WEBVTT

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This is the Convergent Science Network podcast. Leading researchers in the domain

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of neuroscience, brain theory and technology are interviewed by Paul Verschoor and Tony Prescott.

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This is Paul Verschoor with Convergent Science Network and I'm here with my

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colleague Tony Prescott and with our guest, the speaker of our summer school, John Kass,

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the great anatomist with whom we already did a podcast, I think that was two

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years ago, if I'm correct.

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Where we focused at that time very much on the evolution of the brain.

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In your talk today, I mean, two years ago, your talk was so fantastic,

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we definitely wanted you to come back. you expanded much more on the work you

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actually started to do about two years ago on the organization of the motor system.

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So what brought you to looking at motor function in more detail?

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What got you to that point?

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Actually, it was on a visit to give a talk at Princeton, and an investigator

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there had an electrode and motor cortex and he stimulated for a half a second.

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And every time he did that, there was a macaque monkey looking around completely bored.

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And whenever he did that, the monkey put its hand to its mouth.

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And I thought this was the most fantastic thing ever.

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And then I thought, I've got to try this when I get home.

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And we simplified because it takes a long time to put a chamber on a monkey and do everything.

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So we had an anesthetized prosimian primate, a Gallagher, and we put electrodes

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down in the motor cortex and premotor cortex and posterior parietal cortex.

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We got movements with the long-term stimulation, half-second electrical pulses in all these places.

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And we can see that they were related to one another, and we started to get a plan.

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So why did you pick the Gallagher for that?

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The reason wasn't very deep. We had a colony of about 50 of them,

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and they were right there.

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And I didn't have to order any animals or do anything like that.

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And actually, I thought it would never work.

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I thought it was not a macaque monkey.

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It's anesthetized. That's enough. And it won't work.

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But when it worked, then I saw it must be what's— and they didn't know the complete

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story for macaque monkeys. Yeah.

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Graziano was an investigator and

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he was just looking at motor cortex and a little bit in premotor cortex.

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And actually, he gave up this line of research due to lack of funding.

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And we had funding problems initially as well.

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And then it started to emerge. We decided we can do, we did next macaque monkeys,

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and we did a very limited study on macaques because it was expensive and hard to do.

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And then we switched back to New World monkeys, and we did two different species

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of New World monkeys, and we got such similar results from prosimia and galagos, New World monkeys,

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and our limited studies in macaque that I thought, this is something that's

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going to be true for all primates from this.

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Because what you found seemed to, in some sense, contradict,

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if you want, our standard interpretation of how brain and motor systems are organized,

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in the sense that often there's a view of a very hierarchical kind of structure

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where things all are converging onto, let's say,

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a motor area like M1, on and then from

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there action is executed right and also in the

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standard interpretation well then the encoding of a motor

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command at level is fairly primitive right but

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you actually what you found was rather different so how would you describe the

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functional consequence of these results so we would agree on one part of that

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and that's the part that it is fairly hierarchical because if you You cool any

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part of motor cortex that causes a movement when you stimulate.

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You can't get the movement anymore from stimulating premotor or posterior parietal cortex.

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So it depends on that cortex being intact for the stimulation to work.

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So our view is that the posterior parietal cortex is activating at the same

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time motor and premotor cortex.

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And premotor cortex is activating at the same time when you're simulating posterior

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parietal, for example, motor cortex.

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So it's a series that jumps ahead in the sense it's not completely serial.

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It also jumps ahead to motor cortex directly from posterior parietal cortex.

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And that's pretty common in cystic cysts. But wait, would this mean that you

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would get this result anywhere where you were stimulating cortex,

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or it's more to restricted areas where you would see this effect?

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So it's a small area that we would get hand coming to mouth,

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but it's a small region in posterior parietal cortex. It's a small region in

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premotor cortex, and it's a small region in motor cortex.

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A defensive movement protecting the head from a blow would be in all three areas.

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Reaching would be in all three areas. eye movements would be in all three, except.

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Eye movements are hard to get actually from motor cortex to get from frontal eye field.

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But you get this posterior parietal cortex going to premotor cortex to motor

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cortex for all these different things.

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They all involve small regions that we think are in competition with one another

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locally within the overall region, posterior parietal cortex,

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premotor cortex, or motor cortex.

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So you found these results in monkeys.

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And you said in your lecture that there was a difference here from non-primate

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mammals and something that it seems to have changed in evolution,

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in the evolution of primates.

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Two things, yeah, you can say. One is that posterior parietal cortex in tree

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shoes or mice or squirrels or rabbits,

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a lot of those kind of animals, posterior parietal cortex, if we try to define

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it in the same way, is a small part of the brain. It's the narrowest triple cortex.

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There's not much distance between primary visual cortex and primary sensory

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cortex in those animals.

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Pretty close together. There's not much room there.

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But in primates, it's a big expansive region, and it's even more so in the human

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brain than it would be in the galagal brain. It's a large region.

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We also have evidence from other

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people's studies that it's the part of the human

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brain that expands the most in development

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so we think it expands in evolution in primate evolution and then and it's late

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developing in in the formation of the brain part of this cortex is non-responsive

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to electrical stimulation you stimulate there for a half a second at any level

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of current you get nothing.

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That's the most posterior part of posterior panthrointics. Then you get into the movement part.

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The part that doesn't initiate movements actually projects to the part that does.

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So it's a feed-in of higher-order visual information, basically.

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A lot of these areas also get direct visual input from identified visual areas.

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So you have areas, yes, I can say this is V3 or this is the amorosome identified,

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and it's projecting to areas that cause movement.

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But most of the original input is from a higher level that goes in there. It's indirect.

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So it's already fairly analyzed visual information. There's a lot of somatosensory

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information, a lot less somatosensory information for reaching,

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and a lot more for grasping and manipulation.

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And it makes sense what kind of information you need to initiate this behavior.

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So that means what you're identifying is

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let's say a subsystem that could

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control if you want goal-oriented behavior and you call it that yeah it's not

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reflexes really right yeah we call it some systems yes it would be a goal-oriented

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behavior or is that provided would it be these are different possible goal-oriented

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movements and we think that they're basic the primate behavior,

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or a lot of animals behavior, you think a lot of.

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Say, rodents don't need all these steps.

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They do have motor cortex and premotor cortex. A lot of this behavior might

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be in a modular form or a domain form in motor cortex and even in premotor cortex.

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There's some evidence already for this, but they don't have the full repertoire. core.

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And a lot of these behaviors would be just controlled subcortically,

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and subcortical centers will contribute in primates as well.

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For example, you might get protective reflexes by electrically stimulating the superior follicles,

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because you have visual information coming in, and you have access to motor

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movements that would not just be eyes, but moving of arms and head to avoid a blow.

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So subcortical areas could be involved.

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But now it looks to us like we're

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getting more cortical control over basic behaviors that all animals need.

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To various extents, animals might reach for food or they might use their face and reach for food.

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But primates are going to reach with their hand for food a lot.

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These are things to pick them up and bring to their mouth or manipulate them

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or do something like that.

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So that's more developed in primates. But we think that now three stages are

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well-developed in all primates.

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Posterior parietal stage is probably more developed and more expansive in humans

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by far than it would be in prosimian primates.

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And it's more in a macaque monkey by far.

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And I would say it's expanded out so that it has more satellite information coming in.

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The cortex right around the domain where you get the movement is also involved.

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And we know it's involved for two reasons.

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Say you have a grass barrier where you're stimulating and you get grasping movements

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or you might say manipulation on something.

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If you go just outside that region where you're getting the grass,

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you won't get grasped by electrically stimulating anymore but if you record

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from the neurons they're active during this.

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So they might be and they are interconnected directly with the grass domain.

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So they're involved in the grass behavior as well. So that extra cortex that's

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involved in it, it occupies, we think, more of the brain in the macaque monkey than in the calico.

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It gives more options, more ways of modifying that behavior through, we think, learning.

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Mm-hmm. There are two aspects to this, I mean, there are many aspects,

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but two that I would like to ask you about.

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So, let's look at this region, right? So, we have, let's say,

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now a subset of brain areas.

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So, on the one hand, we have this posterior parietal area with M1,

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and then we have a prefrontal area.

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Okay, we might want to draw borders around that, but maybe we can have you on that later.

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But these are sort of like now three interconnected stages of the control of behavioral patterns.

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So this posterior parietal area is more, let's say, perceptual.

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Would you say purely visual or multimodal? Multimodal, but depending on the behavior.

