1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:05,280 The Ear to Asia podcast is made available on the Jakarta Post platform under agreement 2 00:00:05,280 --> 00:00:08,160 between the Jakarta Post and the University of Melbourne. 3 00:00:08,160 --> 00:00:10,840 Hello, I'm Ali Moore. 4 00:00:10,840 --> 00:00:12,400 This is Ear to Asia. 5 00:00:12,400 --> 00:00:20,440 You know, there's been this growing kind of perception that Cambodia is fully in China's 6 00:00:20,440 --> 00:00:24,080 camp whereas Vietnam and Thailand are hedging to some degree. 7 00:00:24,080 --> 00:00:27,320 There's certainly awareness, but they're open for business. 8 00:00:27,320 --> 00:00:32,280 In Cambodia, their perception of the decline of the United States, certainly it's shying 9 00:00:32,280 --> 00:00:37,760 away from the region, that the PRC's economic influence and military strength, since they're 10 00:00:37,760 --> 00:00:41,360 on the rise, they are much more appealing. 11 00:00:41,360 --> 00:00:45,440 In this episode, Cambodia's close China ties. 12 00:00:45,440 --> 00:00:50,200 What do they mean for the region? 13 00:00:50,200 --> 00:00:55,280 Ear to Asia is the podcast from Asia Institute, the Asia research specialist at the University 14 00:00:55,280 --> 00:01:00,300 of Melbourne. 15 00:01:00,300 --> 00:01:05,980 Under Hun Sen, Prime Minister and strongman leader for almost four decades, Cambodia has 16 00:01:05,980 --> 00:01:11,980 been aligning itself ever more closely with China, with substantial economic and political 17 00:01:11,980 --> 00:01:17,820 consequences for the Southeast Asian nation and with geopolitical implications for its 18 00:01:17,820 --> 00:01:20,440 neighbours and beyond. 19 00:01:20,440 --> 00:01:26,080 China's economic influence in Cambodia has been huge, with large scale Chinese investments 20 00:01:26,080 --> 00:01:30,440 and infrastructure projects fueling growth and development. 21 00:01:30,440 --> 00:01:36,960 Yet concerns have been raised both in the country and abroad about this increasing dependence 22 00:01:36,960 --> 00:01:40,040 and what it could mean politically. 23 00:01:40,040 --> 00:01:44,720 Cambodia's immediate neighbours, Vietnam and Thailand, both maintain a more cautious 24 00:01:44,720 --> 00:01:50,960 and ambivalent stance towards China, but still benefit from its economic largesse. 25 00:01:50,960 --> 00:01:57,920 So why is Hun Sen throwing his lot and that of his country so decisively towards Beijing? 26 00:01:57,920 --> 00:02:01,640 Who are the real beneficiaries of this apparent fealty? 27 00:02:01,640 --> 00:02:07,120 And what's the impact on ASEAN, to which Cambodia belongs, particularly on fellow member 28 00:02:07,120 --> 00:02:13,880 states directly affected by China's claim to 90% of the South China Sea? 29 00:02:13,880 --> 00:02:18,600 Joining me to look at the China-Cambodian relationship and what it means for the region 30 00:02:18,600 --> 00:02:24,840 and beyond is Southeast Asia and China historian Dr Matthew Galway of the Australian National 31 00:02:24,840 --> 00:02:25,840 University. 32 00:02:25,840 --> 00:02:33,820 He's also the author of the 2022 book, The Emergence of Global Maoism, China's Red Evangelism 33 00:02:33,820 --> 00:02:39,480 and the Cambodian Communist Movement, published by Cornell University Press. 34 00:02:39,480 --> 00:02:41,960 Welcome back to Ear to Asia, Matt. 35 00:02:41,960 --> 00:02:42,960 Thank you so much, Ali. 36 00:02:42,960 --> 00:02:43,960 Good to be here. 37 00:02:43,960 --> 00:02:50,160 Before we delve into the details of the Cambodia-China relationship, can we just step back a bit 38 00:02:50,160 --> 00:02:53,000 and look at China and Southeast Asia more broadly? 39 00:02:53,000 --> 00:02:58,480 Because we know China shares a border with three of the five mainland Southeast Asian 40 00:02:58,480 --> 00:03:04,120 nations and I guess it's logical to a point that it wants to draw them into its geopolitical 41 00:03:04,120 --> 00:03:06,620 orbit as it's done in the past. 42 00:03:06,620 --> 00:03:11,520 So Matt, what does China offer as incentives for engagement? 43 00:03:11,520 --> 00:03:13,480 Is it all about money? 44 00:03:13,480 --> 00:03:16,200 It's certainly a lot about money, yes. 45 00:03:16,200 --> 00:03:20,800 Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, which does not share a border but it's definitely part of this 46 00:03:20,800 --> 00:03:25,620 orbit and Thailand are very much aware that with the United States' move away from the 47 00:03:25,620 --> 00:03:32,160 region strategically that they needed an ally to fill that vacuum economically. 48 00:03:32,160 --> 00:03:37,420 The People's Republic of China represents that emerging market, this enormous growing 49 00:03:37,420 --> 00:03:41,960 economic powerhouse that is keen to invest in these countries. 50 00:03:41,960 --> 00:03:46,020 Now of course, the three of the five countries, Thailand, Vietnam and Laos, are certainly 51 00:03:46,020 --> 00:03:52,040 very wary of China and have a long history of cooperation and wariness of this emerging 52 00:03:52,040 --> 00:03:53,480 power. 53 00:03:53,480 --> 00:03:58,000 All three of them have approached China very much with their kind of unique skepticisms 54 00:03:58,000 --> 00:04:02,000 as well as optimism about the future with engagement with China. 55 00:04:02,000 --> 00:04:06,400 So let's look at the major neighbours, if you like, Thailand and Vietnam. 56 00:04:06,400 --> 00:04:08,880 As you say, they have the unique approaches to China. 57 00:04:08,880 --> 00:04:14,760 If we start with Thailand, historically Thailand's been in the orbit of the US, hasn't it? 58 00:04:14,760 --> 00:04:20,520 Absolutely, and has a staunch history of anti-communism in its political culture. 59 00:04:20,520 --> 00:04:24,840 In terms of its strategy regarding China, it's very much one of you scratch my back, 60 00:04:24,840 --> 00:04:29,620 I scratch yours, especially with regard to military equipment, technological exchange 61 00:04:29,620 --> 00:04:30,720 and raw materials. 62 00:04:30,720 --> 00:04:35,880 For instance, Thailand imports from the PRC computer components, motors, consumer electronics, 63 00:04:35,880 --> 00:04:41,880 machinery, metal products, chemicals, you name it, VT4 main battle tanks, military, 64 00:04:41,880 --> 00:04:45,320 of course, very important in Thai politics and society. 65 00:04:45,320 --> 00:04:49,920 Meanwhile, the PRC imports a lot from Thailand, much of the same, but instead of military 66 00:04:49,920 --> 00:04:54,640 equipment, they get a lot of raw materials like rubber, refined oil, crude oil and wood 67 00:04:54,640 --> 00:04:55,640 products. 