WEBVTT

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Hi everybody, I am Vincent and you're listening

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to The Lighthouse Lowdown. Welcome to the show,

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episode 89. As you might have heard, Emily was

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not in the introduction. Today is a solo episode

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from me. So, Emily's going through quite a bit

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right now. We are planning the wedding, living

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with family. Thinking about a honeymoon. We're

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looking at financials. Thinking about buying

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a house. Today is the day of her bridal shower.

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So congratulations to Emily. And there's a lot

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going on. So I thought I might give her a break

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and record a solo episode today. I say all this

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because our listeners, many of you have reached

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out in different capacities and shown an interest

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and shown support for us. And I want you to know

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that we appreciate that, both Emily and I. So

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today you're going to hear me talking. Today

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you're going to hear me sipping coffee. Cue now.

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I've got some double shot of espresso with some

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honey in it. You're going to hear me swatting

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away flies. You're going to hear me sipping water,

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whatever happens. I've got no coverage, so it's

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you and me. Welcome to episode 89, and we'll

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just dive in. So no history buoy today because

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the episode itself is not specifically a lighthouse.

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There is a lighthouse involved in this story.

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A couple, if you were to read a little deeper,

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but today we're talking about the wreck of the

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Edmund Fitzgerald. So I'm going to read this

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first. I'm going to read a couple of things.

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The wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald is a song

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written, composed and performed by Canadian singer

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songwriter, Gordon Lightfoot. to commemorate

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the sinking of the bulk carrier SS Edmund Fitzgerald

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on Lake Superior on November 10th, 1975. Lightfoot

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drew his inspiration from Newsweek's article

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on the event, The Cruelest Month, which it published

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on November 24th of 1975. Lightfoot considers

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the song to be his finest work. So we're going

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to talk a little bit more about Gordon Lightfoot.

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Also, I wouldn't know about the sinking of this

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ship if it were not for this song. And I think

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that's kind of what drew me to this content.

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We have some silliness in our family. So motorcycle

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rides and hiking and other grand adventures,

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I've been able to go on with my dad and my brother

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and the rest of my family, depending on what

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the adventure is. There's been times where we

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joked around and we sang sea shanties and just

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kind of things that we could remember, you know,

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shave his belly with a rusty razor. Lots of,

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you know, what would you do? I don't even remember

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that. It was on The Office. What was that? Hold

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on. Let's see. Shave his belly with a rusty razor.

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Oh, the song Drunken Sailor by the Irish Rovers,

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1994. Way hanging up she rises, way hanging up

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she rises, way hanging up she rises early in

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the morning. You may remember that from the show

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The Office. where Dwight thinks he's steering

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the ship while they're out on a river or a lake

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cruise for the evening. It's a very good episode.

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It's a very funny show. So the point is, sea

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shanties have been in my family, ironically,

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and one of the things that comes up on my Spotify

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time to time is the song The Wreck of the Edmund

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Fitzgerald. So I've listened to it a couple times

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lately, and Gordon Lightfoot has some other good

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music. The song, here's another entry I'm reading,

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originally came on Lightfoot's 1976 album, Summertime

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Dream. The single version hit number one in Canada,

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where Lightfoot is from, on November 20th, 1976,

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barely a year after the disaster. So that's interesting

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to me. It was in the media, the social media,

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if you will, of the 70s right away. In the United

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States, the song reached number one in Cashbox

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and number two for two weeks on the Billboard

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Hot 100. Behind Rod Stewart's Tonight is the

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Night, making it Lightfoot's second most successful

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single behind the song Sundown. So I have that

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queued up right now on my Spotify. I'm going

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to do something we've never done before. Any

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episode is demonetized if we play... songs, things

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like that. And I don't care because we don't

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make, uh, we are not looking for money on this,

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on this podcast and on this episode. So I'm going

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to play the song for you now, the wreck of the

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Edmund Fitzgerald through this audio, and then

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we'll be back to discuss. The legend lives on

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from the Chippewa on down at the big lake they

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call Gitche Gumee. The lake, it is said, never

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gives up her dead when the skies of November

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turn gloomy. With a load of iron ore, 26 ,000

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tons more than the Edmund Fitzgerald weighed

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empty. That good ship and true was a bone to

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be chewed when the gales of November came early.

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The ship was the pride of the American side coming

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back from some bill in Wisconsin. As the big

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freighters go, it was bigger than most with a

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crew and good captain well seasoned. concluding

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some terms with a couple of steel firms when

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they left fully loaded for Cleveland. Then later

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that night when the ship's bell rang, could it

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be the north wind they'd been feeling? The Witch

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of November comes stealing So that was The Wreck

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of the Edmund Fitzgerald by Gordon Lightfoot.

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Next, we'll be listening to Candy Shop by 50

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Cent. Just kidding. Ha ha. I make myself laugh.

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So that's quite a piece of art. It's a long song,

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but I had to play the whole thing. And what I've

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actually done, I've gone and printed out the

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lyrics. I was going to read through them. Um,

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but I think I'm going to skip it because the

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song itself is over six minutes and you just

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heard it. So I, I love that song. Um, I've listened

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to it a couple of times. One of the things that

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jumps out to me is as I learned this story, um,

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for the most part, uh, this is a pretty accurate

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retelling of the story. And of course, Gordon

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Lightfoot saw that article we discussed and that's

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what made all this happen. So some of the same

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source material. One of the verses says, does

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anyone know where the love of God goes when the

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waves turn the minutes to hours? There's a lot

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in there. So what I'm going to do today, we're

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going to talk some more about this sinking outside

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of just the song by Lightfoot. The real story

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of the Edmund Fitzgerald is very interesting.

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Of course, there are many ships that have sunk

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on the Great Lakes throughout recorded history.

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Many, many ships. The reason that the Edmund

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Fitzgerald is so well known is because of that

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song and because of the story itself. So we're

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going to talk about the story. So the Fitzgerald

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was an American Great Lakes freighter that sank

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in Lake Superior during the storm, a storm. on

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November 10th of 1975, with the loss of the entire

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crew of 29 men. When it was launched in 1958,

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it was the largest ship in North America's Great

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Lakes and remains the largest ship to have ever

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sunk there. Eventually, after sinking, it was

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located, and we're going to talk about how that

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went, but the U .S. Navy used aircraft with the

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ability to detect magnetic anomalies in a large

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mass of metal. on the base of the lake was soon

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found. So for 17 years, the Fitzgerald carried

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iron ore from mines, several locations, but mostly

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from mines near Duluth, Minnesota, to ironworks

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in Detroit, Michigan, Toledo, Ohio, and other

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Great Lakes ports. Really, it was a workhorse.

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It was always running, except for in the wintertime

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when the lakes freeze over. So carrying a full

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load of cargo of iron ore pellets, Captain McSorley,

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Ernest M. McSorley, in command, she embarked

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on her final voyage from Superior, Wisconsin,

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near Duluth, on the afternoon of November 9th,

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1975. En route to a steel mill near Detroit,

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the Edmund Fitzgerald joined a second freighter,

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the SS Arthur M. Anderson. By the next day, the

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two ships were caught in a severe storm. together

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on Lake Superior with near hurricane force winds

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and waves up to 30 feet high. Shortly after 7

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.10 p .m., Edmund Fitzgerald suddenly sank in

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Canadian waters at a depth of 530 feet. The distance

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closest was about 17 miles from Whitefish Bay,

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and under normal operation, top speed, the Edmund

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Fitzgerald could have covered that distance in

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just over one hour. So it was darn close to safety.

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So the Edmund Fitzgerald previously reported

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being in significant difficulty to a nearby vessel.

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Quote, I have a bad list, lost both radars, and

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I'm taking on heavy seas over the deck. One of

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the worst seas I've ever been in. However, no

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distress signals were sent before she sank. Captain

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McSorley's last message at 7 .10 p .m. was to

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the Arthur M. Anderson. Quote, we are holding

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our own. Her crew of 29 perished and no bodies

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were recovered. The exact cause of the sinking

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remains unknown, which is part of the interest

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of the story. Though many books, studies, and

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expeditions have been in examination. Edmund

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Fitzgerald may have been swamped. It suffered.

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Structural failure or potentially topside damage,

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or maybe it grounded on a shoal, or maybe it

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suffered from a combination of these, or perhaps

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something else. In my reading, there are many

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films, documentaries, books, articles written

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throughout the history from 1975 and since then,

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different research that's been done, different

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data that's been collected, and different suppositions

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of what's gone on in the sinking of the ship.

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The disaster is one of the best known in history

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of the Great Lakes shipping, in part because

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of Gordon Lightfoot's song. Lightfoot wrote the

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hit song after reading an article, The Cruelest

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Month, as we mentioned. The sinking led to the

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changes in Great Lakes shipping regulations and

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practices that included mandatory survival suits,

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depth finders, positioning systems, increased

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freeboard, and more frequent inspection of the

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vessels. So one thing I'll say here, I think

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it's a good time to fit it in. I may have noted

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this later in my notes. I have quite a few notes

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today, and I'll be doing some reading. But Lightfoot,

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I think he noticed that the Edmund Fitzgerald,

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which is spelled E -D -M -U -N -D, was misspelled

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Edmund in the article, The Cruelest Month. So

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I think... And maybe that's lore. There's a little

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bit of lore that surrounds the sinking of this

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ship. But I think that's why he decided to write

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the song. He was influenced, or at least the

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source I read said that Lightfoot was influenced

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to write the song because, of course, the entire

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crew were lost. And in memoriam, it was unfortunate

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that the name of the ship was even misspelled.

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So the next thing I'd like to talk about is some

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history. of the Edmund Fitzgerald, which was

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on the seas, the Great Lakes, like I mentioned,

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17 years before it did sink. So design and construction.

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The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company

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of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, invested in the construction

00:18:59.599 --> 00:19:03.339
of the Edmund Fitzgerald. In 1957, they contracted

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a company called the Great Lakes Engineering

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Works, G -L -E -W, of Michigan to design and

00:19:09.019 --> 00:19:11.940
construct the ship. And what they wanted to do

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is build the largest ship that they could that

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could still be applicable to pass through the

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requirements of the St. Lawrence Seaway. So it

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was, quote, within a foot of the maximum length

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allowed for passage through the soon -to -be

00:19:27.859 --> 00:19:31.460
-completed St. Lawrence Seaway. The ship's value

00:19:31.460 --> 00:19:33.779
at the time was $7 million United States dollars,

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which is equivalent to about $60 million today,

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2025. Edmund Fitzgerald was on the first, the

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ship was the first Laker built to the maximum

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size, which we talked about, which is 730 feet

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long, 75 feet wide, and had a 25 -foot draft.

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The vertical height of the hull was 39 feet.