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A behavior that doesn't need much somatosensory and probably doesn't need auditory

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at all, which would be reaching to a target.

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The target is identified by visual information.

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So reaching to a target is going

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to be almost mostly exclusively added vibrational information. Right.

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Manipulation of something will have a lot of tactile information and proprioceptive

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information added to that. Cell visual.

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Okay. And then we have in the, so this is, let's say if you want the sensory

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component, perception component, like you said earlier, it's fairly high level.

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It's not really at the level of the signals coming from a retina.

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It's really a process signal as a percept we're dealing with,

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you know, like an object. And then we would have this prefrontal area,

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which would supposedly be more executive, decision-oriented, I would presume.

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And then you'd have the motor area, which is then more with,

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let's say, fine-tuning or programming the action itself.

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Would that be a decomposition you would agree with? Yes, and I would add,

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besides fine-tuning to motor cortex, the connection with premotor areas that

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we haven't talked about much would be the supplementary motor area,

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the pre-supplementary area, and three-singular motor areas.

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And some of these will have to do with reward expectancies.

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Some of these will have to do with error correction, like that was a wrong movement.

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And some general motivation, levels of motivation.

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So that all impinges on primary motor cortex.

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Okay, so that would mean there would then be a fourth zone that you haven't

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really identified yet, dealing more with valuation.

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That's input that comes into the motor cortex, and that's the last step at the

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cortical processing that you're sending out.

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We've already sent out some cortical information from premotor cortex,

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even from posterior viral cortex but the critical output is from motor cortex

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you take that away these other areas at least if you take it away immediately

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like in cooling or immediately after a lesion the other areas now don't function

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they don't give movements anymore,

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We haven't looked at what the long-term consequences of a lesion might be.

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Because my guess is, if you do a lesion, you don't get the movement from other areas.

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I would bet in a month's time, you would, maybe less. I mean, two weeks, three weeks.

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Because there's a lot of plasticity, and you can take over functions and reinforce

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connections that were not strong enough before, but become strong enough to

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elicit the behaviors. years.

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But that'll be another whole chapter. The plasticity and the ability to take

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hormone and make up for lesions will be another whole chapter in this kind of

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research. Not started yet.

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But now the consequence of this is a bit tuition. On the one hand,

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we can pose the question, okay, how

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does it really then sit with standard interpretations of motor control?

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And on the other hand we can also ask how does,

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this three layered control system of behavior relate to the subcortical control

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so on the one hand if you look at more,

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common ideas of motor control the granularity is already very different I'm

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thinking of the standard idea of M1 being encoding action along population vectors

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where every neuron would encode very very discreet movement directions and amplitudes.

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And then if you would sample across large populations, then the common response

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would give you a direction of movement.

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But this is a much lower granularity of organization than the one you're describing.

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So do you see this as a conflict, or can these two views be made compatible?

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I don't see it as a conflict, and I think it will be our job to try to fit them together.

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But it's not fitting together. just yet.

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If you electrically stimulate and you get that particular movement by reaching

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and you start stimulating around and moving the electrode, you'll eventually,

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in a short few millimeters or less, move out of that territory into another

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territory where you get another movement.

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Or you might move out where you get no movement and then you move a little further

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and you start getting another movement.

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This is also the model you proposed, right? That's the model.

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But the movement, as you move the electrode, isn't exactly the same.

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So it may be that you're getting somewhat different sets of neurons activated.

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When you look at the connection pattern, say in posterior parietal cortex,

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because we have that posterior parietal cortex, one region will connect widely to all other modules or

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domains that I've been talking about.

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If you turn this around now and optically image while you're doing that,

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you get a totally different picture.

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Optical imaging is where you would activate neurons high enough to recover a

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threshold. So it's not whether there's any activation.

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It's whether you change the ongoing activity to a higher level.

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And there you see a much different picture. You'll see around the electrode

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stimulation, neurons are activated at a higher level over a very short distance.

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And then you'll see patches around that domain that are activated,

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and more distantly you see nothing, although the connections are there.

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So our interpretation of that is that the connections are largely connecting

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inhibitory neurons, and those inhibitory neurons are downregulating the activity.

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If you add a negative image, like it can have an fMRI, but not so easily an

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optical imaging, because you're going over a threshold new set.

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If you look at functional imaging, I would predict in there that you would get

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a down regulation and less activity than if you're doing an optical and nose region.

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So you're saying, and this is how you showed it, right, that actually there's

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a very clean organization of these behavioral zones, if you want.

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And your idea would be that they are quietly excitatory coupled across these

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three pages of the control system, but then they are tightly,

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let's say they're competing with each other through inhibition. Yes.

00:19:19.576 --> 00:19:23.256
But inhibition regulated through cortical-cortical connections.

00:19:23.716 --> 00:19:28.316
Right. Okay. So you don't see a role in this kind of, let's say,

00:19:28.356 --> 00:19:33.536
competition and action selection for subcortical structures such as basal ganglia.

00:19:34.136 --> 00:19:37.856
When you see this play out as a pure cortical problem? We don't know the role

00:19:37.856 --> 00:19:45.636
of subcortical structures yet, but we know that if we inject tracers in free-reach

00:19:45.636 --> 00:19:48.056
zones, for example, one in posterior paracortex,

00:19:48.316 --> 00:19:51.236
one in premotor cortex, and one in motor cortex,

00:19:51.536 --> 00:19:55.956
and we have a medical student working on this project just right now,

00:19:57.656 --> 00:20:01.376
the connections, interconnections are to the same part.

00:20:01.376 --> 00:20:05.556
They're all overlapping completely in the basal ganglia.

00:20:05.616 --> 00:20:11.736
If you go to a reach and a defense area in the same region of cortex or in different

00:20:11.736 --> 00:20:14.676
regions, they'll be in different parts of the basal ganglia.

00:20:14.856 --> 00:20:17.676
So the basal ganglia has a chance of having.

00:20:19.387 --> 00:20:24.087
Information coming from all three areas at once and feeding back,

00:20:24.307 --> 00:20:27.387
ultimately, to all three areas.

00:20:27.807 --> 00:20:34.107
So what the basal ganglia might be contributing, we don't know yet.

00:20:34.187 --> 00:20:39.287
But it's intriguing knowing that basal ganglia are essential for heaven formation.

00:20:39.487 --> 00:20:45.727
I think that this is a place where that kind of learning can alter the functioning

00:20:45.727 --> 00:20:47.407
of these cortical ligaments.

00:20:47.407 --> 00:20:56.267
So our understanding is at a very primitive level you have to get how to not

00:20:56.267 --> 00:21:00.767
only how to standard behaviors come about but how do you vary these behaviors

00:21:00.767 --> 00:21:03.227
how do you how do you unite them how do you,

00:21:03.767 --> 00:21:07.407
get learning sequences of behavior coming

00:21:07.407 --> 00:21:14.907
about and we're not there yet but we want to go there eventually sure the example

00:21:14.907 --> 00:21:21.267
you described is sort of basically guided region graph in primates and so it's

00:21:21.267 --> 00:21:26.707
easy to imagine in the evolution of primate that uh.

00:21:28.461 --> 00:21:33.561
We moved from being animals that essentially use their mouth as their main effector

00:21:33.561 --> 00:21:37.101
to being animals that would use their hands as their main effector.

00:21:37.161 --> 00:21:40.941
And our eyes start to face forward and we do stereo.

00:21:41.241 --> 00:21:46.441
And we were able to then really precisely control the movements of the arm and

00:21:46.441 --> 00:21:47.901
hand, which wasn't possible before.

00:21:48.361 --> 00:21:55.001
And perhaps this posterior parietal cortex, therefore, evolved to fit this need

00:21:55.001 --> 00:21:56.861
of visiting guidance of reach.

00:21:56.861 --> 00:22:01.281
But would you say that it's more general than that, that it's involved in other

00:22:01.281 --> 00:22:05.321
aspects of motor control, or is it particularly for those kind of movements?

00:22:06.021 --> 00:22:13.301
When we go most new, we get movements, combined movements of forelimbs and hindlimbs.

00:22:14.021 --> 00:22:19.301
We've only done this in anesthetized animals, and so we don't know what that

00:22:19.301 --> 00:22:21.721
means, but it looks like it's running or climbing.

00:22:22.101 --> 00:22:26.201
Okay. So… So, but it could be involved in regulating pain? There could be something

00:22:26.201 --> 00:22:30.941
for initiating climbing or running escape behaviors or whatever. I don't know.