68 00:04:55,640 --> 00:04:59,880 Whereas Vietnam has this long, long storied history of rivalry with China. 69 00:04:59,880 --> 00:05:06,280 Much of Vietnamese nationalist identity is forged in the crucible of resisting various 70 00:05:06,280 --> 00:05:10,600 different imperial powers, their inquests into Vietnamese territory. 71 00:05:10,600 --> 00:05:16,480 That patriotism spurred the nationalism that resisted, of course, French colonial rule, 72 00:05:16,480 --> 00:05:21,480 ending it in 1954, and then, of course, the incursion of the United States and the fight 73 00:05:21,480 --> 00:05:24,240 against the United States in the Vietnam War. 74 00:05:24,240 --> 00:05:28,320 As two observers from East Asia Forum note, Vietnam's strategy regarding the PRC is to 75 00:05:28,320 --> 00:05:34,240 hedge its bets to avoid opposition against the PRC and dependence on a rising power, 76 00:05:34,240 --> 00:05:38,880 engaging in deference and defiance with the threatening power and diversifying relations 77 00:05:38,880 --> 00:05:40,480 with other major powers. 78 00:05:40,480 --> 00:05:45,600 These three features are all present in this strategy towards the PRC and its economic 79 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:47,960 designs for the region. 80 00:05:47,960 --> 00:05:53,400 When you talk there about the trade relationship, specifically to start with between Thailand 81 00:05:53,400 --> 00:05:58,960 and China, does China actually have a big economic footprint in Thailand? 82 00:05:58,960 --> 00:06:03,800 Pretty sizeable one, specifically with regard to the military sector, right? 83 00:06:03,800 --> 00:06:08,280 The Royal Thai Navy in May 2017 signed a big contract with the China Shipbuilding Industry 84 00:06:08,280 --> 00:06:13,400 Corporation for electronic submarines to be delivered actually this year. 85 00:06:13,400 --> 00:06:18,160 As one military commentator, Joe Chiaoming, stated, the PRC will also provide technical 86 00:06:18,160 --> 00:06:20,800 guidance to the Thai military. 87 00:06:20,800 --> 00:06:23,840 And this is just one kind of outgrowth of that investment. 88 00:06:23,840 --> 00:06:27,880 There's further investment, of course, in, for instance, building railways. 89 00:06:27,880 --> 00:06:32,760 For instance, the China Railway Construction Corporation Limited has invested billions 90 00:06:32,760 --> 00:06:39,760 of US dollars into extending this rail network to connect Bangkok to other regional railways 91 00:06:39,760 --> 00:06:45,160 and to be part of this cog in the moving wheel of a grand connection, this ultimately part 92 00:06:45,160 --> 00:06:47,040 of the Belt and Road Initiative. 93 00:06:47,040 --> 00:06:51,440 Through the development of canals and railway networks, these infrastructural investments 94 00:06:51,440 --> 00:06:58,280 will create this huge connection between China and its markets, as well as further ones in 95 00:06:58,280 --> 00:07:03,280 Southeast Asia, ultimately extending as far as Singapore and Malaysia is the overall goal. 96 00:07:03,280 --> 00:07:06,680 So what about Vietnam in terms of economic investment? 97 00:07:06,680 --> 00:07:11,320 I mean, as you said earlier, their government also has communist roots. 98 00:07:11,320 --> 00:07:16,240 It was a French colony like Cambodia, but it does have this ambivalent relationship 99 00:07:16,240 --> 00:07:17,240 with Beijing. 100 00:07:17,240 --> 00:07:19,680 So have they welcomed Chinese investment? 101 00:07:19,680 --> 00:07:20,680 They have. 102 00:07:20,680 --> 00:07:25,480 But as you mentioned rightly, Ali, it's one of great wariness. 103 00:07:25,480 --> 00:07:31,400 Vietnam has this long history of cooperation with communist China, itself now a communist 104 00:07:31,400 --> 00:07:33,560 country, but also one of wariness. 105 00:07:33,560 --> 00:07:39,840 These two countries went to war in the mid to late 1970s, particularly a 78 to 1980, 106 00:07:39,840 --> 00:07:43,120 the Sino-Vietnamese War or the Third Indochina War. 107 00:07:43,120 --> 00:07:47,640 And part of that was part of the Cold War kind of triangulation, the Cold War tripartite 108 00:07:47,640 --> 00:07:52,740 allegiances between the Soviet Union, China's warming up to the United States and vice versa. 109 00:07:52,740 --> 00:07:57,160 But now, ever since the 80s with Doi Moi and Nga Ngo Kai Fong, a reform and opening up 110 00:07:57,160 --> 00:08:03,280 in China, the PRC has become Vietnam's top trading partner, amounting to 22.6% of the 111 00:08:03,280 --> 00:08:08,000 total export values in Vietnam and 30% of its imports. 112 00:08:08,000 --> 00:08:13,280 Here both sides resume trade talks in 91, there's just been an enormous annual growth 113 00:08:13,280 --> 00:08:18,720 in bilateral trade, amounting to almost 517 billion by 2019. 114 00:08:18,720 --> 00:08:22,720 But this has coincided with a significant wariness of the CCP, the Chinese Communist 115 00:08:22,720 --> 00:08:27,120 Party, and the People's Republic of China's designs on maritime territories, specifically 116 00:08:27,120 --> 00:08:29,100 with regard to the South China Seas. 117 00:08:29,100 --> 00:08:35,200 So as business is good, there still is this concern that Xi Jinping and the CCP's designs 118 00:08:35,200 --> 00:08:41,200 on the South China Seas will ultimately force it to kind of, again, hedge its bets, to trust 119 00:08:41,200 --> 00:08:46,120 them insofar as business is good, but never at the expense of, of course, Vietnam's territorial 120 00:08:46,120 --> 00:08:47,600 integrity. 121 00:08:47,600 --> 00:08:51,520 And I guess, Matt, Australia sees that with China. 122 00:08:51,520 --> 00:08:55,920 China is a very important trading partner, the most important trading partner for Australia, 123 00:08:55,920 --> 00:08:59,220 but trade does not mean influence, does it? 124 00:08:59,220 --> 00:09:05,780 So how do you see future influence of China in both Thailand and Vietnam? 125 00:09:05,780 --> 00:09:10,840 With Vietnam, I think when it comes to the politics or the type of influence, Vietnam 126 00:09:10,840 --> 00:09:16,160 is very much staunch that it will determine its own destiny in the region. 127 00:09:16,160 --> 00:09:23,280 And as other economies in the region are kind of hedging their bets like Vietnam, or linking 128 00:09:23,280 --> 00:09:28,980 themselves warily and cautiously like with Thailand, you have a Cambodia, which is linking 129 00:09:28,980 --> 00:09:33,960 itself so inextricably to China economically and politically. 