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Hull depth, which is the height inside of the

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cargo hold, was 33 feet and 4 inches. The ship

00:20:08.500 --> 00:20:11.940
had a dead weight capacity of 26 ,000 long tons

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and a 729 foot long hull. It was the longest

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ship in the Great Lakes, earning her the title

00:20:19.039 --> 00:20:24.519
the Queen of the Lakes. And that title was held

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until 1959 when a longer ship was launched, the

00:20:29.000 --> 00:20:33.779
SS Murray Bay. So the Fitzgerald had three cargo

00:20:33.779 --> 00:20:38.400
holds. And there were 21 watertight or maybe

00:20:38.400 --> 00:20:41.240
potentially not watertight cargo hatches. Each

00:20:41.240 --> 00:20:44.779
of those hatches, 11 foot by 48 feet, excuse

00:20:44.779 --> 00:20:48.880
me. And they were made of 5 16th inch thick steel.

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So quite a robust build from what I know. I'm

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not, I don't know a lot about ships, but this

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sounds like, it sounds like a diversified ship

00:20:59.059 --> 00:21:03.079
that was built for this purpose. So originally

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it was coal fired, the boilers, that of course

00:21:06.430 --> 00:21:09.630
made steam to propel the vessel, were converted

00:21:09.630 --> 00:21:14.210
to burn oil in the winter layup of 1971 and 72.

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By the standards of typical ore freighters, the

00:21:22.049 --> 00:21:24.390
interior of the Fitzgerald was actually really

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luxurious. Her J .L. Hudson Company design furnishings

00:21:29.490 --> 00:21:33.549
included deep pile carpeting, tiled bathrooms,

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drapes over portholes, and leather swivel chairs

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in the guest lounge. There are two guest staterooms

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for passengers. Air conditioning extended to

00:21:43.660 --> 00:21:46.140
the cruise quarters also, which featured more

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amenities than usual. A large galley and a fully

00:21:48.920 --> 00:21:51.299
stocked pantry supplied meals for two dining

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rooms. Edmund Fitzgerald's pilot house was outfitted

00:21:54.900 --> 00:21:57.980
with state -of -the -art nautical equipment and

00:21:57.980 --> 00:22:03.289
a beautiful map room. The naming of the Edmund

00:22:03.289 --> 00:22:06.069
Fitzgerald is kind of interesting. So the company

00:22:06.069 --> 00:22:08.509
who paid to build it, the Northwestern Mutual,

00:22:08.509 --> 00:22:10.710
wanted to name the ship after its president and

00:22:10.710 --> 00:22:13.609
chairman of the board. His name, Edmund Fitzgerald.

00:22:14.930 --> 00:22:17.650
Fitzgerald's grandfather and great uncles had

00:22:17.650 --> 00:22:20.250
been lake captains, and his father owned the

00:22:20.250 --> 00:22:22.650
Milwaukee Dry Dock Company, which built and repaired

00:22:22.650 --> 00:22:27.549
ships. So they had some seawater and some lake

00:22:27.549 --> 00:22:30.779
water in their blood. Fitzgerald had attempted

00:22:30.779 --> 00:22:33.059
to dissuade the naming of the ship after himself,

00:22:33.400 --> 00:22:38.019
as you must dissuade. He proposed the names of

00:22:38.019 --> 00:22:41.740
the Sentinel, Seaway, Milwaukee, and Northwestern.

00:22:43.519 --> 00:22:47.920
The board was resolute, and the Edmund abstained

00:22:47.920 --> 00:22:50.660
from voting, but the other 36 board members voted

00:22:50.660 --> 00:22:53.980
unanimously to name the SS Edmund Fitzgerald.

00:22:55.000 --> 00:22:57.400
More than 15 ,000 people attended the Edmund

00:22:57.400 --> 00:22:59.299
Fitzgerald's christening and launch ceremony

00:22:59.299 --> 00:23:03.319
on June 7th of 1958. The event was plagued by

00:23:03.319 --> 00:23:07.640
misfortunes. When Edmund Fitzgerald's wife tried

00:23:07.640 --> 00:23:10.079
to christen the ship by smashing a champagne

00:23:10.079 --> 00:23:12.500
bottle over the bow, which many of us have seen

00:23:12.500 --> 00:23:16.660
in film and perhaps in real life, it took her

00:23:16.660 --> 00:23:19.700
three attempts to break it, which of course is

00:23:19.700 --> 00:23:24.319
bad luck. Another gentleman... Jennings B. Frazier

00:23:24.319 --> 00:23:28.140
of Toledo suffered a heart attack and died at

00:23:28.140 --> 00:23:33.079
the event. The delay of 36 minutes followed while

00:23:33.079 --> 00:23:35.380
the shipyard crew struggled to release the keel

00:23:35.380 --> 00:23:39.579
blocks. Not so smooth, and upon sideways launch,

00:23:39.680 --> 00:23:43.079
the ship created a large wave, dousing the spectators,

00:23:43.200 --> 00:23:45.660
and then crashed into a pier before righting

00:23:45.660 --> 00:23:48.829
itself. The witnesses later said they swore the

00:23:48.829 --> 00:23:51.990
ship was, quote, trying to climb right out of

00:23:51.990 --> 00:24:00.650
the water. The career of the Edmund Fitzgerald.

00:24:01.009 --> 00:24:04.170
So I've taken some highlights here out of some

00:24:04.170 --> 00:24:06.009
content, so I'm just going to say some things

00:24:06.009 --> 00:24:09.390
that I thought were most interesting. So the

00:24:09.390 --> 00:24:13.150
Fitzgerald was a record -setting warhorse, often

00:24:13.150 --> 00:24:18.019
beating her own milestones. for speed and whatnot

00:24:18.019 --> 00:24:23.099
and hauling. So she set the seasonal haul record

00:24:23.099 --> 00:24:27.400
six different times. She earned nicknames including

00:24:27.400 --> 00:24:30.980
The Fits, The Pride of the American Side, The

00:24:30.980 --> 00:24:35.880
Mighty Fits, The Toledo Express, The Big Fits,

00:24:35.920 --> 00:24:38.960
and someone said The Titanic of the Great Lakes,

00:24:39.039 --> 00:24:42.240
although I'm skeptical on that one until maybe

00:24:42.240 --> 00:24:46.259
after it had sank. A round trip for the ship

00:24:46.259 --> 00:24:49.200
between Superior, Wisconsin and Detroit, Michigan

00:24:49.200 --> 00:24:52.819
usually took her five days and she averaged 47

00:24:52.819 --> 00:24:57.779
similar trips per season. She was hauling. The

00:24:57.779 --> 00:25:00.200
vessel's usual route was between Superior, Wisconsin

00:25:00.200 --> 00:25:02.859
and Toledo, Ohio, although her port of destination

00:25:02.859 --> 00:25:06.880
could vary. By November of 1975, Edmund Fitzgerald

00:25:06.880 --> 00:25:10.319
had logged an estimated 748 trips on the Great

00:25:10.319 --> 00:25:12.559
Lakes and covered more than a million miles.

00:25:13.339 --> 00:25:16.259
a distance roughly equivalent to 44 trips around

00:25:16.259 --> 00:25:25.599
this world. Coffee. So up until a few weeks before

00:25:25.599 --> 00:25:27.900
her loss, passengers had traveled on board as

00:25:27.900 --> 00:25:33.099
company guests. Hi. Emily's here to say hello.

00:25:33.940 --> 00:25:36.119
Things are falling apart with the bridal shower

00:25:36.119 --> 00:25:40.200
and we're making do. Do you need help? No, it's

00:25:40.200 --> 00:25:47.230
nothing is allowing us to get in. So maybe hosting

00:25:47.230 --> 00:25:50.549
it here. Okay. Let me know if you need help.

00:25:51.490 --> 00:25:55.869
Our fans can wait. I could play the song again.

00:25:55.930 --> 00:26:02.269
Buy us six more minutes. Oh, the door to the

00:26:02.269 --> 00:26:09.569
garage also broke. Okay. Fantastic. I got some

00:26:09.569 --> 00:26:11.569
things to fix when we're done recording here,

00:26:11.630 --> 00:26:14.670
folks. Much like the christening of the Edmund

00:26:14.670 --> 00:26:18.680
Fitzgerald. So far, the bridal shower of today

00:26:18.680 --> 00:26:24.759
has been plagued with struggle. All right, folks,

00:26:24.920 --> 00:26:28.720
we're back. So 44 trips around the world, a million

00:26:28.720 --> 00:26:33.220
miles. Okay, so she traveled with... Give me

00:26:33.220 --> 00:26:38.319
a moment, folks. Company guests. So guests could

00:26:38.319 --> 00:26:40.319
ride along, and I don't know how these guests

00:26:40.319 --> 00:26:44.289
were selected or who they knew. But some of the

00:26:44.289 --> 00:26:47.869
information that's been collected, it was quite

00:26:47.869 --> 00:26:51.289
the experience. Stewards treated the guest to

00:26:51.289 --> 00:26:54.789
the entire VIP routine. The cuisine was reportedly

00:26:54.789 --> 00:26:57.109
excellent, and the snacks were always available

00:26:57.109 --> 00:27:00.890
in the lounge. Hell yeah. A small but well -stocked

00:27:00.890 --> 00:27:03.910
kitchenette provided the drinks. Once each trip,

00:27:04.049 --> 00:27:07.589
a captain held a candlelight dinner for the guests,

00:27:07.730 --> 00:27:11.420
complete with mess -jacketed stewards. and special

00:27:11.420 --> 00:27:14.680
clam digger punch. I don't know what that was,

00:27:14.700 --> 00:27:17.819
but I bet you it was lit up with rum. Because

00:27:17.819 --> 00:27:21.279
of her size, appearance, string of records, and

00:27:21.279 --> 00:27:24.500
quote, DJ captain, Edmund Fitzgerald became a

00:27:24.500 --> 00:27:26.640
favorite of boat watchers throughout her career.

00:27:27.339 --> 00:27:31.000
Although Captain Peter Pulser was in command

00:27:31.000 --> 00:27:33.500
of the Edmund Fitzgerald on trips when cargo

00:27:33.500 --> 00:27:36.400
records were set, he is best remembered for piping

00:27:36.400 --> 00:27:39.220
music day and night over the ship's intercom

00:27:39.220 --> 00:27:43.099
system. especially when passing through St. Clair

00:27:43.099 --> 00:27:46.319
and Detroit rivers. While navigating the Sioux

00:27:46.319 --> 00:27:48.359
Locks, he would often come out of the pilot house

00:27:48.359 --> 00:27:50.980
and use a bullhorn to entertain tourists with

00:27:50.980 --> 00:27:53.480
commentary and details about the Edmund Fitzgerald.