00:22:31.541 --> 00:22:34.841
But it's promising to go in that direction and try to figure that out.

00:22:35.261 --> 00:22:41.321
Have you looked in non-primate animals that maybe have good vision and grasp

00:22:41.321 --> 00:22:45.861
to see if they have anything similar to this development?

00:22:46.261 --> 00:22:52.621
I don't think you would get in posterior parietal cortex because the stripping cortex is so small.

00:22:52.621 --> 00:22:59.941
And actually you get a lot of visual inputs directly to premotor cortex and

00:22:59.941 --> 00:23:03.881
even motor cortex in rodents and free shoes and a lot of other animals.

00:23:04.081 --> 00:23:12.821
They're not adding this extra step in there and that means you've lost the connection as well.

00:23:13.501 --> 00:23:20.481
You're gaining a large expanse of posterior parietal cortex and you're not having

00:23:20.481 --> 00:23:24.901
these direct visual connections to motor and sensory areas.

00:23:26.521 --> 00:23:32.001
But now the, you could, so this is, and this is a pretty clean scheme, right?

00:23:32.061 --> 00:23:35.961
Because you would say, look, at the level of prior motor cortex,

00:23:36.341 --> 00:23:41.221
you would have, let's say, clusters that control different joints of the body.

00:23:41.281 --> 00:23:42.781
This is the motor of the mind, right?

00:23:42.901 --> 00:23:47.481
And they are again grouped together in a, if you want, a zone that controls

00:23:47.481 --> 00:23:49.501
a specific behavioral pattern.

00:23:50.061 --> 00:23:53.621
And they're linked together They had an executive and had perceptual systems.

00:23:54.021 --> 00:23:58.201
And then you could argue within that behavioral zone, you might find something

00:23:58.201 --> 00:24:02.841
like a population response, but collectively they really control the whole behavioral pattern.

00:24:03.021 --> 00:24:05.681
This would be roughly the picture, right?

00:24:05.881 --> 00:24:10.861
But one challenge here is, of course, that you could argue if you now want to

00:24:10.861 --> 00:24:15.241
scale up towards, let's say, macaque performance or human performance, Mm-hmm.

00:24:16.452 --> 00:24:22.792
One thing that characterizes us, if you want, is that we actually are less dominated

00:24:22.792 --> 00:24:24.512
by stereotype behavioral patterns.

00:24:24.772 --> 00:24:27.732
And in our case, we can play musical instruments, we can generate,

00:24:27.832 --> 00:24:30.532
let's say, and control arbitrary behavioral patterns.

00:24:30.672 --> 00:24:35.392
So, and also using the Gallagher, you could say, well, there's still a fairly primitive brain.

00:24:35.772 --> 00:24:41.472
And maybe what you see is more the behavioral organization of a primitive brain

00:24:41.472 --> 00:24:43.832
as opposed to one of a more advanced brain.

00:24:44.052 --> 00:24:48.172
That is, that you look at the control of stereotype behavioral patterns that

00:24:48.172 --> 00:24:53.732
are very much brainstem dependent, but that in the end the organization of arbitrary

00:24:53.732 --> 00:24:57.312
behavioral patterns as we kept producing them would follow different principles.

00:24:58.232 --> 00:25:03.672
How would you look upon that challenge? I would speculate, and we don't know

00:25:03.672 --> 00:25:08.792
much about human brains in this, or we don't I don't know very much about macaque cranes yet.

00:25:09.552 --> 00:25:15.852
But we would speculate that exactly the expansions in the direction you're going.

00:25:15.892 --> 00:25:20.352
So we have a primitive system that is important for all these primates,

00:25:20.552 --> 00:25:23.172
new world monkeys, old world monkeys, pursuing primates.

00:25:23.412 --> 00:25:28.792
We don't know how chimpanzees might be or humans might be, but there's a lot

00:25:28.792 --> 00:25:35.832
of reason to suspect these basic modules have been retained across all these animals.

00:25:36.472 --> 00:25:39.752
But they would also be built upon.

00:25:40.132 --> 00:25:47.552
And especially, say, from grasping to being able to do grasping in all sorts of different ways.

00:25:48.332 --> 00:25:54.972
And of course, most of what we do with grasping is not in conscious awareness.

00:25:55.512 --> 00:26:02.252
Then you reach out and you do the appropriate position of all the fingers for

00:26:02.252 --> 00:26:03.212
whatever you're going to do.

00:26:03.212 --> 00:26:08.872
And it's been pointed out, I don't know if this has been studied in macaques

00:26:08.872 --> 00:26:15.492
to any extent, but in humans, you not only reach the best grass if you're just

00:26:15.492 --> 00:26:16.932
going to pull a twidge or something,

00:26:17.072 --> 00:26:19.132
but if you're going to do something next,

00:26:19.292 --> 00:26:24.312
like turn it upside down, then you do a different grass for turning upside down.

00:26:26.732 --> 00:26:31.272
So there's the potential for a lot more going on than what we're seeing.

00:26:31.272 --> 00:26:34.172
And how does that occur and where does that occur?

00:26:34.652 --> 00:26:40.372
We don't know. We don't know. But I suspect a lot of that is due to circuits

00:26:40.372 --> 00:26:41.872
in posterior parietal cortex,

00:26:42.092 --> 00:26:48.532
where instead of a small grasp area, you have a huge region involved for manipulation,

00:26:49.072 --> 00:26:50.332
grasping and manipulation.

00:26:50.912 --> 00:26:55.072
And maybe only part of that will give you a simple grasp.

00:26:55.192 --> 00:27:00.412
And other things all combine in different ways to add complexities to this.

00:27:00.412 --> 00:27:07.872
And then you think you have to know what you're going to do more than one step

00:27:07.872 --> 00:27:11.292
in advance to do a lot of this and yeah so,

00:27:12.330 --> 00:27:16.950
The challenges are great. But there's something interesting about scaling this.

00:27:17.070 --> 00:27:20.190
If you scale up, because I think we're going to hit the bottleneck.

00:27:20.810 --> 00:27:26.010
Because you could argue, okay, if we now scale up this Gallagher brain that you're investigating,

00:27:26.730 --> 00:27:30.170
then if the same principle would hold for a human brain,

00:27:30.430 --> 00:27:34.550
which is, let's say, much more diverse in its behavioral output,

00:27:34.570 --> 00:27:39.670
almost arbitrary in what it can do, you would say, well, that would mean that

00:27:39.670 --> 00:27:40.970
instead of having, let's say,

00:27:40.970 --> 00:27:44.890
eight of these behavioral zones that you've seen to go, like defensive,

00:27:45.210 --> 00:27:46.770
grasping.

00:27:48.350 --> 00:27:53.510
Stereotype behaviors you identified, now I have, let's say, a large thousands

00:27:53.510 --> 00:28:00.990
of these three-staged controllers that define very specific behavioral patterns.

00:28:01.290 --> 00:28:05.190
Would that be the scaling up that you envision? That's one possibility.

00:28:05.630 --> 00:28:08.510
That's one possibility. It might not be. That's the way it goes.

00:28:08.870 --> 00:28:17.470
Maybe what happens is individually variable according to learning experience

00:28:17.470 --> 00:28:23.190
and modifications in the circuits that come from the learning experiences and

00:28:23.190 --> 00:28:26.190
may depend more on basal ganglia.

00:28:26.190 --> 00:28:30.530
It might depend more on different parts of the whole complex system.

00:28:31.770 --> 00:28:37.750
We don't know that. But if you start to think about other parts of the brain,

00:28:38.610 --> 00:28:44.750
premotor cortex looks pretty simple in the Gallagher goal and fairly enlarged

00:28:44.750 --> 00:28:46.650
and complex in a macaque monkey array.

00:28:47.010 --> 00:28:53.670
And then you think of the complexities. Where did speech come from?

00:28:53.750 --> 00:28:55.850
The motor circuits for speech and so on.

00:28:56.190 --> 00:29:01.390
How did that get elaborated? We actually have no animal model.

00:29:01.450 --> 00:29:06.670
It's partway there that we can look at. You have to learn from humans how this

00:29:06.670 --> 00:29:09.630
happened and what circuits are involved in. So...

00:29:10.880 --> 00:29:15.340
Big jumps, there may be big jumps. We're so far away from macaque monkeys,

00:29:15.400 --> 00:29:20.200
they use them and say, this is what, we're just scaling this up for human brain.

00:29:21.580 --> 00:29:28.200
I'm thinking that's probably not going to be the case. And so we're going to see a budding off.

