1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:25,200 Hello and welcome to Rounding the Earth. 2 00:00:25,200 --> 00:00:28,720 It is Monday. 3 00:00:28,720 --> 00:00:36,160 Let's see, the 8th, May the 8th, 5th to 8th, 8th to Mayo. 4 00:00:36,160 --> 00:00:37,960 Oh, goodness, that's going to be recorded for all the 5 00:00:37,960 --> 00:00:39,280 posterity now. 6 00:00:39,280 --> 00:00:42,400 But I'm here today with my friend, Gabe, and we're going 7 00:00:42,400 --> 00:00:45,920 to talk about practical matters of keeping your 8 00:00:45,920 --> 00:00:48,120 information private. 9 00:00:48,120 --> 00:00:53,400 And Gabe is of the People's Republic of Libre Solutions 10 00:00:53,400 --> 00:00:53,800 Network. 11 00:00:53,800 --> 00:00:55,000 Do I have that right? 12 00:00:55,000 --> 00:00:57,560 Hello, yes, just the Libre Solutions Network. 13 00:00:57,560 --> 00:00:59,760 Just Libre Solutions Network. 14 00:00:59,760 --> 00:01:01,840 You say Libre instead of Libre. 15 00:01:01,840 --> 00:01:04,040 Yeah, I mean, I don't know how much of that is just 16 00:01:04,040 --> 00:01:08,240 people's preference, but I have that angle going for it. 17 00:01:08,240 --> 00:01:10,880 Because it's supposed to be for free software, Libre 18 00:01:10,880 --> 00:01:15,440 software, Libre freedom, rather than gratis. 19 00:01:15,440 --> 00:01:17,720 Got it, OK. 20 00:01:17,720 --> 00:01:20,040 So what are we talking about today? 21 00:01:20,040 --> 00:01:23,000 We're talking about practical encryption. 22 00:01:23,000 --> 00:01:25,640 And this is not, we're not getting into complicated 23 00:01:25,640 --> 00:01:27,160 details here. 24 00:01:27,160 --> 00:01:27,960 Where are we? 25 00:01:27,960 --> 00:01:30,280 Not necessarily the implementation of it. 26 00:01:30,280 --> 00:01:33,920 I don't know how to teach a cryptography class yet, maybe, 27 00:01:33,920 --> 00:01:36,760 but maybe eventually. 28 00:01:36,760 --> 00:01:40,440 OK, so this is something that mom and pop can watch and learn 29 00:01:40,440 --> 00:01:41,520 a little bit from. 30 00:01:41,520 --> 00:01:42,680 That's the hope. 31 00:01:42,680 --> 00:01:43,680 OK, good. 32 00:01:43,680 --> 00:01:46,680 Well, I'm going to let you get us started. 33 00:01:46,680 --> 00:01:47,960 Where are we going today? 34 00:01:47,960 --> 00:01:50,800 Well, most people will encounter encryption in two 35 00:01:50,800 --> 00:01:51,160 ways. 36 00:01:51,160 --> 00:01:54,000 The first way would be on your websites, where people 37 00:01:54,000 --> 00:01:56,680 remember seeing the green padlock on your browser, and it 38 00:01:56,680 --> 00:01:58,440 says, this site is secure. 39 00:01:58,440 --> 00:02:01,080 They've been slowly trying to tone that notification down, 40 00:02:01,080 --> 00:02:04,440 because all that guarantee means is that you have a 41 00:02:04,440 --> 00:02:08,000 direct connection that is secure to a server. 42 00:02:08,000 --> 00:02:11,240 For instance, anyone behind Cloudflare, they have access 43 00:02:11,240 --> 00:02:14,280 to those keys, and they can do whatever they want with it. 44 00:02:14,280 --> 00:02:18,000 So it's not a guarantee of perfect security and privacy, 45 00:02:18,000 --> 00:02:19,480 but it at least gives you something. 46 00:02:19,480 --> 00:02:24,080 That was why there was such a big push to put HTTPS on as 47 00:02:24,080 --> 00:02:26,080 many websites as possible. 48 00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:28,440 Now, the second way people encounter this is even 49 00:02:28,440 --> 00:02:31,200 something like WhatsApp will advertise that it has end to 50 00:02:31,200 --> 00:02:34,960 end encryption, which means that the service you're using 51 00:02:34,960 --> 00:02:38,200 is encrypting the content before you send it to the 52 00:02:38,200 --> 00:02:40,600 server, it's stored on there, and then, say, sent to your 53 00:02:40,600 --> 00:02:42,920 contacts or however you're sending it out. 54 00:02:42,920 --> 00:02:45,800 Those are the two major ways people see it up close. 55 00:02:45,800 --> 00:02:47,120 OK. 56 00:02:47,120 --> 00:02:51,840 So when I'm connected with a server that has that little 57 00:02:51,840 --> 00:02:56,240 green notification and everything is safe, now there 58 00:02:56,240 --> 00:02:59,040 is a certain level of security that I can probably trust. 59 00:02:59,040 --> 00:03:05,200 It would take at least a professional to then intercept 60 00:03:05,200 --> 00:03:08,680 my data, as in somebody who knows how to get into that 61 00:03:08,680 --> 00:03:11,640 server or who has control of that server. 62 00:03:11,640 --> 00:03:15,600 So the odds are I'm not safe from an intelligence agency 63 00:03:15,600 --> 00:03:19,800 snooping on my information exchange with that server, 64 00:03:19,800 --> 00:03:21,480 with packets going back and forth. 65 00:03:21,480 --> 00:03:27,960 But I probably am safe from 99% of the public, or 99.9%, 66 00:03:27,960 --> 00:03:30,200 probably. 67 00:03:30,200 --> 00:03:33,480 But I'm probably already safe from those people, aren't I? 68 00:03:33,480 --> 00:03:35,440 That's a good point. 69 00:03:35,440 --> 00:03:37,920 One of the biggest challenges when it comes to this is that 70 00:03:37,920 --> 00:03:39,320 there's also time. 71 00:03:39,320 --> 00:03:42,960 Encryption basically just makes it x much harder, so much 72 00:03:42,960 --> 00:03:45,680 harder that it would take thousands or millions of years 73 00:03:45,680 --> 00:03:47,400 to decode the transmission. 74 00:03:47,400 --> 00:03:49,960 Whereas if you don't use encryption at all, you just 75 00:03:49,960 --> 00:03:53,560 have to be careful that it's not stored, which is its own 76 00:03:53,560 --> 00:03:54,280 problem. 77 00:03:54,280 --> 00:03:56,600 But then that's where end-to-end encryption actually 78 00:03:56,600 --> 00:03:59,120 does protect you in that case, because there are data 79 00:03:59,120 --> 00:04:01,040 breaches all the time. 80 00:04:01,040 --> 00:04:05,520 I know on haveibidnpone.net or.com, I forget which one it 81 00:04:05,520 --> 00:04:12,240 is, the Fitbit site, they get hacked all the time. 82 00:04:12,240 --> 00:04:14,960 And so it's like if you have your accounts, all your 83 00:04:14,960 --> 00:04:16,680 information is done with them. 84 00:04:16,680 --> 00:04:20,000 Any information that is not end-to-end encrypted is 85 00:04:20,000 --> 00:04:24,040 basically up for grabs whenever there's a data breach. 86 00:04:24,040 --> 00:04:26,600 Interesting. 87 00:04:26,600 --> 00:04:27,400 I wrote an article. 88 00:04:27,400 --> 00:04:29,120 I'm going to bring this up in a few moments, so I'm going to 89 00:04:29,120 --> 00:04:31,040 go find about it. 90 00:04:31,040 --> 00:04:33,600 Excuse me, I'm going to go find it so that I can pull this 91 00:04:33,600 --> 00:04:38,200 up, but I actually thought about this back in 2021. 92 00:04:38,200 --> 00:04:41,680 I kind of wondered to myself, are we getting past the era of 93 00:04:41,680 --> 00:04:46,600 big data if everybody starts to worry about their privacy? 94 00:04:46,600 --> 00:04:50,600 With data like Fitbit specifically, for instance, or 95 00:04:50,600 --> 00:04:53,400 is it possible that there is some sort of solution that 96 00:04:53,400 --> 00:04:55,280 comes after it? 97 00:04:55,280 --> 00:04:57,120 I'm going to go ahead and bring this up because I was able to 98 00:04:57,120 --> 00:04:59,160 find it easily enough. 99 00:04:59,160 --> 00:05:03,680 This was one of my first Bitcoin wars articles, and I 100 00:05:03,680 --> 00:05:06,880 was thinking about this problem. 101 00:05:06,880 --> 00:05:12,480 We want big data in the sense that we want there to be pools 102 00:05:12,480 --> 00:05:17,120 of data from which we can learn and make useful for 103 00:05:17,120 --> 00:05:20,240 healthcare. 104 00:05:20,240 --> 00:05:24,560 If we all pull our data, if we had a device on us that knew 105 00:05:24,560 --> 00:05:26,920 what medications we were taking, what foods we were 106 00:05:26,920 --> 00:05:30,400 eating, and how often we were getting physical activity, then 107 00:05:30,400 --> 00:05:34,400 we would have a very good sense of how it is those things 108 00:05:34,400 --> 00:05:36,960 affect our body for the most part. 109 00:05:36,960 --> 00:05:43,200 But the problem is, do we want one person or a very small 110 00:05:43,200 --> 00:05:46,000 group of people or a corporation having all of that 111 00:05:46,000 --> 00:05:47,000 data about everybody? 112 00:05:47,000 --> 00:05:51,840 Do we trust them to make good use of the data and not use it 113 00:05:51,840 --> 00:05:55,720 to maximize profitability in their relationship with us as 114 00:05:55,720 --> 00:05:59,280 opposed to maximize our health? 115 00:05:59,280 --> 00:06:06,400 I wanted people to be able to control their own data and only 116 00:06:06,400 --> 00:06:12,440 share their private key with people or not share their 117 00:06:12,440 --> 00:06:19,920 private key, but unlock that data with their private key to 118 00:06:19,920 --> 00:06:24,320 some subset of people so that that subset of people could run 119 00:06:24,320 --> 00:06:29,400 a study, for instance, and you could still be anonymized while 120 00:06:29,400 --> 00:06:32,960 doing it to a degree or to whatever degree that you choose. 121 00:06:32,960 --> 00:06:35,520 You could share some sort of subset of your data. 122 00:06:35,520 --> 00:06:37,560 So this is a problem that I've been thinking about. 123 00:06:37,560 --> 00:06:41,760 So I'm going to I kind of want to set the stage there because 124 00:06:41,760 --> 00:06:45,240 we're going in, we are moving into that era, right? 125 00:06:45,240 --> 00:06:48,040 Like, can we do this in a decentralized way? 126 00:06:48,040 --> 00:06:49,200 Is that where you're going? 127 00:06:49,200 --> 00:06:53,120 I mean, at the risk of deviating a little out of the way, 128 00:06:53,120 --> 00:06:57,080 speaking of having the information and not just giving 129 00:06:57,080 --> 00:07:01,360 it into one big monolith, one of the way that Braves ad system 130 00:07:01,360 --> 00:07:04,160 was supposed to work was that since you're using their 131 00:07:04,160 --> 00:07:07,960 browser, your browser sees all the websites you visit. 132 00:07:07,960 --> 00:07:11,840 And so the Brave browser would request ads based off what you 133 00:07:11,840 --> 00:07:14,880 browse, and that's actually a very different model than how it 134 00:07:14,880 --> 00:07:19,120 works with a lot of these big ad networks, because the idea was 135 00:07:19,120 --> 00:07:23,480 let the user level deal with the information. 136 00:07:23,480 --> 00:07:26,440 And again, at the risk of an even further deviation, 137 00:07:26,440 --> 00:07:28,720 that's something I think AI models will have an interesting 138 00:07:28,720 --> 00:07:32,160 role to play, because then you can have your own locally 139 00:07:32,160 --> 00:07:34,560 trained model that gives the insights, because that's what 140 00:07:34,560 --> 00:07:35,240 we want. 141 00:07:35,240 --> 00:07:38,920 We want the insights to go all the way up to whatever 142 00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:43,440 the public infrastructure is to gain advantage out of those 143 00:07:43,440 --> 00:07:44,360 things. 144 00:07:44,360 --> 00:07:46,040 And that's a really handy thing. 145 00:07:46,040 --> 00:07:49,800 In my opinion, what makes encryption really important 146 00:07:49,800 --> 00:07:51,880 is when you want something to be private. 147 00:07:51,880 --> 00:07:55,720 You don't want insights to be gleaned from your private 148 00:07:55,720 --> 00:07:56,600 communications. 149 00:07:56,600 --> 00:08:01,040 You don't want people having control over what can be said 150 00:08:01,040 --> 00:08:04,240 when you're interacting with people you know and trust. 151 00:08:04,240 --> 00:08:07,760 And so I make a distinction myself between what I call 152 00:08:07,760 --> 00:08:10,760 private systems, which is intuitive there. 153 00:08:10,760 --> 00:08:13,000 But then I also call things broadcast systems. 154 00:08:13,000 --> 00:08:16,800 So like, for instance, Twitter, social media, YouTube, 155 00:08:16,800 --> 00:08:20,400 or even a website, if you're throwing something in the public, 156 00:08:20,400 --> 00:08:22,520 a lot of encryption is kind of unnecessary. 157 00:08:22,520 --> 00:08:26,920 Even HTTPS, the purpose of it really is to say this site is 158 00:08:26,920 --> 00:08:28,680 actually that site. 159 00:08:28,680 --> 00:08:32,720 It's not necessarily so that other things can be done. 160 00:08:32,720 --> 00:08:36,160 But there are other networks like I2P and Tor, 161 00:08:36,160 --> 00:08:39,480 if you do want that anonymization while browsing. 162 00:08:42,560 --> 00:08:44,920 Yeah, and it feels more and more to me 163 00:08:44,920 --> 00:08:48,080 like this is becoming important on a level of not just freedom 164 00:08:48,080 --> 00:08:49,920 of speech, but freedom of thought. 165 00:08:49,920 --> 00:08:51,640 Right, right. 166 00:08:51,640 --> 00:08:54,200 And when you talk about private communications, 167 00:08:54,200 --> 00:08:57,160 we're not talking about somebody standing up 168 00:08:57,160 --> 00:09:01,600 in the public square and making a declaration as to what they 169 00:09:01,600 --> 00:09:03,760 believe or some philosophical statement 170 00:09:03,760 --> 00:09:06,200 that they want the whole world to think about necessarily. 171 00:09:06,200 --> 00:09:09,680 We're even talking about what it is that you tell your buddy 172 00:09:09,680 --> 00:09:12,960 Bob, right? 173 00:09:12,960 --> 00:09:15,840 We're getting to a level that is almost as private 174 00:09:15,840 --> 00:09:18,880 as your interpersonal thoughts, not quite the same level, 175 00:09:18,880 --> 00:09:21,280 not until somebody says, oh, I'm going 176 00:09:21,280 --> 00:09:25,240 to try to implant chips in people's brains. 177 00:09:25,240 --> 00:09:27,720 God forbid we ever get there. 178 00:09:27,720 --> 00:09:30,120 Yeah, I mean, brain transparency is terrifying. 179 00:09:30,120 --> 00:09:33,520 But I'm focused a little bit on what 180 00:09:33,520 --> 00:09:37,840 can we do on the hardware level to bring some of that back? 181 00:09:37,840 --> 00:09:40,160 How can we get some of that privacy back? 182 00:09:40,160 --> 00:09:41,560 And I do think something as simple 183 00:09:41,560 --> 00:09:42,960 as like I mentioned in a previous show 184 00:09:42,960 --> 00:09:44,440 about how people should have their own digital 185 00:09:44,440 --> 00:09:45,400 infrastructure. 186 00:09:45,400 --> 00:09:47,800 And then if you run your own VPN for your family, 187 00:09:47,800 --> 00:09:52,240 the same way companies run their own internal network. 188 00:09:52,240 --> 00:09:53,360 Let's slow down for a second. 189 00:09:53,360 --> 00:09:58,560 Let's keep this at the level which mom and pop can glean 190 00:09:58,560 --> 00:09:59,320 more information. 191 00:09:59,320 --> 00:10:00,600 VPN. 192 00:10:00,600 --> 00:10:02,360 Yes. 193 00:10:02,360 --> 00:10:04,440 So there are virtual private networks, 194 00:10:04,440 --> 00:10:07,400 which most people know of VPNs in this case, 195 00:10:07,400 --> 00:10:09,600 that there's NordVPN, where you connect to, 196 00:10:09,600 --> 00:10:11,720 and it connects you to the rest of the internet. 197 00:10:11,720 --> 00:10:14,200 But you can use the same technology 198 00:10:14,200 --> 00:10:17,760 to run a private network just within machines you control 199 00:10:17,760 --> 00:10:19,520 or with people you know. 200 00:10:19,520 --> 00:10:23,280 And those resources, because VPNs themselves are encrypted, 201 00:10:23,280 --> 00:10:25,840 will use that encryption to protect whatever you want. 202 00:10:25,840 --> 00:10:29,480 So say you have your own internal online library 203 00:10:29,480 --> 00:10:32,560 or online chat services with just people in your trust 204 00:10:32,560 --> 00:10:33,400 network. 