point of 00:51:14.012 --> 00:51:16.512 tension in creating collaboration. 00:51:17.252 --> 00:51:23.352 But it's gotten, if anything, worse. And if we don't solve that one, it's going to eat us. 00:51:28.472 --> 00:51:33.932 I think another point of brittleness is that for collaboration to work, 00:51:34.092 --> 00:51:39.232 I think you have to feel that it's that your engagement with each other can 00:51:39.232 --> 00:51:44.872 actually lead to an action that could could possibly make a difference. 00:51:45.432 --> 00:51:51.392 And I think that's another thing that is very hard to achieve in our world. 00:51:53.392 --> 00:51:56.072 In all worlds. i mean the 00:51:56.072 --> 00:51:59.332 the lab you know we discussed we didn't study the longshore 00:51:59.332 --> 00:52:02.092 workers because they had an effective way to 00:52:02.092 --> 00:52:08.232 act but that became apparent that actually all of these transport workers have 00:52:08.232 --> 00:52:13.632 a way of stopping trade they can just stop it and that gives them a kind of 00:52:13.632 --> 00:52:19.632 an effectiveness um or a sense of effectiveness and efficacy that uh, 00:52:21.002 --> 00:52:26.322 you know, lots of people don't have. So finding those ways for people to be 00:52:26.322 --> 00:52:31.502 feel efficacious, I think is another place where we really have to think hard 00:52:31.502 --> 00:52:34.422 and it can be a brittle place and place of fragility. 00:52:34.562 --> 00:52:36.782 Right. But now in scaling. 00:52:38.882 --> 00:52:44.062 So I feel a tension in, in the way you described the two processes, 00:52:44.202 --> 00:52:47.762 because in the, can I add one more? I just, sorry. 00:52:48.062 --> 00:52:51.622 And then come back, Which goes back to Jenna's point about diversity. 00:52:51.842 --> 00:52:56.162 I think that divergent views can be both healthy and unhealthy. 00:52:56.842 --> 00:53:03.242 And what's happening, we have not figured out mechanisms for turning those divergent, 00:53:03.242 --> 00:53:08.142 extremely held views often, and often for good reasons. 00:53:08.142 --> 00:53:12.582 I mean, we had an argument the other day, I think Jenna might have been there, 00:53:12.642 --> 00:53:20.802 at lunch with one of our fellows who wanted to frame racial and the racial structure 00:53:20.802 --> 00:53:22.942 issues as white supremacy. Supremacy. 00:53:23.382 --> 00:53:28.242 And I took exception to that because I was willing to admit I was a racist in 00:53:28.242 --> 00:53:32.102 the United States because we all are because of the nature of the racial structure. 00:53:32.382 --> 00:53:35.602 But white supremacist had a whole nother meaning to me. 00:53:36.022 --> 00:53:40.042 And it wasn't clear she and I, though we were very civil and friendly, 00:53:40.162 --> 00:53:42.642 we're going to ever come to an agreement about this. 00:53:42.642 --> 00:53:47.362 Now, that was a divergence that I think could be productive, 00:53:47.562 --> 00:53:54.302 but it also could be, you know, it just could block us from talking. Yeah, exactly. 00:53:55.062 --> 00:53:58.442 So, you know, how to deal with those things, I don't think we have good, 00:53:58.502 --> 00:54:01.722 I mean, there are really good reasons why people have those divergent views, 00:54:01.902 --> 00:54:02.822 is what I was trying to say. 00:54:03.622 --> 00:54:07.562 I think you gave the answer to that earlier by saying, well, 00:54:07.622 --> 00:54:11.322 there's actually two parallel structures. There's an information process, 00:54:11.542 --> 00:54:13.102 and there's an incentive process. 00:54:13.562 --> 00:54:18.602 And the incentive process can also be used to then shape. 00:54:19.697 --> 00:54:24.177 The collaboration information process, because it starts to put boundaries. 00:54:24.297 --> 00:54:27.577 It starts to move the collective in one direction or the other. 00:54:27.837 --> 00:54:33.217 Would that not be the way to solve these kinds of conflicts by saying action? 