00:29:28.960 --> 00:29:33.720
Grass barrier will have functional subdivisions and there'll be some that'll be standard.

00:29:35.400 --> 00:29:43.040
And that means a lot of different grass behaviors will be there for every human child.

00:29:43.600 --> 00:29:48.240
And then there will be a lot of things that will be acquired and acquired on

00:29:48.240 --> 00:29:49.160
the basis of experience.

00:29:49.280 --> 00:29:54.700
But the cortex will be there that can be modified for other parts of the brain.

00:29:54.760 --> 00:29:55.820
It doesn't have to be cortex.

00:29:56.080 --> 00:29:59.520
It can be modified according to the learning experience and,

00:29:59.560 --> 00:30:02.040
you know, sort of making stone tools or whatever.

00:30:02.600 --> 00:30:05.480
You're not going to do that well the first day you're doing it.

00:30:05.520 --> 00:30:13.560
But there's some things that you have to do well on the first time avoid a bullet to the head. Right.

00:30:15.620 --> 00:30:23.460
Reaching out and a newborn human baby doesn't have to do very much to survive.

00:30:24.680 --> 00:30:29.760
But a lot of primates are very good at grasping and holding on and reaching out.

00:30:30.260 --> 00:30:35.400
As newborn infants, their visual system has functioned. They can do that.

00:30:36.620 --> 00:30:42.980
So So a lot of experience is needed for some of these behaviors.

00:30:43.060 --> 00:30:46.940
And even if they're late developing or emerging in humans postnatally,

00:30:47.620 --> 00:30:51.400
I'm not sure that experience is an important thing.

00:30:51.600 --> 00:30:54.420
It's just the maturation of the system.

00:30:54.700 --> 00:31:00.720
So it's sort of like the old studies of children crawling upstairs and you don't

00:31:00.720 --> 00:31:01.620
let them crawl upstairs.

00:31:01.860 --> 00:31:05.100
It doesn't make any difference if they have the experience or not.

00:31:05.260 --> 00:31:08.920
At a certain age, they do it. but now.

00:31:10.890 --> 00:31:19.070
So if we take the scaling up question, one bottleneck I would see is how can

00:31:19.070 --> 00:31:24.030
I build my decision-making system, my executive functions of prefrontal?

00:31:24.030 --> 00:31:28.130
Because, for instance, in the perceptual case, you would argue,

00:31:28.170 --> 00:31:32.390
well, this is convergent because I have a number of objects.

00:31:33.270 --> 00:31:37.790
Objects afford certain actions. So you can already see that there's some sort

00:31:37.790 --> 00:31:40.510
of mapping there, which is not completely arbitrary, right?

00:31:40.890 --> 00:31:47.370
And not objects most objects don't afford an infinite amount of of radically different actions,

00:31:47.950 --> 00:31:50.690
at the action side it's highly convergent you have to go to

00:31:50.690 --> 00:31:53.990
your skeletal muscle systems it's very constraint with a

00:31:53.990 --> 00:31:56.710
level of executive control where you have to if

00:31:56.710 --> 00:31:59.530
you want to now these actions to the rules that you find

00:31:59.530 --> 00:32:03.190
in your environment that's almost open-ended right environment

00:32:03.190 --> 00:32:06.350
also for the color goal in theory environments can change

00:32:06.350 --> 00:32:10.430
dramatically and they still have to adapt to that so wouldn't

00:32:10.430 --> 00:32:13.810
would dare not be a bottleneck for

00:32:13.810 --> 00:32:16.690
this idea of very strict zones because that would

00:32:16.690 --> 00:32:20.590
also mean that the information you can now use of capturing

00:32:20.590 --> 00:32:24.190
the rules of your environment the opponent rules your environment is

00:32:24.190 --> 00:32:28.230
actually very limited now because i i'm tied to a certain set of connections

00:32:28.230 --> 00:32:35.690
in a very small zone to pick up an arbitrary set of rules right So don't you

00:32:35.690 --> 00:32:43.310
think that there we need a bit more access to memory than your model would predict?

00:32:44.891 --> 00:32:49.511
You need access to memory, and where memory comes in isn't so clear,

00:32:49.631 --> 00:32:56.631
but you can start to tease this apart by looking at humans with perispherian injuries,

00:32:56.791 --> 00:33:03.691
but it also can be done more productively, I think, with primates where you

00:33:03.691 --> 00:33:08.691
can do selective cooling or inactivation on parts of surface and see what happens.

00:33:09.451 --> 00:33:14.651
But I would, you know, just as an example, say, well, one of the hard things

00:33:14.651 --> 00:33:22.691
for, and I tell you, the frontal cortex develops enough is to inhibit a natural movement.

00:33:22.811 --> 00:33:26.391
So if something moves in the visual field and you look at it,

00:33:26.491 --> 00:33:30.591
but you can tell a person not to do that. Don't look.

00:33:30.751 --> 00:33:35.671
And that would be a command that they understand the rule and they argue. you.

00:33:37.151 --> 00:33:42.471
But a person with frontal lobe damage might have a hard time not looking.

00:33:43.131 --> 00:33:48.271
And so that suggests that the interaction is in the frontal lobe.

00:33:48.291 --> 00:33:55.471
Things that are from the frontal cortex, prefrontal cortex, are important in that decision.

00:33:55.631 --> 00:33:58.011
Otherwise, it's more sensory crib. Right.

00:33:58.271 --> 00:34:03.231
But anatomically, you have not found any evidence for this more,

00:34:03.271 --> 00:34:04.891
let's say, broader other accent of memory.

00:34:05.531 --> 00:34:07.751
Anatomically, you find very sort

00:34:07.751 --> 00:34:11.691
of restricted, zone-like organization is called a vertical projection.

00:34:11.911 --> 00:34:16.531
So we don't know where that happens, but we'd say in short term,

00:34:17.311 --> 00:34:19.991
it's just that short term thing, that working memory.

00:34:22.971 --> 00:34:27.651
Coleman and Ritchie would say prefrontal cortex. Long term memory,

00:34:27.811 --> 00:34:33.331
which certainly if you told me not to look, I wouldn't have to keep that in,

00:34:33.891 --> 00:34:38.471
a short-term memory because I'd remember that the next day saying,

00:34:38.551 --> 00:34:39.751
well, I'm in this situation.

00:34:39.931 --> 00:34:44.431
I'm not supposed to look. I'll just look straight ahead. So how does that,

00:34:45.486 --> 00:34:48.866
Where does that access to that memory, how does that get retrieved?

00:34:49.286 --> 00:34:56.606
And then it gets harder. Okay, but this might imply that there's a fifth zone you should consider.

00:34:56.686 --> 00:34:59.286
Because although there's a fourth zone dealing with value and effect,

00:34:59.546 --> 00:35:04.826
which must be still identified, but maybe there's a fifth zone that is more

00:35:04.826 --> 00:35:07.226
a broader cognitive memory system.

00:35:07.366 --> 00:35:11.346
That is, if you're playing this piano of these zones, these behavioral zones

00:35:11.346 --> 00:35:13.586
you have identified, would that be reasonable as an intervention?

00:35:14.106 --> 00:35:21.966
Yes, absolutely. So we have to think of both understanding what the rules of the game are.

00:35:22.726 --> 00:35:27.226
And we can pick that up verbally very easily. But the problem would be for a

00:35:27.226 --> 00:35:28.466
monkey to understand rules.

00:35:28.606 --> 00:35:33.606
They have to understand by the training procedure that they now are getting

00:35:33.606 --> 00:35:35.126
the idea of how to solve the problem.

00:35:36.446 --> 00:35:39.386
But then you have to know all sorts of other things.

00:35:39.466 --> 00:35:42.106
You have to know if there's a reward if you're doing the right thing.

00:35:42.166 --> 00:35:46.506
What's the value of the reward? And the value of the award would not be consistent

00:35:46.506 --> 00:35:50.026
if it's a food reward because you're hungry or less hungry.

00:35:51.466 --> 00:35:57.986
So if it's a punishment, what's the value of that? And all that information has to be there.

00:35:59.186 --> 00:36:05.166
So it's a huge task to try to explain these complex behaviors.

00:36:06.326 --> 00:36:10.326
So I think we're at the very early stages of trying to do that.

00:36:10.326 --> 00:36:13.006
And looking at basic components.

00:36:13.846 --> 00:36:19.566
And maybe you're right. Maybe the basic components could fade into the woodwork

00:36:19.566 --> 00:36:21.506
as you get a more complicated system.

