The Ear to Asia podcast is made available on
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Hello, I'm Sami Shah. This is Ear to Asia. In
China, Mandarin in general is seen as the language
for social mobility and also for opportunities.
Overall, there's no such a forceful, let's say,
imposition of Mandarin to replace other minority
languages. But rather, it's more of a gradual
approach in which minority languages are seen
as less valuable or made less valuable. Even
a language that in the Chinese context can have
a couple of million speakers and be a minority
language in one or two generations can drastically
fall down the cliff when you have that sense
that people don't want to pass the language on
to their children. These children don't get to
grow up learning these languages as their mother
tongues because their parents have decided that
that won't be a sensible investment of time for
them. Can ethnic minority languages coexist with
Mandarin in China? Ear to Asia is the podcast
from Asia Institute, the Asia research specialists
at the University of Melbourne. Mandarin, or
Putonghua, has long served as China's official
language, yet recent developments have shown
its growing influence is coming at the expense
of the country's minority languages. While China's
constitution mandates the promotion of Putonghua,
it also guarantees the right to use and develop
minority languages. But after a legislative decision
in 2020, mandatory schooling in some minority
languages is now regarded as unconstitutional.
This tension has brought forth language policies
impacting large ethnic groups like the Zhuang,
who live in China's south, and whose language
has been losing ground in official domains. Concerns
have also arisen about the effects of language
policy on linguistic diversity in regions like
Tibet. Underpinning this trend are concepts like
the pluralist unity model, which ostensibly seeks
to balance ethnic diversity with natural cohesion.
However, the growing push to cement Putonghua's
dominance in education and governance marks a
clear shift in China's linguistic landscape.
So, given that Mandarin is indisputably the dominant
language of the nation, why is there an apparent
need to further strengthen its positions vis
-à -vis minority languages? What are the real
-world impacts of China's Mandarin -first language
policies on ethnic minority communities? And
what will it take for minority languages to thrive
alongside Putonghua in China? Joining me to examine
the impact of government policies on minority
languages in China are researchers of linguistic
diversity, Dr. Lajia Tu from Asia Institute and
Dr. Alexandra Gray from University of Technology,
Sydney. Welcome to Ear to Asia, Lajia and Alex.
Thank you for having me. Such a pleasure to be
here, Sami. Alex, let's start with you. Before
we get to minority languages, can you please
give us a quick overview of China's ethnic minorities?
Of course. And I think this is a good place to
start because it's not necessarily something
that people outside of China, say here in Australia,
know much about at all. But if we think about
China just as a physical space, it's much bigger
than, say, Europe. So, of course, if we start
to think, we can anticipate that there might
be quite a lot of diversity in the histories,
the origins, the cultures, the languages of different
groups of people there. And indeed, that is the
case. And so when the nation we now know as China
formed itself after a period of civil war and
tension in the middle of the 20th century, the
government, through its constitution and other
policies, set up an official recognition of not
just the ethnic majority, which is called the
Hanzhou or the Han group, but 55 recognised other
peoples. And they are predominantly at that point
in time being recognised because they have cultural
and linguistic differences from what's seen as
the majority or, if you like, the mainstream.
And so these 55 minorities in Chinese, they're
called 少数民族 or small number minorities, have
a certain legal status. And then coming to the
issue of languages, of those 55, 54 of them were
recognised as having an official language for
their own group. So how many minority languages
are currently spoken and viable in China? Look,
this is a really difficult question to answer,
Sami, although it's also a really sensible question.
Of course, people want to know this. So if we
think of those 55 minorities that I just explained,
together their population is about 8 or 9 % of
the national population. However, it's very hard
to get data, first of all, on... who amongst
those minority peoples speaks what is recognised
as a minority language. And then even in the
cases where we do have data on language being
spoken, it's a further challenge to get data
that properly reflects how often or when or with
whom people speak those languages, how fluently,
how comfortably, whether they write those languages
as well. And then also I think it's really important
to remember that despite this very rigid state
organisation of peoples into groups and languages
to go with peoples, there are people from the
majority who grow up speaking what we think of
as minority languages because... That's the main
language in the village or the town where they
grow up. So there's not necessarily a one -to
-one correspondence between the number of people
in the minorities and the number of people speaking
those languages and then the number of people
speaking those languages as their sole language.
So to put this in a bit of a grounded context,
to give an example, the language that I've done
a lot of my own research on is called Zhuang.