00:27:53.980 --> 00:27:56.420
Of course, it was quite the ship, so he had quite

00:27:56.420 --> 00:28:01.880
a bit to say. Some mishaps happened as the ship

00:28:01.880 --> 00:28:05.079
was in its service life. The vessel once ran

00:28:05.079 --> 00:28:09.920
aground in 1969 and collided with the SS, oh

00:28:09.920 --> 00:28:16.319
boy, the SS Hochelaga, H -O -C -H -E -L -A -G

00:28:16.319 --> 00:28:21.799
-A, sounds German, in 1970. Later the same year,

00:28:21.859 --> 00:28:24.799
she struck the wall of a lock. An accident repeated

00:28:24.799 --> 00:28:30.599
again in 1973 and 1974. On January 7th of 1974,

00:28:30.940 --> 00:28:35.180
she lost her original bow anchor, oopsie, in

00:28:35.180 --> 00:28:37.880
the Detroit River. None of these mishaps were

00:28:37.880 --> 00:28:40.519
considered serious or unusual, though. because

00:28:40.519 --> 00:28:44.480
freshwater ships have a tough life. In fact,

00:28:44.579 --> 00:28:46.259
freshwater ships are built to last more than

00:28:46.259 --> 00:28:49.599
half a century. And when the Edmund Fitzgerald

00:28:49.599 --> 00:28:53.240
sank, it's estimated that she had a long career

00:28:53.240 --> 00:28:57.720
still ahead of her. Let's talk about the sinking.

00:28:57.940 --> 00:29:02.220
So there's lots of things you could look up,

00:29:02.240 --> 00:29:04.240
including the map of the sinking and where the

00:29:04.240 --> 00:29:07.259
ship was eventually found. But the final voyage

00:29:07.259 --> 00:29:10.920
and wreck, The final voyage was almost completed,

00:29:11.079 --> 00:29:16.380
which is really, really unfortunate. Let's talk

00:29:16.380 --> 00:29:19.599
about the wreck. So at the time, Captain was

00:29:19.599 --> 00:29:24.299
Ernest M. McSorley. He was the last captain of

00:29:24.299 --> 00:29:27.180
the Edmund Fitzgerald, and he did end up perishing

00:29:27.180 --> 00:29:30.279
along with 28 other members of the crew on that

00:29:30.279 --> 00:29:34.839
date, November 10th, 1975. So the Fitzgerald

00:29:34.839 --> 00:29:37.980
left Superior, Wisconsin at 2 .15 p .m. on the

00:29:37.980 --> 00:29:41.089
afternoon. Excuse me. On the afternoon of November

00:29:41.089 --> 00:29:45.490
9th, under the command of McSorley, she was en

00:29:45.490 --> 00:29:49.289
route to a steel mill on Zug Island near Detroit,

00:29:49.470 --> 00:29:55.230
Michigan, with a cargo of 26 ,116 long tons of

00:29:55.230 --> 00:30:00.190
tankonite ore pellets. Takonite, excuse me. Tako.

00:30:01.710 --> 00:30:09.960
And soon reached the full... Coffee break. soon

00:30:09.960 --> 00:30:12.920
reached her full speed of 16 .3 miles per hour.

00:30:14.259 --> 00:30:16.819
At around 5 p .m., the Fitzgerald joined the

00:30:16.819 --> 00:30:19.420
second freighter we discussed, the Arthur M.

00:30:19.460 --> 00:30:24.220
Anderson, destined for Gary, Indiana, and they

00:30:24.220 --> 00:30:27.119
had left out of Two Harbors, Minnesota. The weather

00:30:27.119 --> 00:30:30.180
forecast was not unusual for November, which

00:30:30.180 --> 00:30:33.160
is rough, and the National Weather Service predicted

00:30:33.160 --> 00:30:35.900
that a storm would pass through just south of

00:30:35.900 --> 00:30:39.200
Lake Superior at 7 a .m. on November 10th. As

00:30:39.200 --> 00:30:41.759
we know, forecasts are incorrect sometimes, and

00:30:41.759 --> 00:30:46.119
things do change. The SS Wilfred Sykes, another

00:30:46.119 --> 00:30:48.640
ship, loaded opposite of the Edmund Fitzgerald

00:30:48.640 --> 00:30:51.920
at the Burlington Northern Dock No. 1 and departed

00:30:51.920 --> 00:30:55.119
at 4 .15 p .m. about two hours after the Fitzgerald

00:30:55.119 --> 00:30:59.519
for its own adventure. In contrast to the National

00:30:59.519 --> 00:31:02.880
Weather Service forecast, Captain Dudley J. Paquette

00:31:02.880 --> 00:31:05.579
of the Wilfred Sykes predicted that the major

00:31:05.579 --> 00:31:08.569
storm would directly cross Lake Superior. From

00:31:08.569 --> 00:31:10.430
the outset, he chose a route that took advantage

00:31:10.430 --> 00:31:12.430
of the protection offered by the lake's north

00:31:12.430 --> 00:31:15.230
shore to avoid the worst effects of the storm.

00:31:15.630 --> 00:31:18.210
The crew of the Sykes followed radio conversations

00:31:18.210 --> 00:31:21.809
between Fitzgerald and Anderson, the two freighters,

00:31:21.890 --> 00:31:25.769
during the first part of their ship, and overheard

00:31:25.769 --> 00:31:29.130
their captains deciding to take the regular Lake

00:31:29.130 --> 00:31:32.730
Carriers Association downbound route, more central

00:31:32.730 --> 00:31:38.240
to the lake. Oh, my goodness. The National Weather

00:31:38.240 --> 00:31:41.940
Service altered its forecast at 7 p .m., issuing

00:31:41.940 --> 00:31:44.980
gale warnings for the whole of Lake Superior.

00:31:46.059 --> 00:31:47.619
So something, I don't know if it's going to come

00:31:47.619 --> 00:31:50.900
up again, something I read is that winds almost

00:31:50.900 --> 00:31:53.799
always come from the north to the south on Lake

00:31:53.799 --> 00:31:55.500
Superior, and one of the factors that played

00:31:55.500 --> 00:31:59.880
into the weather of this day was unusual winds,

00:31:59.960 --> 00:32:05.170
unusual waves, and a non -typical pattern. So

00:32:05.170 --> 00:32:08.529
Arthur M. Anderson and the Fitzgerald altered

00:32:08.529 --> 00:32:13.630
their course as the storm began and the forecast

00:32:13.630 --> 00:32:16.589
changed to go northward to also seek shelter

00:32:16.589 --> 00:32:20.170
along the Ontario shore. They encountered the

00:32:20.170 --> 00:32:23.230
winter storm at 1 a .m. on November 10th. Fitzgerald

00:32:23.230 --> 00:32:27.349
reported winds of 60 miles an hour and waves

00:32:27.349 --> 00:32:30.609
10 feet high at that time. Captain Paquette,

00:32:30.690 --> 00:32:33.160
who we discussed to the Sykes. reported that

00:32:33.160 --> 00:32:35.859
after 1 a .m. he overheard McSorley say that

00:32:35.859 --> 00:32:38.200
he had reduced the ship's speed because of the

00:32:38.200 --> 00:32:40.940
rough conditions. Paquette said he was stunned

00:32:40.940 --> 00:32:44.119
to hear that from McSorley, who was not known

00:32:44.119 --> 00:32:47.559
for turning aside or slowing down, and he stated,

00:32:47.759 --> 00:32:51.140
quote, we're going to try to get some lee, excuse

00:32:51.140 --> 00:32:54.000
me, we're going to try for some lee from Isle

00:32:54.000 --> 00:32:57.680
Royale. You're walking away from us anyway. I

00:32:57.680 --> 00:33:02.200
can't stay with you. So... The ship was not doing

00:33:02.200 --> 00:33:05.839
well, the Fitzgerald, and it was surprising that

00:33:05.839 --> 00:33:09.359
the captain, known for being a hard -nosed captain,

00:33:09.519 --> 00:33:11.839
especially in storms, was saying these things.

00:33:12.720 --> 00:33:15.940
At 2 a .m., the National Weather Service upgraded

00:33:15.940 --> 00:33:18.500
its warnings from gale to storm, forecasting

00:33:18.500 --> 00:33:22.180
winds from 40 to 58 miles per hour. Until then,

00:33:22.240 --> 00:33:24.599
the Fitzgerald had followed the Anderson, which

00:33:24.599 --> 00:33:27.299
was traveling at a constant 14 .6 miles per hour,

00:33:27.380 --> 00:33:29.859
but the faster Fitzgerald pulled ahead around

00:33:29.859 --> 00:33:34.289
3 a .m. As the storm center passed over the ships,

00:33:34.430 --> 00:33:37.069
they experienced shifting winds and wind speeds

00:33:37.069 --> 00:33:39.809
temporarily dropping as the wind direction changed

00:33:39.809 --> 00:33:43.970
from northeast to south and then northwest. So

00:33:43.970 --> 00:33:47.130
the eye of the storm is usually it's kind of

00:33:47.130 --> 00:33:50.630
a weird calm and an unstable region. So that's

00:33:50.630 --> 00:33:52.470
what they're seeing here also. After 1 .50 p

00:33:52.470 --> 00:33:55.650
.m., the Anderson logged winds of 58 miles per

00:33:55.650 --> 00:33:59.019
hour. Wind speeds again picked up rapidly and

00:33:59.019 --> 00:34:02.180
began to snow at 2 .45pm, reducing visibility.

00:34:03.140 --> 00:34:06.839
Arthur M. Anderson lost sight of the Edmund Fitzgerald,

00:34:07.000 --> 00:34:12.119
which at the time was about 16 miles ahead. Shortly

00:34:12.119 --> 00:34:15.360
after 3 .30pm, Captain McSorley radioed the Arthur

00:34:15.360 --> 00:34:19.559
McAnderson, M. Anderson rather, to report that

00:34:19.559 --> 00:34:21.760
the Edmund Fitzgerald was taking on water and

00:34:21.760 --> 00:34:24.639
had lost two vent covers and a fence railing.

00:34:25.449 --> 00:34:29.369
The vessel had also developed a list. Two of

00:34:29.369 --> 00:34:32.269
the Edmund Fitzgerald's six bilge pumps ran continuously

00:34:32.269 --> 00:34:35.949
to discharge shipped water. McSorley said that

00:34:35.949 --> 00:34:38.789
he would slow his ship down so that Arthur M.