00:54:33.217 --> 00:54:38.517 No, because I don't think so, because I think what we're confronting… So, 00:54:38.577 --> 00:54:40.977 here's a big difference between the unions and a society. 00:54:41.897 --> 00:54:47.497 The unions, you know, have… One, they have the same basic social class, 00:54:47.737 --> 00:54:52.817 the members, They're fighting for the same economic things. 00:54:52.977 --> 00:54:54.677 They have a mechanism to do that. 00:54:54.997 --> 00:54:59.017 When we're looking at a society, we have people with different social classes, 00:54:59.237 --> 00:55:02.897 different levels of poverty, different life experiences, 00:55:03.257 --> 00:55:08.257 which are really, those are really hard boundaries, particularly where in a 00:55:08.257 --> 00:55:11.777 country like the United States and maybe increasingly in Germany too, 00:55:11.837 --> 00:55:15.697 I just don't know the data, people are geographically segregated. 00:55:16.037 --> 00:55:19.877 They know what their neighbors are like. Like they don't really understand, 00:55:20.077 --> 00:55:24.157 you know, the kinds of conditions that other people are living in, 00:55:24.237 --> 00:55:28.717 whether they be coal miners in Appalachia or poor blacks in Chicago. 00:55:29.477 --> 00:55:35.377 Earlier, you said you made a statement in this participatory process discussion. 00:55:36.317 --> 00:55:40.597 If it could happen to them, it could happen to us, meaning these unions were 00:55:40.597 --> 00:55:47.037 interested in making decisions that would reinforce the well-being of other 00:55:47.037 --> 00:55:49.537 people because they could see a connection, 00:55:49.677 --> 00:55:56.317 even long distance over to wherever across the world, they could see a connection to these people. 00:55:56.317 --> 00:56:01.697 Looking at the situation you've just portrayed with how to manage diverging 00:56:01.697 --> 00:56:08.277 views is one of the problems that we have a problem with understanding identity, 00:56:08.797 --> 00:56:14.797 meaning whether it is of us as an individual versus the collective, 00:56:15.137 --> 00:56:21.377 us as a regional person within a context of a region versus in a global context. 00:56:21.377 --> 00:56:27.717 Is the information flow or the divergent views, is that standing in this way 00:56:27.717 --> 00:56:33.517 of connecting to other people in this identity that you mentioned earlier? 00:56:37.377 --> 00:56:41.817 That's obtuse. I can see it in your eyes. No, no, I'm trying to think it through. 00:56:41.877 --> 00:56:46.577 It's not obtuse at all, Julia. I'm just trying to think it through because, 00:56:46.677 --> 00:56:50.717 you know, talking about it in the union setting is so different because you can. 00:56:52.078 --> 00:56:54.718 So, one of the things that the 00:56:54.718 --> 00:56:59.038 longshore workers were able to do was to overcome these racial divides. 00:56:59.038 --> 00:57:03.318 Minds um and it 00:57:03.318 --> 00:57:06.918 was in part because some of the white leadership in 00:57:06.918 --> 00:57:09.918 the unions would say like harry 00:57:09.918 --> 00:57:15.538 bridges who was the president of the longshore workers in the west coast u.s 00:57:15.538 --> 00:57:20.498 said you know if if they're only two after containerization if there are only 00:57:20.498 --> 00:57:27.158 two workers left working for loading and unloading ships, one of them will be Black. 00:57:27.498 --> 00:57:32.898 And the leadership of the union refused to put into trusteeship, 00:57:32.898 --> 00:57:37.838 believe it or not, Portland, which you think of as a liberal city because of 00:57:37.838 --> 00:57:42.178 its racist practices within the union and its refusal to hire Black workers. 00:57:42.358 --> 00:57:47.258 So they showed in a variety of ways, and the Black workers really appreciate 00:57:47.258 --> 00:57:51.318 it, They showed in a variety of ways their commitment to racial justice, 00:57:51.538 --> 00:57:55.058 and the president of the union right now is black. 00:57:55.838 --> 00:57:59.618 I mean, so it continues, and their constitution continues. 