00:36:23.186 --> 00:36:27.786
But my analogy is one that I'll steal from John Ullman in his little book that

00:36:27.786 --> 00:36:31.506
he wrote on the evolution of quinnets because I used to work with him.

00:36:31.686 --> 00:36:37.086
And he said he went to the power station in Los Angeles and said,

00:36:38.248 --> 00:36:42.308
They have some of the most ancient equipment in there and some of the most modern.

00:36:42.588 --> 00:36:46.128
And the reason that they have both is that they never can shut down the power

00:36:46.128 --> 00:36:50.068
system because they have to keep it running all the time. So they add to it.

00:36:50.968 --> 00:36:55.828
And brains are like that in evolution in the sense that it has to keep working

00:36:55.828 --> 00:37:00.428
all the time and you can start to modify it and tinker with it.

00:37:00.588 --> 00:37:04.868
But you can't shut it down and redesign and say, I have a much better design.

00:37:05.568 --> 00:37:10.908
That's maybe pushing it too far because maybe the new additions make some of

00:37:10.908 --> 00:37:17.028
the older components less necessary and they might fade or disappear if it's

00:37:17.028 --> 00:37:19.108
possible. But it might be a different system.

00:37:19.408 --> 00:37:27.628
But my bias is that we're going to see this primitive system,

00:37:27.808 --> 00:37:32.108
which isn't so primitive because it's new with primates as opposed to a trial

00:37:32.108 --> 00:37:33.088
organization. and fish.

00:37:33.248 --> 00:37:39.788
That premise is since preserved in all primates, but greatly modified in the

00:37:39.788 --> 00:37:40.488
human brain especially.

00:37:40.908 --> 00:37:47.868
But also we think macaques will be modified considerably from prosimian primates. Right.

00:37:49.048 --> 00:37:55.928
So you mentioned the possibility of using neuropsychology or cooling to tease

00:37:55.928 --> 00:37:57.548
out some of these questions.

00:37:57.708 --> 00:38:03.068
Do we have evidence from that already maybe of the impact for instance,

00:38:03.228 --> 00:38:08.648
of stroke on posterior to parietal cortex. What does that show us?

00:38:09.708 --> 00:38:15.648
So when Randy Nuda made small lesions on part of the hand cortex,

00:38:15.968 --> 00:38:19.548
he wasn't looking at specific modules or domains.

00:38:19.988 --> 00:38:23.468
He was just doing, this is hand cortex, Randy, sum of this out.

00:38:24.448 --> 00:38:31.568
With a little experience in three or four weeks, you couldn't tell the animal unless it's cortex.

00:38:32.568 --> 00:38:35.748
So Leah Kruitzer has done this in posterior parietal cortex,

00:38:35.788 --> 00:38:39.468
making a small lesion of an area involved in grass behavior.

00:38:39.688 --> 00:38:43.268
And in three days, you can't tell.

00:38:45.621 --> 00:38:52.581
So the reason we want to look at cooling is that we realize that the brain has

00:38:52.581 --> 00:38:56.541
enough plasticity and is going to change the strengths of connections and modify

00:38:56.541 --> 00:38:58.641
actually where the connections are,

00:38:59.661 --> 00:39:04.561
even over short periods of time, that it's a moving target.

00:39:04.721 --> 00:39:06.461
You can't figure out what the

00:39:06.461 --> 00:39:10.361
machinery is doing if it's modifying itself while you're looking at it.

00:39:10.881 --> 00:39:15.381
So cooling will give us a chance to look. look, we're going to change the machinery

00:39:15.381 --> 00:39:20.321
for a short period of time and we're going to restore its original organization.

00:39:20.541 --> 00:39:27.501
And hopefully there aren't permanent changes in the machinery by doing that.

00:39:27.541 --> 00:39:30.481
There might be. You might not ever be able to go back.

00:39:32.781 --> 00:39:36.461
So we're both interested in the plasticity and the ability of the machinery

00:39:36.461 --> 00:39:42.281
to adjust and change because that's going to be important in the learning and

00:39:42.281 --> 00:39:44.721
experience component of everything we do.

00:39:46.241 --> 00:39:51.861
But that's going to be a harder task. You know, the robotic studies would suggest

00:39:51.861 --> 00:39:55.681
that there needs to be, for the control of reach and grasp,

00:39:55.801 --> 00:40:01.981
an area that analyzes the visual affordance of an object or grasp and decides

00:40:01.981 --> 00:40:04.881
then, okay, these are the alternative graphs I might do.

00:40:05.141 --> 00:40:10.901
And then that would go downstream towards the motor system, which would perhaps plan a specific graph.

00:40:11.201 --> 00:40:16.061
And when we write proposals to try to get funding, I'd say one of the criticisms

00:40:16.061 --> 00:40:19.721
we're getting is from older people saying, you're not doing the right experiments.

00:40:20.101 --> 00:40:26.821
For example, when an animal in your setting, some part of the brain is reaching

00:40:26.821 --> 00:40:30.061
and grasping, why don't you put weights on the hand and see what happens then?

00:40:31.221 --> 00:40:37.741
So, but we already know that the animal will compensate for that weight and still do the test.

00:40:37.941 --> 00:40:44.401
How does it do that? That's an interesting question that is,

00:40:44.601 --> 00:40:51.041
in our future, not the immediate thing to understand because we don't understand

00:40:51.041 --> 00:40:53.041
things that come before that.

00:40:53.141 --> 00:40:57.821
I think that's an advanced question, a part of the immediate adjustments of

00:40:57.821 --> 00:40:59.921
circuits so you can accomplish something.

00:41:00.161 --> 00:41:05.401
But already you can do a lot in the spinal cord, as in frogs or whatever,

00:41:05.641 --> 00:41:08.321
that beats anything that's revealed.

00:41:09.001 --> 00:41:12.881
That wherever the limb is, it'll come to a particular position.

00:41:14.481 --> 00:41:21.181
Those circuits are really very elegant at that level for doing something to a specific goal.

00:41:22.461 --> 00:41:24.901
But now with respect to the plasticity effect you mentioned earlier,

00:41:26.222 --> 00:41:30.202
Are you with that saying that these ideas of Lashley from the 30s,

00:41:30.202 --> 00:41:34.142
of mass action, equipotentiality, actually hold?

00:41:34.202 --> 00:41:38.742
That means function of the brain results from the collective activity of many

00:41:38.742 --> 00:41:45.762
of its neural units, and single neurons can basically take on a plurality of

00:41:45.762 --> 00:41:47.862
functions dependent on the context they're in.

00:41:48.602 --> 00:41:54.402
Do you see that confirmed by your... I think that's true, but I wouldn't agree

00:41:54.402 --> 00:41:57.382
with everything that Lashley would say.

00:41:57.482 --> 00:42:02.222
For example, he said that you can do everything with one-sixtieth of primary visual cortex.

00:42:02.942 --> 00:42:08.802
You could, if you imagine doing everything by looking through a peephole, then I'd say yes.

00:42:08.842 --> 00:42:14.182
You have all the machinery for analyzing a small little bit of visual space,

00:42:14.402 --> 00:42:19.202
because you're doing all these different bits of space somewhat in parallel,

00:42:19.382 --> 00:42:23.902
not completely, because there are horizontal connections that are interacting

00:42:23.902 --> 00:42:25.522
and feedback that are interacting.

00:42:25.802 --> 00:42:31.282
The rat would lose that in its 60s, but it still could do a lot in that little people.

00:42:31.482 --> 00:42:36.722
And you would be fooled to think that the rat is fairly normal if you didn't

00:42:36.722 --> 00:42:39.182
pay attention to how it was using vision.

00:42:41.002 --> 00:42:46.522
And that's where Lashley went, of course, you take any part of the brain out,

00:42:46.582 --> 00:42:49.502
you're degrading the function of the machine.

00:42:50.302 --> 00:42:56.842
But the ability to compensate for loss is tremendous. That's what's so...

00:42:58.369 --> 00:43:02.589
Would be so unexpected for people 20 years ago.

00:43:02.849 --> 00:43:08.289
Although any physician that saw somebody with a lesion would say,

00:43:08.429 --> 00:43:12.769
of course they get better.

00:43:14.369 --> 00:43:19.329
It's just that imagining how the brain can change to recover.

00:43:20.509 --> 00:43:25.469
People said, well, once you develop a brain, it's fixed. That was the view I was raised on.