130 00:09:33,960 --> 00:09:39,480 So I think Vietnam is again, very wary of its neighbors and makes a country like Laos, 131 00:09:39,480 --> 00:09:43,820 which shares a border with China, what they're doing with kind of falling into the debt trap 132 00:09:43,820 --> 00:09:48,640 diplomacy of the Belt and Road Initiative, it raises alarm bells for Vietnamese leadership. 133 00:09:48,640 --> 00:09:51,680 They, of course, again, are happy that this exchange is happening. 134 00:09:51,680 --> 00:09:56,640 They've all, each country has signed memorandums of understanding for the Belt and Road Initiative, 135 00:09:56,640 --> 00:10:01,840 but they're, of course, not willing to cede, again, their political sovereignty for this. 136 00:10:01,840 --> 00:10:06,240 Cambodia becomes this very interesting story in the situation, a thorn in the side of Vietnam 137 00:10:06,240 --> 00:10:10,840 in some ways, because for a long time, of course, Vietnam occupied Cambodia during the 138 00:10:10,840 --> 00:10:15,860 80s, and China was a big player in, of course, criticizing that occupation. 139 00:10:15,860 --> 00:10:19,880 But what's happened is since Hun Sen has risen to power, and he's been in office through 140 00:10:19,880 --> 00:10:26,020 various undemocratic means for three decades plus, he's really kind of turned Cambodia 141 00:10:26,020 --> 00:10:29,560 into again, this client state of China. 142 00:10:29,560 --> 00:10:33,800 And that, of course, has alarm bells ringing amongst all of these ASEAN countries in the 143 00:10:33,800 --> 00:10:38,020 region who are again, willing to do business with China, but not see their political sovereignty 144 00:10:38,020 --> 00:10:39,020 and so doing. 145 00:10:39,020 --> 00:10:42,480 So you use the term there, client state. 146 00:10:42,480 --> 00:10:48,600 I mean, I suppose it is accurate, isn't it, to call Cambodia the most unequivocal supporter 147 00:10:48,600 --> 00:10:50,280 of China in the region. 148 00:10:50,280 --> 00:10:51,280 Why is that? 149 00:10:51,280 --> 00:10:52,960 Well, it's a host of reasons. 150 00:10:52,960 --> 00:10:57,360 And I love this question because my book, The Emergence of Global Maoism, which came 151 00:10:57,360 --> 00:11:02,720 out in 2022, really traces the roots of the emergence of Cambodia as a client state. 152 00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:08,080 Now, of course, through ideological support, rhetorical, and even military support, Cambodia 153 00:11:08,080 --> 00:11:14,720 became this massive China friend in the region, particularly during the Khmer Rouge years. 154 00:11:14,720 --> 00:11:20,340 But even before that, before ideology and military really factored into the equation, 155 00:11:20,340 --> 00:11:25,640 it was a big supporter of non-aligned independent states, newly independent states like Cambodia, 156 00:11:25,640 --> 00:11:28,840 which is independent from French rule in 53. 157 00:11:28,840 --> 00:11:33,520 And Sihanouk, who was the first head of state of the country, was a very close personal 158 00:11:33,520 --> 00:11:38,360 friend of many top-ranking CCP leaders, even though he disagreed with them ideologically. 159 00:11:38,360 --> 00:11:44,240 And that kind of charm offensive or cultural diplomacy that manifested in the 50s and 60s 160 00:11:44,240 --> 00:11:49,280 blew up into the Red Guard diplomacy of the PRC and the Cultural Revolution, where Sihanouk 161 00:11:49,280 --> 00:11:51,900 starts to criticize China more openly. 162 00:11:51,900 --> 00:11:56,800 And then over time, that will turn in the 80s and the 90s into China really trying to, 163 00:11:56,800 --> 00:12:02,700 again, support Cambodia to offset Soviet influence in Vietnam and American influence in Thailand. 164 00:12:02,700 --> 00:12:09,040 Into the 1990s up till now, having Hun Sen as a voice in support of China has been important 165 00:12:09,040 --> 00:12:11,840 for the PRC as it receives international backlash. 166 00:12:11,840 --> 00:12:15,520 In particular, now we think of what's going on in Xinjiang. 167 00:12:15,520 --> 00:12:18,720 Hun Sen has been unequivocal in his support for the PRC. 168 00:12:18,720 --> 00:12:23,360 We think of Taiwan and China, the so-called argument over whether there are two Chinas. 169 00:12:23,360 --> 00:12:26,680 Hun Sen has been a vocal advocate of the One China policy. 170 00:12:26,680 --> 00:12:32,360 And it's again kind of returned Cambodia into this positionality as China's most reliable 171 00:12:32,360 --> 00:12:35,640 mouthpiece and most staunch advocate in the region. 172 00:12:35,640 --> 00:12:40,200 And that is important as it tries to continue to build its influence in mainland Southeast 173 00:12:40,200 --> 00:12:41,200 Asia. 174 00:12:41,200 --> 00:12:43,560 So what does Cambodia get? 175 00:12:43,560 --> 00:12:47,760 I guess what does a close China relationship mean in practice? 176 00:12:47,760 --> 00:12:53,040 Well, in terms of aid and in terms of some of the investment, it's really kind of a mixed 177 00:12:53,040 --> 00:12:54,040 bag. 178 00:12:54,040 --> 00:12:59,120 So Cambodia will get, of course, through this, a significant amount of investment in things 179 00:12:59,120 --> 00:13:01,400 that matter for Cambodians. 180 00:13:01,400 --> 00:13:05,600 So for instance, China has invested hundreds of millions of dollars into restoring Angkor 181 00:13:05,600 --> 00:13:08,440 Wat, which is the quintessential symbol of Cambodia. 182 00:13:08,440 --> 00:13:09,440 It's in the flag. 183 00:13:09,440 --> 00:13:12,220 It's one of only a handful of flags that has a monument in it. 184 00:13:12,220 --> 00:13:15,640 So it just kind of shows the centrality of Angkor Wat symbolically. 185 00:13:15,640 --> 00:13:20,480 The PRC has also committed $200 million in low interest loans for the construction of 186 00:13:20,480 --> 00:13:24,160 bridges that span the Mekong and Tonlasap rivers. 187 00:13:24,160 --> 00:13:29,920 The CCP has access to Cambodian seaports through Chinese state companies to exploit oil reserves 188 00:13:29,920 --> 00:13:31,860 on the Gulf of Tonkin. 189 00:13:31,860 --> 00:13:35,320 And this is just the tip of the iceberg, of course. 190 00:13:35,320 --> 00:13:39,440 Sihanouk once called the PRC our number one friend and the number one friend of all peoples 191 00:13:39,440 --> 00:13:40,440 in Asia. 192 00:13:40,440 --> 00:13:46,560 Hun Sen, just upon Wen Jiabao's visit in 2006, described the PRC as Cambodia's most trustworthy 193 00:13:46,560 --> 00:13:47,560 friend. 194 00:13:47,560 --> 00:13:52,160 So it's amazing how the rhetoric is the same in this regard, that China is like a bulwark 195 00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:55,480 in support of Cambodia and investing in Cambodia. 