It's a language that originated in that part
of South Central China that's sort of above Vietnam
and near Thailand. And for that language, we
have data from around the turn of this century,
so data from around the year 2000, and that's
the most recent I can find reflecting this sort
of information, saying that about 53 % of the
people who were technically in the Zhuang population
in what's called the Guangxi Zhuangzi Autonomous
Region were speaking Putonghua, so that is the
national Mandarin language. But only 20 % of
that same group, so only 20 % of that Zhuang
ethnic minority in that area at about the same
time were monolingual, okay? So the majority
of people, at least in this example of the Zhuang,
are multilingual, bilingual, maybe trilingual,
even quadrilingual. So people are speaking, and
this is not just in South China, people are speaking
both ethnic minority languages and the national
language, which... We call it Mandarin, but it's
called Putonghua. And then also a whole range
of other Mandarin dialects that don't have that
official status as the national official version
of Mandarin. So in fact, there's enormous linguistic
diversity going on. And that means both at a
societal level and an individual level, there's
a dynamic, there's, if you like, a sort of allocation
of which language, where and how much and at
what point in everyone's lives. Last year, historically,
how has the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP,
viewed ethnic minorities? Thank you for the question.
Yes, historically, the Communist Party of China
has seen these minority groups, as Alex said,
55 ethnic minority groups, along with the Han
majority group. as a big part of what makes China's
culture so rich and diverse. So they call China
as a multi -ethnic country. And it has come up
with different ways to support these minority
groups in schools and in the media. For example,
in certain ethnic minority groups, there are
bilingual schools, which incorporates ethnic
minority language along with the Mandarin in
their instruction in the classrooms. And also
there are media such as radio broadcasts and
televisions that has bilingual programs. Oh,
well, there are minority language programs. Of
course, there are membranes, but there are televisions
and radio stations that are dedicated to minority
languages that usually have programs that focus
on a minority culture and the language and their
literature and all aspects of their lives. And
also, of course, the state news. And so Historically,
I would say China has seen this as a very important
part of their family. They call this the family
of a Chinese nation, in which Chinese call it
Zhonghua Minzu, right? Zhonghua Minzu is a big
umbrella term that includes all these 56 ethnic
groups, including... Han Chinese. And as Alex
said, that Han Chinese actually makes up about
92 % of the population in the nation. So that's
a super majority. And all the other 55 ethnic
groups make up only about 8 % to 9%. That's the
latest statistics that we can get. So yeah, so
that's a very quick overview of historical approach
to ethnic diversity in China. So does that change
from autonomous regions versus hand -majority
provinces, the approaches that the CCP might
have towards the transmission and use of minority
languages? Yes, Sami. So in autonomous regions,
so in China, there are several levels of autonomous
regions. So first you have autonomous region
like TAR, Tibet Autonomous Region, and Ningxia
Hui Autonomous Region, and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region. So there are also autonomous counties
that are dedicated to different ethnic groups.
So in autonomous regions such as in the Tibet
Autonomous Region or Inner Mongolia or Xinjiang
or Guangxi or Ningxia. China has established
these frameworks to allow these communities to
preserve their cultural identities. So they designated
these regions for specific ethnic groups like,
as I said, Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region
or Mongolians in Inner Mongolia to ensure their
traditions, languages, customs remain prominent.
And it reflects the government's commitment to
keep the distinct contributions of these groups
within the broader context of China. So what
this means is that, for instance, In Mongolia,
when they attend the school, they usually go
to bilingual schools. And in these bilingual
schools, there are courses that are... that include
Mandarin and Mongolian, either as a medium of
instruction or as a language subject. So this
is the crux of the issue that you pointed out
in the introduction that we can dive into later.
So this kid theoretically can learn Mongolian
fluently as a language subject or as a medium
of instruction in a classroom, and also can celebrate
their cultural practices and their traditions,
and also pick up Mandarin along the way. So that's
That's what it's like in autonomous regions.
But in the high majority provinces, usually there
are very few, if any, bilingual schools. But
in China, we can also differentiate the bilingual
schools from the bilingual schools that include
Mandarin and thick minority language, and also
international schools, because these are also
called, the latter are also called the bilingual
schools. For example, there are international
schools that have... Mandarin along with English
or Mandarin with Japanese and others, yes. So
in this high majority provinces, there are ethnic
minority people living there like Tibetans, Mongolians,
Uyghurs, but they usually lack this access to
education in their mother tongue. So they can
only learn this through their household, through
their parents and the peers. So that's a quick
overview of this difference between autonomous
region and the high majority provinces. Alex,
you had something to add? Yes, Sammy, I did.
Look, I wanted to clarify two things, both the
status of bilingual schooling in those autonomous
regions and their autonomy itself. These are
things I've looked at in some of my own research
because I take both a linguistic and a legal
approach to my research on Chinese minority languages.