205 00:10:33,400 --> 00:10:37,200 Having an internal private network will do that. 206 00:10:37,200 --> 00:10:39,800 And VPNs allow you to do it over the internet 207 00:10:39,800 --> 00:10:42,280 as opposed to having to say run your own cables 208 00:10:42,280 --> 00:10:44,280 between everyone's houses. 209 00:10:44,280 --> 00:10:45,520 So I'm at home. 210 00:10:45,520 --> 00:10:51,160 Let's say that I contract with you as my VPN provider. 211 00:10:51,160 --> 00:10:54,880 And I want to find out what's on ESPN. 212 00:10:54,880 --> 00:11:00,680 And maybe I probably shouldn't do this. 213 00:11:00,680 --> 00:11:05,760 But let's say that I'm going to ESPN porn, sports porn. 214 00:11:05,760 --> 00:11:10,040 I don't want anyone to know that I'm searching sports porn. 215 00:11:10,040 --> 00:11:13,920 Then what I do is I send that request through you. 216 00:11:13,920 --> 00:11:16,880 And then you send the request to the website 217 00:11:16,880 --> 00:11:19,600 so that anybody who sees that transmission going on 218 00:11:19,600 --> 00:11:22,760 doesn't see me to ESPN sports porn. 219 00:11:22,760 --> 00:11:26,880 They see this one central server to ESPN sports porn. 220 00:11:26,880 --> 00:11:30,680 And then you communicate with me directly privately. 221 00:11:30,680 --> 00:11:34,480 OK, but do you know what it is that I'm surfing? 222 00:11:34,480 --> 00:11:36,960 That, I mean, anyone who has access 223 00:11:36,960 --> 00:11:39,360 to a layer of your internet infrastructure 224 00:11:39,360 --> 00:11:41,360 will be able to see some of that. 225 00:11:41,360 --> 00:11:42,840 Because I know it's, for instance, 226 00:11:42,840 --> 00:11:46,520 easy for your provider to know what websites you're visiting 227 00:11:46,520 --> 00:11:48,400 because you have DNS queries. 228 00:11:48,400 --> 00:11:50,720 Now, you can encrypt DNS queries. 229 00:11:50,720 --> 00:11:53,680 There's DNS over HTTPS. 230 00:11:53,680 --> 00:11:55,760 So how that would effectively work 231 00:11:55,760 --> 00:11:59,640 is that if the person providing your network infrastructure 232 00:11:59,640 --> 00:12:03,560 knows, say, oh, this guy is connected to this IP, 233 00:12:03,560 --> 00:12:04,960 they can do a reverse lookup. 234 00:12:04,960 --> 00:12:07,000 And so depending on the level of effort, 235 00:12:07,000 --> 00:12:10,760 there are ways to investigate these kinds of questions, 236 00:12:10,760 --> 00:12:13,160 which is why I will say it is a matter of trust. 237 00:12:13,160 --> 00:12:15,280 Unless we have what I would almost consider the gold 238 00:12:15,280 --> 00:12:18,520 standard of some kind of absolutely neutral public 239 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:20,520 infrastructure, there will always 240 00:12:20,520 --> 00:12:23,640 be a trust component at play. 241 00:12:23,640 --> 00:12:28,240 Now, you say a public infrastructure. 242 00:12:28,240 --> 00:12:33,160 Already, that's a big, yeah, neutral, right, yeah. 243 00:12:33,160 --> 00:12:36,720 I'm not sure that I think of that exists. 244 00:12:36,720 --> 00:12:41,200 But the Bitcoin network solution where 245 00:12:41,200 --> 00:12:45,680 you have multiple validators, is there 246 00:12:45,680 --> 00:12:48,880 the possibility of decentralizing 247 00:12:48,880 --> 00:12:52,280 that level of trust to a network so that you don't 248 00:12:52,280 --> 00:12:56,000 have one point of failure? 249 00:12:56,000 --> 00:12:58,120 I mean, the thing that stands out to me 250 00:12:58,120 --> 00:13:00,760 is there is a project called Helium that 251 00:13:00,760 --> 00:13:04,360 tries to tokenize connectivity. 252 00:13:04,360 --> 00:13:08,440 So for instance, whether it's devices using something 253 00:13:08,440 --> 00:13:11,240 as simple as a 5G data connection for a cell phone 254 00:13:11,240 --> 00:13:15,280 in the area, what it allows is that people are incentivized 255 00:13:15,280 --> 00:13:17,360 to run data through the system. 256 00:13:17,360 --> 00:13:20,600 The challenge I see with many of these different things 257 00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:23,240 is that making the network more complex 258 00:13:23,240 --> 00:13:25,560 does not necessarily make it more private. 259 00:13:25,560 --> 00:13:28,040 And there are a ton of different considerations 260 00:13:28,040 --> 00:13:31,800 to be made when it comes to, if we do this change, 261 00:13:31,800 --> 00:13:35,000 how does that affect these other considerations? 262 00:13:35,000 --> 00:13:36,080 How does it impact privacy? 263 00:13:36,080 --> 00:13:40,200 How does it impact autonomy and these kind of controls? 264 00:13:40,200 --> 00:13:42,840 I do think at the lowest level, you 265 00:13:42,840 --> 00:13:46,160 want to have as few intermediaries as possible. 266 00:13:46,160 --> 00:13:50,600 So if there was, say, one giant token-based way 267 00:13:50,600 --> 00:13:53,200 of distributing internet in that way, 268 00:13:53,200 --> 00:13:56,840 if the providers themselves aren't colluding against you, 269 00:13:56,840 --> 00:13:59,680 that's probably a perfectly valid way of doing it. 270 00:14:02,560 --> 00:14:04,560 Personally, one of the things I think 271 00:14:04,560 --> 00:14:08,840 Bitcoin has over other attempts at tokenizing resources 272 00:14:08,840 --> 00:14:11,040 is it at least has 10 years of history to say, hey, 273 00:14:11,040 --> 00:14:14,000 we've done it, and nothing crazy has gone wrong. 274 00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:16,080 I think it would be hard to convince people 275 00:14:16,080 --> 00:14:19,520 to switch all their internet to, say, Helium, which may not 276 00:14:19,520 --> 00:14:23,400 have the same track record behind it, so to speak. 277 00:14:23,400 --> 00:14:23,920 Right. 278 00:14:23,920 --> 00:14:27,080 Before people do that, it would require a multi-year history 279 00:14:27,080 --> 00:14:29,560 of people being able to say, well, this thing has never 280 00:14:29,560 --> 00:14:30,640 been hacked. 281 00:14:30,640 --> 00:14:32,320 To whatever degree Bitcoin has been hacked, 282 00:14:32,320 --> 00:14:35,280 it's always been through somebody interfacing with it 283 00:14:35,280 --> 00:14:38,440 in a poor way or in a vulnerable way, 284 00:14:38,440 --> 00:14:41,120 not the system itself being hacked. 285 00:14:41,120 --> 00:14:44,840 But is there anybody making an attempt 286 00:14:44,840 --> 00:14:47,840 to start building that track record? 287 00:14:47,840 --> 00:14:50,760 Are you saying that people are using this Helium system 288 00:14:50,760 --> 00:14:51,280 right now? 289 00:14:51,280 --> 00:14:53,360 Is it building a track record? 290 00:14:53,360 --> 00:14:56,720 I would say it is, though I haven't watched it too closely. 291 00:14:56,720 --> 00:14:58,280 I mean, it's operational. 292 00:14:58,280 --> 00:15:01,680 I knew a guy who was running one of their, 293 00:15:01,680 --> 00:15:05,080 they call them gateways to mine the Helium currency. 294 00:15:05,080 --> 00:15:07,000 And it does look like an interesting project. 295 00:15:07,000 --> 00:15:09,400 Now, some people kind of want to do things 296 00:15:09,400 --> 00:15:12,480 without changing the infrastructure too much. 297 00:15:12,480 --> 00:15:13,440 There's Loki Net. 298 00:15:13,440 --> 00:15:17,120 There's Urbit, I think is a similar type of project, 299 00:15:17,120 --> 00:15:18,920 where there are a lot of things where it's like, 300 00:15:18,920 --> 00:15:22,240 we can either build on top of the internet as it exists, 301 00:15:22,240 --> 00:15:24,680 or we do something completely new. 302 00:15:24,680 --> 00:15:28,840 And I don't know how effective the completely new options 303 00:15:28,840 --> 00:15:31,360 will be, because then it just introduces 304 00:15:31,360 --> 00:15:34,720 a lot of complexity that people aren't used to thinking about. 305 00:15:37,720 --> 00:15:42,440 OK, let's return for a moment back to end-to-end encryption. 306 00:15:42,440 --> 00:15:46,880 So I'm a fan of the Signal app. 307 00:15:46,880 --> 00:15:51,240 And I don't know how many other similar apps there are. 308 00:15:51,240 --> 00:15:53,000 It's the kind of system where you probably 309 00:15:53,000 --> 00:15:54,920 don't want too many, because you want people 310 00:15:54,920 --> 00:15:58,640 to be on the same app in order to have this end-to-end 311 00:15:58,640 --> 00:15:59,160 encryption. 312 00:15:59,160 --> 00:16:00,720 What's the other one that you mentioned? 313 00:16:00,720 --> 00:16:02,760 Well, there's a Matrix. 314 00:16:02,760 --> 00:16:05,960 WhatsApp does it as well, though they're run by Facebook, 315 00:16:05,960 --> 00:16:09,560 so not everybody trusts WhatsApp for themselves. 316 00:16:09,560 --> 00:16:13,920 But then both Matrix and XMPP run end-to-end encryption 317 00:16:13,920 --> 00:16:17,000 through different methods, but it's the same idea. 318 00:16:17,000 --> 00:16:19,480 The advantage with both Matrix and XMPP 319 00:16:19,480 --> 00:16:22,400 is you have your own client, whatever you want. 320 00:16:22,400 --> 00:16:24,360 Telegram does support end-to-end encryption. 321 00:16:24,360 --> 00:16:25,640 You just have to turn it on. 322 00:16:25,640 --> 00:16:26,880 And that's kind of its problem. 323 00:16:26,880 --> 00:16:29,680 It's not there by default. And I believe 324 00:16:29,680 --> 00:16:32,640 Telegram also rules their own, which cryptographers will 325 00:16:32,640 --> 00:16:34,360 complain is not the best way of doing it. 326 00:16:34,360 --> 00:16:37,480 You should use some kind of industry standard 327 00:16:37,480 --> 00:16:40,960 instead of just hoping your engineers can figure it out. 328 00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:41,920 I mean, maybe they can. 329 00:16:41,920 --> 00:16:46,200 I'm not knocking them, but it's a complicated work, 330 00:16:46,200 --> 00:16:47,480 that's for sure. 331 00:16:47,480 --> 00:16:52,320 Right, and already you have sort of a conflict of interest 332 00:16:52,320 --> 00:16:55,680 there in terms of them wanting to figure it out. 333 00:16:55,680 --> 00:16:57,600 Right, and to me, one of the things 334 00:16:57,600 --> 00:17:00,000 that I find interesting right now is that there 335 00:17:00,000 --> 00:17:02,280 are all these different services, whether it's Nostr, 336 00:17:02,280 --> 00:17:04,640 whether it's Matrix, whether it's XMPP, 337 00:17:04,640 --> 00:17:06,680 whether it's the Fediverse, you've got all these different 338 00:17:06,680 --> 00:17:09,800 open protocols, you know, anybody can set up their own server 339 00:17:09,800 --> 00:17:11,080 and get connected with them. 340 00:17:11,080 --> 00:17:13,920 The challenge is when there's interoperability there, 341 00:17:13,920 --> 00:17:17,560 you know, say somebody on Nostr can talk to somebody on XMPP, 342 00:17:17,560 --> 00:17:19,120 that goes through a bridge. 343 00:17:19,120 --> 00:17:22,560 And the bridge kind of breaks whatever standard encryption 344 00:17:22,560 --> 00:17:26,320 everyone using on one system that doesn't exist on the other. 345 00:17:26,320 --> 00:17:29,080 And it would be nice if there were plugins that say, 346 00:17:29,080 --> 00:17:32,240 if you have two people on different systems using 347 00:17:32,240 --> 00:17:34,240 the same end-to-end encryption, there 348 00:17:34,240 --> 00:17:37,440 should be a way to intermediate that. 349 00:17:37,440 --> 00:17:39,200 OK, here's one of the worries that I 350 00:17:39,200 --> 00:17:43,760 have with some encryption going through other people's systems 351 00:17:43,760 --> 00:17:47,720 is that encryption, like you could say, OK, 352 00:17:47,720 --> 00:17:50,400 there are numbers being chosen at random. 353 00:17:50,400 --> 00:17:53,040 There's random number generation that happens, 354 00:17:53,040 --> 00:17:57,600 and most are all encryption processes, right? 355 00:17:57,600 --> 00:17:59,640 You have to start with some sort of a number that 356 00:17:59,640 --> 00:18:03,400 is being pushed through this complicated mathematical 357 00:18:03,400 --> 00:18:07,080 algorithm that spits out another number. 358 00:18:07,080 --> 00:18:10,320 But a number that's being chosen, there's a seed. 359 00:18:10,320 --> 00:18:14,560 And with something like, with a lot of systems, 360 00:18:14,560 --> 00:18:18,720 you have sort of a system of looping back and reusing a seed 361 00:18:18,720 --> 00:18:20,400 to then churn through again. 362 00:18:20,400 --> 00:18:23,000 So it only really matters the very first time 363 00:18:23,000 --> 00:18:25,840 you choose a number. 364 00:18:25,840 --> 00:18:26,600 Often. 365 00:18:26,600 --> 00:18:29,440 But how are random numbers? 366 00:18:29,440 --> 00:18:31,280 A lot of people don't know this necessarily, 367 00:18:31,280 --> 00:18:33,480 but random numbers are not random. 368 00:18:33,480 --> 00:18:35,440 A computer can't do that. 369 00:18:35,440 --> 00:18:38,680 A computer has to start at one place 370 00:18:38,680 --> 00:18:42,240 when it applies some sort of a randomization algorithm. 371 00:18:42,240 --> 00:18:43,640 And because of that, there have been 372 00:18:43,640 --> 00:18:47,640 hacks on some systems that seemed otherwise 373 00:18:47,640 --> 00:18:50,560 mathematically impenetrable. 374 00:18:50,560 --> 00:18:55,360 So where does that problem occur in the system, 375 00:18:55,360 --> 00:18:57,040 and how can we avoid that? 376 00:18:57,040 --> 00:19:00,080 Well, a lot of that's in the hardware itself. 377 00:19:00,080 --> 00:19:05,400 The CPU, a lot of it is very opaque to most people. 378 00:19:05,400 --> 00:19:08,280 Your CPU really is a black box, whether it's in your phone 379 00:19:08,280 --> 00:19:09,560 or whether it's in your computer. 380 00:19:09,560 --> 00:19:12,680 Nobody's got to open it up and, with a little magnifying lens, 381 00:19:12,680 --> 00:19:14,640 take a look, hey, what's going on there? 382 00:19:14,640 --> 00:19:17,160 It's a very complicated task, which 383 00:19:17,160 --> 00:19:20,760 is why I do think the concept of free and open source hardware 384 00:19:20,760 --> 00:19:24,400 is going to be probably a big goldmine over the next 10 385 00:19:24,400 --> 00:19:27,480 years, because a lot of people are asking those very 386 00:19:27,480 --> 00:19:28,840 questions. 387 00:19:28,840 --> 00:19:30,360 When there is a piece of hardware, 388 00:19:30,360 --> 00:19:32,160 whether it's a CPU or even a modem, 389 00:19:32,160 --> 00:19:35,800 those are the big ones that make people nervous these days, 390 00:19:35,800 --> 00:19:39,400 because the modem itself can forward information along. 391 00:19:39,400 --> 00:19:40,800 And that makes encryption useless, 392 00:19:40,800 --> 00:19:42,160 which is what they're doing. 393 00:19:42,160 --> 00:19:45,280 And I believe it's either the UK or the EU, where they're like, 394 00:19:45,280 --> 00:19:47,200 oh, we want client-side scanning. 395 00:19:47,200 --> 00:19:48,760 We're not going to break your encryption, 396 00:19:48,760 --> 00:19:51,000 but we just want to check all the images on your device 397 00:19:51,000 --> 00:19:55,560 against a table of hashes we have to prosecute people over. 398 00:19:55,560 --> 00:19:57,480 And that does make encryption useless. 399 00:19:57,480 --> 00:19:59,040 There's no point to run encryption 400 00:19:59,040 --> 00:20:01,440 if you're going to let the government or other entities 401 00:20:01,440 --> 00:20:04,480 scan everyone's devices proactively. 