196 00:13:55,480 --> 00:14:00,940 And in so doing, there's just a lot of important infrastructure developments, important restoration 197 00:14:00,940 --> 00:14:05,560 of those important symbols, those kind of cultural relics of Cambodia's past. 198 00:14:05,560 --> 00:14:10,440 And this has allowed the leadership like Hun Sen to point to all of that investment, to 199 00:14:10,440 --> 00:14:14,840 point to all of these developments and say, look how good China is to us, look how good 200 00:14:14,840 --> 00:14:19,120 I am at turning Cambodia into an emerging economy. 201 00:14:19,120 --> 00:14:23,500 And that has been one of the main kind of things that has propped up his continued political 202 00:14:23,500 --> 00:14:25,720 rule over these last four decades. 203 00:14:25,720 --> 00:14:32,360 Indeed, is, I suppose, Hun Sen inextricably linked to China? 204 00:14:32,360 --> 00:14:37,320 Would he still be there after all these decades if it wasn't for China? 205 00:14:37,320 --> 00:14:43,200 Well, I think when it comes to Hun Sen, it's always good to have powerful friends in high 206 00:14:43,200 --> 00:14:44,280 places. 207 00:14:44,280 --> 00:14:50,160 It's undeniable that having the PRC, having Beijing supporting him as somebody who keeps 208 00:14:50,160 --> 00:14:55,600 a status quo in terms of China friendliness in the region, in terms of providing Cambodia 209 00:14:55,600 --> 00:15:00,160 as a market for Chinese investment, whether that's the savoury in terms of infrastructural 210 00:15:00,160 --> 00:15:06,040 development or the unsavory in terms of turning a place like Sihanoukville into a very, very 211 00:15:06,040 --> 00:15:09,920 dangerous place, but a haven for gambling and organized crime. 212 00:15:09,920 --> 00:15:15,600 I think it's undeniable that the PRC's support of Hun Sen has kept him in office. 213 00:15:15,600 --> 00:15:20,200 I'm also quite confident in saying that Hun Sen has also done a lot in his own right, 214 00:15:20,200 --> 00:15:24,520 absent the PRC, as is importantly something that I've talked about in my book and Andrew 215 00:15:24,520 --> 00:15:27,840 Murtha talks about in his work, Brothers in Arms. 216 00:15:27,840 --> 00:15:32,560 Cambodia has often turned the PRC into the subordinate party, whether that's through 217 00:15:32,560 --> 00:15:38,480 diplomacy, political engagement, or in the case of this, these types of economic diplomacy. 218 00:15:38,480 --> 00:15:41,440 Cambodia is always going to wedge between Thailand and Vietnam. 219 00:15:41,440 --> 00:15:44,960 It's always going to put its sovereignty and autonomy first. 220 00:15:44,960 --> 00:15:49,320 So as the PRC is investing all this money in infrastructure, as it wants to prop up 221 00:15:49,320 --> 00:15:53,320 Hun Sen to keep him in office, Hun Sen is a wily operator. 222 00:15:53,320 --> 00:15:59,040 He's not going to risk depending too much on one side when he can use another to get 223 00:15:59,040 --> 00:16:00,120 what he wants. 224 00:16:00,120 --> 00:16:04,560 So I think that Hun Sen is, again, happy to have China support him, but at the same time, 225 00:16:04,560 --> 00:16:08,120 I'm also quite confident in thinking that he would just as easily pivot away from them 226 00:16:08,120 --> 00:16:11,040 if he found it politically expedient. 227 00:16:11,040 --> 00:16:15,680 You're listening to Ear to Asia from Asia Institute at the University of Melbourne. 228 00:16:15,680 --> 00:16:21,080 And just a reminder to listeners about Asia Institute's online publication on Asia and 229 00:16:21,080 --> 00:16:24,000 its societies, politics and cultures. 230 00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:25,720 It's called the Melbourne Asia Review. 231 00:16:25,720 --> 00:16:32,160 It's free to read and it's open access at melbourneasiarreview.edu.au. 232 00:16:32,160 --> 00:16:36,320 You'll find articles by some of our regular Ear to Asia guests and by many others. 233 00:16:36,320 --> 00:16:41,600 Plus, you can catch recent episodes of Ear to Asia at the Melbourne Asia Review website, 234 00:16:41,600 --> 00:16:46,680 which again, you can find at melbourneasiarreview.edu.au. 235 00:16:46,680 --> 00:16:51,360 I'm Ali Moore and I'm joined by Southeast Asia historian Dr Matthew Galway. 236 00:16:51,360 --> 00:16:57,200 We're discussing China's footprint in Cambodia and the implications for neighbouring countries. 237 00:16:57,200 --> 00:17:02,520 Matt, you just said there you think Hun Sen would pivot away if he thought that was in 238 00:17:02,520 --> 00:17:03,520 his interest. 239 00:17:03,520 --> 00:17:07,400 He doesn't want to risk too much, too many eggs in one basket. 240 00:17:07,400 --> 00:17:12,640 But I guess the question would be how dependent is the economy on China? 241 00:17:12,640 --> 00:17:17,800 And if he doesn't want to put too many eggs in one basket, what other eggs would there 242 00:17:17,800 --> 00:17:18,800 be? 243 00:17:18,800 --> 00:17:24,240 Cambodia, of course, under Hun Sen has accrued a significant trade deficit with China. 244 00:17:24,240 --> 00:17:31,000 Imports over 3.9 billion in raw fabrics, constituting the largest constituent of that in comparison 245 00:17:31,000 --> 00:17:33,600 to its exports of 830 million. 246 00:17:33,600 --> 00:17:39,200 Nearly 60% of products in Cambodian markets are Chinese made by 2006 and 24% of Cambodian 247 00:17:39,200 --> 00:17:42,440 imports were from the PRC by 2015. 248 00:17:42,440 --> 00:17:45,000 And these numbers have only grown since. 249 00:17:45,000 --> 00:17:50,040 There's also multiple large scale PRC investment projects in Cambodia, such as the lower Saison 250 00:17:50,040 --> 00:17:57,160 2 dam, which has accrued almost a billion dollars and the 3.8 USD billion deep water 251 00:17:57,160 --> 00:18:00,960 port project on a 90 kilometre stretch of Cambodian coastline. 252 00:18:00,960 --> 00:18:03,400 So there's this huge trade deficit that has emerged. 253 00:18:03,400 --> 00:18:06,000 So economically, they're almost inextricable. 254 00:18:06,000 --> 00:18:07,920 Politically, it's a little bit different. 255 00:18:07,920 --> 00:18:10,600 I think that Hun Sen has been in power for a long time. 256 00:18:10,600 --> 00:18:16,200 He was, of course, emerged in power by dint of Vietnamese Fiat to try and, again, oust 257 00:18:16,200 --> 00:18:20,760 the Khmer Rouge and have someone reliable in office who wasn't going to be both a China 258 00:18:20,760 --> 00:18:24,040 ally and somebody who was going to engage in open warfare with them. 259 00:18:24,040 --> 00:18:28,240 And somebody who, you know, over time was able to marshal that closeness, that close 260 00:18:28,240 --> 00:18:34,400 allyship with Vietnam into a long lasting position in political power in Cambodia. 