But the autonomous regions, the five of them
that Lajia explained... They haven't had a full
devolution of power from the central government.
There is a mechanism set up to do that, but it's
never been completely executed. It's been blocked
continually at the highest level for some 20,
30 years. And so while we call these autonomous
regions because that's their official name, they
don't actually necessarily have more legal power
than other parts of China to serve their minority
populations. But more than that, demographically,
Guangxi, again, to take an example, so this is
in south -central China, one -third of the population
of that autonomous region are officially part
of the Zhuang minority. It's still an area where
the Han majority are the majority of people living
in that place, and increasingly it's also a place
that is urbanised, and in urban places you have
greater dispersal of the minority populations.
And so while Lajia is correct in saying that
there's bilingual schooling available across
China, it varies very drastically in the form
it takes and the access people have. So in the
Inner Mongolian example that he gives, yes, Inner
Mongolia has long been touted as a model minority
and in particular because they've had very successful
bilingual education and we'll come to how that
has changed. sadly, in my view, in the last few
years. But in the south of China, bilingual schooling
in Guangxi has been, in fact, quite inaccessible.
When I did my research in the 2010s, it was very
difficult to get exact data, but crunching together
different sources that I could find, I calculated
that about 1 % of the school -aged population
of the Zhuang minority had access to bilingual
schooling. And even then, that's bilingual schooling
that doesn't go all the way through primary and
secondary school. It's bilingual schooling that
predominantly is bilingual for a couple of years
to help people transition into full Mandarin
schooling. And so actually, while there is a
framework to support minority peoples and their
self -governance of a sort, and there is a framework
and an allowance in the national education law
for bilingual education, that doesn't necessarily
mean that it plays out in a really robust and
full and accessible way for everyone. Let's talk
about that framework then a little bit. You mentioned,
of course, that your research focuses on the
legal side of things as well as the linguistic.
So what then has been the constitutional status
of both Mandarin and minority languages in China
since 1949? In 1949, in a preliminary kind of
constitution and then in the actual constitution
as it has existed and been updated since, there
has always been a provision that minority peoples
have the freedom, not the right, the freedom,
to use and develop their own languages. And then
there has, at the same time... also been an article
of the Constitution saying, amongst other things
to do with the national language, that the state
promotes the nationwide use of Putonghua. And
then since 2000, there's also been a really important
piece of national legislation. So it's not the
Constitution, but it's a nationwide, very important
piece of legislation about what's called the
common spoken and written Chinese language. And
in Article 4 of that, there is a right so not
a freedom a right to learn and use the standard
language so we have at the high level a really
strong not just status for standardized mandarin
as the national language but a right to access
it a right to use it and an obligation on the
state to promulgate it and that stands alongside
uneasily this legally weaker and in practice
not always fully fleshed out, freedom to use
and develop minority languages. Can you just
kind of expand on that a little bit? What's the
difference there between the right versus the
freedom? Yeah. How does that pan out? Look, in
general terms, a right is something that can
be... um advocated for or used you know to sort
of prompt expectations of the state more than
a freedom um the way it plays out particularly
is the way say in the the decision i've recently
written about and the article that underpins
i think my invitation to this podcast a really
high level important legal body called the um
Legislative Affairs Commission, undertook a review
on the constitutionality of certain regulations
that were regulations setting up bilingual schooling
in parts of China. And this was in 2020, right?
So this review was in 2020 and then it came out
in a report in early 2021. And in that report,
they determined that, in fact, these bilingual
schooling regulations offended the constitutional...
necessity for the state to promote the nationwide
use of Putonghua. So they're using that constitutional
protection of the national language to invalidate
bilingual schooling regulations, even though
bilingual schooling regulations, these particular
ones had been in existence already uncontroversially
for some years prior, and even though the national
education law specifically allows for bilingual
schooling. And so that's an example of how that
legal tension or that difference between, if
you like, the right and the freedom plays out.
The Legislative Affairs Commission doesn't have
to provide reasons, and it didn't, but the discussion
of it by commentators, legal scholars inside
and outside China links it to this sense that...
there is more strength or there is more obligation
in that legal protection of Putonghua and what
it demands compared to the more flexible freedom
to use and develop minority languages, which
is localized to these particular territories
and also always conditional upon whether conditions
exist, as the provisos in the law say. So those
might be economic conditions, those might be
demographic conditions that mean that... local
governments can say, well, conditions no longer
exist. So we don't really need to put this freedom
to develop the language into any concrete form.
So is it fair then to say that minority languages
are being preserved, but that preservation is
symbolic, but they are also simultaneously being
marginalized on a functional level? Totally.