00:34:38.829 --> 00:34:42.369
Anderson could close the gap between them. In

00:34:42.369 --> 00:34:45.369
a broadcast shortly afterwards, the United States

00:34:45.369 --> 00:34:48.469
Coast Guard warned all shipping that the Sioux

00:34:48.469 --> 00:34:52.250
locks had been closed and they should seek safe

00:34:52.250 --> 00:34:57.059
anchorage. Shortly after 4 .10 p .m., McSorley

00:34:57.059 --> 00:34:59.480
called the Anderson again to report a radar failure

00:34:59.480 --> 00:35:03.500
and asked Anderson to keep track of them. Fitzgerald,

00:35:03.599 --> 00:35:06.400
effectively blind, slowed to let Anderson come

00:35:06.400 --> 00:35:09.840
within a 10 -mile range so that she could receive

00:35:09.840 --> 00:35:13.440
radar guidance from the other ship. For a time,

00:35:13.480 --> 00:35:15.539
the Anderson directed Fitzgerald towards relative

00:35:15.539 --> 00:35:19.280
safety of Whitefish Bay. Then, at 4 .39 p .m.,

00:35:19.280 --> 00:35:21.260
McSorley contacted the U .S. Coast Guard Station

00:35:21.260 --> 00:35:27.250
in Grand Marais, Michigan. They were inquiring

00:35:27.250 --> 00:35:30.849
whether Whitefish Point Light and Navigation

00:35:30.849 --> 00:35:33.630
Beacon were operational. The U .S. Coast Guard

00:35:33.630 --> 00:35:35.789
replied that their monitoring equipment indicated

00:35:35.789 --> 00:35:39.369
that both instruments were inactive. McSorley

00:35:39.369 --> 00:35:41.809
then hailed any ships in the Whitefish Point

00:35:41.809 --> 00:35:44.750
area to report the state of navigational aids,

00:35:44.969 --> 00:35:49.489
receiving an answer from Captain Cedric Woodard

00:35:49.489 --> 00:35:54.909
of Avifors. between 5 and 5 .30 p .m. that the

00:35:54.909 --> 00:35:57.449
Whitefish Point light was on, but not the radio

00:35:57.449 --> 00:36:01.429
beacon. Woodard testified to the Marine Board

00:36:01.429 --> 00:36:04.869
that he overheard McSorley say, don't allow anybody

00:36:04.869 --> 00:36:07.969
on deck, as well as something about a vent that

00:36:07.969 --> 00:36:11.769
Woodard could not have understood. Sometime later,

00:36:11.929 --> 00:36:16.929
McSorley told Woodard, I have a bad list, I have

00:36:16.929 --> 00:36:19.329
lost both radars, and I am taking heavy seas

00:36:19.329 --> 00:36:22.070
over the deck. in one of the worst seas I have

00:36:22.070 --> 00:36:26.090
ever been in. Now, here's an aside. I found a

00:36:26.090 --> 00:36:28.190
document from the United States Coast Guard on

00:36:28.190 --> 00:36:30.690
the sinking of the Edmund Fitzgerald, and I'm

00:36:30.690 --> 00:36:32.690
going to read this page to you in regards to

00:36:32.690 --> 00:36:36.550
Whitefish Point Light. The Aids to Navigation

00:36:36.550 --> 00:36:40.949
Monitoring Equipment at Salt Ste. Marie. I think

00:36:40.949 --> 00:36:44.889
I'm saying that wrong. S -A -U -L -T -S -T -E.

00:36:46.230 --> 00:36:50.409
For now, I'll say Salt. At that Coast Guard station

00:36:50.409 --> 00:36:54.150
is fitted with a paper tape recording merchant.

00:36:54.570 --> 00:37:00.090
My goodness. Mechanism. But there are no indicator

00:37:00.090 --> 00:37:03.750
records for 10th of November. There is no requirement

00:37:03.750 --> 00:37:06.610
that a permanent record of the monitoring equipment

00:37:06.610 --> 00:37:10.469
be maintained. The records of the commander,

00:37:10.789 --> 00:37:13.889
9th Coast Guard District, indicate that Whitefish

00:37:13.889 --> 00:37:17.139
Point Light. was automated and unmanned on the

00:37:17.139 --> 00:37:21.280
11th of June, 1970. This is one of the first

00:37:21.280 --> 00:37:23.800
aids in the area to be automated. Immediately

00:37:23.800 --> 00:37:26.280
following the automation, several outages were

00:37:26.280 --> 00:37:29.000
experienced. However, they were attributed to

00:37:29.000 --> 00:37:31.539
the newness and complexity of the automation

00:37:31.539 --> 00:37:36.239
equipment. Between 1st of June, 1973 and 15th

00:37:36.239 --> 00:37:42.099
of November, 1975, the outages were in 73. six

00:37:42.099 --> 00:37:46.300
light outages seven radio beacon outages seven

00:37:46.300 --> 00:37:50.679
foghorn outages in seventy four one zero and

00:37:50.679 --> 00:37:55.679
three seventy five two light three radio and

00:37:55.679 --> 00:37:59.340
five foghorn the lighthouse at whitefish point

00:37:59.340 --> 00:38:02.119
is also fitted with a battery powered auxiliary

00:38:02.119 --> 00:38:04.860
light with a range of nine and one half miles

00:38:05.519 --> 00:38:07.860
which would come on automatically if both the

00:38:07.860 --> 00:38:10.699
normal power and emergency generator power for

00:38:10.699 --> 00:38:14.519
the main light should fail. The only U .S. navigational

00:38:14.519 --> 00:38:17.440
aids in the eastern Lake Superior north or west

00:38:17.440 --> 00:38:20.360
of Whitefish Bay, which were inoperative on the

00:38:20.360 --> 00:38:22.239
afternoon or evening of the 10th of November,

00:38:22.480 --> 00:38:25.619
were those at Whitefish Point. There were no

00:38:25.619 --> 00:38:28.260
Canadian aids in eastern Lake Superior which

00:38:28.260 --> 00:38:33.639
were inoperative. So this paper is hundreds of

00:38:33.639 --> 00:38:37.010
pages. Literally. And this is the only segment

00:38:37.010 --> 00:38:39.130
in which I found reference to Whitefish Point

00:38:39.130 --> 00:38:42.670
or the lighthouses en masse. And I think it's

00:38:42.670 --> 00:38:46.010
interesting because obviously for this podcast

00:38:46.010 --> 00:38:48.750
where we talk a lot about lighthouses, these

00:38:48.750 --> 00:38:52.889
ships were looking, these captains were looking

00:38:52.889 --> 00:38:57.230
for lighthouses, especially this one in discussion

00:38:57.230 --> 00:39:01.449
at Whitefish Point, which would mean safety.

00:39:01.570 --> 00:39:04.619
It would mean that they were close to land. At

00:39:04.619 --> 00:39:06.960
the time of the sinking, I think it's going to

00:39:06.960 --> 00:39:08.820
come up again. I think they're about 16 miles,

00:39:08.960 --> 00:39:12.000
17 miles from that position from Whitefish Point.

00:39:12.159 --> 00:39:16.300
So they were near safety, but of course did not

00:39:16.300 --> 00:39:24.460
make it. By the afternoon of November 10th, there

00:39:24.460 --> 00:39:27.260
were sustained winds of 67 miles per hour recorded

00:39:27.260 --> 00:39:31.920
and waves increasing as high as 25 feet by 6

00:39:31.920 --> 00:39:36.789
p .m. The Anderson was also struck by 86 mph

00:39:36.789 --> 00:39:44.030
gusts and rogue waves as high as 35 feet. At

00:39:44.030 --> 00:39:46.250
approximately 7 .10 p .m., when the Anderson

00:39:46.250 --> 00:39:51.989
notified the Fitzgerald of an upbound ship oncoming

00:39:51.989 --> 00:39:56.170
and asked how the Fitzgerald was doing, Captain

00:39:56.170 --> 00:40:00.130
McSorley reported, We are holding our own. She

00:40:00.130 --> 00:40:03.860
was never heard from again. No distress signal

00:40:03.860 --> 00:40:06.860
was received, and 10 minutes later, the Anderson

00:40:06.860 --> 00:40:10.519
lost the ability to either reach the Fitzgerald

00:40:10.519 --> 00:40:16.780
by radio or detector on the radar screens. The

00:40:16.780 --> 00:40:19.260
captain of the Anderson, his name was Captain

00:40:19.260 --> 00:40:22.280
Cooper, first called the Coast Guard at 7 .39

00:40:22.280 --> 00:40:26.119
p .m. on Channel 16, the radio distress frequency.

00:40:26.860 --> 00:40:28.500
The Coast Guard reported that they were having

00:40:28.500 --> 00:40:30.300
difficulty with their communication systems,

00:40:30.400 --> 00:40:33.739
including antennas blown down by the storm. Cooper

00:40:33.739 --> 00:40:36.159
then contacted another nearby ship, and they

00:40:36.159 --> 00:40:38.059
said they could not pick up the Fitzgerald on

00:40:38.059 --> 00:40:41.099
their radar either. Despite repeated attempts

00:40:41.099 --> 00:40:43.679
to raise the Coast Guard, Cooper was not successful

00:40:43.679 --> 00:40:47.480
until 7 .54 p .m., when the officer on duty asked

00:40:47.480 --> 00:40:50.480
him to keep watch for a 16 -foot boat lost in

00:40:50.480 --> 00:40:54.880
his area, a different incident. About 8 .25 p

00:40:54.880 --> 00:40:57.079
.m., Cooper again called the Coast Guard to express

00:40:57.079 --> 00:40:59.780
his concern about the Fitzgerald, and at 9 .03

00:40:59.780 --> 00:41:03.579
p .m., he reported her missing officially. Petty

00:41:03.579 --> 00:41:06.699
Officer Philip Branch later testified, I considered

00:41:06.699 --> 00:41:09.239
it serious, but at the time, it was not urgent.

00:41:10.440 --> 00:41:13.420
It sounds like there was quite a few things going

00:41:13.420 --> 00:41:17.039
on in this storm. Lacking appropriate search

00:41:17.039 --> 00:41:19.179
and rescue vessels to respond to the Fitzgerald

00:41:19.179 --> 00:41:22.429
disaster, At approximately 9 p .m., the Coast

00:41:22.429 --> 00:41:25.309
Guard asked the Anderson to turn around and to

00:41:25.309 --> 00:41:28.530
look for survivors. 10 .30 p .m., the Coast Guard

00:41:28.530 --> 00:41:32.210
asked all commercial vessels anchored near Whitefish

00:41:32.210 --> 00:41:35.210
Bay to assist in the search. The initial search

00:41:35.210 --> 00:41:37.050
for survivors was carried out by the Anderson,

00:41:37.250 --> 00:41:40.650
a second freighter, the Clay Ford. The efforts

00:41:40.650 --> 00:41:43.050
of a third freighter, the Toronto -registered

00:41:43.050 --> 00:41:46.949
SS Hilda Marjane, were foiled by the weather.

00:41:47.409 --> 00:41:50.010
The Coast Guard sent a buoy tender, Wood Rush,

00:41:50.599 --> 00:41:53.760
It's a cool name. From Duluth, Minnesota, but

00:41:53.760 --> 00:41:56.440
it took two and a half hours to launch and a

00:41:56.440 --> 00:41:59.300
day to travel to the search area. The Traverse

00:41:59.300 --> 00:42:01.599
City, Michigan Coast Guard Station launched a

00:42:01.599 --> 00:42:05.559
HU -16 fixed -wing search aircraft that arrived

00:42:05.559 --> 00:42:09.460
on the scene at 10 .53 p .m., while a HH -52

00:42:09.460 --> 00:42:13.460
Coast Guard helicopter with a 3 .8 million candle

00:42:13.460 --> 00:42:16.539
power searchlight arrived at 1 a .m. on November

00:42:16.539 --> 00:42:21.179
11th. Coast Guard aircraft joined on day three

00:42:21.179 --> 00:42:26.179
from Canada on the search, and Ontario Provincial

00:42:26.179 --> 00:42:29.000
Police established and maintained a beach patrol

00:42:29.000 --> 00:42:32.539
along all the eastern shore of Lake Superior.