00:58:00.458 --> 00:58:04.758 In Australia, the leadership there has made that kind of commitment to Aborigines, 00:58:05.018 --> 00:58:11.218 which was unheard of, as well as to Asians, which if we're thinking the 1930s 00:58:11.218 --> 00:58:14.598 and 1940s, you can just imagine how extreme that was. 00:58:15.818 --> 00:58:21.598 So in those kinds of situations with those kinds of arrangements and where you're 00:58:21.598 --> 00:58:26.938 seeing actual workers who are affected by this on both sides and where you're 00:58:26.938 --> 00:58:31.478 having to deal with those so that's where there was not clearly homogeneity 00:58:31.478 --> 00:58:34.018 in the views there were some very racist workers, 00:58:35.198 --> 00:58:40.718 and there were people with very different views so they managed to pull it together 00:58:40.958 --> 00:58:45.998 because of strong leadership, strong membership commitment, for the most part, 00:58:46.658 --> 00:58:50.858 willingness to go along with this or even encouraging it, this kind of racial 00:58:50.858 --> 00:58:54.498 integration and understanding and engagement. 00:58:54.878 --> 00:58:58.558 It's harder to figure out how to do that, as I said, in a country, 00:58:59.478 --> 00:59:03.338 because this somewhat depends, it depends on a quality of leadership, 00:59:03.498 --> 00:59:07.378 something we haven't really addressed, but which I think is quite important 00:59:07.378 --> 00:59:12.038 in creating cooperative and even and collaborative arrangements and different 00:59:12.038 --> 00:59:15.878 mechanisms of leadership, but the quality of leadership matters and its commitments. 00:59:16.778 --> 00:59:21.518 And that's been a problem. But we also have, 00:59:22.718 --> 00:59:29.958 no means of getting people to really confront each other's differences in a 00:59:29.958 --> 00:59:32.158 way that can lead to a constructive outcome. 00:59:33.378 --> 00:59:43.738 Seems to lead to hatred and riots and reactive politics or overly, you know. 00:59:45.066 --> 00:59:49.266 Noblesse oblige politics, which is equally bad in some ways, 00:59:49.426 --> 00:59:51.606 maybe better, but also has a problem. 00:59:51.606 --> 00:59:55.866 And then when we're talking about, at a global scale, building a global community 00:59:55.866 --> 01:00:02.246 of fate to manage our two huge crises, the pandemic and climate change. 01:00:02.746 --> 01:00:07.146 So let me ask you this, Margaret, what hope do you see for that? 01:00:07.926 --> 01:00:11.886 Well, you know, I hope that during the pandemic, a community of fate would develop. 01:00:11.966 --> 01:00:14.766 And here's why I did emphasize leadership in part. 01:00:15.066 --> 01:00:18.926 Because if you have leadership that undermines that, as we did in the United 01:00:18.926 --> 01:00:23.586 States and happened in Britain and some other countries, not in Germany so much, 01:00:23.766 --> 01:00:28.386 it really undermines the community of faith. 01:00:28.486 --> 01:00:33.146 Because what our leadership was doing, as we all know, was creating divides 01:00:33.146 --> 01:00:36.646 rather than commonalities. So we weren't all in it together. 01:00:36.806 --> 01:00:39.826 Different groups were in it in different ways and have different, 01:00:39.906 --> 01:00:44.466 the differences in interests were emphasized rather than the difference in, 01:00:44.546 --> 01:00:47.506 you know, a common and entwined destiny. 01:00:47.706 --> 01:00:51.226 So leadership can matter there. So that was very disappointing. 01:00:51.306 --> 01:00:55.826 And I think we're still suffering. I know we are still suffering the consequences 01:00:55.826 --> 01:01:01.566 of a series of very problematic actions by not just our president, 01:01:01.686 --> 01:01:06.366 but by other political leaders as well in this country and in other countries. 01:01:06.366 --> 01:01:16.166 Um the climate crisis i'm a little more am i optimistic or pessimistic i am hopeful. 