I think that's a very good way of saying it.
And what I would add to that is that while they're
being preserved and not... without some expense
i mean there is an enormous amount of resources
going into documentation and archival of linguistic
diversity in china at the moment both for mandarin
dialects and official minority languages and
that of course is done with a great deal of effort
by the people involved that is primarily done
to make a sort of record, a relic, so people
don't forget what the linguistic diversity was,
what the languages were. That's quite different
from setting up the conditions of life where
people can and want to, are compelled to, or
are encouraged to use multiple languages and
to pass them on to their children. So in my work,
I talk about this as a kind of nationalisation
of linguistic heritage. it becomes documented
it becomes archived it becomes used in museums
and it's not necessarily accessible for minority
peoples going forward both in a functional sense
maybe people no longer learn to speak or read
that language so what are they going to do with
that archive but also it's not necessarily accessible
as a social resource for them to identify with
it no longer is as closely connected to them
and their own people But it is, by contrast,
then a resource that others like local governments
can use for things like place branding. So it's
really shifting, if you like, the power, the
control, the embodiment of these linguistic resources.
Alex, as language policy goes, then China also
implemented the Yubao or linguistic treasures
policy in 2015. What is that and how does that
fit with the 2020 review recommendations? Yeah,
thanks for that question, Sammy. So in fact,
what I was talking about just now, this mass
effort to document and archive and preserve languages
in China, that is the Yubao policy from 2015,
language protection policy. It plays out differently
for some languages, not for minority languages,
at least as far as my research has found. So
some languages, particularly strategically useful
foreign languages, under this policy are also
getting protection in the form of enormous organisation.
organisation of, say, higher education resources
to make sure more people speak those languages
for the benefit of international trade and so
forth. So that's also part of UBAL, but that
kind of economic value or utility is not seen
as worth preserving for minority languages, even
though some minority languages at least are spoken
across borders, are already used in cross -border
trade. around all the fringes of China and related
to the languages overseas nearby. And so their
speakers have a head start in learning those
other foreign languages too. So it's not that
there is in reality no possible economic value
for these languages, but the way the Yubao policy
plays out is quite different from the minority
languages and their sort of documentation and
strategically useful foreign languages and their
investment. There's also a slightly more recent
policy called the National Language Capacity
Approach that sits alongside UBAL. And that really
supports further the sense that any implementation
of language rights or language policy has to
be geared towards economic development and how
those languages play into the capacity of the
nation. A third policy sitting alongside this
all, Sammy, so it's a slightly complicated policy
landscape. A third policy sitting alongside this
is what we translate into English as subjectivity
and diversity. It's a slightly opaque name, but
it is a policy that is specifically about how
diversity and linguistic diversity sits alongside
the core. essential subject of the nation who
is seen to be a Mandarin speaking subject. And
that policy is explicitly hierarchical in how
Putonghua, so national standard Mandarin, should
fit alongside minority languages. So it's an
explicitly hierarchical. So in the past, the
kinds of things that Lajia and I have been talking
about have always had a sort of inherent hierarchy
between the languages. But this is a new policy
that makes that hierarchy and that intention
to continue to maintain a hierarchy between the
languages really explicit. Lajia, it seems that
China's language policy then comes down to...
The pluralist unity tenet. Can you just explain
what that is and why is it so important to the
CCP? Yes. So China's ethnic policy in general
is guided by a principle known as the pluralist
unity, which was proposed by Chinese sociologist
and anthropologist Fei Xiaotong in early 1980s.
And it started as an academic term in his research
about ethnic minority areas in China. But since
it serves as this foundational concept in managing
the country's linguistic and cultural diversity
among ethnic groups. So the pluralist aspect
of this principle refers to this acknowledgement
and all. appreciation of these diverse languages
and cultures that are present in China among
the ethnic minority populations, such as Tibetans
in the western parts of China and Mongolians
in the northern parts and Zhuang in the southern
regions. So it emphasizes the importance of these
distinct linguistic traditions as valuable components
of China as a nation. It's also part of the Chinese
nation. And conversely, the unity component focuses
on how to foster a cohesive national identity
that binds these diverse groups together and
ensure that all communities integrate into this
broader family of Chinese nation. So as Alex
has mentioned that this is not... let's say pluralist
and unity it's not a equal let's say equally
weighted rather there's an emphasis on the unity
part of this pluralist unity tenet or this approach.
So for example, in schools in the Tibetan areas
or in other parts of China, Mandarin is often
prioritized over other, I think, minority languages.