00:42:33.519 --> 00:42:36.079
Although the search recovered debris, including

00:42:36.079 --> 00:42:38.719
lifeboats and rafts, none of the crew were found.

00:42:39.380 --> 00:42:42.099
On her final voyage, the Fitzgerald's crew of

00:42:42.099 --> 00:42:45.559
29, consistent of the captain, the first, second,

00:42:45.719 --> 00:42:49.460
and third mates, five engineers, three oilers,

00:42:49.500 --> 00:42:54.000
a cook, a wiper, two maintenance men, three watchmen,

00:42:54.099 --> 00:42:57.980
three deckhands, three wheelsmen, two porters,

00:42:58.019 --> 00:43:02.420
a cadet, and one steward. Most of the crew were

00:43:02.420 --> 00:43:05.579
from Ohio and Wisconsin. Their ages ranged from

00:43:05.579 --> 00:43:10.099
20, the youngest being Watchman Carl A. Peckhall,

00:43:10.239 --> 00:43:14.260
and 63 was the oldest, of course, that was Captain

00:43:14.260 --> 00:43:17.849
McSorley. The Edmund Fitzgerald is among the

00:43:17.849 --> 00:43:19.849
largest and best known vessels lost on the Great

00:43:19.849 --> 00:43:23.050
Lakes. She is not alone on Lake Superior seabed

00:43:23.050 --> 00:43:27.690
in that area. In the years between 1816, when

00:43:27.690 --> 00:43:31.949
Invincible, the ship, was lost, and 1975, when

00:43:31.949 --> 00:43:34.349
the Fitzgerald sank, the Whitefish Point area

00:43:34.349 --> 00:43:39.650
had claimed at least 240 ships. It's really,

00:43:39.730 --> 00:43:45.389
really crazy. Sorry, those conditions are just

00:43:45.389 --> 00:43:48.650
nuts. 35 -foot waves. What did we say about the

00:43:48.650 --> 00:43:53.349
wind? I want to say 80 miles an hour, 86 miles.

00:43:53.429 --> 00:43:56.150
Yeah, 86 -mile -an -hour gusts. Rogue waves as

00:43:56.150 --> 00:43:59.329
high as 35 feet. And I'm looking at an image.

00:43:59.349 --> 00:44:01.210
I don't know what I'm going to show on YouTube

00:44:01.210 --> 00:44:04.030
for this episode, but an image you could find

00:44:04.030 --> 00:44:07.690
easily on Wikipedia, for example, is one of the

00:44:07.690 --> 00:44:10.210
Edmund Fitzgerald's lifeboats, which is now on

00:44:10.210 --> 00:44:16.280
display at the Valley Camp Museum ship. A couple

00:44:16.280 --> 00:44:20.219
of items were recovered. So the wreck and the

00:44:20.219 --> 00:44:23.780
discovery and the surveys. There's a Coast Guard

00:44:23.780 --> 00:44:27.239
drawing that's on record of the ship that was

00:44:27.239 --> 00:44:30.340
found, and it was found in two parts, which will

00:44:30.340 --> 00:44:33.760
build into the mystery of how it sank. So the

00:44:33.760 --> 00:44:39.340
wreck discovery. The Navy sent an aircraft, and

00:44:39.340 --> 00:44:43.420
it used a set of equipment with magnetic anomaly

00:44:43.420 --> 00:44:47.630
detection. And on November 14th of 1975, it was

00:44:47.630 --> 00:44:51.090
able to find the ship, the Fitzgerald, close

00:44:51.090 --> 00:44:53.630
to the international boundary, U .S. and Canada,

00:44:53.769 --> 00:45:00.230
at a depth of 530 feet. For reference, if anyone

00:45:00.230 --> 00:45:02.489
knows the area, it's about 15 miles west of Dead

00:45:02.489 --> 00:45:05.369
Man's Cove, Ontario, about 8 miles northwest

00:45:05.369 --> 00:45:09.110
of Pancake Bay Provincial Park, and 17 miles

00:45:09.110 --> 00:45:11.570
from the entrance to Whitefish Bay to the southeast.

00:45:12.610 --> 00:45:17.599
What fun names. There was a further survey, November

00:45:17.599 --> 00:45:20.260
14th through 16th, quickly by the U .S. Coast

00:45:20.260 --> 00:45:23.719
Guard using a side -scan sonar. And that survey

00:45:23.719 --> 00:45:25.940
confirmed what was detected by the aircraft,

00:45:26.239 --> 00:45:29.219
two large objects lying close together on the

00:45:29.219 --> 00:45:33.860
lake floor. So there's a whole entry here on

00:45:33.860 --> 00:45:36.079
underwater surveys. And what I'll summarize,

00:45:36.219 --> 00:45:38.280
if you want to read, of course, plenty of reading

00:45:38.280 --> 00:45:44.869
to be had, but lots of footage. Many surveys

00:45:44.869 --> 00:45:47.949
were taken using different pieces of technology

00:45:47.949 --> 00:45:51.949
and underwater cameras. And actually, there was

00:45:51.949 --> 00:45:56.150
a record set for scuba diving. I think it was

00:45:56.150 --> 00:45:59.630
a pair of gentlemen scuba dove down to see the

00:45:59.630 --> 00:46:03.730
Fitzgerald and did some 3D videotaping. So there

00:46:03.730 --> 00:46:06.250
are many hundreds of hours of videotape of the

00:46:06.250 --> 00:46:08.989
Fitzgerald that were collected for research and

00:46:08.989 --> 00:46:14.219
to investigate the situation. Eventually, diving

00:46:14.219 --> 00:46:19.000
to the Fitzgerald, it became kind of a tenuous

00:46:19.000 --> 00:46:23.219
thing because what is the purpose of the dive?

00:46:23.300 --> 00:46:28.760
Are you trying to solve the mystery of a now

00:46:28.760 --> 00:46:32.980
50 -year -old shipwreck or a shipwreck or a rip

00:46:32.980 --> 00:46:37.099
check? Or are you diving for fun, for adventure,

00:46:37.380 --> 00:46:42.860
oceanic adventure? and it's disrespectful to

00:46:42.860 --> 00:46:47.360
those crew. So there was a restriction put on

00:46:47.360 --> 00:46:52.360
diving to the shipwreck as a defined watery grave

00:46:52.360 --> 00:46:57.719
for those gentlemen. So I think there's the potential

00:46:57.719 --> 00:47:00.960
that more investigation might be done, but since

00:47:00.960 --> 00:47:03.340
so long has passed since the shipwreck, I think

00:47:03.340 --> 00:47:06.539
it's more of a moment in culture and a respect

00:47:06.539 --> 00:47:12.380
now for those who were killed there. Regarding

00:47:12.380 --> 00:47:16.360
the sinking of the ship, you know, in the song,

00:47:16.619 --> 00:47:19.679
Sinking of the Edmund, Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald,

00:47:19.739 --> 00:47:22.900
it talks about water came over the bow and the

00:47:22.900 --> 00:47:25.860
hatchway gave in and, you know, boys, it's been

00:47:25.860 --> 00:47:30.159
so good to know you. It's not exactly been determined

00:47:30.159 --> 00:47:34.860
from radio records and testimonies of the night.

00:47:35.659 --> 00:47:37.719
Captain McSorley talked about a couple things

00:47:37.719 --> 00:47:40.199
that are interesting. There was a guardrail that

00:47:40.199 --> 00:47:42.849
was broken. on the surface of the ship, on the

00:47:42.849 --> 00:47:46.590
deck. They had already been taking on water for

00:47:46.590 --> 00:47:49.329
a while, and they had developed a list, as we

00:47:49.329 --> 00:47:52.309
talked about, so a lean in the ship as it was

00:47:52.309 --> 00:47:56.969
traveling. And there's a ton of investigations.

00:47:57.210 --> 00:48:01.570
So let's talk through some notes here briefly,

00:48:01.710 --> 00:48:04.070
and then I'll give kind of my summary of what

00:48:04.070 --> 00:48:07.510
I've read. So there was waves and weather hypothesis.

00:48:09.340 --> 00:48:11.880
We talked about some rogue waves. We talked about

00:48:11.880 --> 00:48:14.539
being in the eye of the storm that evening. Winds

00:48:14.539 --> 00:48:18.860
were changing. Things were not typical. The waves

00:48:18.860 --> 00:48:21.260
and the wind were coming from an unusual perspective

00:48:21.260 --> 00:48:23.880
from not the north to south, but rather multiple

00:48:23.880 --> 00:48:28.460
directions. The rogue wave hypothesis of the

00:48:28.460 --> 00:48:31.300
sinking of the ship is interesting because that

00:48:31.300 --> 00:48:33.320
ship we keep referencing that was close to the

00:48:33.320 --> 00:48:37.420
Fitzgerald, the Anderson, reported three waves.

00:48:38.400 --> 00:48:40.719
Sometimes three rogue waves in a pattern are

00:48:40.719 --> 00:48:46.739
called three sisters. And let's see. The first

00:48:46.739 --> 00:48:50.920
wave introduces an abnormally large amount of

00:48:50.920 --> 00:48:53.659
water onto the deck. The water is unable to fully

00:48:53.659 --> 00:48:55.840
drain away before the second wave strikes, adding

00:48:55.840 --> 00:48:58.780
to the surplus. The third incoming wave again

00:48:58.780 --> 00:49:01.820
adds to the two accumulated backwashes, quickly

00:49:01.820 --> 00:49:06.940
overloading the deck with too much water. The

00:49:06.940 --> 00:49:10.519
Anderson reported that they were hit by two waves,

00:49:10.739 --> 00:49:16.460
30 to 35 foot high, around 6 .30 p .m., which

00:49:16.460 --> 00:49:19.860
is before we think the Fitzgerald sank. But it's

00:49:19.860 --> 00:49:21.699
possible because they weren't in the same position

00:49:21.699 --> 00:49:25.039
that the Fitzgerald managed those waves more

00:49:25.039 --> 00:49:31.159
poorly. Also, a third wave or a particular dive

00:49:31.159 --> 00:49:33.619
where the bow would be taking on more water,

00:49:33.659 --> 00:49:36.320
it just... It just couldn't shed. It could lead

00:49:36.320 --> 00:49:40.480
to a couple things. And those are the other hypotheses

00:49:40.480 --> 00:49:44.420
that are oncoming. So one is that it just simply

00:49:44.420 --> 00:49:47.980
took on too much water over time. So this next

00:49:47.980 --> 00:49:51.400
one is the cargo hold flooding hypothesis. So

00:49:51.400 --> 00:49:54.159
as we mentioned, there are many, many hatches

00:49:54.159 --> 00:49:57.880
to the cargo hold. And there's some confusion

00:49:57.880 --> 00:50:00.900
as to whether or not they are truly watertight

00:50:00.900 --> 00:50:06.159
or mostly watertight or... they were clamped

00:50:06.159 --> 00:50:09.219
or not clamped, closed. So, you know, these are

00:50:09.219 --> 00:50:11.800
steel hatch covers, and under a normal condition,

00:50:11.980 --> 00:50:14.500
they're going to fall closed. So they're opened

00:50:14.500 --> 00:50:17.739
manually when the ship is being loaded or unloaded.