261 00:18:34,400 --> 00:18:39,480 So as he's been able to kind of pivot away from that reliance on Vietnamese support, 262 00:18:39,480 --> 00:18:42,840 he knows what to do when he's betwixt and between two major forces. 263 00:18:42,840 --> 00:18:47,840 And I think that Cambodia's political distrust of Vietnam and Thailand will always dictate 264 00:18:47,840 --> 00:18:49,720 how it views China. 265 00:18:49,720 --> 00:18:54,740 If they feel that they're getting sandwiched or isolated because of these much more populous 266 00:18:54,740 --> 00:18:59,800 and much more economically strong countries in Vietnam and Thailand, China's prominence, 267 00:18:59,800 --> 00:19:03,640 the primacy that Cambodia places on China will increase. 268 00:19:03,640 --> 00:19:06,680 But as again, as I mentioned earlier, as the United States is kind of pivot away from this 269 00:19:06,680 --> 00:19:11,680 region and Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have really kind of thrown more of their eggs into 270 00:19:11,680 --> 00:19:17,400 the Chinese basket, it just makes sense for Cambodia to continue its unequivocal support 271 00:19:17,400 --> 00:19:19,840 and open door policy when it comes to Chinese investment. 272 00:19:19,840 --> 00:19:22,240 Yeah, that's the interesting thing, isn't it? 273 00:19:22,240 --> 00:19:27,240 That there's definitely an economic imperative, but there's very much a geopolitical imperative. 274 00:19:27,240 --> 00:19:33,620 And these perceptions of security threats from Thailand and Vietnam do push Cambodia 275 00:19:33,620 --> 00:19:35,040 closer to China. 276 00:19:35,040 --> 00:19:42,200 But I do wonder, would China, for want of a better word, allow Cambodia to have a very 277 00:19:42,200 --> 00:19:47,960 different geopolitical view, to express a different view than it has been expressing 278 00:19:47,960 --> 00:19:51,320 in regional organisations like ASEAN, for example? 279 00:19:51,320 --> 00:19:59,580 I have to say, because of Hun Sen's political longevity and how he's been such a bulwark 280 00:19:59,580 --> 00:20:06,600 in support of the PRC, from saying that what's going on in Xinjiang under CCP rule is completely 281 00:20:06,600 --> 00:20:11,720 fine and that there's no genocide or ethnic cleansing or whatever you want to call it, 282 00:20:11,720 --> 00:20:12,720 it's hard to imagine. 283 00:20:12,720 --> 00:20:18,080 And the thing is, is that Hun Sen has invested so much importance on his familial dynasty 284 00:20:18,080 --> 00:20:20,280 remaining in political power. 285 00:20:20,280 --> 00:20:26,000 So I think that to imagine what role China would have if, say, Hun's successor, Hun Manet, 286 00:20:26,000 --> 00:20:31,800 his ordained successor, his eldest son, if he were to say, oh, I'm going to disaggregate 287 00:20:31,800 --> 00:20:37,200 Cambodia economically from China, I'm going to disaggregate it politically from China, 288 00:20:37,200 --> 00:20:43,560 it would be such an abrupt volt fasse that I really cannot imagine what that would do. 289 00:20:43,560 --> 00:20:49,320 One would hope that as these debts continue to accrue between Cambodia and China and as 290 00:20:49,320 --> 00:20:55,320 the country realises it cannot just bury these debts and socioeconomic inequality in Cambodia 291 00:20:55,320 --> 00:21:00,120 is as stark as ever, that people will become dissatisfied with this. 292 00:21:00,120 --> 00:21:04,640 And certainly there's a fair amount of animus in Cambodia today and in the past towards 293 00:21:04,640 --> 00:21:10,300 the Chinese and ethnic Chinese Cambodians or Sino-Khmais over that wealth inequality. 294 00:21:10,300 --> 00:21:17,200 So one can only imagine what might happen if disequilibria remains as stark as it is 295 00:21:17,200 --> 00:21:18,240 now. 296 00:21:18,240 --> 00:21:23,400 And when it comes to Hun's ordained successor, I see a lot of business as usual. 297 00:21:23,400 --> 00:21:26,880 There's someone who I think will want to do the same thing as his father, maintain the 298 00:21:26,880 --> 00:21:28,680 familial dynasty in office. 299 00:21:28,680 --> 00:21:34,560 And it seems to me that China is really hedging its bets on business as usual in the Cambodian 300 00:21:34,560 --> 00:21:35,560 political arena. 301 00:21:35,560 --> 00:21:41,600 At the same time, debt issues aside and the point that you make whether people will lose 302 00:21:41,600 --> 00:21:48,640 patience with that, does aligning with China actually have broader support in the Cambodian 303 00:21:48,640 --> 00:21:51,120 political sphere? 304 00:21:51,120 --> 00:21:53,960 Is it considered in many ways the best strategic option? 305 00:21:53,960 --> 00:21:58,760 Because Sam Ransi, for example, the former president of the opposition CNRP, does he 306 00:21:58,760 --> 00:22:00,960 support the China focus? 307 00:22:00,960 --> 00:22:07,360 Well, Sam Ransi is sadly because of the 2017 outlawing of the Cambodian National Rescue 308 00:22:07,360 --> 00:22:13,040 Party, Sam Ransi is sadly not somebody who's going to be able to do anything politically 309 00:22:13,040 --> 00:22:15,600 in terms of influence and bringing about change. 310 00:22:15,600 --> 00:22:21,840 I've been a Cambodian observer for almost two decades and optimism does not come to 311 00:22:21,840 --> 00:22:23,260 the Cambodia observer. 312 00:22:23,260 --> 00:22:27,680 It's going to be the Cambodian People's Party again with the upcoming elections, and it 313 00:22:27,680 --> 00:22:32,940 will probably be the same for the subsequent elections if there are subsequent elections. 314 00:22:32,940 --> 00:22:37,920 So in terms of what Sam Ransi or any kind of opposition party might view vis-a-vis China 315 00:22:37,920 --> 00:22:42,240 and its continued investment in Cambodia, it's hard to imagine where they might stand. 316 00:22:42,240 --> 00:22:49,640 It might be expedient to come out and say, hey, we cannot continue this China-Cambodia 317 00:22:49,640 --> 00:22:50,640 relationship. 318 00:22:50,640 --> 00:22:56,120 It's not beneficial to most Cambodians, for one, and it isolates us from our neighbors 319 00:22:56,120 --> 00:23:02,460 who are immediate, I don't want to say threat, but they're certainly more pressing in terms 320 00:23:02,460 --> 00:23:04,860 of direct engagement. 