And this also raises this question of how these
minority languages are used and supported by
the government. So to begin with, China has largely
officially recognized one language for each ethnic
minority groups. But that's very different from
how linguists and linguistic anthropologists
and language researchers see this. So, for example,
in Tibet, usually we see that we think that Tibetans
speak Tibetan, of course, that's their mother
tongue, their native language. But some scholars,
such as Gerald Raj from La Trobe University,
has studied this linguistic diversity with Tibetan,
and he and his co -authors have identified more
languages, for example, like Mani Kaja, which
he specializes in. And so for him, Tibetan language
is also a dominant language within these minority
areas. For example, it marginalizes other minority
languages within this minority community. And
in schools, in the public schools in China, all
the schools are public. ethnic minority areas,
they only provide this bilingual education in
Mandarin and the officially designated ethnic
minority language. So for example, in Tibetan
bilingual schools, it's usually Mandarin along
with Tibetan, but there are no instruction in
other, let's say, minority languages within Tibet.
And so that means that when a kid goes to school
and learns these languages, usually it's the
national language along with the the more let's
say dominant or language that represents the
ethnic group as a whole but not really not necessarily
the language that speak at home and within tibet
there are other languages and varieties varieties
are languages that are sometimes called as dialects
but strictly speaking they can be linguistically
different um however i also have to emphasize
that the The status of these language use or
how widely they are used in a social context
in education varies a lot across China. So for
example, in a drawn communities as Alex said
that some of these languages needs really they
are in in the state of endangerment and they
need this documentation and protections to to
really keep them alive. But in a Tibetan areas,
I would say the The situation is much better,
although it could be better, of course. There
are rooms for improvement all the time, but language
is widely spoken. And it's just my observation
that in recent years, with the emergence of these
live streaming apps, such as in Tibetan areas,
an app is particularly popular. That's called
Kuaishou. It's very similar to TikTok, and also
the Chinese version of TikTok, Douyin, is also
popular in some parts of Tibet, but mostly it's
a kuaishou. And on kuaishou, as a frequent user
of myself, there are many Tibetans who sell stuff,
they perform. arts and music, and they also speak
in Tibetan. And that has actually generated more
enthusiasm among the Tibetans who are very addicted
to these social media platforms. So I would say
that in the past, you learned Tibetan at the
household, in your communities, and then at the
schools. But now we also have this virtual platform
which provides them with this space. But that's
not That might not be the case in other areas,
such as in a drawn and other, let's say, communities.
But in Tibet, yes. So that's the case. And so
go back to your question. So this pluralist unity
is seen as very crucial. And to outsiders, it
sounds that China... does appreciate diversity
and this like the pluralism among its ethnic
groups in terms of language culture and traditions
but there is a huge emphasis on this unity and
some scholars might argue that there's actually
a directional approach that is from a pluralism
to the one body of unity and the purpose is really
to uh to integrate all ethnic groups into the
big family of uh chinese nation Yeah, that directionality,
Ladja, or that sort of assimilationist tendency
really comes to the fore at different periods
of history and then fades away again. And I mean,
most recently, say for the last 15 or so years,
scholars in this space have particularly noticed
that that focus on unity, particularly when it
comes to linguistic issues, has been to see multilingualism
or the use of... languages other than the national
standard as a security threat almost, as a sort
of a will to separatism, which is pretty extreme
and a little, maybe we could say hypochondriac
if you want to take that metaphor. And that's
not the view of all local governments all across
China, but definitely there is that increasing
tendency. I've called this in my own work, this
mistaken conflation of homogeneity with unity.
would also be fun at this point, or interesting,
just to remind listeners that China's not totally
alone in this. A lot of these aspects of language
policy, these problems, these dynamics, you know,
they resonate in other parts of the world too.
This aspiration to monolingualism is, you know,
something we encounter in Australia and something
people are talking about right now in the US.
But also just this pluralistic unity, this concept,
or in Chinese it's 多言一体. That's almost exactly
the motto of the European Union as well. So this
sense of an identity as a national or sort of
a group identity as a diverse body, that's not
new in China or that's not unique to China. And
then the ongoing dynamism or the ongoing tension
that it creates to be both a unity and diverse,
that also is not unique to China. It's free to
read and it's open access at melbourneasiareview
.edu .au. You'll find articles by some of our
regular Air to Asia guests and by many others.
Plus, you can catch recent episodes of Air to
Asia at the Melbourne Asia Review website, which
again you can find at melbourneasiareview .edu
.au. I'm Sami Shah and I'm joined by researchers
of language diversity, Dr. Alexandra Gray of
UTS and Dr. Lajia Tu of Asia Institute. Alex,
we've been talking so much about Mandarin over
the minority languages and how much it has been
sold or justified to the public. How is that
done? How is the public, particularly those who
practice minority languages themselves, being
convinced of the value of Mandarin? The main
ways I would say are through creating economic
avenues where Mandarin is what gets you economic
value. And part of that is the job market and
part of that is education and higher education.