00:50:18.239 --> 00:50:22.820
And it's regular. So here's a quote. Video footage

00:50:22.820 --> 00:50:24.880
of the wreck showed that most of her hatch clamps

00:50:24.880 --> 00:50:28.880
were in perfect condition. The Coast Guard Marine

00:50:28.880 --> 00:50:31.679
Board concluded that... the few damaged clamps

00:50:31.679 --> 00:50:34.579
were probably the ones that were fastened. So

00:50:34.579 --> 00:50:38.599
one of the theories is that ineffective hatch

00:50:38.599 --> 00:50:42.440
closure caused the Fitzgerald to flood. And so

00:50:42.440 --> 00:50:45.019
as it was taking on water and rough seas, a lot

00:50:45.019 --> 00:50:47.739
of the hatches were not clamped closed, which

00:50:47.739 --> 00:50:50.099
clamping is a manual process to where the crew

00:50:50.099 --> 00:50:52.219
would go to each of the hatches, and there were

00:50:52.219 --> 00:50:55.340
many of them, and clamp them closed with some

00:50:55.340 --> 00:51:00.469
ratchet -type devices, some hardware. With iron

00:51:00.469 --> 00:51:03.869
ore, if the ship were to roll over, which would

00:51:03.869 --> 00:51:06.989
be catastrophic, the weight of the cargo may

00:51:06.989 --> 00:51:10.289
rip those closures open, I guess is the supposed

00:51:10.289 --> 00:51:13.929
situation. And so if they were ripped open, the

00:51:13.929 --> 00:51:16.849
clamps would be destroyed. The fact that in the

00:51:16.849 --> 00:51:19.469
shipwreck it's seen the clamps in mass or in

00:51:19.469 --> 00:51:21.269
good condition means, well, those clamps must

00:51:21.269 --> 00:51:23.969
have never been engaged. So if they're never

00:51:23.969 --> 00:51:26.010
been engaged and water was flooding over onto

00:51:26.010 --> 00:51:27.889
the deck, perhaps it was finding its way into

00:51:27.889 --> 00:51:33.409
the cargo hold. And, you know, 16 ,000 long tons,

00:51:33.489 --> 00:51:36.909
I think, was the load of cargo. As you begin

00:51:36.909 --> 00:51:40.369
to add water to that load, it's going to become

00:51:40.369 --> 00:51:42.610
too much weight for the ship, both structurally

00:51:42.610 --> 00:51:46.289
and from a basic buoyancy perspective. The ship's

00:51:46.289 --> 00:51:48.650
going to sit lower in the water with more weight,

00:51:48.730 --> 00:51:50.369
and then, of course, that's a compounding issue.

00:51:54.780 --> 00:51:59.340
hypothesis as the shoaling hypothesis. So perhaps

00:51:59.340 --> 00:52:04.019
they hit a shoal and the whole of the Edmund

00:52:04.019 --> 00:52:07.300
Fitzgerald was breached or the structure otherwise

00:52:07.300 --> 00:52:10.699
compromised to where the ship broke apart and

00:52:10.699 --> 00:52:13.000
then sunk in the two parts that are now at the

00:52:13.000 --> 00:52:17.059
bottom of the lake. Although it was investigated,

00:52:17.239 --> 00:52:21.679
no shoal was ever found within the area that

00:52:23.690 --> 00:52:25.610
No shoal was ever found that was obviously damaged,

00:52:25.789 --> 00:52:27.510
is what I should say, within the area that the

00:52:27.510 --> 00:52:29.849
ship sank. There is a shoal there, which will

00:52:29.849 --> 00:52:33.190
come up again. The third is that there was a

00:52:33.190 --> 00:52:35.929
structural failure. And this one's interesting

00:52:35.929 --> 00:52:38.909
to me. I'm a mechanical engineer by study, and

00:52:38.909 --> 00:52:44.070
there's lots of discussion about the structure

00:52:44.070 --> 00:52:47.769
of the Fitzgerald, about maintenance, about welds,

00:52:47.769 --> 00:52:53.170
and how some areas of the keel. were tack welded,

00:52:53.289 --> 00:52:56.610
quote, during inspections, and some welds had

00:52:56.610 --> 00:53:01.409
broken. There was also some supposition and some

00:53:01.409 --> 00:53:06.449
anecdotal evidence about captains. Several of

00:53:06.449 --> 00:53:10.570
the Fitzgerald had noted that the ship flexed

00:53:10.570 --> 00:53:14.530
when it hit large waves, rogue waves, or was

00:53:14.530 --> 00:53:18.210
on rough seas. Sometimes... I think the diving

00:53:18.210 --> 00:53:21.510
board was used as a term to reference the flexibility

00:53:21.510 --> 00:53:25.869
of the ship, which throughout history, there's

00:53:25.869 --> 00:53:27.849
been an interesting relationship to strength

00:53:27.849 --> 00:53:31.630
and flexibility of ships. For example, the Vikings

00:53:31.630 --> 00:53:33.949
way back in the day, I learned this on a trip

00:53:33.949 --> 00:53:38.789
to Sweden, the Viking longboats were particularly

00:53:38.789 --> 00:53:42.769
interesting because they were wide and so they

00:53:42.769 --> 00:53:45.150
didn't require a great depth of water for travel.

00:53:45.550 --> 00:53:47.389
They could travel on the ocean as well as up

00:53:47.389 --> 00:53:50.289
riverways. They were able to be rowed or sailed,

00:53:50.449 --> 00:53:53.230
which allowed for that diversity. But what I

00:53:53.230 --> 00:53:56.750
wanted to say was they were made of wood and

00:53:56.750 --> 00:53:59.429
they built them in a way that they would flex

00:53:59.429 --> 00:54:03.170
also in stronger seas. Of course, many, many,

00:54:03.170 --> 00:54:07.389
many of them sank. But the longboat was interesting

00:54:07.389 --> 00:54:11.809
because the flexibility allowed the ship to endure

00:54:11.809 --> 00:54:16.849
the undulations of storm. And so that concept

00:54:16.849 --> 00:54:20.190
is still around. And the stronger you have something,

00:54:20.269 --> 00:54:23.369
or rather, the more rigid it is, the harder a

00:54:23.369 --> 00:54:28.150
metal is, the more brittle it is. And the more

00:54:28.150 --> 00:54:31.469
annealed a metal is, more or less. Of course,

00:54:31.489 --> 00:54:35.389
I'm speaking a little bit outside of my knowledge

00:54:35.389 --> 00:54:39.750
here. But what I remember is that the more...

00:54:41.890 --> 00:54:44.909
durable a metal is the longer it will last in

00:54:44.909 --> 00:54:48.050
cyclical stress so you can have metal strain

00:54:48.050 --> 00:54:51.630
and stress and remain together without breaking

00:54:51.630 --> 00:54:55.829
to where hardened metal may last longer and provide

00:54:55.829 --> 00:54:59.650
a higher overall strain or rather a higher overall

00:54:59.650 --> 00:55:02.130
strength before failure but the failure is more

00:55:02.130 --> 00:55:05.869
of a crack rather than a tear that makes sense

00:55:05.869 --> 00:55:14.039
so um Structural. Structural strength. There's

00:55:14.039 --> 00:55:16.119
lots to read. If you're really interested in

00:55:16.119 --> 00:55:18.639
that, I would recommend reading some articles.

00:55:19.579 --> 00:55:23.480
The third hypothesis listed here is topside damage.

00:55:24.139 --> 00:55:27.239
So again, it was mentioned by Captain McSorley.

00:55:28.820 --> 00:55:33.039
The Fitzgerald deck had something broken. The

00:55:33.039 --> 00:55:36.079
rail was broken on the side of the deck. So there's

00:55:36.079 --> 00:55:37.920
a couple things that might mean. One is that

00:55:37.920 --> 00:55:41.980
the ship was flexing and under flexion The bow

00:55:41.980 --> 00:55:45.980
was being pulled down by force. The rail, which

00:55:45.980 --> 00:55:47.980
was on the top of the deck, may have taken on

00:55:47.980 --> 00:55:49.960
some of that load and, of course, is not designed

00:55:49.960 --> 00:55:52.219
for that, so it may have snapped like a wire.

00:55:53.460 --> 00:55:56.440
This topside damage hypothesis is supposing that

00:55:56.440 --> 00:55:59.300
maybe something really heavy was floating, like

00:55:59.300 --> 00:56:02.719
a log example, and that log may have come onto

00:56:02.719 --> 00:56:05.480
the deck of the ship and caused some damage in

00:56:05.480 --> 00:56:07.719
which water might be able to enter the ship quickly.

00:56:09.449 --> 00:56:14.269
through hatches or otherwise. The thing I just

00:56:14.269 --> 00:56:15.909
connected that I haven't thought about, it's

00:56:15.909 --> 00:56:18.829
really just a question, is that boat that went

00:56:18.829 --> 00:56:21.170
missing. There was another ship that the Coast

00:56:21.170 --> 00:56:23.710
Guard said to be on the lookout for. Let's see

00:56:23.710 --> 00:56:40.739
if I can find that real quick in the notes. A

00:56:40.739 --> 00:56:44.139
16 -foot boat was lost in the area, was a quote

00:56:44.139 --> 00:56:47.539
from the Coast Guard. So around 8 p .m. So I

00:56:47.539 --> 00:56:50.320
doubt those are related, but potentially from

00:56:50.320 --> 00:56:52.800
the little that I have read and learned here,

00:56:52.920 --> 00:56:55.940
it's possible there was a run -in, especially

00:56:55.940 --> 00:57:00.840
with no radar on the Fitzgerald and presumably

00:57:00.840 --> 00:57:05.239
no radar on a boat as small as 16 feet. I don't

00:57:05.239 --> 00:57:06.739
know that story there, but I don't know why they

00:57:06.739 --> 00:57:09.489
were out in that storm, such a small ship. Such

00:57:09.489 --> 00:57:12.849
a small boat. So let's find our way back to our

00:57:12.849 --> 00:57:18.590
notes. Some possible contributing factors to

00:57:18.590 --> 00:57:23.170
the wreck is that it could be any of those failure

00:57:23.170 --> 00:57:25.949
modes that we talked about just recently. Structural

00:57:25.949 --> 00:57:28.989
failure, topside damage, shoaling hypothesis,

00:57:29.690 --> 00:57:32.510
cargo hold flooding. It could be any of those

00:57:32.510 --> 00:57:34.050
things, or it could be a combination of those

00:57:34.050 --> 00:57:36.469
things, even if the cargo hold were flooding.