00:43:25.549 --> 00:43:29.929
It's developmental capability can change. Once it's developed, it's fixed.

00:43:30.669 --> 00:43:33.509
Now we have so much evidence that it's not there.

00:43:33.929 --> 00:43:38.729
But now, what's so surprising about this result that we've now been discussing,

00:43:38.789 --> 00:43:42.709
as well as we've paid so much attention to it, is that after, let's say,

00:43:42.849 --> 00:43:49.749
what, 150 years or so of motor system neurophysiology,

00:43:51.209 --> 00:43:56.129
why did it take us so long to stumble on to this idea about the organization,

00:43:57.309 --> 00:44:02.549
of motor control in this sort of, let's say, multi-layered architecture.

00:44:04.389 --> 00:44:11.209
Why did no one stumble into that earlier? I think early on, there was a lot

00:44:11.209 --> 00:44:14.869
of evidence that you can simulate widely in the brain and get behaviors.

00:44:15.929 --> 00:44:21.289
And then that was forgotten as soon as we said we have a motor cortex and this

00:44:21.289 --> 00:44:22.409
is where it's really happening.

00:44:22.689 --> 00:44:31.069
And we can focus on that. but also single-unit, single-none recordings became the focus.

00:44:31.329 --> 00:44:37.589
And if you look at where in the macaque monkey you can evoke grasping behavior

00:44:37.589 --> 00:44:42.629
by electrical stimulation, it's only part of a much larger area where neurons

00:44:42.629 --> 00:44:45.709
are active, very active during grasping.

00:44:46.629 --> 00:44:52.929
Those neurons are all contributing in some way, but we don't know how they're contributing.

00:44:52.929 --> 00:44:58.749
So this correlation of being active during a behavior is a good start,

00:44:58.929 --> 00:45:04.129
but it doesn't tell you their role in the behavior yet.

00:45:04.169 --> 00:45:08.889
And of course, you could lose a lot of them and the behavior still would either

00:45:08.889 --> 00:45:10.309
be there or would recover.

00:45:10.549 --> 00:45:12.709
And it doesn't tell you how that happens.

00:45:14.339 --> 00:45:20.879
Now, one contradiction that I have, or that I have to resolve for myself,

00:45:21.059 --> 00:45:27.319
is that if I look to your work, on the one hand, you do make a point,

00:45:27.419 --> 00:45:28.719
also supported by a lot of anatomy,

00:45:29.099 --> 00:45:34.319
that actually we should not interpret sensory modalities as being really so

00:45:34.319 --> 00:45:36.239
specialized as single modalities.

00:45:36.959 --> 00:45:41.999
There's a lot of, let's say, cross-modal responses that you find in,

00:45:42.039 --> 00:45:45.619
let's say, primaries, in the primary sensory, some of the sensory area might

00:45:45.619 --> 00:45:49.279
find response that led to motor actions or you might find, let's say,

00:45:49.339 --> 00:45:50.099
visual response, whatever.

00:45:50.319 --> 00:45:52.419
So it's much more, let's say, a mixed bag.

00:45:52.739 --> 00:45:54.139
There's specialization, but

00:45:54.139 --> 00:45:58.659
not strict boundaries. It depends on what sensory information is needed.

00:45:59.199 --> 00:46:10.179
Yeah. And, of course, you know, Sixty years ago, Wellesley was saying that we

00:46:10.179 --> 00:46:12.299
shouldn't call something motor cortex.

00:46:12.379 --> 00:46:15.799
It's motor sensory or sensory motor.

00:46:15.999 --> 00:46:20.939
And the second word means it's the reduced part. What's the dominant part?

00:46:20.999 --> 00:46:23.759
You put motor or sensory. But they're all sensory motor.

00:46:24.019 --> 00:46:29.419
Right. But now in your interpretation of the functional organization,

00:46:30.039 --> 00:46:37.239
you seem to segregate very specifically from perceptual, executive, and mode.

00:46:38.719 --> 00:46:42.719
So should we really put strict borders around that now?

00:46:42.919 --> 00:46:48.139
Or do we also face, let's say, a challenge that maybe, let's say,

00:46:48.179 --> 00:46:53.759
executive is not solely executive in that way or perceptual neither?

00:46:54.559 --> 00:47:01.219
Yeah, I see what you're getting at. Part of the problem is that you would say, let's say.

00:47:03.456 --> 00:47:07.536
Because I have someone in my department working on frontal light field.

00:47:08.256 --> 00:47:12.296
And he would say that frontal light field.

00:47:13.336 --> 00:47:19.816
If you ask an animal to move to a target, and the target has to be a red square

00:47:19.816 --> 00:47:24.116
against green ovals, or it could be shape,

00:47:24.176 --> 00:47:30.196
it can be color, it can be anything that you can change in the visual system, The animal will move,

00:47:30.276 --> 00:47:37.696
and the neurons in the frontal eye field will be activated by more by the red

00:47:37.696 --> 00:47:40.796
square than the green oval or whatever dimension you want.

00:47:40.936 --> 00:47:47.256
So you could claim now that those neurons are sensory neurons that are selective

00:47:47.256 --> 00:47:50.956
for whatever attribute you wanted to make up.

00:47:51.676 --> 00:47:56.576
But in another test, they can be selective for any other visual attribute. view.

00:47:56.916 --> 00:48:02.136
So I would say they're visual, but not in the same sense that we have a visual

00:48:02.136 --> 00:48:06.116
processing hearing that's trying to extract bits of information.

00:48:06.376 --> 00:48:11.716
That information has already been extracted, and now there has to be some mechanism

00:48:11.716 --> 00:48:15.596
of having frontal eye field know what the rules are.

00:48:15.696 --> 00:48:21.576
And only get excited when the cue is coming that means that you'll get water

00:48:21.576 --> 00:48:27.916
or juice or some reward if you move your eye to there, then those neurons won't be activated.

00:48:28.216 --> 00:48:31.456
So is that a sensory input or not?

00:48:31.536 --> 00:48:37.376
It's probably an executive input that also has the sensory information and so on.

00:48:38.036 --> 00:48:43.756
And when the red color in the square is there, go for it.

00:48:45.056 --> 00:48:51.396
But that's hard, I think, to start to specify exactly how that's accomplished

00:48:51.396 --> 00:48:54.836
in a mile. Mm-hmm, right.

00:48:56.821 --> 00:49:00.561
So the theme of this week is about the evolution and development,

00:49:00.701 --> 00:49:02.921
the evo-gevo of behavior.

00:49:03.321 --> 00:49:12.121
And I wonder what ideas you might have about how this relatively reorganized

00:49:12.121 --> 00:49:15.401
system emerges with early primates.

00:49:15.441 --> 00:49:19.481
Sort of what are the combination of different things which are giving rise to

00:49:19.481 --> 00:49:23.641
this, a lot of developmental mechanisms that are perhaps allowing the brain

00:49:23.641 --> 00:49:29.661
to reorganize of this important esthetic parietal cortex area that can,

00:49:31.221 --> 00:49:34.381
give you much more control over visually guided vision of rats.

00:49:34.661 --> 00:49:42.681
So I think in early mammals the behaviors that were species specific and necessary

00:49:42.681 --> 00:49:47.141
are largely subcortical under control. That's somewhat limiting.

00:49:49.101 --> 00:49:55.041
In mammals without a motor or primal cortex which we would judge to be marsupials,

00:49:56.021 --> 00:49:57.261
Most of them or all of them.

00:49:59.901 --> 00:50:04.761
Somatosensory cortex is heavily involved in providing sensory information about

00:50:04.761 --> 00:50:12.221
where touch is, where proprioceptive, and so on, to a largely subcortical motor system.

00:50:14.961 --> 00:50:21.181
So a lot of behaviors can be evoked by stimulating subcortical stations or visual

00:50:21.181 --> 00:50:26.321
avoidance. A lot of this can be done by deep layers of the spirit colliculus, for example.

00:50:26.541 --> 00:50:30.081
We don't know how that's involved in this behavior that I'm talking about,

00:50:30.241 --> 00:50:32.701
but it's certainly part of the possibility.

00:50:33.301 --> 00:50:38.141
How this is done by extra-parietal system, for example, not so clear.

00:50:38.981 --> 00:50:45.841
But with the advent of a separate motor cortex and what I would call the fracture

00:50:45.841 --> 00:50:52.721
or modular organization of motor cortex, That seems to be, when you have a primary motor cortex,

00:50:52.921 --> 00:50:55.321
it has these jumps.