And laws and policies are used in regards to
both to prioritise credentials or instruction
or use of Mandarin. And increasingly what we've
seen is even the use of law to create exclusive
domains for Mandarin. So before I was talking
about the Legislative Affairs Commission. and
their decision that certain bilingual schooling
regulations were unconstitutional. But then a
couple of years later in 2023, they also declared
that certain regulations that gave preferential
local government positions to people who passed
their civil service exam in a minority language,
they were also unconstitutional. So that's an
example of closing the spaces in which you can
make a living for yourself through your minority
language skills. And so that In a nutshell, or
in the broader context of a nation where economic
development is really always the key value, that
is something that is sold not just in language
but across the board as sort of the mission of
China and what the government does for its people.
You know, in that context, it's the economic
value of Mandarin that really... sells it to
people or compels people or gives people really
very little choice, whichever way you want to
put it. Yes, I like to add that I think the word
choice is really the key here. So Mandarin in
general is seen as the language for social mobility
and also for opportunities. So for example, in
many cases, like in education and employment,
there's a... although the situation varies across
different regions and and areas but overall there's
no such a forceful let's say imposition of a
Mandarin to replace other minority languages,
but rather it's more of a gradual approach in
which minority languages are seen as less valuable
or made less valuable. So for example, let's
say in my research area in a Minzu higher education,
if a Tibetan student who attends a bilingual
school and learns... most courses in their mother
town, Tibetan, and also has a very high fluency
in Mandarin. When they choose university degree
programs, most of those programs are in Mandarin.
So they have to really give up their minority
language to apply to those degree programs that
are exclusively in Mandarin. But there are also
other programs, degree programs at the higher
education level that provide some forms of instruction
in minority languages. And those are usually
in Minzu universities. But if you know this higher
education landscape in China, Minzu University,
it's a very hierarchical, let's say, education
system in that. So there are first -tier universities,
second -tier, and a third -tier. And the Minsu
universities, except the Central Minsu University
in China, is usually in the second tier. So that
means a Tibetan student insists that they want
to learn Tibetan in university classrooms, they
have to go to Minsu University, and they have
to pick from a very narrow, let's say, specialized
areas or majors. But if they want to go to a
better university or a higher tier university
and to learn more, let's say, choose from a wider
subject, such as science and physics and all
those areas, they have to really, there's no
way but to give up their mother tongue at the
higher educational level. But at this time, we're
really speaking of this academic language use,
but not necessarily the language that they use
in their daily conversations. These students
have acquired a very high, uh let's say uh officials
uh these students can speak their mother tongue
fluently but there's no really use in the the
current uh situation at the higher education
level and then when they look for jobs uh although
i think other Parts of China are different, but
in Tibet, as I see, such as in Qinghai province,
in the past, if you want to take an exam and
apply for a job in a civil, let's say in the
civil services or in a government, you really
have to. prove that you are fluent both in chinese
and the tibetan so usually the most of the courses
are either in tibetan or chinese but you have
to prove that you are fluent you are bilingually
fluent but in recent years there's no such demands
on the the proof of fluency in a tibetan so you
have to just prove that you are tibetan ethnically
so but that doesn't mean that you have to speak
very good Tibetan. I'm not saying that Tibetans
would decide or make decisions on whether they
attend a bilingual school or Tibetan medium instruction
just purely based on the employment, but that
does have this washback effect. So for some Tibetans,
when they see that, oh, if I go to Tibetan medium
instruction and learn Tibetan well, but not so
much focus on the Mandarin, then there's less
opportunities at the university admission. Meaning
that when they apply to university, there are
less opportunities. And then those jobs require
a strong influence in Mandarin. Although, let's
say, as much as they love Tibetan and their mother
tongue, but it's really hard for them to make
a personal choice just based on their passion
and enthusiasm and their love for their mother
tongue. So that's why I think I would say that
it's really about choice, or rather, it's a limited
choice that forces these students to naturally
give up, or let's say, or pay less attention
to their mother tongue. However, I would also
just... uh repeat to what the point that i mentioned
before that is uh tibetan language can be also
language of entertainment and for social interactions
and that's exactly what's happening in tibet
at least from my observation that is in the life
let's say uh live streaming uh social media platforms
like question tibetans such widely used for example
one of the one of the bloggers that i follow
he has more than a thousand simultaneous viewers
every night for his live stream and he talked
about about literature history and culture and
uh to my surprise there's less censorship on
this because there are also reports that once
you use minority languages, all those media apps,
you get censored or your live stream gets banned
or prohibited. But so far, I haven't seen such
cases, at least on this particular app. Lajia,
just to take your point there a little further,
it's really important to think of them the next
generation. So we still have people in China
growing up. With a mother tongue or at least
a familiarity with a minority language in some
contexts, those people are reducing in number,
but they still exist. But as you've pointed out,
these economic imperatives or incentives are
not there for them to pursue that language much
and in important domains in their adult lives.