00:57:36.840 --> 00:57:39.019
They mentioned bilge pumps were activated, so

00:57:39.019 --> 00:57:40.739
that means that there is some water that had

00:57:40.739 --> 00:57:44.179
been taken on. If a significant amount of water

00:57:44.179 --> 00:57:47.000
added up to a certain part of the ship, you know,

00:57:47.000 --> 00:57:48.860
contributing to structural failure, that ship

00:57:48.860 --> 00:57:51.300
could have broken up on the surface and sank

00:57:51.300 --> 00:57:55.260
in two pieces. If it hit just a crazy wave or

00:57:55.260 --> 00:57:57.119
potentially a couple of rogue waves and took

00:57:57.119 --> 00:57:59.760
a dive, potentially it could have began to sink

00:57:59.760 --> 00:58:02.460
and then broken up on the way down. Of course,

00:58:02.480 --> 00:58:06.940
it did end up in two pieces. So some contributing

00:58:06.940 --> 00:58:10.880
factors. The weather forecasting. We talked about

00:58:10.880 --> 00:58:13.300
the National Weather Service changing their forecast

00:58:13.300 --> 00:58:17.440
a couple times. That was unfortunate. They did

00:58:17.440 --> 00:58:20.800
not predict that storm to be at that intensity.

00:58:21.019 --> 00:58:24.500
And honestly, from what I've read, it was really

00:58:24.500 --> 00:58:28.920
unlikely that this situation would be so bad.

00:58:29.400 --> 00:58:32.079
And it was a culmination of bad luck, wrong time,

00:58:32.179 --> 00:58:35.139
wrong place. And, you know, if the ship had just

00:58:35.139 --> 00:58:37.599
put a couple more miles ahead of her, then she

00:58:37.599 --> 00:58:41.360
would not have been in that place. There was

00:58:41.360 --> 00:58:44.400
some inaccuracy to navigational charts. So one

00:58:44.400 --> 00:58:47.820
of the things we mentioned, there's an area called

00:58:47.820 --> 00:58:51.179
Six Fathom Shoal, which is a hazard to ships.

00:58:51.619 --> 00:58:56.940
And eventually a survey was taken after the Fitzgerald

00:58:56.940 --> 00:58:59.429
had sunk. and the survey revealed that the shoal

00:58:59.429 --> 00:59:02.150
ran about one mile further east than shown on

00:59:02.150 --> 00:59:07.010
the Canadian charts. So that's a big problem.

00:59:07.409 --> 00:59:09.409
Now, of course, I mentioned the shoals were,

00:59:09.570 --> 00:59:15.590
nearby shoals for the crash area were surveyed,

00:59:15.590 --> 00:59:17.469
and it wasn't found to be any immediate damage.

00:59:17.789 --> 00:59:20.449
Also on the shipwreck at the Fitzgerald, there

00:59:20.449 --> 00:59:24.730
was no immediate damage that was visible. But,

00:59:24.849 --> 00:59:27.269
of course, the ship is not something you can,

00:59:27.630 --> 00:59:31.210
It was sitting in mud. So it's an imperfect assumption.

00:59:33.250 --> 00:59:36.590
Contributing factor, the lack of watertight bulkheads.

00:59:37.050 --> 00:59:42.050
So bulkheads are, if you know, separations in

00:59:42.050 --> 00:59:45.190
a ship that help in the case of sinking, especially

00:59:45.190 --> 00:59:49.409
to where if one area were to flood, the others

00:59:49.409 --> 00:59:53.070
would not flood. And it would have enough buoyancy

00:59:53.070 --> 00:59:55.170
in the ship to survive certain situations. Of

00:59:55.170 --> 00:59:57.659
course, a shipwreck that... everyone knows about

00:59:57.659 --> 01:00:01.579
is the Titanic. And the water, the design of

01:00:01.579 --> 01:00:04.079
the Titanic had a fault, I believe, with the

01:00:04.079 --> 01:00:08.460
bulkheads being insufficient. So when the Titanic

01:00:08.460 --> 01:00:11.500
hit the iceberg, there were several areas in

01:00:11.500 --> 01:00:15.559
which the water was able to travel. And of course,

01:00:15.559 --> 01:00:19.099
wrong time, wrong place, and bad luck took on

01:00:19.099 --> 01:00:20.800
too much water. And we know the story of the

01:00:20.800 --> 01:00:26.190
Titanic. But the Fitzgerald apparently had I

01:00:26.190 --> 01:00:28.630
mean, it was a cargo ship, so it had two non

01:00:28.630 --> 01:00:31.849
-watertight traverse screen bulkheads as part

01:00:31.849 --> 01:00:37.610
of the cargo area. Potentially that watertight

01:00:37.610 --> 01:00:42.809
bulkheads might have helped in that case. There's

01:00:42.809 --> 01:00:47.090
a lack of instrumentation. So a fathometer, which

01:00:47.090 --> 01:00:49.190
is a fun name, was not required under the Coast

01:00:49.190 --> 01:00:53.000
Guard regulations. The Fitzgerald lacked one,

01:00:53.059 --> 01:00:55.960
so that's a depth finder. The Fitzgerald at the

01:00:55.960 --> 01:00:59.099
time actually used a rope, so the old -fashioned

01:00:59.099 --> 01:01:02.739
style was a piece of line knotted with measured

01:01:02.739 --> 01:01:04.900
intervals and a lead weight on the end, and that's

01:01:04.900 --> 01:01:07.579
what they would use. Of course, in a storm, it's

01:01:07.579 --> 01:01:10.159
unlikely and less likely that they would be using

01:01:10.159 --> 01:01:13.940
that system. So the Marine Board noted that because

01:01:13.940 --> 01:01:16.480
the Fitzgerald lacked a draft reading system,

01:01:16.579 --> 01:01:18.000
the crew had no way to determine whether the

01:01:18.000 --> 01:01:20.849
vessel had lost freeboard. which is the level

01:01:20.849 --> 01:01:27.690
of a ship's deck above the water. One thing I

01:01:27.690 --> 01:01:29.409
just missed here, the Fitzgerald had no system

01:01:29.409 --> 01:01:31.369
to monitor the presence or the amount of water

01:01:31.369 --> 01:01:34.050
in her cargo hold, which we talked about. So

01:01:34.050 --> 01:01:37.329
the intensity of that storm was likely to have

01:01:37.329 --> 01:01:40.329
some water that's going to reach that cargo hold.

01:01:40.889 --> 01:01:43.449
We talked about the bilge pumps were on, so there

01:01:43.449 --> 01:01:45.110
were areas of the ship that were being emptied

01:01:45.110 --> 01:01:48.329
of water, but there was no bilge pumps within

01:01:48.329 --> 01:01:51.710
the cargo hold particularly, and no way to monitor

01:01:51.710 --> 01:01:54.329
if there's additional water, which is, of course,

01:01:54.349 --> 01:01:57.730
heavy. It's not as heavy as iron ore by volume,

01:01:57.769 --> 01:02:01.329
but again, additional load after the ship was

01:02:01.329 --> 01:02:06.389
fully loaded would not be a good idea. This is

01:02:06.389 --> 01:02:09.409
interesting to me. A contributing factor increased

01:02:09.409 --> 01:02:12.769
load lines and reduced freeboard. To summarize,

01:02:12.989 --> 01:02:16.429
the ship was allowed an additional number of

01:02:16.429 --> 01:02:20.269
inches to sink into the water, which allowed

01:02:20.269 --> 01:02:24.409
the ship to hold 4 ,000 more tons in its cargo.

01:02:24.969 --> 01:02:29.030
So, of course, it's a regulated system, and the

01:02:29.030 --> 01:02:33.889
ship increased its cargo load and so also increased

01:02:33.889 --> 01:02:36.750
the depth at which it sat in the water. which

01:02:36.750 --> 01:02:41.369
for any situation with high seas is less advantageous.

01:02:49.210 --> 01:02:56.309
Captains that piloted the ship prior and afterwards

01:02:56.309 --> 01:02:59.409
to the load line increase said that she was a,

01:02:59.469 --> 01:03:02.230
quote, good riding ship, but afterwards the Fitzgerald

01:03:02.230 --> 01:03:05.010
became a sluggish ship with slower response and

01:03:05.010 --> 01:03:08.130
recovery times. McSorley said he did not like

01:03:08.130 --> 01:03:10.630
the action of a ship he described as a wiggling

01:03:10.630 --> 01:03:14.309
thing that scared him. Fitzgerald's bow hooked

01:03:14.309 --> 01:03:16.389
to one side or the other in heavy seas without

01:03:16.389 --> 01:03:19.530
recovering and made a groaning sound not heard

01:03:19.530 --> 01:03:25.650
on the ships. Scary. Very scary. Maintenance

01:03:25.650 --> 01:03:29.809
is contributed in here. The lake decils were

01:03:29.809 --> 01:03:33.559
dry docked only once every five years. And then,

01:03:33.599 --> 01:03:36.019
of course, we talked about the welds on the Fitzgerald.

01:03:36.400 --> 01:03:38.320
There's a quote here. The hole was just being

01:03:38.320 --> 01:03:41.900
held together with patching plates. So it's not

01:03:41.900 --> 01:03:48.000
ideal. Really not ideal. The combings, gaskets,

01:03:48.000 --> 01:03:50.019
and clamps were poorly maintained. It was a note

01:03:50.019 --> 01:03:56.400
in the year before 1975. Dry dock complacency

01:03:56.400 --> 01:04:00.880
is interesting. How do I say this? I don't want

01:04:00.880 --> 01:04:03.730
to be disrespectful. This article is a little

01:04:03.730 --> 01:04:07.550
bit aggressive. Of course, it kind of makes sense

01:04:07.550 --> 01:04:11.449
because you don't want to do this. So McSorley,

01:04:11.650 --> 01:04:14.449
the captain, was known as, quote, a heavy weather

01:04:14.449 --> 01:04:18.469
captain, which, you know, in the sense of masculinity

01:04:18.469 --> 01:04:22.510
and the sense of holding a man's position, you

01:04:22.510 --> 01:04:26.010
know, he was a proud person and he was used to

01:04:26.010 --> 01:04:29.210
pushing the limits. He was known to, quote, beat

01:04:29.210 --> 01:04:32.380
hell. out of the Edmund Fitzgerald and very seldom

01:04:32.380 --> 01:04:36.880
ever hauled up for weather. So that's tough.