402 00:20:04,480 --> 00:20:08,200 This makes me think back to the movie Gremlins, which 403 00:20:08,200 --> 00:20:09,720 it was a childhood movie for me. 404 00:20:09,720 --> 00:20:10,280 I don't know. 405 00:20:10,280 --> 00:20:12,280 Did you ever see the movie Gremlins? 406 00:20:12,280 --> 00:20:14,800 Yes, yes. 407 00:20:14,800 --> 00:20:16,640 And I haven't watched it in so long 408 00:20:16,640 --> 00:20:19,000 that I can't remember the situation. 409 00:20:19,000 --> 00:20:21,800 But there was somebody in the small town who already 410 00:20:21,800 --> 00:20:23,760 knew what Gremlins were. 411 00:20:23,760 --> 00:20:25,840 He was like a veteran or something like that. 412 00:20:25,840 --> 00:20:29,520 And I can't remember if it was like Vietnam or Japan. 413 00:20:29,520 --> 00:20:32,160 But he was like, there's Gremlins in the watches. 414 00:20:32,160 --> 00:20:33,440 There's Gremlins everywhere. 415 00:20:33,440 --> 00:20:38,080 And so I guess that's sort of an analogy for how it is 416 00:20:38,080 --> 00:20:40,200 that people can think about hardware. 417 00:20:40,200 --> 00:20:42,640 You really don't know who set up the hardware for you 418 00:20:42,640 --> 00:20:45,080 or who might have put some. 419 00:20:45,080 --> 00:20:47,720 There was a rumor just like three, four years ago 420 00:20:47,720 --> 00:20:52,360 about there being like rice-sized grain computer 421 00:20:52,360 --> 00:20:54,600 chips that nobody knew what they did. 422 00:20:54,600 --> 00:20:56,920 You open up hardware, and there was this thing that wasn't 423 00:20:56,920 --> 00:20:58,200 supposed to be there. 424 00:20:58,200 --> 00:21:03,080 And some of that is probably nonsense. 425 00:21:03,080 --> 00:21:05,120 But some of it is a very real concern 426 00:21:05,120 --> 00:21:10,840 that somewhere in a supply chain process, where all these pieces 427 00:21:10,840 --> 00:21:13,520 are coming from different places being manufactured 428 00:21:13,520 --> 00:21:15,840 around the world, and they're coming to one place 429 00:21:15,840 --> 00:21:17,320 and then being put together. 430 00:21:17,320 --> 00:21:18,920 And how do you know that somebody doesn't 431 00:21:18,920 --> 00:21:22,440 have something writing on the system 432 00:21:22,440 --> 00:21:25,400 or at the final production level something extra getting 433 00:21:25,400 --> 00:21:27,560 added to it? 434 00:21:27,560 --> 00:21:29,240 It would take a great feat of engineering, 435 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:31,880 but that doesn't mean that it's impossible. 436 00:21:31,880 --> 00:21:32,840 Right. 437 00:21:32,840 --> 00:21:35,320 And that really is scary because I 438 00:21:35,320 --> 00:21:38,760 know somebody I follow who is a friend of mine. 439 00:21:38,760 --> 00:21:40,560 He basically wrote a blog post about how 440 00:21:40,560 --> 00:21:41,200 he's giving up. 441 00:21:41,200 --> 00:21:43,480 He thinks all of technology is unsavable. 442 00:21:43,480 --> 00:21:45,880 He wants to go totally analog because 443 00:21:45,880 --> 00:21:49,240 of these very concerns, which are real concerns. 444 00:21:49,240 --> 00:21:51,600 There's no validity to that. 445 00:21:51,600 --> 00:21:53,640 I just think there's a lot of opportunity 446 00:21:53,640 --> 00:21:56,080 to fix it as time goes on. 447 00:21:56,080 --> 00:22:00,400 Yeah, I like to maintain the optimist's perspective. 448 00:22:00,400 --> 00:22:03,680 I do think that it's very possible that we 449 00:22:03,680 --> 00:22:09,040 see a world in which we make use of computer resources 450 00:22:09,040 --> 00:22:13,560 for some fraction of what it is that we want to use them for. 451 00:22:13,560 --> 00:22:20,160 We identify the utilities in our life or to society 452 00:22:20,160 --> 00:22:23,200 that we need computers for, but we otherwise give them 453 00:22:23,200 --> 00:22:24,480 up for a lot of things. 454 00:22:24,480 --> 00:22:26,360 There's a movie. 455 00:22:26,360 --> 00:22:28,760 I can't remember if it's the movie or the television show. 456 00:22:28,760 --> 00:22:32,040 There's a television show called Firefly from something 457 00:22:32,040 --> 00:22:34,040 like 20 years ago. 458 00:22:34,040 --> 00:22:37,480 And there's a movie associated with it called Serenity. 459 00:22:37,480 --> 00:22:39,000 And in one of the two, I think it 460 00:22:39,000 --> 00:22:41,720 is the movie, there's a scene that cuts to one 461 00:22:41,720 --> 00:22:43,040 of the character's childhoods. 462 00:22:43,040 --> 00:22:44,600 The character is a doctor. 463 00:22:44,600 --> 00:22:49,760 He's like top notch, award winning type of, 464 00:22:49,760 --> 00:22:52,520 he was clearly a high academic mind growing up 465 00:22:52,520 --> 00:22:55,840 and a very responsible person. 466 00:22:55,840 --> 00:22:57,960 And you have this scene in childhood 467 00:22:57,960 --> 00:23:01,920 where he's maybe 14 years old and his father gives him 468 00:23:01,920 --> 00:23:05,760 a dedicated source box. 469 00:23:05,760 --> 00:23:08,200 And he's so happy because what he wants 470 00:23:08,200 --> 00:23:10,040 is to make it to an elite university 471 00:23:10,040 --> 00:23:12,360 because he wants to be a doctor. 472 00:23:12,360 --> 00:23:16,600 And he's just one of those people who has his dream already 473 00:23:16,600 --> 00:23:17,400 when he's 14. 474 00:23:17,400 --> 00:23:20,840 So he's mapping it out and he's working hard toward it. 475 00:23:20,840 --> 00:23:26,920 And it's never explained to you what a dedicated source box is. 476 00:23:26,920 --> 00:23:28,800 But you kind of get the sense that he's 477 00:23:28,800 --> 00:23:31,400 talking about the internet. 478 00:23:31,400 --> 00:23:34,640 This is a future in which people have figured out, OK, 479 00:23:34,640 --> 00:23:38,040 we have this internet thing, but it's a really terrible idea 480 00:23:38,040 --> 00:23:41,480 to put this in the hands of most children. 481 00:23:41,480 --> 00:23:42,920 And I could see that. 482 00:23:42,920 --> 00:23:52,320 I could see a future in which maybe 90%, 95%, 99% 483 00:23:52,320 --> 00:23:55,480 of what we do on the internet, we just decide, 484 00:23:55,480 --> 00:23:57,680 not going to do that anymore. 485 00:23:57,680 --> 00:23:58,680 It's too dangerous. 486 00:23:58,680 --> 00:24:05,360 One, it's too dangerous to have boxes all over our house 487 00:24:05,360 --> 00:24:10,200 where children can surf porn, where children can figure out 488 00:24:10,200 --> 00:24:11,360 how to surf porn. 489 00:24:11,360 --> 00:24:15,960 And it is true that some huge proportion of internet traffic 490 00:24:15,960 --> 00:24:17,760 is porn. 491 00:24:17,760 --> 00:24:22,240 And I think that a lot of people underestimate the poison 492 00:24:22,240 --> 00:24:24,800 that that likely is to all of society. 493 00:24:24,800 --> 00:24:27,440 We probably don't even know. 494 00:24:27,440 --> 00:24:30,800 We probably couldn't even spot the little influences. 495 00:24:30,800 --> 00:24:32,720 It's probably kind of like chaos theory, 496 00:24:32,720 --> 00:24:35,080 like a butterfly flaps its wings. 497 00:24:35,080 --> 00:24:38,280 And suddenly, there's chaos on the other side of the Earth. 498 00:24:38,280 --> 00:24:40,840 I think that that's probably more likely 499 00:24:40,840 --> 00:24:44,560 to be a correct analogy for people surfing porn at home. 500 00:24:44,560 --> 00:24:47,000 And that's the butterfly flapping its wings. 501 00:24:47,000 --> 00:24:49,240 But then does that have an effect on what 502 00:24:49,240 --> 00:24:50,600 bills get passed in Congress? 503 00:24:53,600 --> 00:24:55,080 I bet it does. 504 00:24:55,080 --> 00:24:58,240 Everything that happens in society 505 00:24:58,240 --> 00:24:59,640 is downstream of something. 506 00:24:59,640 --> 00:25:01,720 It's downstream of human behaviors. 507 00:25:01,720 --> 00:25:05,520 So I could see a future in which we 508 00:25:05,520 --> 00:25:12,040 dodge a lot of the worst uses of technology. 509 00:25:12,040 --> 00:25:14,640 And then we're not even worried anymore 510 00:25:14,640 --> 00:25:17,640 about people intercepting our communications. 511 00:25:17,640 --> 00:25:21,360 We don't necessarily have to communicate to thousands 512 00:25:21,360 --> 00:25:23,040 of people at a time. 513 00:25:23,040 --> 00:25:24,680 There isn't much need. 514 00:25:24,680 --> 00:25:28,160 Most knowledge can get passed through the grapevine. 515 00:25:28,160 --> 00:25:32,960 And conversations in real life where people get together 516 00:25:32,960 --> 00:25:37,800 in order to have conversations. 517 00:25:37,800 --> 00:25:46,760 So what do we do on the internet that's really necessary? 518 00:25:46,760 --> 00:25:49,040 Well, I mean, a lot of it's been trained into us. 519 00:25:49,040 --> 00:25:52,400 The companies that wanted to profit off collecting, 520 00:25:52,400 --> 00:25:54,160 marketing based off, and now training 521 00:25:54,160 --> 00:25:56,720 AIs based off people's information. 522 00:25:56,720 --> 00:25:59,720 There was a real drive to get you, hey, hand this out. 523 00:25:59,720 --> 00:26:01,920 Facebook would introduce a cool new feature. 524 00:26:01,920 --> 00:26:03,720 Oh, you checked in at this location. 525 00:26:03,720 --> 00:26:05,680 Tell everyone what you think about it. 526 00:26:05,680 --> 00:26:08,720 There was a lot of incentivization and pushing 527 00:26:08,720 --> 00:26:10,800 or nudging, I guess we would say, 528 00:26:10,800 --> 00:26:14,360 to nudge people into giving out as much as possible. 529 00:26:14,360 --> 00:26:16,040 And I do think a big part of it, though, 530 00:26:16,040 --> 00:26:18,480 is when you create these micro celebrities, 531 00:26:18,480 --> 00:26:22,280 whether it's the biggest YouTuber, the biggest 532 00:26:22,280 --> 00:26:25,560 Twitch streamer, it presents a lifestyle. 533 00:26:25,560 --> 00:26:27,280 First of all, not everybody can do. 534 00:26:27,280 --> 00:26:31,280 Not everybody can become the top Twitch streamer, whatever. 535 00:26:31,280 --> 00:26:34,040 But all the imitations of it, all the people trying, 536 00:26:34,040 --> 00:26:36,320 now I wish everybody the best of luck 537 00:26:36,320 --> 00:26:38,320 would try that kind of thing out. 538 00:26:38,320 --> 00:26:40,720 But then people don't necessarily 539 00:26:40,720 --> 00:26:43,480 realize that, hey, there's only so many tickets to that ride. 540 00:26:43,480 --> 00:26:46,320 And then they're still giving the same information. 541 00:26:46,320 --> 00:26:48,360 And that's a trade off. 542 00:26:48,360 --> 00:26:50,560 And I want people to think about this. 543 00:26:50,560 --> 00:26:55,080 When thinking about what, if we move toward a future where 544 00:26:55,080 --> 00:27:00,080 we tear down a lot of what the internet is because of security, 545 00:27:00,080 --> 00:27:05,000 and I think that we might, I think perhaps even we should, 546 00:27:05,000 --> 00:27:07,880 I think that computing is awesome. 547 00:27:07,880 --> 00:27:09,520 There is high utility that we want 548 00:27:09,520 --> 00:27:11,880 to figure out how not to give up. 549 00:27:11,880 --> 00:27:13,640 And then we want to figure out how it is we 550 00:27:13,640 --> 00:27:16,760 want to organize society. 551 00:27:16,760 --> 00:27:20,960 But what we're talking about, like an internet star, 552 00:27:20,960 --> 00:27:23,080 and I look around, we've probably 553 00:27:23,080 --> 00:27:26,920 got a few dozen live watchers. 554 00:27:26,920 --> 00:27:30,600 And maybe 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 people 555 00:27:30,600 --> 00:27:32,880 will see this video at some point in time. 556 00:27:37,320 --> 00:27:39,360 We're not internet celebrities starting here. 557 00:27:39,360 --> 00:27:41,000 But what does happen is you wind up 558 00:27:41,000 --> 00:27:43,920 with parasocial relationships. 559 00:27:43,920 --> 00:27:48,440 And one of the points that I've made in a lot of my articles 560 00:27:48,440 --> 00:27:51,080 is these parasocial relationships, 561 00:27:51,080 --> 00:27:55,400 this is where societal steering is happening to a large degree. 562 00:27:55,400 --> 00:27:59,560 You have somebody who becomes good at generating 563 00:27:59,560 --> 00:28:01,000 parasocial relationships. 564 00:28:01,000 --> 00:28:04,000 They're good at talking directly to the camera. 565 00:28:04,000 --> 00:28:07,960 They're good at all the little things that go on. 566 00:28:07,960 --> 00:28:13,040 They have a look that fits whatever it is they're selling. 567 00:28:13,040 --> 00:28:18,640 And suddenly you have massive nudging going on, 568 00:28:18,640 --> 00:28:21,160 nudging too many people at once. 569 00:28:21,160 --> 00:28:24,720 And so it becomes profitable to corrupt the system 570 00:28:24,720 --> 00:28:27,920 through one individual. 571 00:28:27,920 --> 00:28:29,840 And I think a big part of that, too, 572 00:28:29,840 --> 00:28:32,840 though, is that there is a real fragmentation in culture 573 00:28:32,840 --> 00:28:33,360 right now. 574 00:28:33,360 --> 00:28:38,480 I just saw somebody post about the trust in the media 575 00:28:38,480 --> 00:28:39,680 is highly partisan. 576 00:28:39,680 --> 00:28:41,000 People will trust certain outlets 577 00:28:41,000 --> 00:28:42,360 and they won't trust others. 578 00:28:42,360 --> 00:28:44,000 And this is creating this effect where 579 00:28:44,000 --> 00:28:46,840 there's no one common fabric. 580 00:28:46,840 --> 00:28:49,400 And I think whatever the power structure is, 581 00:28:49,400 --> 00:28:54,440 it wants to herd everyone back onto a single fabric, 582 00:28:54,440 --> 00:28:58,000 whereas anyone who justifiably doesn't trust this process is, 583 00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:01,480 oh, no, I just want my own little island of coherence. 584 00:29:01,480 --> 00:29:03,920 And they don't want to be assimilated 585 00:29:03,920 --> 00:29:06,760 into this greater context that really isn't 586 00:29:06,760 --> 00:29:08,800 serving anybody's interests. 587 00:29:08,800 --> 00:29:11,320 And the only way I see that being solved 588 00:29:11,320 --> 00:29:16,000 is if there is a new common fabric that does suit people 589 00:29:16,000 --> 00:29:22,200 without being overtly tyrannical or other problematic features. 590 00:29:22,200 --> 00:29:26,160 Yeah, it seems like we had, because of mass communication, 591 00:29:26,160 --> 00:29:30,160 we entered an era in which fabric of society 592 00:29:30,160 --> 00:29:34,040 meant accepting one common truth. 593 00:29:34,040 --> 00:29:36,760 And I actually don't think that that needs to happen. 594 00:29:36,760 --> 00:29:38,680 I actually think fabric of society 595 00:29:38,680 --> 00:29:43,840 can be one common set of general manners. 596 00:29:43,840 --> 00:29:46,560 The way it is that you're not going to aggress on somebody 597 00:29:46,560 --> 00:29:49,920 or treat somebody, but that otherwise there 598 00:29:49,920 --> 00:29:54,280 is no particular need for a common set of beliefs, 599 00:29:54,280 --> 00:29:58,160 like whether or not you or I both have the same view on 600 00:29:58,160 --> 00:30:00,240 whether or not. 601 00:30:00,240 --> 00:30:01,240 Viruses are real. 602 00:30:01,240 --> 00:30:03,760 I know. 603 00:30:03,760 --> 00:30:09,320 Or that the CIA murdered John F. Kennedy 604 00:30:09,320 --> 00:30:12,360 or that the moon landing was faked or whatever. 605 00:30:12,360 --> 00:30:16,000 And I could pick out these things that 606 00:30:16,000 --> 00:30:20,280 are within the realms of speculation or hidden 607 00:30:20,280 --> 00:30:24,640 information that some people denigrate as conspiracy theory 608 00:30:24,640 --> 00:30:26,000 or something like that. 609 00:30:26,000 --> 00:30:29,560 Suddenly, you have truths where if you even 610 00:30:29,560 --> 00:30:33,120 begin to discuss them or question them, 611 00:30:33,120 --> 00:30:35,600 you have an automatic stigma associated. 