00:50:55.461 --> 00:50:58.501
It's not completely cemented topi. It's jumbled.

00:50:59.641 --> 00:51:05.081
And the cerebellum, where you're dealing with a jazzing, using sensory information

00:51:05.081 --> 00:51:10.001
to correct errors in motor behavior, is jumbled as well.

00:51:10.081 --> 00:51:12.741
Why is it fractured in this way?

00:51:12.841 --> 00:51:17.621
You have different body parts next to one another. probably for the same reason.

00:51:17.741 --> 00:51:21.961
You have to have different combinations locally, so you have to repeat the same

00:51:21.961 --> 00:51:27.841
inputs several times in different ways so that you can have a modular kind of organization.

00:51:28.121 --> 00:51:32.041
So we think this already happens in motor cortex.

00:51:32.141 --> 00:51:37.201
So one way of looking at motor cortex is to say motor cortex is just the general

00:51:37.201 --> 00:51:42.801
purpose motor region, and its organizing feature is somatotopy,

00:51:42.881 --> 00:51:46.421
goes from foot down to tongue. Tale to Pond.

00:51:47.666 --> 00:51:50.606
That's the crude organization within those big blocks.

00:51:51.186 --> 00:51:57.066
You'll see all kinds of mixtures, and this will be true of any motor cortex, rat, whatever.

00:51:58.686 --> 00:52:03.406
So already, I think there's a sign that it's modulately organized in terms of

00:52:03.406 --> 00:52:04.626
certain specific behaviors.

00:52:05.746 --> 00:52:10.026
Once you set up that organization that would match with the information that's

00:52:10.026 --> 00:52:11.646
coming from the cerebellum,

00:52:11.646 --> 00:52:19.646
then that means that premotor cortex should follow that suit or posterior parietal

00:52:19.646 --> 00:52:24.126
cortex should follow that suit if it's going to interact with it in a meaningful

00:52:24.126 --> 00:52:29.746
manner and so these are steps added on older cortex first,

00:52:30.866 --> 00:52:39.346
posterior parietal is more on the perceptual side of the beginning of this motor hierarchy in a way,

00:52:40.226 --> 00:52:46.566
I wouldn't necessarily say so much on the perceptual side because what if the

00:52:46.566 --> 00:52:51.226
sensory information is used in a non-conscious way where you're not aware of

00:52:51.226 --> 00:52:53.766
how the sensory information is being used?

00:52:54.506 --> 00:52:58.606
Right, it would still be perceptual, no? It would be sensory,

00:52:58.746 --> 00:53:01.186
but perceptual implies an awareness.

00:53:01.686 --> 00:53:10.346
I mean, you are aware of the visual scene, but you might not be aware of how you crawl motor behave,

00:53:11.446 --> 00:53:16.146
well I'm not sure if we really have to bring in awareness for to talk about

00:53:16.146 --> 00:53:18.086
perception perception maybe.

00:53:19.506 --> 00:53:24.966
Perception essentially means that you rely on categories right that knowledge

00:53:24.966 --> 00:53:33.206
is imposed in defining what a visual scene or what a sensory scene comprises of,

00:53:34.166 --> 00:53:36.686
So, I'm not sure whether we have to…,

00:53:37.686 --> 00:53:43.906
So, I'll try to make the distinction in how I think about it and see if we have some agreement.

00:53:44.046 --> 00:53:48.146
But I would say that if an area of the brain is involved in perception,

00:53:48.346 --> 00:53:52.146
when you electrically stimulate, you should have a perception.

00:53:54.920 --> 00:53:59.340
And if you electrically simulate a motor cortex you might not have any perception

00:53:59.340 --> 00:54:05.960
you might I move but I don't know why okay yeah I would I would I would disentangle

00:54:05.960 --> 00:54:09.200
these two because I think a percept as such can be,

00:54:09.900 --> 00:54:14.520
a representation you use to classify states,

00:54:15.240 --> 00:54:19.380
but these states don't you don't need to enter awareness we don't need to couple

00:54:19.380 --> 00:54:23.960
this automatically to awareness but of course we can make on definitions right but

00:54:24.220 --> 00:54:30.820
But to bring it to the finish line, so here you are with this enormous experience

00:54:30.820 --> 00:54:33.980
in brain research and evolution of the brain.

00:54:34.280 --> 00:54:36.820
So how many more years do we need to really understand the brain?

00:54:38.260 --> 00:54:42.480
I hope five more years. Because I have five years of funding.

00:54:44.080 --> 00:54:47.080
Well, here you are. But I think it's

00:54:47.080 --> 00:54:53.720
an endless task in the sense that our understanding is very crude now.

00:54:53.720 --> 00:55:01.900
I feel, but much better than it was at the time I showed you the Thompson textbook pictures of cortex.

00:55:02.120 --> 00:55:07.780
And now people are labeling functions or areas all over the place and saying,

00:55:07.900 --> 00:55:11.420
well, this area is involved in eye movements. Well, that's pretty good.

00:55:12.280 --> 00:55:17.300
But why would you have an area that people call LIP, which we see in all these

00:55:17.300 --> 00:55:20.380
primates now that we can get the eye movements from posterior parietal cortex

00:55:20.380 --> 00:55:25.120
in the region that I think is LIP that you define in humans or mechanics.

00:55:25.400 --> 00:55:29.340
Why would you have an eye movement in there? Also another eye movement in the

00:55:29.340 --> 00:55:32.080
frontal lobe. And then a supplementary eye.

00:55:33.440 --> 00:55:38.500
Why all these steps? Unless each step has a different role.

00:55:39.540 --> 00:55:45.560
And that's the heart of what I'm thinking about. And so the role of posterior

00:55:45.560 --> 00:55:52.240
paracortex is sensory-dominated. to make the best of what the sensory information is.

00:55:53.640 --> 00:55:59.000
And that's perception. It's perception. But I don't necessarily think that the

00:55:59.000 --> 00:56:05.520
person, the observer, has to be aware of the perceptual decisions or the sensory decisions.

00:56:06.080 --> 00:56:09.080
They could be or they might not be. I'm not sure.

00:56:09.200 --> 00:56:14.440
But really, if you were designing a robot, it wouldn't make any difference, right?

00:56:15.360 --> 00:56:17.460
What's the function of consciousness?

00:56:19.877 --> 00:56:23.377
That's to add the executive decisions to the whole thing.

00:56:24.937 --> 00:56:30.817
But a lot could be totally automated where consciousness is not an important component.

00:56:31.217 --> 00:56:35.197
Right. I think, I mean, a perhaps interesting analogy,

00:56:35.737 --> 00:56:42.037
that we might consider in robotics, you know, until maybe 10 years ago,

00:56:42.137 --> 00:56:47.637
we were really struggling with vision for robots to do even elementary scene analysis.

00:56:48.177 --> 00:56:54.517
And then suddenly, people did have stereo algorithms, but it was difficult to piece it all together.

00:56:54.817 --> 00:56:59.177
And then Microsoft came out with the Kinect and it delivered to you a 3D analysis

00:56:59.177 --> 00:57:01.937
of the scene, which is really quite detailed.

00:57:02.197 --> 00:57:06.477
And suddenly we can do all sorts of new things really quite easily and quickly

00:57:06.477 --> 00:57:08.277
that were very difficult before.

00:57:08.577 --> 00:57:15.137
So perhaps in primate vision, we have something similar is that the visual system reorganized itself

00:57:15.417 --> 00:57:18.117
to give us good stereo because i think in a lot

00:57:18.117 --> 00:57:21.177
of these other animals it's really a defense system and it's

00:57:21.177 --> 00:57:23.937
not fusing it's not giving you depth it's certainly not

00:57:23.937 --> 00:57:27.017
as you were saying in your talk giving you a high detail

00:57:27.017 --> 00:57:35.237
so once you have this nice depth analysis of the visual world the brain can

00:57:35.237 --> 00:57:39.597
maybe reorganize itself to make use of that in some way and that would be interesting

00:57:39.597 --> 00:57:43.537
to try and understand whether that was one of the things that is giving rise

00:57:43.537 --> 00:57:45.177
to this new capacity They probably have.

00:57:46.377 --> 00:57:49.977
And what's surprising to me, even though I've studied plasticity for a long

00:57:49.977 --> 00:57:55.177
time, is how quickly a new feature can be useful.

00:57:55.397 --> 00:58:00.957
And the best example is adding a third cone to a squirrel monkey's eye.