And those people often then choose not to pass
on their language to their children at all. And
that's where it's an issue of having no choice
at all. These children don't get to grow up.
Learning these languages as their mother tongues
because their parents have decided that that
won't be a sensible investment of time for them
and some maybe never regret that but certainly
some do and certainly that is the way that intergenerational
transmission breaks down on such a rapid scale
that you get a shift away from a language. Even
a language that in the Chinese context can have
a couple of million speakers and be a minority
language in one or two generations can drastically
fall down the cliff when you have that sense
that people don't want to pass the language on
to their children. Well, let's talk then about
the Zhuang people. Alex, you've written about
them. They reside in the Guangxi Autonomous Region
in southern China. Can you give us a quick account
of this ethnic group and the languages they speak?
And then how has China's policies affected their
language communication? Sure. So traditionally,
Zhuang language originated in south -central
China. Over the course of the 20th century, the
people who spoke Chuang came to be territorialized
in the Guangxi Autonomous Region and then an
autonomous prefecture and an autonomous county
in the neighboring provinces. No longer do those
people necessarily always live in those areas
because like everyone in China, they participate
in this enormously high level of internal migration.
Some of it permanent, some of it temporary. And
then even within that area, there's enormous
urbanization. So people who feel like are not
moving away from the Zhuang speaking homelands
are still having change arrive at their doorstep.
And so in this context, there is increasingly
little place for Zhuang in everyday life. I've
mentioned before in this podcast in various answers,
there's very little access to literacy in Zhuang.
There's very little access to schooling in Zhuang.
If we look at the built environment, there are
very few cues that prompt people to use Zhuang
or to think that Zhuang is in place in that area.
And that's something I write a lot about in my
own work. And so there is increasingly a sense
that Zhuang is displaced even from its homelands,
but also relegated to them. The way we're talking
about it, the way the legal system talks about
it, it's as if Zhuang can only be legitimately
spoken within these areas of South Central China.
So once people move out of them, they have no
legitimate expectation of any linguistic protection
or support. And so that really localised, territorialised
system is just totally at odds with the mobility,
the urbanisation, you know the everyday life
of contemporary china and how has the community
responded to the reduced status of their language
in official venues well i mean this is a community
of some 17 million people so it's hard to give
an answer that represents everyone but Even the
Guangxi government itself, so the regional autonomous
government itself in 2019 published a report
that surprised me in its frankness on the weakening
status of Zhuang. So it's recognized as an issue.
When I spoke to people, so as part of my doctoral
research, I did interviews with Zhuang community
leaders and separately with young people, just
university age people with Zhuang language heritage.
But there was a sense from some people of great
disappointment. And then there was a sense from
other people that it was, if you like, something
of a fault of the community themselves that they
hadn't pushed for more, they hadn't expected
more. And so you get this diversity of views
as to, like, to what extent this is a problem
and who is to blame or how to fix the problem.
I also did interviews up in Inner Mongolia, so
in the far north of the country. And just to
give a really, you know, sort of... I think,
telling little example of how some people can
feel about this. I sat down with a group of language
officials who had retired, Mongolian language
officials. So they were passionate enough about
Mongolian language to have made it their work,
their life, but they hadn't passed it on to their
children. They had raised non -Mongolian speaking
children. And now in their retirement and their
children's adulthood, those children were very
disappointed and felt they had lost a part of
themselves or never had access to it. And those
retirees told me that they felt really regretful
about the decision they had made. And so that
is also a scenario that can happen where, you
know, a community can respond to this by feeling,
well, what can we do or whose fault is it? Or,
you know, we just need to get ahead. It's a pretty
poor part of China. And yet at the same time,
come to also feel like regretful or mournful
that they've lost something. And so the question
I take away from that is that. Is it not possible
for policy to make people both richer and bilingual?
Why does it have to always be a trade -off between
a minority language and getting ahead in the
world? Well, that really does then raise the
question, and I suppose this goes to both of
you, and Alex, I'll come to you first. The process
of migration and demographic shift often results
in a shift by speakers away from the languages
of their ethnic backgrounds or ancestral homelands.