612 00:30:35,600 --> 00:30:38,080 And I think that that's one big problem right there. 613 00:30:38,080 --> 00:30:42,880 But even just the attempt to have one common truth, 614 00:30:42,880 --> 00:30:46,360 why is it that everybody needs to believe that same thing 615 00:30:46,360 --> 00:30:48,920 in order to go about their daily lives? 616 00:30:48,920 --> 00:30:51,280 They don't, honestly. 617 00:30:51,280 --> 00:30:53,440 To me, it's an interesting thing because you're 618 00:30:53,440 --> 00:30:56,720 right that the conversations that people are almost 619 00:30:56,720 --> 00:31:00,600 being pushed to have are combative inherently 620 00:31:00,600 --> 00:31:04,160 because you're forcing everybody to discuss this issue when 621 00:31:04,160 --> 00:31:06,960 people with different perspectives will have, 622 00:31:06,960 --> 00:31:08,640 honestly, different shorthands for things. 623 00:31:08,640 --> 00:31:10,360 I've been called on many times when 624 00:31:10,360 --> 00:31:12,920 I say a particular phrase, there's 625 00:31:12,920 --> 00:31:14,920 a ton of ideas associated with that. 626 00:31:14,920 --> 00:31:17,400 When I say we only have one timeline, 627 00:31:17,400 --> 00:31:19,640 I'm actually not just asserting the fact 628 00:31:19,640 --> 00:31:22,160 that, oh, there's only one trend through history. 629 00:31:22,160 --> 00:31:24,800 I'm also talking about the idea that we can't go back 630 00:31:24,800 --> 00:31:27,760 and test every different hypothetical situation 631 00:31:27,760 --> 00:31:30,480 throughout history because as far as I know, 632 00:31:30,480 --> 00:31:32,720 we only have one timeline. 633 00:31:32,720 --> 00:31:36,600 And that shorthand creates the Tower of Babel effect 634 00:31:36,600 --> 00:31:38,760 where people are talking different languages 635 00:31:38,760 --> 00:31:41,040 because they all have different shorthand based off what 636 00:31:41,040 --> 00:31:42,840 subcultures they're a part of. 637 00:31:42,840 --> 00:31:44,920 And like you say, when you force everybody 638 00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:48,400 into this one giant vat of soup, basically, 639 00:31:48,400 --> 00:31:50,000 to have those conversations, they 640 00:31:50,000 --> 00:31:53,560 will become combative because they'll fight for dominance 641 00:31:53,560 --> 00:31:54,440 in that system. 642 00:31:54,440 --> 00:31:57,040 And so how do you deescalate that so that nobody 643 00:31:57,040 --> 00:31:59,000 has to fight? 644 00:31:59,000 --> 00:32:03,680 Right, and a lot of that shorthand is actually 645 00:32:03,680 --> 00:32:05,960 in group testing. 646 00:32:05,960 --> 00:32:08,760 There is a cost associated with it, right? 647 00:32:08,760 --> 00:32:13,680 There's a cost of in-group testing and validation of, 648 00:32:13,680 --> 00:32:16,240 that's a form of sort of public-private key, 649 00:32:16,240 --> 00:32:18,720 in a sense, linguistically. 650 00:32:18,720 --> 00:32:21,560 And if you're going to be in my sphere, 651 00:32:21,560 --> 00:32:23,080 you have to pass this test. 652 00:32:23,080 --> 00:32:26,400 But if everybody's at the Tower of Babel, 653 00:32:26,400 --> 00:32:29,800 then everybody is in each other's sphere. 654 00:32:29,800 --> 00:32:32,400 And suddenly, they're all up in each other's faces. 655 00:32:32,400 --> 00:32:34,080 And you've created this situation 656 00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:38,480 where the weight of all of that becomes perhaps more 657 00:32:38,480 --> 00:32:40,840 than the walls can bear. 658 00:32:40,840 --> 00:32:42,840 And it all comes crashing down. 659 00:32:42,840 --> 00:32:43,960 So you know what? 660 00:32:43,960 --> 00:32:46,640 I didn't know that we were going to get 661 00:32:46,640 --> 00:32:48,600 this level of philosophical about this. 662 00:32:48,600 --> 00:32:50,800 But I actually think that getting 663 00:32:50,800 --> 00:32:53,120 this level of philosophical is where the technology 664 00:32:53,120 --> 00:32:56,440 conversation actually needs to be. 665 00:32:56,440 --> 00:32:58,920 Because we do have a certain number of problems 666 00:32:58,920 --> 00:33:02,520 that we probably simply cannot solve, right? 667 00:33:02,520 --> 00:33:04,440 You have a friend who's just like, I give up. 668 00:33:04,440 --> 00:33:05,960 Yeah. 669 00:33:05,960 --> 00:33:10,080 And I get that. 670 00:33:10,080 --> 00:33:13,240 I never want to be the fatalist. 671 00:33:13,240 --> 00:33:16,400 And I don't believe in the fatalistic future. 672 00:33:16,400 --> 00:33:18,160 I am an optimist. 673 00:33:18,160 --> 00:33:21,880 I do think that these problems are going to come to a head. 674 00:33:21,880 --> 00:33:23,960 And it might be an ugly head. 675 00:33:23,960 --> 00:33:25,360 But that they will come to a head, 676 00:33:25,360 --> 00:33:27,840 and then humanity will get past them. 677 00:33:27,840 --> 00:33:31,840 But I think that it is more likely than not 678 00:33:31,840 --> 00:33:36,680 that we think through what things we can tolerate and live 679 00:33:36,680 --> 00:33:42,000 with and give people asymmetric power advantages, right? 680 00:33:42,000 --> 00:33:44,560 What you never want with a Tower of Babel, 681 00:33:44,560 --> 00:33:47,640 whether or not it collapses, is one person 682 00:33:47,640 --> 00:33:52,960 listening to everyone or one person influencing everyone. 683 00:33:52,960 --> 00:33:53,560 Right. 684 00:33:53,560 --> 00:33:58,200 And to me, to get back to somebody just being 685 00:33:58,200 --> 00:34:00,120 fatalistic about this stuff, I am 686 00:34:00,120 --> 00:34:02,160 a big fan of incremental progress. 687 00:34:02,160 --> 00:34:04,720 I don't have the power to completely re-engineer society, 688 00:34:04,720 --> 00:34:05,960 nor do I want it. 689 00:34:05,960 --> 00:34:09,000 But I do think there's a lot people can do in their own lives, 690 00:34:09,000 --> 00:34:09,880 take step by step. 691 00:34:09,880 --> 00:34:11,600 Oh, I want this to be a little different. 692 00:34:11,600 --> 00:34:12,760 You make that change. 693 00:34:12,760 --> 00:34:15,520 Just because some problems are unsolvable, 694 00:34:15,520 --> 00:34:19,680 it doesn't mean that problems aren't worth solving. 695 00:34:19,680 --> 00:34:20,200 Right. 696 00:34:20,200 --> 00:34:24,160 And even something like Bitcoin, which somebody might say, 697 00:34:24,160 --> 00:34:25,680 well, that's not an incremental step. 698 00:34:25,680 --> 00:34:27,320 That's a monumental step. 699 00:34:27,320 --> 00:34:31,240 Oh, but it involves the incremental step of some number 700 00:34:31,240 --> 00:34:33,960 of hundreds of millions or billions of people 701 00:34:33,960 --> 00:34:36,920 learning that system one by one. 702 00:34:36,920 --> 00:34:40,480 And even if it seems impossible at the very beginning, 703 00:34:40,480 --> 00:34:45,840 oh, you're never going to get everybody to relearn money. 704 00:34:45,840 --> 00:34:47,040 But you know what? 705 00:34:47,040 --> 00:34:50,480 Reality has a funny way of getting people 706 00:34:50,480 --> 00:34:57,280 to do things for their own benefit one step at a time. 707 00:34:57,280 --> 00:35:01,240 When they see it done, when it becomes more ordinary, 708 00:35:01,240 --> 00:35:04,920 when it becomes normalized, and normalization, 709 00:35:04,920 --> 00:35:06,560 well, that's a psychological word 710 00:35:06,560 --> 00:35:09,520 that could be used for things that are improvements 711 00:35:09,520 --> 00:35:10,960 or that are bad. 712 00:35:10,960 --> 00:35:12,720 And maybe I'm wrong about Bitcoin. 713 00:35:12,720 --> 00:35:14,680 Maybe it is something that would also 714 00:35:14,680 --> 00:35:16,640 have to be trashed in order for us to get back 715 00:35:16,640 --> 00:35:18,360 to something ordinary. 716 00:35:18,360 --> 00:35:22,720 But I think that because of what it is, it doesn't need to be. 717 00:35:22,720 --> 00:35:25,200 It doesn't have the problems that we're 718 00:35:25,200 --> 00:35:27,800 talking about right now. 719 00:35:27,800 --> 00:35:32,080 Though I suppose it could have the hardware problem. 720 00:35:32,080 --> 00:35:34,960 I personally have been very concerned of the hardware 721 00:35:34,960 --> 00:35:37,000 side when it comes to Bitcoin. 722 00:35:37,000 --> 00:35:40,000 I mentioned on the other show that I am probably 723 00:35:40,000 --> 00:35:42,520 closer to the big blocker side of the spectrum 724 00:35:42,520 --> 00:35:44,800 just because I think hardware incentives are 725 00:35:44,800 --> 00:35:46,240 very difficult to align. 726 00:35:49,320 --> 00:35:50,840 I'll have to think that one through. 727 00:35:50,840 --> 00:35:53,400 Maybe we'll have a private discussion one day. 728 00:35:53,400 --> 00:35:57,920 Static block size or variable, possibly growing block 729 00:35:57,920 --> 00:36:00,040 size for the blockchain. 730 00:36:00,040 --> 00:36:01,400 It's a challenging conversation. 731 00:36:01,400 --> 00:36:03,240 It's one that I do not feel like I 732 00:36:03,240 --> 00:36:08,360 have a solid enough grasp on to want to have a firm opinion. 733 00:36:08,360 --> 00:36:12,600 Well, I try not to be super dogmatic about things. 734 00:36:12,600 --> 00:36:13,760 I'm not doing myself. 735 00:36:13,760 --> 00:36:15,280 It's the kind of thing that if I was 736 00:36:15,280 --> 00:36:18,400 a core different Bitcoin developer, 737 00:36:18,400 --> 00:36:21,360 I would certainly have stronger feelings about it. 738 00:36:21,360 --> 00:36:24,920 And the thing that I think is important for people to realize 739 00:36:24,920 --> 00:36:26,840 is kind of like what you said where we don't all 740 00:36:26,840 --> 00:36:30,600 need to have the same tune when it comes to different issues. 741 00:36:30,600 --> 00:36:32,560 My personal preference is that we don't all 742 00:36:32,560 --> 00:36:34,240 have to use the same system. 743 00:36:34,240 --> 00:36:35,920 Some people like to use Matrix. 744 00:36:35,920 --> 00:36:38,640 Some people like to use XMPP. 745 00:36:38,640 --> 00:36:41,760 And I think as long as it suits them, that's perfectly fine. 746 00:36:41,760 --> 00:36:43,800 I just think in the dream state, it 747 00:36:43,800 --> 00:36:46,160 would be nice if there was a way to bridge those things 748 00:36:46,160 --> 00:36:49,080 without sacrificing privacy, though there will always 749 00:36:49,080 --> 00:36:53,880 be trade-offs. 750 00:36:53,880 --> 00:36:56,040 Yeah, agreed. 751 00:36:56,040 --> 00:36:58,080 Agreed. 752 00:36:58,080 --> 00:37:08,360 So now I'm in a place of deep thought. 753 00:37:08,360 --> 00:37:11,000 You've brought me to this point where I feel like, oh, 754 00:37:11,000 --> 00:37:12,760 I may have hours of thinking before I 755 00:37:12,760 --> 00:37:15,680 want to come back and ask the next set of questions. 756 00:37:15,680 --> 00:37:17,480 So have we talked about the things 757 00:37:17,480 --> 00:37:19,400 that you wanted to come talk about today? 758 00:37:19,400 --> 00:37:22,760 Or is there another topic that we can just move on? 759 00:37:22,760 --> 00:37:23,760 Yes, actually. 760 00:37:23,760 --> 00:37:24,260 OK. 761 00:37:24,260 --> 00:37:25,800 Let's look at that then, because you've 762 00:37:25,800 --> 00:37:28,120 got me on a path of deep thought where 763 00:37:28,120 --> 00:37:30,960 I want to come back and finish this conversation another day. 764 00:37:30,960 --> 00:37:31,720 But go ahead. 765 00:37:31,720 --> 00:37:34,000 Since you're stronger in the math space, 766 00:37:34,000 --> 00:37:36,000 I'd be curious on your thoughts or even thoughts 767 00:37:36,000 --> 00:37:38,120 you've come across regarding this. 768 00:37:38,120 --> 00:37:41,640 Because right now, the US cybersecurity bill, 769 00:37:41,640 --> 00:37:43,240 something went down the pipe. 770 00:37:43,240 --> 00:37:45,680 And they want every aspect of the federal government 771 00:37:45,680 --> 00:37:48,320 to implement post-quantum encryption. 772 00:37:48,320 --> 00:37:50,360 And I was like, OK, this is interesting. 773 00:37:50,360 --> 00:37:53,840 So if quantum computers are becoming online and encryption. 774 00:37:53,840 --> 00:37:54,360 Wait, wait. 775 00:37:54,360 --> 00:37:55,360 Stop and roll back. 776 00:37:55,360 --> 00:38:00,200 Who wants everyone to adopt post-quantum encryption? 777 00:38:00,200 --> 00:38:03,920 It was some Biden administration proposal. 778 00:38:03,920 --> 00:38:06,520 I don't know if it was a bill or an executive order or something, 779 00:38:06,520 --> 00:38:08,040 but there was something put through 780 00:38:08,040 --> 00:38:10,800 that they want the entire federal government to do. 781 00:38:10,800 --> 00:38:14,920 They want the entire federal government to roll it out. 782 00:38:14,920 --> 00:38:17,400 And to me, this is almost a terrifying signal. 783 00:38:17,400 --> 00:38:17,880 Oh, shoot. 784 00:38:17,880 --> 00:38:20,160 They've broken it already, which I don't know. 785 00:38:20,160 --> 00:38:22,040 Maybe that's not accurate. 786 00:38:22,040 --> 00:38:24,960 But the thing is, I did a bit of a deep dive on, OK, 787 00:38:24,960 --> 00:38:29,080 are there open source post-quantum implementations 788 00:38:29,080 --> 00:38:30,320 available right now? 789 00:38:30,320 --> 00:38:34,560 They exist, but they're slim and not maybe production ready yet. 790 00:38:34,560 --> 00:38:35,060 OK. 791 00:38:35,060 --> 00:38:35,800 I wanted to make that. 792 00:38:35,800 --> 00:38:39,360 Let's stop here and define quantum encryption 793 00:38:39,360 --> 00:38:41,800 and post-quantum encryption. 794 00:38:41,800 --> 00:38:42,300 Right. 795 00:38:42,300 --> 00:38:46,680 So post-quantum is a different set of algorithms 796 00:38:46,680 --> 00:38:50,120 because I don't know much about the cryptography side of this, 797 00:38:50,120 --> 00:38:51,560 which is what I wanted to ask you. 798 00:38:51,560 --> 00:38:55,440 But my understanding is that as quantum computers 799 00:38:55,440 --> 00:38:59,360 gain more qubits and can run these different algorithms that 800 00:38:59,360 --> 00:39:01,160 have already been written for them, 801 00:39:01,160 --> 00:39:04,560 there is the capability to not only break encryption moving 802 00:39:04,560 --> 00:39:06,480 forward, but also break everything 803 00:39:06,480 --> 00:39:08,040 that was encrypted in the past. 804 00:39:08,040 --> 00:39:11,840 When Langley stores everyone's communication through the NSA, 805 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:15,360 suddenly all of that can be broken retroactively 806 00:39:15,360 --> 00:39:17,240 if this is such a game changer. 807 00:39:17,240 --> 00:39:17,760 OK. 808 00:39:17,760 --> 00:39:22,480 So I think this is actually a giant Psyop. 809 00:39:22,480 --> 00:39:24,560 Let's talk about this for a second. 810 00:39:24,560 --> 00:39:27,000 There are people out there who go, oh, quantum computers 811 00:39:27,000 --> 00:39:29,120 are going to break all of encryption, blah, blah, blah, 812 00:39:29,120 --> 00:39:29,840 blah, blah. 813 00:39:29,840 --> 00:39:31,840 And it frustrates me. 814 00:39:31,840 --> 00:39:34,160 I bite my tongue every time I see this conversation. 815 00:39:34,160 --> 00:39:35,880 I want to dive into it. 816 00:39:35,880 --> 00:39:38,720 I reach out online like this person does not 817 00:39:38,720 --> 00:39:40,640 know what quantum computing is. 818 00:39:40,640 --> 00:39:41,920 OK. 819 00:39:41,920 --> 00:39:45,960 Quantum computing is not going to ever break 820 00:39:45,960 --> 00:39:47,880 elliptical cryptography. 