00:58:01.057 --> 00:58:06.877
Officially, everybody knows about that research, where you add a new gene to

00:58:06.877 --> 00:58:11.177
something to coincide in the retina so that you have a third pigment.

00:58:11.177 --> 00:58:14.837
And their color vision immediately changes.

00:58:16.097 --> 00:58:18.577
The whole system adjusts to something new.

00:58:20.257 --> 00:58:23.317
Would anybody ever have guessed that in advance?

00:58:23.697 --> 00:58:30.997
I mean, I'm stunned by that, but it shows us that at least the developmental

00:58:30.997 --> 00:58:35.117
plasticity is fantastic in adjusting to change.

00:58:35.297 --> 00:58:41.837
And so a little change anywhere can be built. will affect the brain widely. Right.

00:58:42.817 --> 00:58:46.597
Although I want to be careful with Tony's suggestion that the primate brain

00:58:46.597 --> 00:58:49.377
might have been based on Microsoft architecture.

00:58:50.577 --> 00:58:52.997
So the other thing is, so now.

00:58:55.337 --> 00:59:01.697
What's the kind of prediction you would like to make today about the work that you're pushing now?

00:59:01.897 --> 00:59:04.457
So you have five more years, you were telling us, funding.

00:59:05.237 --> 00:59:07.877
What are we going to see at the end of these five years? What's the prediction

00:59:07.877 --> 00:59:08.917
that you're really testing there?

00:59:09.797 --> 00:59:18.437
Well, we hope to do several things. I want to demonstrate that it can be put

00:59:18.437 --> 00:59:21.577
into a model of how posterior parietal cortex,

00:59:21.577 --> 00:59:24.837
seven or eight functional zones interact and

00:59:24.837 --> 00:59:28.317
how they interact and do

00:59:28.317 --> 00:59:31.917
the same for motor cortex and premotor cortex if anything

00:59:31.917 --> 00:59:38.497
more than that comes out of it I'll be delighted and the one way to do this

00:59:38.497 --> 00:59:44.217
is I want to know what are the inhibitory connections and what are the excitatory

00:59:44.217 --> 00:59:50.597
connections we have a prediction and the prediction is that there will be,

00:59:51.577 --> 00:59:56.837
excitatory connections to excitatory neurons in a very specific local pattern.

00:59:57.857 --> 01:00:00.957
And then the other ones will be excitatory to inhibitory neurons,

01:00:01.157 --> 01:00:07.217
but in posterior parietal cortex, there will be mutual conflict between the

01:00:07.217 --> 01:00:11.457
areas, and they'll be fighting on the basis of inputs to win out.

01:00:12.877 --> 01:00:20.957
Those connections can be demonstrated now by selectively labeling connections

01:00:20.957 --> 01:00:25.517
to inhibitory neurons and seeing which neurons go to inhibitory neurons and

01:00:25.517 --> 01:00:27.497
which ones go to excitatory neurons.

01:00:27.617 --> 01:00:31.157
That's possible through genetic manipulation techniques.

01:00:34.461 --> 01:00:37.921
We haven't done that. The things that have been done in that area are not very

01:00:37.921 --> 01:00:39.741
far along yet, but we can do it.

01:00:40.101 --> 01:00:43.661
If I have the right collaborators, we can do it. Right.

01:00:44.481 --> 01:00:50.021
And then, so how long have you been active in neuroscience now?

01:00:50.121 --> 01:00:51.921
How many years are we talking about here?

01:00:52.281 --> 01:01:04.261
Well, I started graduate school in late, I finished in early 60s.

01:01:04.461 --> 01:01:08.781
Undergraduate, and then I was in graduate school, and so I would say I was involved

01:01:08.781 --> 01:01:13.701
in it from the 60s, and late 60s, pretty well involved in it,

01:01:13.821 --> 01:01:19.601
and so it's really a long career, longer than most people ever get to enjoy,

01:01:19.861 --> 01:01:26.441
and so I'm delighted to be still here doing this thing, having this fun,

01:01:26.601 --> 01:01:27.621
because it's really fun.

01:01:27.621 --> 01:01:32.081
But now, based on this experience, in the study of the brain,

01:01:32.301 --> 01:01:36.261
what is the John Kass law that we should all follow?

01:01:38.241 --> 01:01:42.301
I'm not sure I understand your question. Well, there's like a norm that you

01:01:42.301 --> 01:01:48.081
would like to sort of, if you want, impose upon all of us interested in the brain, a heuristic,

01:01:48.301 --> 01:01:54.041
a rule that we should adhere to in order to make progress, to really gain understanding in the brain.

01:01:56.001 --> 01:02:01.141
Everybody gets it understanding and in their own ways and so i wouldn't hesitate

01:02:01.141 --> 01:02:05.821
to say this is the way i don't know the way i'm i'm learning new ways all the

01:02:05.821 --> 01:02:09.441
all of the time and and uh i would,

01:02:10.721 --> 01:02:13.501
after working on plasticity for a long time i

01:02:13.501 --> 01:02:16.501
didn't intend to work on plasticity and developing think they're

01:02:16.501 --> 01:02:22.641
dull brains but there it was and you couldn't avoid it so i guess all of us

01:02:22.641 --> 01:02:28.401
should be open to different ways of thinking about surprises that we didn't

01:02:28.401 --> 01:02:33.861
anticipate and then incorporating them into our thinking and um,

01:02:35.163 --> 01:02:40.543
I think it's very hard to ever change your mind on something when you get committed

01:02:40.543 --> 01:02:42.323
emotionally to a line of thinking.

01:02:42.723 --> 01:02:45.523
But if we could do that more easily, it would be helpful.

01:02:48.103 --> 01:02:52.563
One example is I was on sabbatical on the way, and my graduate student was working

01:02:52.563 --> 01:02:58.563
on something that would provide really compelling evidence for a view I had

01:02:58.563 --> 01:02:59.663
about the visual system.

01:03:00.203 --> 01:03:05.623
And he said, the evidence is just the opposite. and argues that you were wrong

01:03:05.623 --> 01:03:07.683
about how you thought the visual system.

01:03:07.743 --> 01:03:12.063
He thought he was first hesitant to tell me about this because I was on sabbatical.

01:03:12.123 --> 01:03:13.943
I wasn't seeing how things were happening at home.

01:03:14.523 --> 01:03:19.683
And I thought, this is great. It's much better to announce the mistake ourselves

01:03:19.683 --> 01:03:21.603
than have somebody tell us we were wrong.

01:03:23.603 --> 01:03:27.843
But the evidence was so convincing that I flipped over right away.

01:03:28.123 --> 01:03:32.083
And now I have a person that's now working with me, a crew that's there,

01:03:32.083 --> 01:03:36.563
And she's telling me, you're wrong in another way. You have to incorporate that in your thing.

01:03:36.763 --> 01:03:40.243
And I teased her and I said, no, that can't be right. She went away in a postdoc,

01:03:40.323 --> 01:03:42.763
still thinking I disagree with her completely.

01:03:43.163 --> 01:03:46.463
But I'm going to send her a paper that I want her to be a co-author on,

01:03:46.483 --> 01:03:49.903
which I agree with her completely. It'll be a surprise to her.

01:03:51.123 --> 01:03:54.543
But maybe it's because I've had now a couple of years to think it over.

01:03:55.203 --> 01:04:00.563
But she didn't have a strong bias in going in. And she just looked at the data

01:04:00.563 --> 01:04:02.223
and she came to a different view.

01:04:02.383 --> 01:04:06.743
My other graduate student didn't have a strong bias. I had the strong biases.

01:04:07.283 --> 01:04:12.023
It's my view that had to be changed. Theirs was easy to change because they

01:04:12.023 --> 01:04:14.903
didn't have a strong one. So, John's law, we keep an open mind.

01:04:15.803 --> 01:04:19.423
Keep new investigators around you. Right, exactly.

01:04:19.963 --> 01:04:23.823
A lot of surprise. That's fantastic. So, they'll tell you where you're going.

01:04:24.403 --> 01:04:27.163
Exactly. Well, John, thank you very much for this conversation.

01:04:29.563 --> 01:04:35.363
The CSN podcast was produced by the Convergent Science Network of Biometrics

01:04:35.363 --> 01:04:42.123
and Biohybrid Systems, a project funded by the European 7th Research Framework Programme.

01:04:43.323 --> 01:04:48.643
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01:04:48.643 --> 01:04:54.863
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01:04:54.960 --> 01:05:03.760
Music.