That's a natural thing that happens. It can happen
without policy measures by government. Does that
mean language shift should then be ignored by
researchers, advocates, or policymakers? Certainly
not, because it's not necessarily natural, just
because it happens a lot. I mean, societal change,
migration, demographic change, change in the
economy, all these things happen and all these
things create pressures and changes in language,
in the relationships between languages in many
places around the world. But that doesn't mean
that there's no room for policy to step in. And
the fact that these things haven't been directly
caused by policies that were overtly intending
to wipe out languages doesn't mean that there's
no policy involvement at all. You know, not having
a policy or just having, as in the case I have
studied, having policies that are outdated and
non -responsive to the current situation. That's
a kind of policy response that creates. this
sort of problem. So it doesn't have to be an
explicitly oppressive language policy for us
to pay attention to the situation and say there
might be a role for government here. I was thinking
overnight of a somewhat provocative analogy,
but let's think of the case of female infanticide
that is common in some parts of the world still.
People make that very unfortunate choice. because
they feel compelled by reasons to do with say
economics or opportunity that might be something
that has arisen without a government policy of
course nowhere in the world is there a government
policy saying you must kill your female children
And yet nowhere do we sit back and say, well,
that means it's not a problem. Of course, we
look at that and we, as a society in many places,
as a government in many places, construct that
as a problem and something that perhaps needs
policy intervention to shift those imperatives
or to shift the kind of choices that people are
making in those households. And it's not a perfect
analogy, of course, but I think it helps us understand
that what happens to people's languages in their
households, in the way they use languages, in
the way they transmit languages, in whether or
not they maintain multilingual lives or shift
to just one particular language, that can happen
under so much societal and economic pressure
that there is space for policy to step in and
change those conditions. So to you then also,
Elijah, as social scientists, how can minority
languages be given the best chance of remaining
viable and vibrant? What do you think? As a social
scientist, I think we have to really be very,
let's say, descriptive and analytical rather
than saying... that we should prescribe certain,
let's say, solutions or changes or, let's say,
reforms, because the world is changing fast.
And the case I see in Tibet is that it's not
necessarily, like, let's say, there's a formula
that we as a social scientist think is good,
but not necessarily in the interest of the locals.
So, for example, speaking of Tibetan bilingual
education, currently, really, the problem is
not whether Tibetans should be eliminated in
the schools or not. But rather, should Tibetan
be the medium of instruction or language subject?
And for Tibetans, there are a lot who think that
language, Tibetan as a language subject is sufficient
for their kids to pick up. And then they would
rather their kids to learn Mandarin. Although
I'm not saying that's desirable outcome for most,
but there are some Tibetans who think this way.
Because that way they can send their kids to
really good universities and get higher. paying
jobs. But in the meantime, they can get to pick
up their Tibetan. Because Tibetan, let's say,
there's also this linguistic part to this argument.
That is, we humans are very capable of picking
up languages, especially at a younger age. It's
very, very common in some societies to be bilingual
or multilingual. And so that's why in Tibetan
community, let's say, asking someone to really
learn to speak two languages at the same time
is not really too much to ask. Because kids pick
up language very naturally. And those kids attend
schools because they attend bilingual schools.
Mostly their peers are Tibetan. And then they
learn really Tibetan very fast. And there are
more, as I said, programs on those social media
apps. And also their parents at least speak Tibetan.
So yes. So overall, I think for me, I tend to
really describe better than just analyze why
this happens. And so that's why when I see this
language movement, I'm very critical. For example,
on one hand, I see this language ideology of
authenticity as a very powerful tool to organize
and to really raise awareness about the importance
of speaking Tibetan. But on the other hand, I
see this exclusionary, even this social discipline
among Tibetans to please each other and to see,
oh, are you Tibetan or not? Why you are not speaking
Tibetan? Because that does have a bad let's say,
effect on those who do not speak Tibetan, but
probably Tibet. Our guests have been Dr. Lajia
Tu of Asia Institute and Dr. Alexandra Gray from
University of Technology, Sydney. Thank you both.
Thank you. Thanks so much. Ear to Asia is brought
to you by Asia Institute of the University of
Melbourne, Australia. and review it. Every positive
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please help us by spreading the word on your
socials. This episode was recorded on the 19th
of March, 2025. Producers were Kelvin Param and
Eric Van Bemmel of Profactual .com. Ear to Asia
is licensed under Creative Commons, copyright
2025, the University of Melbourne. I'm Sami Shah.
Thanks for your company.