821 00:39:47,880 --> 00:39:51,720 And whatever it is the Biden administration is announcing 822 00:39:51,720 --> 00:39:55,360 is probably a giant boondoggle. 823 00:39:55,360 --> 00:40:00,280 And or it is a matter of the intelligence agencies 824 00:40:00,280 --> 00:40:02,960 getting their claws on all of the government 825 00:40:02,960 --> 00:40:05,400 to have all of the information swept into them. 826 00:40:05,400 --> 00:40:06,880 That's what I would suspect. 827 00:40:06,880 --> 00:40:07,800 And I'll explain why. 828 00:40:10,280 --> 00:40:13,880 Within a quantum computer, within a system, 829 00:40:13,880 --> 00:40:18,160 sure, having these quantum states 830 00:40:18,160 --> 00:40:22,200 and seeking wave convergence when 831 00:40:22,200 --> 00:40:26,560 you're locking onto an answer to a difficult math problem, 832 00:40:26,560 --> 00:40:28,680 OK, yeah, within this system there 833 00:40:28,680 --> 00:40:30,520 are things that you can do that you couldn't have 834 00:40:30,520 --> 00:40:32,440 done without that system. 835 00:40:32,440 --> 00:40:36,680 But that has nothing whatsoever to do 836 00:40:36,680 --> 00:40:40,520 with breaking encryption systems as they are today. 837 00:40:40,520 --> 00:40:41,680 And here's why. 838 00:40:41,680 --> 00:40:43,680 No matter what that wave function is doing, 839 00:40:43,680 --> 00:40:46,560 you still have to test a key over here 840 00:40:46,560 --> 00:40:50,800 on this computer that is outside of that system. 841 00:40:50,800 --> 00:40:53,080 And that can only happen discreetly, 842 00:40:53,080 --> 00:40:57,560 as in one set of packets gets sent, answer gets sent back, 843 00:40:57,560 --> 00:40:59,720 did or did not break. 844 00:40:59,720 --> 00:41:02,880 It's still a brute force thing, no matter what is going on 845 00:41:02,880 --> 00:41:05,040 in this quantum computer. 846 00:41:05,040 --> 00:41:06,560 Right? 847 00:41:06,560 --> 00:41:09,920 Imagine simply that you have a quantum brain. 848 00:41:09,920 --> 00:41:13,720 In fact, go a step further. 849 00:41:13,720 --> 00:41:15,960 Go as many steps further as you can. 850 00:41:15,960 --> 00:41:22,080 You have a god brain or something like that. 851 00:41:22,080 --> 00:41:27,000 However you want to define it, but it doesn't mean whatever 852 00:41:27,000 --> 00:41:30,640 it is you can do in that amazing brain, that doesn't mean 853 00:41:30,640 --> 00:41:34,720 that you can enter keys into a computer any faster. 854 00:41:38,080 --> 00:41:41,960 And literally, it's actually a physically, mathematically 855 00:41:41,960 --> 00:41:43,560 limiting problem. 856 00:41:43,560 --> 00:41:47,480 I wrote an article maybe December or January, 857 00:41:47,480 --> 00:41:49,320 monkeys on typewriters. 858 00:41:49,320 --> 00:41:51,240 OK, yes. 859 00:41:51,240 --> 00:41:53,920 And maybe I'll go find that one, because it relates 860 00:41:53,920 --> 00:41:56,280 to what we're talking about. 861 00:41:56,280 --> 00:41:58,160 There is still the physical limitation 862 00:41:58,160 --> 00:42:01,080 of how much energy gets used in that process 863 00:42:01,080 --> 00:42:03,720 and how much time that process will take. 864 00:42:03,720 --> 00:42:09,520 So elliptical curve, elliptical cryptography, 865 00:42:09,520 --> 00:42:13,120 which is where we are right now, that's not ever 866 00:42:13,120 --> 00:42:17,680 going to be hacked unless it is within the quantum computer 867 00:42:17,680 --> 00:42:19,480 itself. 868 00:42:19,480 --> 00:42:24,520 Now, maybe we get into simulation theory 869 00:42:24,520 --> 00:42:26,560 or something like that, but simulation theory 870 00:42:26,560 --> 00:42:29,720 is just like a useless exercise. 871 00:42:29,720 --> 00:42:32,560 I mean, it's a fun exercise to think through. 872 00:42:32,560 --> 00:42:34,840 But whatever it is, it's still the case 873 00:42:34,840 --> 00:42:37,920 that within this simulation, we have no reason 874 00:42:37,920 --> 00:42:43,640 to believe that each piece of it contains 875 00:42:43,640 --> 00:42:48,720 super knowledge of other pieces that are in a separate place. 876 00:42:48,720 --> 00:42:51,600 The reason why I bring it up, because I notice right now 877 00:42:51,600 --> 00:42:54,280 that there's a really useful trend that I think actually 878 00:42:54,280 --> 00:42:54,800 helps. 879 00:42:54,800 --> 00:42:57,640 They're trying to push people onto past keys, where 880 00:42:57,640 --> 00:43:01,000 you use, say, a UB key, which is just a hardware device that you 881 00:43:01,000 --> 00:43:01,880 plug in. 882 00:43:01,880 --> 00:43:03,360 It signs. 883 00:43:03,360 --> 00:43:05,320 It's like a Bitcoin hardware wallet, 884 00:43:05,320 --> 00:43:09,560 where it does the challenge and response for the encryption. 885 00:43:09,560 --> 00:43:10,800 I think that's a really good point. 886 00:43:10,800 --> 00:43:12,720 A Bitcoin hardware wallet is like it. 887 00:43:12,720 --> 00:43:13,600 Well, yeah. 888 00:43:13,600 --> 00:43:15,680 That's a more general thing. 889 00:43:15,680 --> 00:43:16,960 You've got a physical device. 890 00:43:16,960 --> 00:43:18,560 You plug it into a computer. 891 00:43:18,560 --> 00:43:23,920 It has your keys on it for you, because memorizing 892 00:43:23,920 --> 00:43:27,040 36-digit strings of letters and numbers 893 00:43:27,040 --> 00:43:29,840 isn't what most of us do with our spare time. 894 00:43:29,840 --> 00:43:32,080 And I think it's an excellent idea, 895 00:43:32,080 --> 00:43:35,360 because you take the concept of an air gap, a computer that's 896 00:43:35,360 --> 00:43:37,400 not connected to the internet, but then you just 897 00:43:37,400 --> 00:43:40,560 strip out all the parts that you just want for key management. 898 00:43:40,560 --> 00:43:42,760 You really just need it to be able to plug in and say, 899 00:43:42,760 --> 00:43:44,960 hi, I'm the key signer, whatever. 900 00:43:44,960 --> 00:43:47,960 And then you go on your merry way. 901 00:43:47,960 --> 00:43:51,040 Well, I was curious about quantum, 902 00:43:51,040 --> 00:43:52,680 post-quantum encryption, because I 903 00:43:52,680 --> 00:43:55,840 don't have the math background to know how big of a game 904 00:43:55,840 --> 00:43:57,840 changer it was or might not have been. 905 00:43:57,840 --> 00:44:00,920 And would that mean we just simply need longer keys? 906 00:44:00,920 --> 00:44:05,440 Would that mean we do need some kind of post-quantum hardware 907 00:44:05,440 --> 00:44:07,960 device that has a different mechanism? 908 00:44:07,960 --> 00:44:11,480 So if it is just merely the encryption itself being sound, 909 00:44:11,480 --> 00:44:13,360 that's almost a reassurance. 910 00:44:13,360 --> 00:44:14,600 It's amazing watching this. 911 00:44:14,600 --> 00:44:16,640 And this is a good lesson for anybody 912 00:44:16,640 --> 00:44:19,000 who might be out there thinking this problem through. 913 00:44:19,000 --> 00:44:23,320 I don't know if what I said was understandable 914 00:44:23,320 --> 00:44:26,320 to a large audience, but I think so. 915 00:44:26,320 --> 00:44:28,680 It is actually a relatively simple thing to think about. 916 00:44:28,680 --> 00:44:31,320 It doesn't matter what fancy computation is going on 917 00:44:31,320 --> 00:44:32,760 on the quantum computer. 918 00:44:32,760 --> 00:44:36,080 There is still a limitation of how many packets of information 919 00:44:36,080 --> 00:44:37,560 getting sent back and forth. 920 00:44:37,560 --> 00:44:40,000 And that excess computation speed 921 00:44:40,000 --> 00:44:43,600 does not actually speed up those packets at all. 922 00:44:43,600 --> 00:44:47,320 So in a brute forcing process, it doesn't change anything. 923 00:44:47,320 --> 00:44:51,240 And there's no information from the encrypted machine. 924 00:44:51,240 --> 00:44:52,760 These are your secrets, tight fist. 925 00:44:52,760 --> 00:44:53,760 These are the secrets. 926 00:44:53,760 --> 00:44:55,480 This is the quantum computer over here. 927 00:44:59,280 --> 00:45:01,880 Whatever is being processed in the quantum computer 928 00:45:01,880 --> 00:45:05,000 really actually has nothing to do with the machine that's 929 00:45:05,000 --> 00:45:06,360 holding your secrets. 930 00:45:06,360 --> 00:45:08,080 The quantum computer knows nothing more 931 00:45:08,080 --> 00:45:15,680 about the cryptography algorithm or your key or anything else. 932 00:45:15,680 --> 00:45:17,280 Whatever it's computing has nothing 933 00:45:17,280 --> 00:45:20,760 to do with whether or not you can send packets back and forth 934 00:45:20,760 --> 00:45:22,160 to test different passwords. 935 00:45:22,160 --> 00:45:24,280 And you don't get any new information. 936 00:45:24,280 --> 00:45:25,760 There's no new information. 937 00:45:25,760 --> 00:45:31,680 If I test a key, some random key to try to break into your vault, 938 00:45:31,680 --> 00:45:36,560 and I just get a signal back, success or failure, 939 00:45:36,560 --> 00:45:39,280 it's like, how do you process that to compute anything? 940 00:45:39,280 --> 00:45:40,280 There's no information. 941 00:45:40,280 --> 00:45:43,440 It's zero information exchanged. 942 00:45:43,440 --> 00:45:45,440 It's just how fast you can test. 943 00:45:45,440 --> 00:45:51,680 I'd also put out, have you heard of a rainbow table? 944 00:45:51,680 --> 00:45:52,800 What's a rainbow table? 945 00:45:52,800 --> 00:45:55,040 So a rainbow table is something. 946 00:45:55,040 --> 00:45:58,200 So when somebody hacks a site, whether they hack Facebook 947 00:45:58,200 --> 00:46:00,920 and they get their database and they hack some other site, 948 00:46:00,920 --> 00:46:04,280 they get their database, they'll have the passwords 949 00:46:04,280 --> 00:46:05,560 and their hashes. 950 00:46:05,560 --> 00:46:09,400 And what that means is that the hashes 951 00:46:09,400 --> 00:46:11,920 are a way of the site protecting your password. 952 00:46:11,920 --> 00:46:15,080 Because if that site gets hacked and it's your password, 953 00:46:15,080 --> 00:46:16,840 then they can log into all the other websites 954 00:46:16,840 --> 00:46:17,960 with your password. 955 00:46:17,960 --> 00:46:20,000 So the industry standard is that you hash it 956 00:46:20,000 --> 00:46:21,760 so that it's not your password. 957 00:46:21,760 --> 00:46:24,440 It's just another random string based off 958 00:46:24,440 --> 00:46:26,200 these kind of encryption methods. 959 00:46:26,200 --> 00:46:28,400 The problem with this, though, is 960 00:46:28,400 --> 00:46:30,400 that there are pre-computed hashes put 961 00:46:30,400 --> 00:46:33,400 in these rainbow tables, which are, OK, this is the hash. 962 00:46:33,400 --> 00:46:34,240 Here is the answer. 963 00:46:34,240 --> 00:46:36,160 And you have this huge table of that. 964 00:46:36,160 --> 00:46:38,480 And this is the seed problem we were discussing earlier. 965 00:46:38,480 --> 00:46:39,000 Right. 966 00:46:39,000 --> 00:46:40,080 I'm going there. 967 00:46:40,080 --> 00:46:43,840 And so the problem, I think, that quantum computers 968 00:46:43,840 --> 00:46:47,320 will present is that they may be faster at generating 969 00:46:47,320 --> 00:46:48,000 these tables. 970 00:46:48,000 --> 00:46:49,160 I don't know. 971 00:46:49,160 --> 00:46:52,320 And that's the threat mechanism that intuitively 972 00:46:52,320 --> 00:46:54,160 makes the most sense to me based off 973 00:46:54,160 --> 00:46:56,760 how I understand they work, which is not very solid, 974 00:46:56,760 --> 00:46:59,080 I will admit. 975 00:46:59,080 --> 00:46:59,720 OK. 976 00:46:59,720 --> 00:47:08,560 So it does present a challenge for this still just 977 00:47:08,560 --> 00:47:13,520 seems like a problem of collecting hash information. 978 00:47:13,520 --> 00:47:14,760 Right. 979 00:47:14,760 --> 00:47:18,120 That's still not internal to a quantum computer. 980 00:47:18,120 --> 00:47:21,840 But is a quantum computer going to be able to? 981 00:47:21,840 --> 00:47:24,160 Now, I still think that hash information is still 982 00:47:24,160 --> 00:47:26,120 just the same thing as getting the packet back 983 00:47:26,120 --> 00:47:29,320 that says success or failure. 984 00:47:29,320 --> 00:47:38,120 But if the hashes are applied to everybody in the same way, 985 00:47:38,120 --> 00:47:41,120 then you can eventually collect a lot of information 986 00:47:41,120 --> 00:47:45,680 that may tell you how you're going to proceed with the hash. 987 00:47:45,680 --> 00:47:48,800 So I'll think about that. 988 00:47:48,800 --> 00:47:50,720 The thing that I find interesting about this 989 00:47:50,720 --> 00:47:52,880 is that when we're talking about quantum computing, 990 00:47:52,880 --> 00:47:54,680 your average hacker on the internet 991 00:47:54,680 --> 00:47:58,120 is not going to have those kind of resources even anytime soon. 992 00:47:58,120 --> 00:48:00,400 This is nation state level stuff. 993 00:48:00,400 --> 00:48:02,120 And so when it comes to quantum computing, 994 00:48:02,120 --> 00:48:05,080 I think the aspect of it that is most interesting 995 00:48:05,080 --> 00:48:07,760 is how it will play into geopolitical events. 996 00:48:07,760 --> 00:48:10,920 Because say, even they may not be able to break encryption. 997 00:48:10,920 --> 00:48:15,080 But if they can use techniques like that to discover patterns, 998 00:48:15,080 --> 00:48:17,400 that's a very valuable tool in this kind 999 00:48:17,400 --> 00:48:21,120 of global cyber warfare game, which is one of the disasters 1000 00:48:21,120 --> 00:48:22,360 they plan on. 1001 00:48:22,360 --> 00:48:23,840 They have signaled that they will use 1002 00:48:23,840 --> 00:48:25,640 to try to gain more control. 1003 00:48:25,640 --> 00:48:28,120 And so I'm personally very worried 1004 00:48:28,120 --> 00:48:30,560 that they will try to say that the internet is basically 1005 00:48:30,560 --> 00:48:31,320 a battleground. 1006 00:48:31,320 --> 00:48:33,880 And like you said, how there's a healthy way people 1007 00:48:33,880 --> 00:48:36,560 can withdraw from the internet and find their own healthy 1008 00:48:36,560 --> 00:48:40,360 balance with what they can have a healthy life with. 1009 00:48:40,360 --> 00:48:43,120 I feel like there's also the turbo opposite, where 1010 00:48:43,120 --> 00:48:44,960 the plan is basically is that they 1011 00:48:44,960 --> 00:48:47,240 will want to have complete control because it's now 1012 00:48:47,240 --> 00:48:48,520 a strategic resource. 1013 00:48:48,520 --> 00:48:51,160 And having people sucked into the matrix 1014 00:48:51,160 --> 00:48:53,440 is one of those strategic resources 1015 00:48:53,440 --> 00:48:56,840 in the greater geopolitical games. 1016 00:48:56,840 --> 00:48:57,560 Right. 1017 00:48:57,560 --> 00:49:04,920 And this is where fifth generation warfare 1018 00:49:04,920 --> 00:49:06,840 is taking place. 1019 00:49:06,840 --> 00:49:12,720 And it keeps people from having the same levels of local trust 1020 00:49:12,720 --> 00:49:14,880 outside of it once they leave. 1021 00:49:14,880 --> 00:49:17,440 You leave the internet, you have a different idea 1022 00:49:17,440 --> 00:49:20,880 as to who your friends and enemies are. 1023 00:49:20,880 --> 00:49:27,040 Even worse, you have the, we'll insert Matthias Desmond here, 1024 00:49:27,040 --> 00:49:29,440 even though I'm not a fan of his theory on the whole, 1025 00:49:29,440 --> 00:49:33,200 but I'm a fan of thinking about free-floating anxiety 1026 00:49:33,200 --> 00:49:37,600 and free-floating stresses. 1027 00:49:37,600 --> 00:49:40,920 You come away thinking there are enemies out there, 1028 00:49:40,920 --> 00:49:43,440 but you don't even know who they are. 1029 00:49:43,440 --> 00:49:46,760 And I think this keeps people from gathering in groups 1030 00:49:46,760 --> 00:49:47,720 locally. 