321 00:23:04,860 --> 00:23:10,400 So whether or not anybody who occupies that space, whether there is some miraculous return 322 00:23:10,400 --> 00:23:14,720 of Sam Ransi to the political arena and he's actually allowed to reform the National Rescue 323 00:23:14,720 --> 00:23:20,760 Party, or if there's another political opponent who poses a genuine threat to Hun Sen's continued 324 00:23:20,760 --> 00:23:25,360 autocratic rule, it would, I guess, have to depend on what they're campaigning on. 325 00:23:25,360 --> 00:23:30,480 Sadly, in the Cambodian political arena, it is far too easy to target Vietnam. 326 00:23:30,480 --> 00:23:34,440 And this is something that Andy Murtha has looked at as well in his work, and he and 327 00:23:34,440 --> 00:23:40,280 I have discussed at length about, is that Vietnam rather than China is the eternal boogeyman, 328 00:23:40,280 --> 00:23:44,200 blaming Vietnam for X wires, it seems to be what riles people up. 329 00:23:44,200 --> 00:23:46,500 It gets them to go to the ballot boxes. 330 00:23:46,500 --> 00:23:51,720 It is something that both parties, even Sam Ransi and the royalist predecessors have done 331 00:23:51,720 --> 00:23:56,560 in their campaigning, is to blame them rather than to look at a country like China where 332 00:23:56,560 --> 00:23:58,520 you have this massive trade deficit. 333 00:23:58,520 --> 00:24:02,040 So we'll see, but it's sadly might be business as usual. 334 00:24:02,040 --> 00:24:05,600 So we might not actually see any change in this regard. 335 00:24:05,600 --> 00:24:12,280 You did touch on what people think earlier, but if Vietnam is painted as the eternal boogeyman, 336 00:24:12,280 --> 00:24:17,360 is the relationship with China at the forefront of the Cambodian people's mind? 337 00:24:17,360 --> 00:24:22,080 Is it something that people are very conscious of, the level of ties and how the relationship 338 00:24:22,080 --> 00:24:24,440 is perceived outside the country? 339 00:24:24,440 --> 00:24:25,880 That's a good question. 340 00:24:25,880 --> 00:24:28,400 I think generally I wouldn't say so. 341 00:24:28,400 --> 00:24:30,240 In terms of the city, absolutely. 342 00:24:30,240 --> 00:24:32,080 People are very cognizant of it. 343 00:24:32,080 --> 00:24:34,960 You're in Phnom Penh, you're in Siem Reap, you're in Battambang. 344 00:24:34,960 --> 00:24:36,600 You know, Sienokville. 345 00:24:36,600 --> 00:24:39,480 It's something you can't avoid. 346 00:24:39,480 --> 00:24:44,560 And this is kind of a resurgence of animus towards, again, whether it's ethnic Chinese 347 00:24:44,560 --> 00:24:49,300 or the PRC now, where it's, oh, that's Chinese companies, oh, that's Chinese products that 348 00:24:49,300 --> 00:24:53,760 are over flooding the markets and pushing Cambodian produced goods or handicrafts out 349 00:24:53,760 --> 00:24:54,760 of the market. 350 00:24:54,760 --> 00:24:59,440 50, 60 years ago, many of these Khmer Rouge leaders will write economics dissertations 351 00:24:59,440 --> 00:25:03,440 lampooning foreign investment into consumer goods that are flooding the market and pushing 352 00:25:03,440 --> 00:25:08,660 Cambodian products, particularly handicrafts, out of the commercial sector. 353 00:25:08,660 --> 00:25:11,040 So I'd say in the rural sector, it's not the same. 354 00:25:11,040 --> 00:25:13,920 I think the issues are much more about land. 355 00:25:13,920 --> 00:25:19,000 The Cambodian People's Party, of course, has immense rural support because CPP of propagandists 356 00:25:19,000 --> 00:25:23,220 will say, look at all the good we're doing, while it's systematically not improving their 357 00:25:23,220 --> 00:25:25,160 lot on the whole. 358 00:25:25,160 --> 00:25:30,280 And the issues kind of are more about land reform and whether day to day they will see 359 00:25:30,280 --> 00:25:32,000 their standards of living improve. 360 00:25:32,000 --> 00:25:35,600 The issue is less about kind of this foreign bogeyman, so to speak. 361 00:25:35,600 --> 00:25:41,640 However, because Vietnam has occupied that role so much under the French rule, of course, 362 00:25:41,640 --> 00:25:44,560 it's kind of got this collective consciousness where you can just say, oh, we'll blame the 363 00:25:44,560 --> 00:25:45,560 Vietnamese. 364 00:25:45,560 --> 00:25:49,840 And believe you me, the Khmer Rouge and their slogans and in their broadcast were able to 365 00:25:49,840 --> 00:25:55,520 rally a lot of support around an impending Vietnamese invasion and destruction of Cambodia 366 00:25:55,520 --> 00:25:57,720 rather easily among rural workers. 367 00:25:57,720 --> 00:25:59,480 Whereas in the cities, people are a lot more discerning. 368 00:25:59,480 --> 00:26:04,520 They see the emergence of China as the second largest economy in the world, soon to be the 369 00:26:04,520 --> 00:26:09,400 world's largest economy, and can't help but think, okay, this is good for us in some ways, 370 00:26:09,400 --> 00:26:12,460 but probably for most of us not something that's beneficial. 371 00:26:12,460 --> 00:26:17,080 So I think there's a lot more wariness among intellectuals, people who are urban dwellers 372 00:26:17,080 --> 00:26:21,720 than the level of either fear or skepticism that you see in the rural sector. 373 00:26:21,720 --> 00:26:26,640 What about how other countries view the closeness of China and Cambodia? 374 00:26:26,640 --> 00:26:31,160 You did touch on this with Vietnam and Thailand, but are those two countries, and I'll ask 375 00:26:31,160 --> 00:26:36,720 about the West in a minute, but are Vietnam and Thailand acutely aware with anything they 376 00:26:36,720 --> 00:26:40,360 do that they may not just be dealing with Cambodia? 377 00:26:40,360 --> 00:26:42,440 I think that's certainly true. 378 00:26:42,440 --> 00:26:47,840 There's been this growing kind of perception that Cambodia is fully in the PRC camp, whereas 379 00:26:47,840 --> 00:26:52,840 Vietnam and Thailand are hedging to some degree, there's certainly awareness, but they're 380 00:26:52,840 --> 00:26:55,320 open for business for sure. 381 00:26:55,320 --> 00:27:00,360 In Cambodia, their kind of perception of the decline of the United States, or certainly 382 00:27:00,360 --> 00:27:06,200 it's shying away from the region, really since the ascendance of the Trump presidency, that 383 00:27:06,200 --> 00:27:11,220 the PRC's economic influence and military strength, since they're on the rise, they 384 00:27:11,220 --> 00:27:17,800 are much more appealing than say linking Cambodia to the United States, which some policymakers 385 00:27:17,800 --> 00:27:23,320 in Phnom Penh view as having lost its prestige and supremacy in Asia. 386 00:27:23,320 --> 00:27:27,600 The majority of countries in Southeast Asia see a rising China as an opportunity and a 387 00:27:27,600 --> 00:27:31,640 challenge, whereas Cambodian leaders view a rising China as an opportunity strategically 388 00:27:31,640 --> 00:27:33,080 and economically. 