01:04:37.039 --> 01:04:40.719
I mean, you know, there was several captains

01:04:40.719 --> 01:04:43.860
that were interviewed that discussed how McSorley

01:04:43.860 --> 01:04:46.760
was like, you know, a hard -nosed man and he

01:04:46.760 --> 01:04:49.880
pushed through and he knew rough seas. And of

01:04:49.880 --> 01:04:52.260
course, I've never been in these positions, but

01:04:52.260 --> 01:04:55.760
it's something in engineering and also in construction

01:04:55.760 --> 01:05:00.139
that we've seen. recur is when something works

01:05:00.139 --> 01:05:03.119
out when you do something you shouldn't do you

01:05:03.119 --> 01:05:07.739
take a risk and it turns out okay you've confirmed

01:05:07.739 --> 01:05:10.099
in your mind that you can do it and you can do

01:05:10.099 --> 01:05:12.980
it again and next time it will also be okay even

01:05:12.980 --> 01:05:16.420
if it's still sketchy so that's a bit of an oversimplification

01:05:16.420 --> 01:05:19.159
but that that theme has recurred several times

01:05:19.159 --> 01:05:23.320
and it's interesting to me how that would apply

01:05:23.320 --> 01:05:29.659
to this position I think it's more of an old

01:05:29.659 --> 01:05:33.960
-time position, and these days we have more assessed

01:05:33.960 --> 01:05:39.519
risk and more strategic thinking. I would say

01:05:39.519 --> 01:05:43.320
that the military, Coast Guard, and official

01:05:43.320 --> 01:05:45.739
positions at the time, we're talking about the

01:05:45.739 --> 01:05:48.880
Coast Guard and their regulations for the Great

01:05:48.880 --> 01:05:52.659
Lakes area. I would say that they're more measured,

01:05:52.800 --> 01:05:55.650
but again, I'm not really in that world. It's

01:05:55.650 --> 01:05:58.230
just from what I've heard and impressions I have

01:05:58.230 --> 01:06:03.769
from regimentation and strict procedure, the

01:06:03.769 --> 01:06:05.670
way things really need to be. And of course,

01:06:05.690 --> 01:06:09.610
no one wants any more ships to sink. So I just

01:06:09.610 --> 01:06:12.170
thought that was interesting as a listed complacency.

01:06:13.369 --> 01:06:16.650
There's a legal settlement I don't really have

01:06:16.650 --> 01:06:19.949
an interest in getting into. There were several

01:06:19.949 --> 01:06:22.329
lawsuits that followed the sinking of the Edmund

01:06:22.329 --> 01:06:26.039
Fitzgerald. I would say in my personal take that,

01:06:26.039 --> 01:06:31.380
you know, the families of the lost sailors, the

01:06:31.380 --> 01:06:34.619
wives and children, you're never going to really

01:06:34.619 --> 01:06:38.940
be made whole again with a lawsuit. I'm not trying

01:06:38.940 --> 01:06:41.360
to blame them. I'm just saying overall the lawsuits

01:06:41.360 --> 01:06:44.559
kind of don't find much satisfaction in my reading.

01:06:44.699 --> 01:06:47.380
So if you are interested, you can look into that.

01:06:49.480 --> 01:06:52.119
Subsequent changes to Great Lakes shipping practice.

01:06:52.320 --> 01:06:54.519
So, of course, after the event, there were some

01:06:54.519 --> 01:06:58.420
changes, which is good. I'll summarize. The Coast

01:06:58.420 --> 01:07:00.579
Guard made a requirement that all vessels of

01:07:00.579 --> 01:07:04.260
1 ,600 gross registered tons or over use depth

01:07:04.260 --> 01:07:08.380
finders. Survival suits, strobe lights were added,

01:07:08.599 --> 01:07:12.360
life jackets and such as a requirement. Emergency

01:07:12.360 --> 01:07:16.349
positioning radio beacons. on all lake vessels

01:07:16.349 --> 01:07:19.389
for immediate accurate location of an event of

01:07:19.389 --> 01:07:25.670
a disaster. NOAA revised its method for predicting

01:07:25.670 --> 01:07:29.710
wave heights. Navigational charts for the northeastern

01:07:29.710 --> 01:07:33.110
Lake Superior were improved for accuracy and

01:07:33.110 --> 01:07:37.250
for greater detail. And the Coast Guard rescinded

01:07:37.250 --> 01:07:42.820
the 1973 load line regulation. that permitted

01:07:42.820 --> 01:07:45.519
reduced freeboard loadings. So the ships were

01:07:45.519 --> 01:07:49.179
sitting a bit higher in the water, those that

01:07:49.179 --> 01:07:53.440
had been modified previously. Coast Guard began

01:07:53.440 --> 01:07:57.000
the annual pre -November inspection program recommended

01:07:57.000 --> 01:08:00.460
by the National Traffic and Safety Board. Is

01:08:00.460 --> 01:08:03.059
that right? NTSB? Transportation Safety Board?

01:08:04.429 --> 01:08:07.349
Coast Guard inspectors now board all U .S. ships

01:08:07.349 --> 01:08:10.210
during the fall to inspect hatch and vent closures

01:08:10.210 --> 01:08:17.670
and life -saving equipment. And, of course, there

01:08:17.670 --> 01:08:20.270
are some memorials that are nice. One thing I

01:08:20.270 --> 01:08:24.109
wanted to read, the day after the wreck, the

01:08:24.109 --> 01:08:27.310
Mariner's Church in Detroit rang its bell 29

01:08:27.310 --> 01:08:31.300
times, once for each life lost. The church continued

01:08:31.300 --> 01:08:33.479
to hold an annual memorial, reading the names

01:08:33.479 --> 01:08:35.319
of the crewmen and ringing the church bell until

01:08:35.319 --> 01:08:37.979
2006, when the church broadened its memorial

01:08:37.979 --> 01:08:40.619
ceremony to commemorate all lives lost in the

01:08:40.619 --> 01:08:43.800
Great Lakes. After the death of singer Gordon

01:08:43.800 --> 01:08:48.100
Lightfoot on May 1st of 2023, the church bell

01:08:48.100 --> 01:08:51.399
was ceremoniously rung 29 times in memory of

01:08:51.399 --> 01:08:54.159
the crew, plus an additional ring in memory of

01:08:54.159 --> 01:08:56.939
Lightfoot, who committed their deaths to posterity.

01:08:59.880 --> 01:09:05.060
There's a lot in there, folks. It's a really

01:09:05.060 --> 01:09:08.739
interesting thing. It's very sad, of course.

01:09:09.479 --> 01:09:11.760
There's a lot of detail, and people have done

01:09:11.760 --> 01:09:14.619
quite a bit of research to bring notes together.

01:09:15.060 --> 01:09:17.140
There are many articles written, many sources

01:09:17.140 --> 01:09:21.060
to be cited. I just wanted to talk about it because

01:09:21.060 --> 01:09:24.420
I thought it was so funny that we go from singing

01:09:24.420 --> 01:09:28.609
sea shanties to... you know, The Wreck of the

01:09:28.609 --> 01:09:30.609
Edmund Fitzgerald, which, to be honest with you,

01:09:30.630 --> 01:09:33.409
when I heard that song, I did not believe that

01:09:33.409 --> 01:09:36.550
was a real event. I thought it was an old -timey

01:09:36.550 --> 01:09:40.390
song with a catchy tune, and it's always been

01:09:40.390 --> 01:09:43.130
fun to listen to, but it is saved on my Spotify

01:09:43.130 --> 01:09:46.649
playlist. In fact, it was recommended to me on

01:09:46.649 --> 01:09:50.590
a Spotify playlist recently called Sea Shanty

01:09:50.590 --> 01:09:53.649
Bangers. So there's that piece of information

01:09:53.649 --> 01:09:58.829
for you. Emily asked that I do a spooky episode.

01:09:59.250 --> 01:10:01.270
And there's one that we have in mind that would

01:10:01.270 --> 01:10:03.390
be a lot of fun because this episode is releasing

01:10:03.390 --> 01:10:08.529
just around Halloween. But this one in particular,

01:10:08.630 --> 01:10:12.810
I thought maybe get somewhere with hauntings.

01:10:12.810 --> 01:10:15.270
And apparently there is a little bit of connection.

01:10:15.430 --> 01:10:18.109
So I won't draw a hard line, but between the

01:10:18.109 --> 01:10:20.130
Fitzgerald sinking and the many other ships,

01:10:20.289 --> 01:10:24.010
it's one thing, you know, the lake never gives

01:10:24.010 --> 01:10:27.349
up her dead. It's one of the quotes. Apparently,

01:10:27.349 --> 01:10:31.109
many people have reported sightings of the Fitzgerald

01:10:31.109 --> 01:10:35.810
and other ships. They've heard things. They've

01:10:35.810 --> 01:10:39.130
seen things. There's spooky seas out there on

01:10:39.130 --> 01:10:42.350
the Great Lakes. And the Fitzgerald, I guess,

01:10:42.409 --> 01:10:46.649
has come up on radars. And when ships pass through

01:10:46.649 --> 01:10:50.189
the area where it sank, sometimes there's some

01:10:50.189 --> 01:10:56.100
relation to hauntings. Because of the story we

01:10:56.100 --> 01:10:57.920
just covered, I'm not going to dive further into

01:10:57.920 --> 01:11:00.720
that, but there's your spooky moment for the

01:11:00.720 --> 01:11:05.380
day. That's all I have today, guys. I've never

01:11:05.380 --> 01:11:07.779
done the solo episode before. I appreciate you

01:11:07.779 --> 01:11:10.420
listening. Of course, it's rambled on a bit long

01:11:10.420 --> 01:11:13.979
here, but I hope you've made it through. The

01:11:13.979 --> 01:11:16.479
wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald was a history

01:11:16.479 --> 01:11:20.560
buoy that got carried away. So, thank you for

01:11:20.560 --> 01:11:24.859
joining me. Please check out our... our audio

01:11:24.859 --> 01:11:28.739
on Spotify. Check out our YouTube. Almost every

01:11:28.739 --> 01:11:31.699
episode, very nearly every episode I posted YouTube

01:11:31.699 --> 01:11:34.800
for. Someday I'll work on the early episodes

01:11:34.800 --> 01:11:37.220
and get all those cast on there too. But there's

01:11:37.220 --> 01:11:40.720
quite a few collected. I keep promising Emily

01:11:40.720 --> 01:11:43.840
and you all listeners some merchandise. Today

01:11:43.840 --> 01:11:46.359
I wore a Lighthouse Slowdown hat and I carried

01:11:46.359 --> 01:11:50.199
my Lighthouse Slowdown Yeti mug. So it's in the

01:11:50.199 --> 01:11:53.479
works, fam. It's happening. If you would, please

01:11:53.479 --> 01:11:55.880
reach out with a kind word. If you have one for

01:11:55.880 --> 01:11:59.199
Emily to support her in this tough time, she

01:11:59.199 --> 01:12:02.659
is very loved. We've got a great community and

01:12:02.659 --> 01:12:07.659
you all are a part of it. So once again, thank

01:12:07.659 --> 01:12:10.920
you very much. And I hope you have a great time

01:12:10.920 --> 01:12:16.399
today and tomorrow. I hope you're having a nice

01:12:16.399 --> 01:12:19.300
day and I am so tired and I will see you next

01:12:19.300 --> 01:12:22.329
time on the Lighthouse Lowdown. Cheers.