1031 00:49:47,720 --> 00:49:50,880 It keeps people from walking to the local pub, necessarily, 1032 00:49:50,880 --> 00:49:53,600 and being able to have a conversation with people 1033 00:49:53,600 --> 00:49:56,360 because you now have to be more guarded 1034 00:49:56,360 --> 00:49:58,160 about your conversations, just whatever 1035 00:49:58,160 --> 00:50:00,680 it is you might think about the world than you used to have 1036 00:50:00,680 --> 00:50:02,040 to be. 1037 00:50:02,040 --> 00:50:03,080 Yeah. 1038 00:50:03,080 --> 00:50:06,680 People have taken their interactions from the matrix 1039 00:50:06,680 --> 00:50:12,000 and they have, it is the Tower of Babel, like we said. 1040 00:50:12,000 --> 00:50:14,480 They have created their own language 1041 00:50:14,480 --> 00:50:18,680 with which to test anyone entering their bubble. 1042 00:50:18,680 --> 00:50:20,760 Yeah, and I feel that on a real, when 1043 00:50:20,760 --> 00:50:23,520 I talk to anyone who is significantly older than me, 1044 00:50:23,520 --> 00:50:25,480 there is a real disconnect where I'm like, 1045 00:50:25,480 --> 00:50:28,360 we did not live in the same world growing up. 1046 00:50:28,360 --> 00:50:31,240 I don't believe I grew up in the same world as, say, 1047 00:50:31,240 --> 00:50:32,560 my grandparents. 1048 00:50:32,560 --> 00:50:34,520 It is really night and day. 1049 00:50:34,520 --> 00:50:37,840 And I used to wonder how much, whether it's accelerating 1050 00:50:37,840 --> 00:50:41,920 or not, like whether, say, someone my grandchildren's age 1051 00:50:41,920 --> 00:50:44,040 kind of, you know, in eventuality. 1052 00:50:44,040 --> 00:50:46,360 And I don't think it's slowed down currently, honestly. 1053 00:50:46,360 --> 00:50:49,000 I do think I may be as out of touch 1054 00:50:49,000 --> 00:50:51,360 with the state of reality for my grandchildren 1055 00:50:51,360 --> 00:50:53,440 as I, you know, grandparents would be for me. 1056 00:50:56,560 --> 00:50:59,120 Hmm. 1057 00:50:59,120 --> 00:51:02,120 You know, I didn't know where this conversation would go 1058 00:51:02,120 --> 00:51:03,560 or what it would make me think about. 1059 00:51:03,560 --> 00:51:08,640 But I am thinking about the possibility of the whole world 1060 00:51:08,640 --> 00:51:12,240 rebelling by saying we're going to use computers 1061 00:51:12,240 --> 00:51:14,320 to do fewer things. 1062 00:51:14,320 --> 00:51:17,800 We're going to define what those things are. 1063 00:51:17,800 --> 00:51:21,760 And maybe the definitions of those things 1064 00:51:21,760 --> 00:51:25,160 are where we don't have to worry about the more 1065 00:51:25,160 --> 00:51:28,000 significant problems of, you know, 1066 00:51:28,000 --> 00:51:31,640 a chip being inserted somewhere in the supply chain 1067 00:51:31,640 --> 00:51:34,480 that automatically leeches, you know, 1068 00:51:34,480 --> 00:51:36,600 asymmetrically gathers information 1069 00:51:36,600 --> 00:51:38,960 for, you know, one giant actor. 1070 00:51:38,960 --> 00:51:41,120 Of course, there are only a few places in the world 1071 00:51:41,120 --> 00:51:44,000 where, like, ASICs are even built, right? 1072 00:51:44,000 --> 00:51:45,960 There's only a few places, I mean, technically, 1073 00:51:45,960 --> 00:51:47,480 there's only a few places in the world 1074 00:51:47,480 --> 00:51:51,000 where computer chips are made. 1075 00:51:51,000 --> 00:51:53,520 You have to have clean floor. 1076 00:51:53,520 --> 00:51:55,200 You're handling a lot of chemicals. 1077 00:51:55,200 --> 00:51:56,560 These are toxic chemicals. 1078 00:51:56,560 --> 00:51:59,640 You've got to be able to ventilate in a responsible way. 1079 00:51:59,640 --> 00:52:03,600 So, you know, maybe there are just a few dozen factories 1080 00:52:03,600 --> 00:52:05,520 in the world that even make computer chips. 1081 00:52:05,520 --> 00:52:08,800 And the number that make these ASIC processors 1082 00:52:08,800 --> 00:52:11,560 that are used for just hashing, like, 1083 00:52:11,560 --> 00:52:16,200 would be used to generate the Bitcoin network. 1084 00:52:16,200 --> 00:52:18,280 I don't even know what the number is. 1085 00:52:18,280 --> 00:52:19,800 Is it two? 1086 00:52:19,800 --> 00:52:21,600 Is it three? 1087 00:52:21,600 --> 00:52:24,280 Certainly not many, that's for sure. 1088 00:52:24,280 --> 00:52:26,800 Yeah, and this is where you could 1089 00:52:26,800 --> 00:52:32,680 have the possibility of somebody inserting something in there. 1090 00:52:32,680 --> 00:52:35,200 And maybe they can. 1091 00:52:35,200 --> 00:52:37,440 This is something we're thinking through. 1092 00:52:37,440 --> 00:52:39,440 You know, we started this conversation 1093 00:52:39,440 --> 00:52:40,960 with, like, end-to-end encryption 1094 00:52:40,960 --> 00:52:43,000 and just, like, how do we protect our information 1095 00:52:43,000 --> 00:52:43,960 from chats? 1096 00:52:43,960 --> 00:52:46,200 But that's where the exploration gets us, 1097 00:52:46,200 --> 00:52:49,840 where we have to think on a hardware level. 1098 00:52:49,840 --> 00:52:54,960 So I'm going to rewind the conversation then. 1099 00:52:54,960 --> 00:53:01,000 My hope is that we are able to make use of mass pools of data. 1100 00:53:01,000 --> 00:53:04,880 But my worry is that the way that we have gone currently 1101 00:53:04,880 --> 00:53:08,720 is that that data is dramatically centralized. 1102 00:53:08,720 --> 00:53:11,080 And we don't even know the degree to centralization, 1103 00:53:11,080 --> 00:53:11,320 right? 1104 00:53:11,320 --> 00:53:13,440 I mean, we do know that there are probably 1105 00:53:13,440 --> 00:53:15,840 10 to 20 corporations out there who 1106 00:53:15,840 --> 00:53:17,600 have massive pools of data. 1107 00:53:17,600 --> 00:53:19,480 Maybe it's like a power law distribution. 1108 00:53:19,480 --> 00:53:21,680 You know, who knows who has the most data? 1109 00:53:21,680 --> 00:53:25,640 If it's Apple or Facebook or Google, probably Google, 1110 00:53:25,640 --> 00:53:26,720 I would think. 1111 00:53:26,720 --> 00:53:31,600 But whoever has, like, the greatest amount of data, 1112 00:53:31,600 --> 00:53:34,040 or actually, it's probably the government. 1113 00:53:34,040 --> 00:53:35,360 I don't know why I said Google. 1114 00:53:35,360 --> 00:53:36,200 That makes no sense. 1115 00:53:36,200 --> 00:53:38,400 It's probably the US government. 1116 00:53:38,400 --> 00:53:40,960 Well, yeah. 1117 00:53:40,960 --> 00:53:42,920 So we have these massive pools of data. 1118 00:53:42,920 --> 00:53:45,240 And that should worry people. 1119 00:53:45,240 --> 00:53:45,760 It should. 1120 00:53:45,760 --> 00:53:49,000 Worry people, because it gives a very small people 1121 00:53:49,000 --> 00:53:52,200 a high degree of control about what's going on. 1122 00:53:52,200 --> 00:53:57,960 Or possibly the internet warfare era that we're seeing, 1123 00:53:57,960 --> 00:54:01,960 where just everything is like bullets and sharp knives going 1124 00:54:01,960 --> 00:54:03,400 back and forth. 1125 00:54:03,400 --> 00:54:07,200 Maybe that's actually the necessary defense 1126 00:54:07,200 --> 00:54:09,680 that your second, third, or fourth corporation 1127 00:54:09,680 --> 00:54:14,440 on the totem pole would have to play in order 1128 00:54:14,440 --> 00:54:18,320 to not have an asymmetric, like a winner-take-all advantage 1129 00:54:18,320 --> 00:54:19,560 over that system. 1130 00:54:19,560 --> 00:54:23,040 Is there necessary sort of like a combat of the mind, 1131 00:54:23,040 --> 00:54:29,240 like death by a trillion or quadrillion cuts, right, 1132 00:54:29,240 --> 00:54:31,800 effect going on with the internet 1133 00:54:31,800 --> 00:54:35,680 on the psyche of the average person making use of it 1134 00:54:35,680 --> 00:54:37,920 because of this? 1135 00:54:37,920 --> 00:54:41,440 So where am I going with this? 1136 00:54:41,440 --> 00:54:45,520 Well, I think they absolutely benefit from the control side 1137 00:54:45,520 --> 00:54:46,000 of it. 1138 00:54:46,000 --> 00:54:50,640 And in a geopolitical game, it may be seen as a fair trade. 1139 00:54:50,640 --> 00:54:52,200 Oh, we get to keep our way of life. 1140 00:54:52,200 --> 00:54:55,280 And sorry, we have to do this to you. 1141 00:54:55,280 --> 00:54:58,120 But the other side of it is on top of the way you said, 1142 00:54:58,120 --> 00:55:01,760 like, oh, it would be nice if we had a different way of managing 1143 00:55:01,760 --> 00:55:02,520 the data. 1144 00:55:02,520 --> 00:55:06,400 I would argue if we were truly using this data for something 1145 00:55:06,400 --> 00:55:08,520 to actually help people as opposed 1146 00:55:08,520 --> 00:55:12,160 to wage these kind of control war games, 1147 00:55:12,160 --> 00:55:15,560 I believe the data itself, we would have different data 1148 00:55:15,560 --> 00:55:16,840 being collected. 1149 00:55:16,840 --> 00:55:20,000 For instance, a lot of these Fitbit trackers, they're neat. 1150 00:55:20,000 --> 00:55:22,040 But I don't know how comprehensive 1151 00:55:22,040 --> 00:55:26,080 that is for actually building healthier and happier people. 1152 00:55:26,080 --> 00:55:27,760 As far as I can tell, your heart rate 1153 00:55:27,760 --> 00:55:30,400 is really just a good proxy for your emotional state, 1154 00:55:30,400 --> 00:55:33,320 which having that on a good segment of the population 1155 00:55:33,320 --> 00:55:35,400 as you roll out these mass fear campaigns 1156 00:55:35,400 --> 00:55:37,680 would be a really effective information to have, 1157 00:55:37,680 --> 00:55:40,160 especially in real time as you're doing it. 1158 00:55:40,160 --> 00:55:43,600 Whereas I think if there was this more holistic approach 1159 00:55:43,600 --> 00:55:46,520 to people voluntarily choosing what's shared 1160 00:55:46,520 --> 00:55:50,200 and there being more information on how it's being used 1161 00:55:50,200 --> 00:55:52,600 and techniques to use it properly, 1162 00:55:52,600 --> 00:55:54,800 things would go very differently. 1163 00:55:54,800 --> 00:55:57,640 And an example of this is I think 1164 00:55:57,640 --> 00:56:00,160 this is, again, where I think AI models may actually 1165 00:56:00,160 --> 00:56:02,760 have a real legitimate use because a lot of things 1166 00:56:02,760 --> 00:56:04,200 are individualized. 1167 00:56:04,200 --> 00:56:06,760 If you're training data to work with, say, 1168 00:56:06,760 --> 00:56:10,800 somebody's ability to run faster, as a silly example here, 1169 00:56:10,800 --> 00:56:14,160 I can see a scenario where the data that's 1170 00:56:14,160 --> 00:56:16,080 like every other runner throughout history 1171 00:56:16,080 --> 00:56:18,640 can only help you so much because you're 1172 00:56:18,640 --> 00:56:21,120 a different being than all those other runners. 1173 00:56:21,120 --> 00:56:23,760 And so a model that's trained to suit you 1174 00:56:23,760 --> 00:56:25,380 would be something, first of all, you'd 1175 00:56:25,380 --> 00:56:27,040 want to keep very private because that's 1176 00:56:27,040 --> 00:56:28,600 very sensitive information. 1177 00:56:28,600 --> 00:56:31,120 But if you're going down that road, 1178 00:56:31,120 --> 00:56:34,160 you would still have insights to share 1179 00:56:34,160 --> 00:56:36,320 to the wider community. 1180 00:56:36,320 --> 00:56:38,400 But that's something you want control of, 1181 00:56:38,400 --> 00:56:41,120 not something you want imposed on people. 1182 00:56:41,120 --> 00:56:43,080 And suddenly there are these individual models 1183 00:56:43,080 --> 00:56:45,000 that are just a representation of you 1184 00:56:45,000 --> 00:56:48,720 to this terrifying system. 1185 00:56:48,720 --> 00:56:50,040 Interesting. 1186 00:56:50,040 --> 00:56:54,680 Have you ever seen that, do you know who Hussein Bolt is? 1187 00:56:54,680 --> 00:56:55,920 Yes. 1188 00:56:55,920 --> 00:56:58,360 There's an article that somebody wrote a few years ago 1189 00:56:58,360 --> 00:57:02,000 saying that if you looked at running performance 1190 00:57:02,000 --> 00:57:07,720 under a certain model, and we can see the records getting 1191 00:57:07,720 --> 00:57:10,920 better and better, like rate of running the 100 meter dash 1192 00:57:10,920 --> 00:57:13,440 or 200 or 400 meter dash has been going up, 1193 00:57:13,440 --> 00:57:15,920 historically, the fastest runner in the world. 1194 00:57:15,920 --> 00:57:19,240 And then if you plotted that as a certain function, 1195 00:57:19,240 --> 00:57:22,800 and you get limiting returns, we're 1196 00:57:22,800 --> 00:57:27,120 never going to see any human, at least as we define humans, 1197 00:57:27,120 --> 00:57:30,600 run a 200 meter dash in five seconds. 1198 00:57:30,600 --> 00:57:34,000 It's going to be getting better than 20 seconds is real 1199 00:57:34,000 --> 00:57:36,440 difficult, real difficult. 1200 00:57:36,440 --> 00:57:39,760 But that Hussein Bolt already was faster 1201 00:57:39,760 --> 00:57:42,240 than the models predicted any human would ever be. 1202 00:57:42,240 --> 00:57:43,240 Wow. 1203 00:57:43,240 --> 00:57:45,520 Which was really, really fascinating, right? 1204 00:57:45,520 --> 00:57:48,960 You have such an outlier case. 1205 00:57:48,960 --> 00:57:52,080 And then somebody studied who was it 1206 00:57:52,080 --> 00:57:53,960 who would set these records over the years. 1207 00:57:53,960 --> 00:57:55,360 One of the things that they noticed 1208 00:57:55,360 --> 00:58:01,680 was it was generally a younger brother in a large family. 1209 00:58:01,680 --> 00:58:04,240 And I can't remember where Hussein Bolt is, 1210 00:58:04,240 --> 00:58:09,320 but my fuzzy memory is that he was like the seventh child. 1211 00:58:09,320 --> 00:58:14,240 He had all these older siblings growing up in Jamaica. 1212 00:58:14,240 --> 00:58:16,760 And in the neighborhood, I'm sure you've 1213 00:58:16,760 --> 00:58:19,360 got your 20 kids who get together and play soccer 1214 00:58:19,360 --> 00:58:23,320 or run around and do whatever it is that they're doing. 1215 00:58:23,320 --> 00:58:26,840 And so when you have the youngest one, 1216 00:58:26,840 --> 00:58:32,360 in order to even participate, they're having to run faster. 1217 00:58:32,360 --> 00:58:36,000 From the age of like three, that kid 1218 00:58:36,000 --> 00:58:40,360 is having to exercise and learn a different level of movement 1219 00:58:40,360 --> 00:58:43,600 that almost any other human will ever even think about. 1220 00:58:43,600 --> 00:58:46,400 And they're putting their whole heart into it 1221 00:58:46,400 --> 00:58:49,000 because that three-year-old wants to be 1222 00:58:49,000 --> 00:58:51,600 with his older brothers. 1223 00:58:51,600 --> 00:58:52,920 It's a good feeling, right? 1224 00:58:52,920 --> 00:58:55,440 And so you know what? 1225 00:58:55,440 --> 00:58:58,560 I think that we are likely going to find. 1226 00:58:58,560 --> 00:59:01,720 I think that we could almost skip to the end. 1227 00:59:01,720 --> 00:59:06,000 We're likely going to find that 99.99% of the information 1228 00:59:06,000 --> 00:59:07,880 that we pass back and forth on the internet 1229 00:59:07,880 --> 00:59:11,800 is completely useless at best. 1230 00:59:11,800 --> 00:59:14,440 So I think that you're going down the right path exploring 1231 00:59:14,440 --> 00:59:15,160 this. 1232 00:59:15,160 --> 00:59:21,000 But it may be that for something like possible drug 1233 00:59:21,000 --> 00:59:24,080 interactions, we did once upon a time 1234 00:59:24,080 --> 00:59:28,600 find out that the bark of the chinchona tree in Peru 1235 00:59:28,600 --> 00:59:31,200 or South America, several places in South America, 1236 00:59:31,200 --> 00:59:34,200 now they've got huge fields of them in India 1237 00:59:34,200 --> 00:59:36,560 where they make medicines out of them. 1238 00:59:36,560 --> 00:59:39,920 But that the bark of this one tree 1239 00:59:39,920 --> 00:59:44,360 would help with malaria or things 1240 00:59:44,360 --> 00:59:47,760 that cause similar symptoms, fever, such things, 1241 00:59:47,760 --> 00:59:53,160 that you can grind it up, maybe take it like a tea 1242 00:59:53,160 --> 00:59:54,080 or something like that. 1243 00:59:54,080 --> 00:59:57,680 And that would help people maybe just prevent deaths, period, 1244 00:59:57,680 --> 01:00:00,120 at times, right? 