389 00:27:33,080 --> 00:27:38,920 However, like Vietnam, which is hedging its bets with China, Cambodia seems to view the 390 00:27:38,920 --> 00:27:44,440 strategic direction of Southeast Asia towards the great powers with China at the centerpiece 391 00:27:44,440 --> 00:27:48,960 of these things, whereas for instance, like a country like Laos and Myanmar, there isn't 392 00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:53,880 the same kind of privilege of strategic maneuverability because of that. 393 00:27:53,880 --> 00:28:00,440 What about the impact on regional groupings like ASEAN, for example, which Cambodia joined 394 00:28:00,440 --> 00:28:01,440 in 1999? 395 00:28:01,440 --> 00:28:06,800 I mean, is Cambodia considered to be China's leverage point inside ASEAN? 396 00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:08,840 I'd say so at this stage. 397 00:28:08,840 --> 00:28:13,120 That's something that of course Vietnamese and Thai officials are well aware of it. 398 00:28:13,120 --> 00:28:14,120 Laos as well. 399 00:28:14,120 --> 00:28:19,560 Laos, of course, has also amounted an enormous trade deficit and debt with China. 400 00:28:19,560 --> 00:28:25,960 And the BRI, there is constant fear of the debt trap diplomacy that might go with signing 401 00:28:25,960 --> 00:28:28,800 on to these memorandums of understanding. 402 00:28:28,800 --> 00:28:30,400 So there's indeed that wariness. 403 00:28:30,400 --> 00:28:37,640 Again, if Cambodia is a client state, continues to be a client state, yet the rest of these 404 00:28:37,640 --> 00:28:40,680 countries are not, what happens in ASEAN? 405 00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:44,040 Is Cambodia China's voice in ASEAN? 406 00:28:44,040 --> 00:28:45,080 We'll have to wait and see. 407 00:28:45,080 --> 00:28:47,680 But so far they've given no indication otherwise. 408 00:28:47,680 --> 00:28:52,120 All I know is that Cambodian leaders thus far in ASEAN have been unequivocal in their 409 00:28:52,120 --> 00:28:56,080 support for China in defiance of evidence of human rights violations. 410 00:28:56,080 --> 00:28:57,680 That's for sure. 411 00:28:57,680 --> 00:29:01,080 Talking about human rights violations, it has to be acknowledged, doesn't it, that 412 00:29:01,080 --> 00:29:07,760 of course the impact of economic sanctions imposed by the US and the EU over human rights 413 00:29:07,760 --> 00:29:13,880 violations, that impact has been blunted, hasn't it, because of China's support? 414 00:29:13,880 --> 00:29:15,040 Definitely yes. 415 00:29:15,040 --> 00:29:21,080 And it's amazing that Cambodia, just referring to the earlier question about Hun Sen's stranglehold 416 00:29:21,080 --> 00:29:27,520 on political power, that again, pointing to China, pointing to Beijing as this loyal ally, 417 00:29:27,520 --> 00:29:31,920 having someone like Xi Jinping paying a state visit to Cambodia. 418 00:29:31,920 --> 00:29:36,920 And he had Wen Xiaobao earlier, the first in his 2006 visit, the first since 1963 of 419 00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:41,000 a major CCP leader, Liu Xiaoxi and his wife visited there. 420 00:29:41,000 --> 00:29:45,440 It's the symbolism of having China as the big guy, the person you can fall back to, 421 00:29:45,440 --> 00:29:47,400 the person you can rely on. 422 00:29:47,400 --> 00:29:53,400 That's something that has been almost an unbroken constant in Cambodian politics since independence, 423 00:29:53,400 --> 00:29:56,040 certainly since 1955, 56. 424 00:29:56,040 --> 00:30:01,240 Whether that means that Hun Sen will aggregate even further into China's camp economically 425 00:30:01,240 --> 00:30:06,800 and politically to ensure the security of his family dynasty and political office, we'll 426 00:30:06,800 --> 00:30:07,880 have to wait and see. 427 00:30:07,880 --> 00:30:13,600 But I'm still wary to say that he would give up certain things if China asked him to, because 428 00:30:13,600 --> 00:30:20,920 I do think that he's very aware that Cambodia has been able to marshal this relationship 429 00:30:20,920 --> 00:30:24,280 into a point where the CCP is often the subordinate party. 430 00:30:24,280 --> 00:30:28,720 And I do think that if there were other opportunities that he thought were better, like for instance, 431 00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:32,480 that the United States were to enter the redraw, Australia were to say, hey, we're going to 432 00:30:32,480 --> 00:30:37,720 start targeting small states and investing in these smaller states in Southeast Asia, 433 00:30:37,720 --> 00:30:41,920 whether he might see that as beneficial and to try and do what Sihanouk did in the 50s, 434 00:30:41,920 --> 00:30:45,960 play the US and the Soviet Union and China off each other as much as he possibly could 435 00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:48,520 so he didn't rely too much on one. 436 00:30:48,520 --> 00:30:50,920 That's a difficult diplomatic game though, isn't it? 437 00:30:50,920 --> 00:30:52,480 Is even he founded. 438 00:30:52,480 --> 00:30:53,480 Absolutely true. 439 00:30:53,480 --> 00:30:54,480 Absolutely true. 440 00:30:54,480 --> 00:30:55,920 It's a marvel he did it for as long as he did. 441 00:30:55,920 --> 00:30:58,800 But of course, we sadly know how that turned out. 442 00:30:58,800 --> 00:31:03,800 He was removed through a bloodless coup that the CIA allowed happen in 1970 and the rest 443 00:31:03,800 --> 00:31:05,160 is history. 444 00:31:05,160 --> 00:31:09,840 So we've talked quite a lot about this from Cambodia's point of view and Hun Sen's point 445 00:31:09,840 --> 00:31:12,200 of view, and we're almost out of time, Matt. 446 00:31:12,200 --> 00:31:15,560 But I do want to ask about this from China's perspective. 447 00:31:15,560 --> 00:31:20,760 What do you think ultimately China's ambitions are in Southeast Asia? 448 00:31:20,760 --> 00:31:24,280 And do you think that they're fairly happy with the status quo? 449 00:31:24,280 --> 00:31:30,500 Do they want to see themselves able to exert greater influence in the region? 450 00:31:30,500 --> 00:31:32,240 I think yes. 451 00:31:32,240 --> 00:31:38,680 The PRC certainly sees these economies and look, we're looking at Thailand and Vietnam. 452 00:31:38,680 --> 00:31:43,840 These are large populations emerging if not emergent economies. 453 00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:50,120 Vietnam has since still more in the 80s has really succeeded in many respects in establishing 454 00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:53,960 a planned economy that is open to liberal marketization. 