01:01:17.306 --> 01:01:20.706 That we can find a way and 01:01:20.706 --> 01:01:23.766 i i certainly see it happening with the young people so 01:01:23.766 --> 01:01:31.966 hopefully they can get us us older guys to act fast enough to save them um so 01:01:31.966 --> 01:01:36.106 i think there's There's an intergenerational expanded community of faith that 01:01:36.106 --> 01:01:41.546 we really need to keep in mind that you're working for your grandchildren, not just for yourself. 01:01:42.606 --> 01:01:48.486 And I think that's where the hope is, to try to create that understanding that our world. 01:01:49.729 --> 01:01:55.109 Is about the future, not just about whatever present injustices there are. 01:01:55.589 --> 01:01:59.109 So, I think that's the other fillip to the expanded and inclusive community 01:01:59.109 --> 01:02:01.089 of faith that we have to really think through. 01:02:01.449 --> 01:02:02.809 But, you know, looking at the 01:02:02.809 --> 01:02:08.009 young people, I am somewhat optimistic that somehow this will be solved. 01:02:08.109 --> 01:02:14.089 We may all have to get out of the way, but that's okay with me. 01:02:14.129 --> 01:02:18.849 I'm ready to do that i'm ready for the next generation to try to move this forward 01:02:18.849 --> 01:02:27.809 but margaret what i before we really go to the finish line there's in your analysis 01:02:27.809 --> 01:02:30.389 i feel there are two opposing. 01:02:31.589 --> 01:02:37.269 Models of of the human agent involved and i cannot reconcile the two so maybe 01:02:37.269 --> 01:02:41.869 maybe you can help me with that because on the one hand or not early on early 01:02:41.869 --> 01:02:46.229 on you you were very firm about saying that institutions with their rules and 01:02:46.229 --> 01:02:49.889 norms are shapers of the process of collaboration. 01:02:50.409 --> 01:02:55.629 And if that is true, that is also more a behaviorist perspective on how human 01:02:55.629 --> 01:03:02.149 behavior can be formed through external incentives and information, right? 01:03:02.229 --> 01:03:06.149 Then the intrinsic features of the human agent doesn't really matter. 01:03:06.149 --> 01:03:13.769 But on the other hand, you also put a lot of weight on this notion of discussion, debate, 01:03:14.269 --> 01:03:23.529 interaction, which is more an enlightenment-informed view on how human progress might be instilled. 01:03:23.649 --> 01:03:25.789 But I cannot see how I can bring these two together. 01:03:26.369 --> 01:03:33.109 I need to clarify something because, one, I don't think institutions totally shape behavior. 01:03:33.949 --> 01:03:40.109 I'm not at all arguing that. I would never argue that. But they make it easier 01:03:40.109 --> 01:03:41.849 to act in some ways than other ways. 01:03:42.996 --> 01:03:48.596 And they make it easier or harder to act on your intrinsic motivations and your ethical commitments. 01:03:49.416 --> 01:03:55.856 So one of the things that I have argued for a long time is that to evoke willing compliance. 01:03:56.656 --> 01:04:02.196 Or quasi-voluntary compliance with extractive demands of government requires 01:04:02.196 --> 01:04:07.236 not only some kind of promise-keeping and contract, 01:04:07.496 --> 01:04:14.596 if you will, between the government and the citizens And that is shown to be actually operating. 01:04:14.856 --> 01:04:18.476 I mean, that there's actually delivery by the government on its side of the 01:04:18.476 --> 01:04:25.956 bargain, but that there is also, and therefore some trust and confidence in 01:04:25.956 --> 01:04:27.576 the institutional arrangements, 01:04:28.196 --> 01:04:33.256 but that also there is confidence that government will punish the free riders. 01:04:33.256 --> 01:04:39.256 So, that makes it easier for me to act on my commitments, 01:04:39.676 --> 01:04:44.476 my ethical commitments, if I know that those who will be trying to take advantage 01:04:44.476 --> 01:04:52.976 of me will be likely caught and punished and restrained from engaging in that. 01:04:52.976 --> 01:04:58.016 I mean, you know, it's much then it makes it much easier for me to act on my ethical commitment. 