1245 01:00:00,120 --> 01:00:04,520 What is it that we do when we like there are a lot of things 1246 01:00:04,520 --> 01:00:06,760 that we can explore in the world? 1247 01:00:06,760 --> 01:00:08,760 Can we grind up this plant, that plant? 1248 01:00:08,760 --> 01:00:14,800 Will it help us avoid certain illnesses that are just, 1249 01:00:14,800 --> 01:00:17,400 you know, mosquitoes are going to be there? 1250 01:00:17,400 --> 01:00:19,080 I actually think that it's almost 1251 01:00:19,080 --> 01:00:23,400 folly to even think about trying to make the mosquitoes extinct 1252 01:00:23,400 --> 01:00:25,400 because with the technology that they're 1253 01:00:25,400 --> 01:00:28,320 using to try to do that, gene drive editing, 1254 01:00:28,320 --> 01:00:30,360 well, that's the same technology that 1255 01:00:30,360 --> 01:00:33,160 steers toward being able to edit human beings. 1256 01:00:33,160 --> 01:00:36,040 And then suddenly, you've got asymmetric control over whether 1257 01:00:36,040 --> 01:00:37,880 or not people even live or die. 1258 01:00:37,880 --> 01:00:40,920 And that's a real scary proposition. 1259 01:00:40,920 --> 01:00:44,560 But if we were to just nuke most of the information 1260 01:00:44,560 --> 01:00:49,640 on the internet and go back to thinking about, hey, 1261 01:00:49,640 --> 01:00:54,200 we do like transmission of data, right? 1262 01:00:54,200 --> 01:00:59,800 Maybe we should only do it when there is, 1263 01:00:59,800 --> 01:01:06,000 when we have good control over the level of information 1264 01:01:06,000 --> 01:01:09,520 that we're sharing, like as in everything from my end, 1265 01:01:09,520 --> 01:01:14,040 from my Fitbit, whatever it is, that not to even be made 1266 01:01:14,040 --> 01:01:17,320 by anybody that we would pass our key to, 1267 01:01:17,320 --> 01:01:21,920 or to have good control over how it's made. 1268 01:01:21,920 --> 01:01:24,760 And it could be so simple too, right? 1269 01:01:24,760 --> 01:01:27,560 Kind of like thinking of a Raspberry Pi versus a computer, 1270 01:01:27,560 --> 01:01:31,320 it may be checkable that this is tampered with. 1271 01:01:31,320 --> 01:01:32,640 If it's that simple. 1272 01:01:32,640 --> 01:01:35,480 I'm a big fan of keeping things simple that way, 1273 01:01:35,480 --> 01:01:38,000 especially in the hardware domain. 1274 01:01:38,000 --> 01:01:41,440 Because smartphones are such a fantastic example 1275 01:01:41,440 --> 01:01:43,040 where this has gone wrong. 1276 01:01:43,040 --> 01:01:45,720 Because you have all these devices that are made useless. 1277 01:01:45,720 --> 01:01:49,400 The moment their battery that is really difficult to replace 1278 01:01:49,400 --> 01:01:50,760 goes kaput. 1279 01:01:50,760 --> 01:01:53,400 Yes, there are ways to repair and replace them. 1280 01:01:53,400 --> 01:01:55,920 And where possible, I recommend doing it. 1281 01:01:55,920 --> 01:01:58,880 But the challenge is there is a ton of waste involved 1282 01:01:58,880 --> 01:02:00,800 with these what I call Omni devices. 1283 01:02:00,800 --> 01:02:03,080 Really, in my opinion, a smartphone really 1284 01:02:03,080 --> 01:02:06,840 should just be a touchscreen that acts as a remote 1285 01:02:06,840 --> 01:02:07,960 for your other devices. 1286 01:02:07,960 --> 01:02:10,280 To me, that is the optimal use of that interface. 1287 01:02:10,280 --> 01:02:11,440 Because a lot of people are used to that. 1288 01:02:11,440 --> 01:02:14,480 And it does seem to actually help in a lot of scenarios. 1289 01:02:14,480 --> 01:02:16,640 But the problem is when you pack on a big computer, 1290 01:02:16,640 --> 01:02:19,440 you pack on all these surveillance devices, 1291 01:02:19,440 --> 01:02:22,520 the GPS, the recording, the microphone. 1292 01:02:22,520 --> 01:02:23,960 All of those could be external. 1293 01:02:23,960 --> 01:02:26,480 We don't need devices that do everything. 1294 01:02:26,480 --> 01:02:28,400 I think part of this model of how 1295 01:02:28,400 --> 01:02:31,600 we get into a better balance with technology 1296 01:02:31,600 --> 01:02:34,800 involves disintermediating the devices themselves. 1297 01:02:34,800 --> 01:02:37,600 Now, I get that people prefer things to be wireless. 1298 01:02:37,600 --> 01:02:41,720 But it is entirely possible to build almost like they're 1299 01:02:41,720 --> 01:02:43,480 wireless mice and keyboards. 1300 01:02:43,480 --> 01:02:45,760 You could add different things to that protocol. 1301 01:02:45,760 --> 01:02:47,440 And then you could keep that private 1302 01:02:47,440 --> 01:02:49,840 by having some sort of encryption mechanism 1303 01:02:49,840 --> 01:02:51,280 on those signals itself. 1304 01:02:51,280 --> 01:02:52,440 So it could still be personal. 1305 01:02:52,440 --> 01:02:53,880 It could still be convenient. 1306 01:02:53,880 --> 01:02:56,480 But suddenly, your microphone isn't 1307 01:02:56,480 --> 01:02:58,080 built into every one of your devices. 1308 01:02:58,080 --> 01:02:59,120 Your TV's spying on you. 1309 01:02:59,120 --> 01:03:00,400 Your toaster's spying on you. 1310 01:03:00,400 --> 01:03:01,200 You know, whatever. 1311 01:03:01,200 --> 01:03:04,640 Let's go back to single use appliances, single use devices, 1312 01:03:04,640 --> 01:03:06,480 and just take the lessons we've learned on how 1313 01:03:06,480 --> 01:03:08,000 to make them more convenient. 1314 01:03:08,000 --> 01:03:10,880 NFC tags are actually really interesting things 1315 01:03:10,880 --> 01:03:11,640 on their own. 1316 01:03:11,640 --> 01:03:14,280 They're just a little microchip RFID thing 1317 01:03:14,280 --> 01:03:16,840 that you can attach as a sticker to something. 1318 01:03:16,840 --> 01:03:19,960 And it says, you can assign whatever arbitrary data 1319 01:03:19,960 --> 01:03:20,760 you want to it. 1320 01:03:20,760 --> 01:03:23,220 But then anything that can read it, figure out what it is. 1321 01:03:23,220 --> 01:03:26,280 So a really simple example of how this could be leveraged 1322 01:03:26,280 --> 01:03:30,240 that way is, say you have this television in a room. 1323 01:03:30,240 --> 01:03:32,640 And if you've ever used Chromecast, 1324 01:03:32,640 --> 01:03:36,640 you can put whatever video is on your phone on the television. 1325 01:03:36,640 --> 01:03:39,320 And with these kind of NFC tags, you 1326 01:03:39,320 --> 01:03:42,480 could have the TV itself say, oh, I'm this TV. 1327 01:03:42,480 --> 01:03:43,600 This is my address. 1328 01:03:43,600 --> 01:03:46,160 You tap your what I would call remote instead 1329 01:03:46,160 --> 01:03:46,800 of a smartphone. 1330 01:03:46,800 --> 01:03:48,880 You would tap your remote to it and then say, OK, 1331 01:03:48,880 --> 01:03:50,320 play this video now. 1332 01:03:50,320 --> 01:03:54,160 And that doesn't need all this crazy spyware and tracking. 1333 01:03:54,160 --> 01:03:56,720 And even honestly, some of the software overhead 1334 01:03:56,720 --> 01:03:58,640 that exists with many of these devices, 1335 01:03:58,640 --> 01:04:00,560 because you build things for a purpose. 1336 01:04:00,560 --> 01:04:02,020 And then like you say, it's easier 1337 01:04:02,020 --> 01:04:04,720 to verify it for that purpose instead of, oh, 1338 01:04:04,720 --> 01:04:06,440 we've got this device that does everything, 1339 01:04:06,440 --> 01:04:09,520 and we need to verify it against x, y, and z now. 1340 01:04:09,520 --> 01:04:11,520 And for those people out there who are not yet 1341 01:04:11,520 --> 01:04:15,120 afraid that their TV is spying on them, 1342 01:04:15,120 --> 01:04:17,280 I have this to say. 1343 01:04:17,280 --> 01:04:22,640 Today it's your TV, but your toaster, that's vicious. 1344 01:04:22,640 --> 01:04:25,600 Your toaster handles your food. 1345 01:04:25,600 --> 01:04:28,520 It also has a really bad attitude. 1346 01:04:28,520 --> 01:04:30,400 You're not used to checking. 1347 01:04:30,400 --> 01:04:32,200 You're not used to talking with your toaster. 1348 01:04:32,200 --> 01:04:36,720 But something out there will bite you in a different way 1349 01:04:36,720 --> 01:04:39,520 that you might not even be thinking about right now 1350 01:04:39,520 --> 01:04:42,720 with your information. 1351 01:04:42,720 --> 01:04:45,160 And the big example of that is everybody talking about 1352 01:04:45,160 --> 01:04:46,800 the thermostats being turned down, 1353 01:04:46,800 --> 01:04:49,800 because the region is like, oh, we need the electricity. 1354 01:04:49,800 --> 01:04:52,120 We need to save on the climate. 1355 01:04:52,120 --> 01:04:55,120 When you hand control over by building back doors 1356 01:04:55,120 --> 01:04:57,400 into systems, that is what will happen. 1357 01:04:57,400 --> 01:05:00,480 They will use them to their benefit rather than the user's 1358 01:05:00,480 --> 01:05:01,960 benefit. 1359 01:05:01,960 --> 01:05:04,340 And you don't even know that they're 1360 01:05:04,340 --> 01:05:08,000 going to use it to save climate change. 1361 01:05:08,000 --> 01:05:10,320 That sounds like one of those things where you're getting 1362 01:05:10,320 --> 01:05:13,120 a 0.1% advantage. 1363 01:05:13,120 --> 01:05:16,360 A lot of people don't even know that the vast majority 1364 01:05:16,360 --> 01:05:17,840 of all the carbon that's produced 1365 01:05:17,840 --> 01:05:21,960 is produced by governments and militaries. 1366 01:05:21,960 --> 01:05:26,120 I shouldn't say vast majority, but the strict majority. 1367 01:05:26,120 --> 01:05:29,360 Whatever they're doing in your home with your thermostat, 1368 01:05:29,360 --> 01:05:31,200 that's not what it's about. 1369 01:05:31,200 --> 01:05:31,920 No. 1370 01:05:31,920 --> 01:05:35,640 They are more likely, probably, to maximize their own profit 1371 01:05:35,640 --> 01:05:39,920 level by futzing with your thermostat 1372 01:05:39,920 --> 01:05:43,000 by then, like if they need excess factory production, 1373 01:05:43,000 --> 01:05:47,600 if they need some sort of load balancing 1374 01:05:47,600 --> 01:05:49,160 in the electrical grid. 1375 01:05:49,160 --> 01:05:50,720 That is much more likely what they 1376 01:05:50,720 --> 01:05:53,240 will use that information for. 1377 01:05:53,240 --> 01:05:55,120 So yeah, you are giving up. 1378 01:05:55,120 --> 01:05:59,720 You are letting someone maximize their profits off of you 1379 01:05:59,720 --> 01:06:01,160 when you share your data. 1380 01:06:01,160 --> 01:06:03,200 That's the way people should think about it. 1381 01:06:03,200 --> 01:06:05,640 Or that's one of the ways. 1382 01:06:05,640 --> 01:06:08,240 Knowing your thoughts is also another. 1383 01:06:08,240 --> 01:06:11,160 And that's a big reason why I do try to push the, 1384 01:06:11,160 --> 01:06:15,760 hey, it is good to be on even moderately more secure 1385 01:06:15,760 --> 01:06:16,840 platforms. 1386 01:06:16,840 --> 01:06:20,840 Because the WHO put out this document about how they called 1387 01:06:20,840 --> 01:06:24,560 it dark analytics, where they were looking at people's 1388 01:06:24,560 --> 01:06:27,320 private chats on some of these platforms where it's easier. 1389 01:06:27,320 --> 01:06:29,680 For instance, your text messages are not 1390 01:06:29,680 --> 01:06:32,040 end-to-end encrypted in most cases. 1391 01:06:32,040 --> 01:06:34,080 And they were using that as analytics 1392 01:06:34,080 --> 01:06:35,840 as they were manipulating people with fear. 1393 01:06:35,840 --> 01:06:38,280 And it's not going to be limited to that campaign. 1394 01:06:38,280 --> 01:06:40,920 I can guarantee it. 1395 01:06:40,920 --> 01:06:45,840 Yeah, even worse, Signal recently 1396 01:06:45,840 --> 01:06:50,640 stopped being a platform for SMS texting. 1397 01:06:50,640 --> 01:06:51,600 Yes. 1398 01:06:51,600 --> 01:06:53,640 Which forced people like me, I had 1399 01:06:53,640 --> 01:06:55,960 to figure out exactly what I was going to do about this. 1400 01:06:55,960 --> 01:07:00,160 I had 20-something thousand messages 1401 01:07:00,160 --> 01:07:02,760 that then I had to figure out what app I 1402 01:07:02,760 --> 01:07:05,360 was going to give access to. 1403 01:07:05,360 --> 01:07:08,080 And you don't have time to go through your 20-something 1404 01:07:08,080 --> 01:07:12,200 thousand past messages and think about what information you 1405 01:07:12,200 --> 01:07:17,400 want to add vulnerability to in order to ever again use 1406 01:07:17,400 --> 01:07:19,640 SMS texting. 1407 01:07:19,640 --> 01:07:21,680 And when I started using Signal, I 1408 01:07:21,680 --> 01:07:25,920 never imagined that they would force me to make that decision. 1409 01:07:25,920 --> 01:07:28,760 And so what can I do? 1410 01:07:28,760 --> 01:07:32,840 Now, do I just not have the opportunity ever again 1411 01:07:32,840 --> 01:07:36,360 to use SMS texting? 1412 01:07:36,360 --> 01:07:38,280 Otherwise, I don't even know what thoughts I'm 1413 01:07:38,280 --> 01:07:40,880 spilling out to a new app. 1414 01:07:40,880 --> 01:07:42,120 That's awful. 1415 01:07:42,120 --> 01:07:42,800 Right. 1416 01:07:42,800 --> 01:07:45,200 And that's another challenge is that I 1417 01:07:45,200 --> 01:07:48,440 find the open source community is 1418 01:07:48,440 --> 01:07:51,640 kind of this almost dirty secret to a lot of people, 1419 01:07:51,640 --> 01:07:55,400 where because everybody is used to the big tech platforms, 1420 01:07:55,400 --> 01:07:56,800 there are options out there. 1421 01:07:56,800 --> 01:07:59,000 But somebody will say, oh, but they're not perfect. 1422 01:07:59,000 --> 01:08:00,480 And to be honest, they're not. 1423 01:08:00,480 --> 01:08:03,720 There are a lot of holes in many places. 1424 01:08:03,720 --> 01:08:06,440 But I think the most important, whether it's hardware, 1425 01:08:06,440 --> 01:08:09,960 whether it's software, is that mindset of can we verify it? 1426 01:08:09,960 --> 01:08:14,040 Is it built in a way that's verifiable, 1427 01:08:14,040 --> 01:08:16,480 whether it's the hardware, whether it's the software? 1428 01:08:16,480 --> 01:08:19,760 And is it working to our benefit? 1429 01:08:19,760 --> 01:08:20,680 Is it my device? 1430 01:08:20,680 --> 01:08:21,960 Can I repair it? 1431 01:08:21,960 --> 01:08:24,360 Can I change what processes it's running? 1432 01:08:24,360 --> 01:08:27,640 All those questions can only be done under these kind 1433 01:08:27,640 --> 01:08:29,320 of more open models. 1434 01:08:29,320 --> 01:08:32,680 Because honestly, I'm sure there are very excellent products 1435 01:08:32,680 --> 01:08:34,440 that promise a lot of security. 1436 01:08:34,440 --> 01:08:36,400 But I would never trust a company 1437 01:08:36,400 --> 01:08:39,000 to put my data over their business model. 1438 01:08:39,000 --> 01:08:41,520 That just doesn't make sense to me. 1439 01:08:41,520 --> 01:08:43,680 Why would they do that? 1440 01:08:43,680 --> 01:08:45,640 Right. 1441 01:08:45,640 --> 01:08:51,080 When it comes down to pure incentives, yeah. 1442 01:08:51,080 --> 01:08:54,800 The person on the other side has no relationship with you 1443 01:08:54,800 --> 01:08:57,400 other than their business model. 