455 00:31:53,960 --> 00:31:57,120 Thailand, of course, military rule for many years. 456 00:31:57,120 --> 00:31:59,860 There's few bright spots where there was hope of democracy, but what have you. 457 00:31:59,860 --> 00:32:01,180 But it's a large economy. 458 00:32:01,180 --> 00:32:03,160 It's a very populous nation. 459 00:32:03,160 --> 00:32:05,680 Laos and Cambodia are emerging economies. 460 00:32:05,680 --> 00:32:12,440 Laos and Cambodia both remain two very, very poor countries with great wealth inequality. 461 00:32:12,440 --> 00:32:14,320 But there's a lot of potential there. 462 00:32:14,320 --> 00:32:20,060 So I think that the PRC through the Belt and Road Initiative sees these countries as great 463 00:32:20,060 --> 00:32:24,480 opportunities for Chinese investment and political influence. 464 00:32:24,480 --> 00:32:29,880 And Cambodia is its restoration as a client state in the region is very important politically 465 00:32:29,880 --> 00:32:31,360 for China. 466 00:32:31,360 --> 00:32:35,280 It can count on Cambodia to say you're not doing anything wrong. 467 00:32:35,280 --> 00:32:39,360 It will be the most vocal advocate for the things that China does well. 468 00:32:39,360 --> 00:32:43,260 And it will never criticize it for things like Xinjiang, for instance. 469 00:32:43,260 --> 00:32:44,260 And that's important. 470 00:32:44,260 --> 00:32:48,440 There's a long history of Cambodia doing that, a long history of China establishing relations 471 00:32:48,440 --> 00:32:52,640 with smaller countries to gain that diplomatic voice. 472 00:32:52,640 --> 00:32:58,240 For instance, before there was international recognition or UN recognition of the PRC as 473 00:32:58,240 --> 00:33:02,920 China, because the Republic of China in Taiwan was occupying that seat in the UN up until 474 00:33:02,920 --> 00:33:06,960 the 70s, countries like Cambodia were the ones to say there is one China. 475 00:33:06,960 --> 00:33:10,560 Sion Ngoke himself supported the one China policy. 476 00:33:10,560 --> 00:33:11,560 And he was not alone. 477 00:33:11,560 --> 00:33:16,400 And it was through that kind of cultural diplomacy that those nice kind of exchanges where it's 478 00:33:16,400 --> 00:33:18,240 like, OK, we'll send a dance troupe over here. 479 00:33:18,240 --> 00:33:22,560 You can send a student delegation here to study that China was able to turn those quote 480 00:33:22,560 --> 00:33:27,520 unquote soft power initiatives into ones that were much more economically rooted in the 481 00:33:27,520 --> 00:33:28,960 70s and 80s. 482 00:33:28,960 --> 00:33:30,820 And those continue to this day. 483 00:33:30,820 --> 00:33:36,040 So I think ultimately, yes, I think ultimately their goal is to regard these emerging markets 484 00:33:36,040 --> 00:33:41,960 in Cambodia and Laos as an opportunity for investment, as an opportunity to get Chinese 485 00:33:41,960 --> 00:33:43,860 products into these markets. 486 00:33:43,860 --> 00:33:48,560 And that is one side of a two-sided coin that will involve eventual political influence, 487 00:33:48,560 --> 00:33:53,700 which will again create either a status quo in the region or certainly provide a bulwark 488 00:33:53,700 --> 00:33:59,640 against, say, a Vietnam or a Thailand holding power in a place like ASEAN. 489 00:33:59,640 --> 00:34:05,520 And if China sees both those countries, Laos and Cambodia, as great opportunities, Cambodia 490 00:34:05,520 --> 00:34:07,040 is the bigger one, isn't it? 491 00:34:07,040 --> 00:34:12,360 Because I guess Hun Sen and the role that he has created for himself over decades in 492 00:34:12,360 --> 00:34:13,360 the region. 493 00:34:13,360 --> 00:34:14,360 Absolutely. 494 00:34:14,360 --> 00:34:15,360 100%. 495 00:34:15,360 --> 00:34:18,200 It's a fascinating time in history for this region, isn't it? 496 00:34:18,200 --> 00:34:19,960 Oh, I can't get enough of it. 497 00:34:19,960 --> 00:34:20,960 It's amazing. 498 00:34:20,960 --> 00:34:26,480 And, you know, one again looks with a great amount of pessimism about the political future 499 00:34:26,480 --> 00:34:29,920 of a country like Cambodia when it comes to democracy. 500 00:34:29,920 --> 00:34:35,340 There's all this optimism in Thai politics because two anti-Hunta parties registered 501 00:34:35,340 --> 00:34:37,920 first and second in their recent elections. 502 00:34:37,920 --> 00:34:42,200 Meanwhile, I look to Cambodia with a great amount of sadness, knowing full well that 503 00:34:42,200 --> 00:34:46,920 the elections will not have that type of optimism or any kind of change. 504 00:34:46,920 --> 00:34:47,920 Yet it is fascinating. 505 00:34:47,920 --> 00:34:53,360 It is a fascinating country with a very fraught and troubled history that because of this 506 00:34:53,360 --> 00:34:59,060 China relationship that is not new, one that has six, seven decades of history in terms 507 00:34:59,060 --> 00:35:03,040 of PRC to Cambodia relations, I can't seem to get enough of it. 508 00:35:03,040 --> 00:35:07,480 So I hope that listeners will also find it interesting and dig more deeply into it as 509 00:35:07,480 --> 00:35:08,480 well. 510 00:35:08,480 --> 00:35:11,080 I am absolutely sure that they have found it interesting. 511 00:35:11,080 --> 00:35:16,320 Matt, thank you so much for your insights and for joining once again, Ear to Asia. 512 00:35:16,320 --> 00:35:17,320 Thank you so much, Ali. 513 00:35:17,320 --> 00:35:22,800 Our guest has been Dr Matthew Galway from the Australian National University. 514 00:35:22,800 --> 00:35:27,900 Ear to Asia is brought to you by Asia Institute of the University of Melbourne, Australia. 515 00:35:27,900 --> 00:35:32,520 You can find more information about this and all our other episodes at the Asia Institute 516 00:35:32,520 --> 00:35:33,520 website. 517 00:35:33,520 --> 00:35:39,240 Be sure to keep up with every episode of Ear to Asia by following us on the Apple Podcasts 518 00:35:39,240 --> 00:35:43,600 app, Spotify or wherever you get your favourite podcast. 519 00:35:43,600 --> 00:35:44,640 Please rate and review us. 520 00:35:44,640 --> 00:35:49,680 It helps new listeners find the show and put in a good word for us on your socials. 521 00:35:49,680 --> 00:35:53,800 This episode was recorded on the 29th of June, 2023. 522 00:35:53,800 --> 00:35:57,440 Producers were Calvin Parham and Eric van Bemmel of Profactual.com. 523 00:35:57,440 --> 00:36:04,040 Ear to Asia is licensed under Creative Commons, copyright 2023, the University of Melbourne. 524 00:36:04,040 --> 00:36:05,040 I'm Ali Moore. 525 00:36:05,040 --> 00:36:28,320 Thanks for your company.