01:04:58.116 --> 01:05:05.336 So I see institutions not so much as shaping as enabling or blocking, 01:05:05.456 --> 01:05:10.116 which is a little bit different than shaping. Okay, clear. 01:05:10.376 --> 01:05:21.356 And I do think that they make it possible for certain kinds of norms to arise 01:05:21.356 --> 01:05:24.496 within an organization, a government. 01:05:26.369 --> 01:05:30.429 A larger polity maybe, that are shaping. 01:05:31.049 --> 01:05:36.089 I mean, I think the norms are shaping because they come from a social set of 01:05:36.089 --> 01:05:41.069 interactions among people, not just a top-down set of rules telling people to 01:05:41.069 --> 01:05:43.249 walk this way or not walk that way. 01:05:43.709 --> 01:05:47.149 So I'm not just talking about institutions that tell us to drive on the right 01:05:47.149 --> 01:05:49.989 or the left side of the road. Those do shape our behavior, yes. 01:05:50.609 --> 01:05:53.789 And that's very very behaviorist, but for very good reasons. 01:05:54.169 --> 01:05:57.249 But we don't really have commitments one way or the other there. 01:05:57.409 --> 01:06:01.509 I mean, that's just helping to regulate the way the society, 01:06:01.889 --> 01:06:07.089 making sure that we don't bump into each other with our cars and kill each other. 01:06:07.529 --> 01:06:11.909 Very different kind of thing, that kind of institution than the ones I'm talking about. 01:06:12.149 --> 01:06:15.989 Sure. But in the meantime, with your own example, I could also say, 01:06:15.989 --> 01:06:20.029 look, look, Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, and that's terrible. 01:06:20.529 --> 01:06:24.389 And everybody believes that. And with that, you've shaped their behavior to 01:06:24.389 --> 01:06:26.269 support a certain course of action. 01:06:27.529 --> 01:06:32.209 But that's the information flow, not the institutions, right? 01:06:32.329 --> 01:06:37.249 So you were talking about the, I'm not seeing a total conflict between the two. 01:06:37.349 --> 01:06:44.169 I mean, what I see as what humans are is that all of us have some self-interest. 01:06:44.689 --> 01:06:45.989 That's self-preserving. 01:06:46.769 --> 01:06:52.009 That often involves our children, not just ourselves, but it's still self-preserving. 01:06:52.449 --> 01:06:57.429 And all of us have some ethical commitments and some passions and other things 01:06:57.429 --> 01:07:01.329 that we care intensely about, which will be enabled or disabled. 01:07:01.849 --> 01:07:06.029 And some of those we want to disable some of the really nasty things. 01:07:06.149 --> 01:07:11.369 I mean, we don't want young men running around with guns, shooting others because 01:07:11.369 --> 01:07:18.389 they decide they don't like their tattoos or their politics or their color. 01:07:18.589 --> 01:07:20.889 Following up on that, last question, 01:07:20.969 --> 01:07:25.929 Margaret, unless Jenna or Julia still want to bring something up. 01:07:27.429 --> 01:07:34.809 If you had the ability to change one thing in humans to make them more effective 01:07:34.809 --> 01:07:39.409 in collaborating and solving these crises that are right in front of us, 01:07:39.409 --> 01:07:41.509 What would this one thing be that you would change? 01:07:43.189 --> 01:07:50.349 I don't think I can change anything in humans, frankly. I think we have to learn 01:07:50.349 --> 01:07:57.049 what humans are like and create arrangements that enable them to be the best 01:07:57.049 --> 01:07:59.769 of themselves rather than the worst of themselves. 01:08:01.249 --> 01:08:04.089 All right, Margaret Levy, thank you very much for this conversation. 01:08:05.529 --> 01:08:09.109 You're very welcome. It was enlightening to me. Now I know a lot more about you. 01:08:10.409 --> 01:08:15.509 Hi, you listened to one of our podcasts in the series on collaboration produced 01:08:15.509 --> 01:08:18.429 by the Ernst Trommel Forum and the Convergent Science Network. 01:08:19.169 --> 01:08:22.109 You can find more episodes on our website.