1444 01:08:57,400 --> 01:09:01,000 Has somebody developed anything like a simple aphorism 1445 01:09:01,000 --> 01:09:07,960 or a simple way to think about where to identify 1446 01:09:07,960 --> 01:09:11,600 your points of vulnerability? 1447 01:09:11,600 --> 01:09:14,280 I have not seen that laid out in a comprehensive way. 1448 01:09:14,280 --> 01:09:16,760 Because you generally have to make a lot of assumptions. 1449 01:09:16,760 --> 01:09:18,280 Like, oh, do you have a smartphone? 1450 01:09:18,280 --> 01:09:20,000 Oh, what smartphone do you have? 1451 01:09:20,000 --> 01:09:21,800 That would be a useful tool. 1452 01:09:21,800 --> 01:09:25,920 Though I will say, if that type of tool was created, 1453 01:09:25,920 --> 01:09:28,680 people would be staggered at how much is given away 1454 01:09:28,680 --> 01:09:30,240 by very innocuous things. 1455 01:09:30,240 --> 01:09:33,160 I mean, God forbid you pull in the privacy policies 1456 01:09:33,160 --> 01:09:35,360 of a bunch of different major services. 1457 01:09:35,360 --> 01:09:39,120 That'll be a real interesting question. 1458 01:09:39,120 --> 01:09:43,760 So OK, I'm going to throw out an invention that I imagined 1459 01:09:43,760 --> 01:09:45,280 a number of years ago. 1460 01:09:45,280 --> 01:09:50,200 And I've since lost interest in even thinking about whether or not 1461 01:09:50,200 --> 01:09:53,600 I would actually ever want to try to pursue this. 1462 01:09:53,600 --> 01:09:57,200 But somebody out there has the capability that I do not. 1463 01:09:57,200 --> 01:10:01,000 And so I'm going to throw it out there in this chat right now. 1464 01:10:01,000 --> 01:10:05,520 When thinking about centralization, 1465 01:10:05,520 --> 01:10:08,000 and when thinking about a moment like the plandemonium, 1466 01:10:08,000 --> 01:10:10,840 like all this chaos we've been in for the last three plus 1467 01:10:10,840 --> 01:10:14,960 years, I think about the ability to be 1468 01:10:14,960 --> 01:10:19,400 able to pass electronic communications around, 1469 01:10:19,400 --> 01:10:21,560 make sure that they get to where we want them to go 1470 01:10:21,560 --> 01:10:26,080 without a centralized system or hub or something like that. 1471 01:10:26,080 --> 01:10:28,520 And I imagine something like a BlackBerry. 1472 01:10:28,520 --> 01:10:30,120 Imagine that you had a little device. 1473 01:10:30,120 --> 01:10:31,560 You could type into it. 1474 01:10:31,560 --> 01:10:34,400 You have a little screen maybe. 1475 01:10:34,400 --> 01:10:37,600 Maybe I type you a message and I hit go. 1476 01:10:37,600 --> 01:10:40,600 But I don't want this to go through my Wi-Fi 1477 01:10:40,600 --> 01:10:42,680 and onto the internet. 1478 01:10:42,680 --> 01:10:47,600 Instead, what I want is for there to be like a mesh network. 1479 01:10:47,600 --> 01:10:50,360 What I want is for this to be encrypted. 1480 01:10:50,360 --> 01:10:53,880 Then my neighbor has one of these two. 1481 01:10:53,880 --> 01:10:56,080 That's probably the first jump point, 1482 01:10:56,080 --> 01:10:59,640 that my device communicates with my neighbor's device. 1483 01:10:59,640 --> 01:11:02,880 And my neighbor's device sends a ping back and says, got it. 1484 01:11:02,880 --> 01:11:07,560 And suddenly, this message is it's looking for you. 1485 01:11:07,560 --> 01:11:12,240 It's jumping through other people's phones 1486 01:11:12,240 --> 01:11:14,560 until it reaches you. 1487 01:11:14,560 --> 01:11:16,080 I shouldn't say phone. 1488 01:11:16,080 --> 01:11:17,520 I think of this as another device. 1489 01:11:17,520 --> 01:11:19,080 It's not a phone. 1490 01:11:19,080 --> 01:11:24,160 This is only on a system that is entirely distinct from any 1491 01:11:24,160 --> 01:11:27,320 networks that exist. 1492 01:11:27,320 --> 01:11:31,640 Could that be made and marketed and used? 1493 01:11:31,640 --> 01:11:33,320 What would it take? 1494 01:11:33,320 --> 01:11:36,280 Personally, that is how the darknets 1495 01:11:36,280 --> 01:11:39,600 work on top of the internet, whether it's Tor or I2P. 1496 01:11:39,600 --> 01:11:41,960 And really implementing it on the hardware layer 1497 01:11:41,960 --> 01:11:45,080 would be a very valuable thing to do. 1498 01:11:45,080 --> 01:11:46,440 I don't think it's impossible. 1499 01:11:46,440 --> 01:11:49,320 I think it's a matter of it catching on. 1500 01:11:49,320 --> 01:11:52,600 And Meshtastic does try to do that, 1501 01:11:52,600 --> 01:11:57,320 though like any considered meshnet in that way, 1502 01:11:57,320 --> 01:12:00,000 it does require you to have the people around you, which 1503 01:12:00,000 --> 01:12:02,160 is what brings this to the local picture. 1504 01:12:02,160 --> 01:12:05,040 It really doesn't matter so much that if people halfway 1505 01:12:05,040 --> 01:12:07,200 across the world think it's a great idea, 1506 01:12:07,200 --> 01:12:10,520 if you can actually build it with the people around you, 1507 01:12:10,520 --> 01:12:13,160 you could probably make at least Meshtastic work. 1508 01:12:13,160 --> 01:12:15,440 But building these other networks, 1509 01:12:15,440 --> 01:12:17,400 whether it's Tor, whether it's I2P, 1510 01:12:17,400 --> 01:12:20,760 whether it's there's this other interesting one. 1511 01:12:20,760 --> 01:12:22,680 FreeNet is another and LokiNet. 1512 01:12:22,680 --> 01:12:23,720 There's tons of them now. 1513 01:12:23,720 --> 01:12:27,280 I think there's a lot of opportunity and possibilities. 1514 01:12:27,280 --> 01:12:30,440 It's just we can't ignore hardware for much longer. 1515 01:12:30,440 --> 01:12:33,600 And I'll admit that is probably the root of this discussion, 1516 01:12:33,600 --> 01:12:35,440 is that it's nice to talk about protocols. 1517 01:12:35,440 --> 01:12:38,920 It's nice about what things can be done gradually, 1518 01:12:38,920 --> 01:12:41,240 which I encourage, though hardware itself 1519 01:12:41,240 --> 01:12:42,320 is very important. 1520 01:12:42,320 --> 01:12:45,400 And I hope that as people start to care about this, 1521 01:12:45,400 --> 01:12:48,760 the market incentives to produce verifiable hardware 1522 01:12:48,760 --> 01:12:52,800 will start to align themselves in a better direction. 1523 01:12:52,800 --> 01:12:55,680 It seems like an almost impossible problem to solve, 1524 01:12:55,680 --> 01:12:59,520 though, when I hear about the difficulties 1525 01:12:59,520 --> 01:13:04,480 that engineers had going from 10 nanometer chips to 7 nanometer 1526 01:13:04,480 --> 01:13:08,800 chips to 5 to 4. 1527 01:13:08,800 --> 01:13:14,440 These are such extraordinary leaps because the level you're 1528 01:13:14,440 --> 01:13:17,800 trying to pack so many resistors into a computer chip, right? 1529 01:13:17,800 --> 01:13:22,000 The level of there is a physical limitation, right? 1530 01:13:22,000 --> 01:13:24,120 I mean, obviously, at some point, you've just got 1531 01:13:24,120 --> 01:13:26,480 you're at the atomic level. 1532 01:13:26,480 --> 01:13:28,840 But already, you have enough interaction 1533 01:13:28,840 --> 01:13:33,600 at that type of level that it's difficult to get smaller 1534 01:13:33,600 --> 01:13:37,200 than 4 nanometer chips. 1535 01:13:37,200 --> 01:13:38,800 When I think about that, I actually 1536 01:13:38,800 --> 01:13:41,600 think this makes me optimistic that we 1537 01:13:41,600 --> 01:13:45,680 can learn to evaluate hardware, right? 1538 01:13:45,680 --> 01:13:49,280 Because you can't hide anything, right? 1539 01:13:49,280 --> 01:13:51,600 There's only so much physical matter 1540 01:13:51,600 --> 01:13:55,840 that comes in a box that we call a computer, right? 1541 01:13:55,840 --> 01:13:58,320 There's only so much physical matter in there. 1542 01:13:58,320 --> 01:14:00,360 That can be checked. 1543 01:14:00,360 --> 01:14:02,240 At the very least, you can probably 1544 01:14:02,240 --> 01:14:07,480 get a sense of where it's made or what it's designed to do. 1545 01:14:07,480 --> 01:14:12,240 So this is not an impossible problem to solve. 1546 01:14:12,240 --> 01:14:13,280 But I will say this. 1547 01:14:13,280 --> 01:14:16,360 I do believe that we may be leaving 1548 01:14:16,360 --> 01:14:22,760 the era of mass electronics and just sort of spamming our way 1549 01:14:22,760 --> 01:14:25,000 to the electronic world. 1550 01:14:25,000 --> 01:14:29,400 It may be that people come to understand that it's 1551 01:14:29,400 --> 01:14:32,080 fine to have less internet communications, 1552 01:14:32,080 --> 01:14:35,200 fine to have fewer packets of information, 1553 01:14:35,200 --> 01:14:39,760 and that as we move toward cryptocurrency systems, 1554 01:14:39,760 --> 01:14:43,640 we're probably going to be spending money every time we 1555 01:14:43,640 --> 01:14:46,200 send a packet of information anyway, maybe 1556 01:14:46,200 --> 01:14:47,160 a small amount of money. 1557 01:14:47,160 --> 01:14:50,040 But that may be a good limiter for us, 1558 01:14:50,040 --> 01:14:52,080 may be a good idea to go ahead and accept that, 1559 01:14:52,080 --> 01:14:55,680 because it's going to keep us. 1560 01:14:55,680 --> 01:15:01,520 It'll be the automatic medicine for the system, in a sense. 1561 01:15:01,520 --> 01:15:03,440 But it will keep us from just sending 1562 01:15:03,440 --> 01:15:06,680 so much useless information over the internet, 1563 01:15:06,680 --> 01:15:10,120 and especially allowing for the mass levels 1564 01:15:10,120 --> 01:15:14,680 of asymmetric control, the matrix system that is built. 1565 01:15:14,680 --> 01:15:19,120 And I actually wonder if there is some sort of a, 1566 01:15:19,120 --> 01:15:22,800 I don't know what this whole plan to Monumura is about. 1567 01:15:22,800 --> 01:15:26,560 There is some grand plan. 1568 01:15:26,560 --> 01:15:29,520 Some people think that they have it figured out. 1569 01:15:29,520 --> 01:15:31,960 The more I see, the more hypotheses I have, 1570 01:15:31,960 --> 01:15:34,560 the more questions, the more models I have for what's 1571 01:15:34,560 --> 01:15:35,920 actually going on. 1572 01:15:35,920 --> 01:15:37,880 But it's very possible that it simply 1573 01:15:37,880 --> 01:15:41,920 breaks down into less information, 1574 01:15:41,920 --> 01:15:43,440 less communication over the internet, 1575 01:15:43,440 --> 01:15:47,480 and people having to sort that out locally. 1576 01:15:47,480 --> 01:15:49,280 So I kind of hope so. 1577 01:15:49,280 --> 01:15:52,720 I think we'll eventually reach that stage one way or another. 1578 01:15:52,720 --> 01:15:56,480 I think that there is a path that doesn't require 1579 01:15:56,480 --> 01:16:00,320 us to give up computing. 1580 01:16:00,320 --> 01:16:02,480 I don't think that that's necessary. 1581 01:16:02,480 --> 01:16:03,600 Maybe I'm wrong. 1582 01:16:03,600 --> 01:16:06,400 But I don't think that's necessary to reach privacy 1583 01:16:06,400 --> 01:16:08,880 again and to reach health again. 1584 01:16:08,880 --> 01:16:11,040 But we need to continue to have these conversations. 1585 01:16:11,040 --> 01:16:12,680 And we need to continue to figure out 1586 01:16:12,680 --> 01:16:15,760 what can be done and what can't, and test those models, 1587 01:16:15,760 --> 01:16:17,360 see what works. 1588 01:16:17,360 --> 01:16:21,400 Yeah, lots of open questions there. 1589 01:16:21,400 --> 01:16:25,040 Well, anything else before we wrap things up? 1590 01:16:25,040 --> 01:16:26,000 That's all I have. 1591 01:16:26,000 --> 01:16:29,360 I mean, I would say on top of there's 1592 01:16:29,360 --> 01:16:32,280 two sides of the coin, there's keeping it local. 1593 01:16:32,280 --> 01:16:35,680 Though I will say the fact that humanity across the whole world 1594 01:16:35,680 --> 01:16:39,200 can communicate, I do think that is a very valuable thing. 1595 01:16:39,200 --> 01:16:41,040 And like you said, there's a difference 1596 01:16:41,040 --> 01:16:44,040 between the mass redundant information. 1597 01:16:44,040 --> 01:16:45,400 Useless might be a little harsh. 1598 01:16:45,400 --> 01:16:47,000 But I'll say redundant. 1599 01:16:47,000 --> 01:16:50,440 And then, but the ability to talk across the world 1600 01:16:50,440 --> 01:16:52,160 and say, hey, my government's doing this, 1601 01:16:52,160 --> 01:16:53,280 and I don't really like it. 1602 01:16:53,280 --> 01:16:55,160 And it happened because of x, y, and z. 1603 01:16:55,160 --> 01:16:57,800 That's really important information for people 1604 01:16:57,800 --> 01:16:59,640 to send halfway across the world. 1605 01:16:59,640 --> 01:17:03,400 And I would argue, while the local is vital and essential 1606 01:17:03,400 --> 01:17:06,680 and the building block of what makes a lot of this 1607 01:17:06,680 --> 01:17:08,640 worth doing, the other side of it 1608 01:17:08,640 --> 01:17:11,640 is that I don't want people to forget that there is a whole 1609 01:17:11,640 --> 01:17:12,560 other world out there. 1610 01:17:12,560 --> 01:17:16,280 And we do need to keep those lines of communication open. 1611 01:17:16,280 --> 01:17:21,680 And we want the benefits of global resources. 1612 01:17:21,680 --> 01:17:25,760 There are things that do not exist where I live in Texas. 1613 01:17:25,760 --> 01:17:28,160 There is not a mine for them. 1614 01:17:28,160 --> 01:17:31,600 There is not a way to grow them from the ground for some things 1615 01:17:31,600 --> 01:17:33,040 that can be grown. 1616 01:17:33,040 --> 01:17:35,640 There are things that we simply won't 1617 01:17:35,640 --> 01:17:37,720 be able to have from the rest of the world. 1618 01:17:37,720 --> 01:17:41,320 And maybe this is what we call the spice. 1619 01:17:41,320 --> 01:17:44,680 Using the Dune universe, the Dune-iverse, 1620 01:17:44,680 --> 01:17:48,600 the spice of the world is connectivity. 1621 01:17:48,600 --> 01:17:52,600 Can we have that without the drawbacks? 1622 01:17:52,600 --> 01:17:55,160 And we need global communication in order 1623 01:17:55,160 --> 01:17:56,640 for that to take place. 1624 01:17:56,640 --> 01:18:00,080 So lots of things that we want to keep and lots of things 1625 01:18:00,080 --> 01:18:01,320 that we want to get rid of. 1626 01:18:01,320 --> 01:18:02,880 And we've got to design the system. 1627 01:18:02,880 --> 01:18:06,880 And thanks so much for joining us for a conversation. 1628 01:18:06,880 --> 01:18:09,680 We went into a lot of weeds here. 1629 01:18:09,680 --> 01:18:14,320 So I hope that whether or not you followed all of this, 1630 01:18:14,320 --> 01:18:20,200 including my, I don't know, thinking out loud a moment 1631 01:18:20,200 --> 01:18:24,120 or two, because these are difficult topics, 1632 01:18:24,120 --> 01:18:25,960 hopefully you learned something from today. 1633 01:18:25,960 --> 01:18:28,560 Hopefully it made you think about what 1634 01:18:28,560 --> 01:18:31,400 it is that might be done or what the problems are. 1635 01:18:31,400 --> 01:18:32,600 Hopefully this is educational. 1636 01:18:32,600 --> 01:18:34,240 Thanks for joining us, Gabe. 1637 01:18:34,240 --> 01:18:34,800 Thanks a lot. 1638 01:18:34,800 --> 01:18:36,920 I had a great time. 1639 01:18:36,920 --> 01:18:40,680 And we're going to be back tomorrow 1640 01:18:40,680 --> 01:18:42,640 for another roundtable discussion. 1641 01:18:42,640 --> 01:18:45,320 And Gabe may be joining us for that one too. 1642 01:18:45,320 --> 01:18:49,240 But we're going to, actually, I'm not going to announce it yet. 1643 01:18:49,240 --> 01:18:51,760 We're going to move to the out there now. 1644 01:18:51,760 --> 01:18:53,360 But we'll be here tomorrow. 1645 01:18:53,360 --> 01:19:00,600 خر