1
00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:06,160
But Tara, you love Jeopardy, right?

2
00:00:06,160 --> 00:00:07,920
I do love Jeopardy.

3
00:00:07,920 --> 00:00:10,240
Would you want to be a Jeopardy?

4
00:00:10,240 --> 00:00:17,600
Yes, but Willa Fortune is the top of my game show host thing that it's not really a host

5
00:00:17,600 --> 00:00:21,960
that I want to be on because I grew up watching it with my grandmother and I still watch it

6
00:00:21,960 --> 00:00:26,400
to this day with my boys and it's our thing every night that we do that together.

7
00:00:26,400 --> 00:00:30,720
So Willa Fortune has my heart right now.

8
00:00:30,720 --> 00:00:31,720
That's awesome.

9
00:00:31,720 --> 00:00:32,720
Love that.

10
00:00:32,720 --> 00:00:37,840
Matthew, if you had to be on a game show, what would it be?

11
00:00:37,840 --> 00:00:43,600
I'd not, practically.

12
00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:45,100
Willa Fortune's good.

13
00:00:45,100 --> 00:00:49,240
Jeopardy would be fun, but I think Jeopardy's one of those ones where the second you get

14
00:00:49,240 --> 00:00:53,880
up there you'd forget half the things you know.

15
00:00:53,880 --> 00:01:00,920
So I don't know which ones I'd be good at, but the idea of doing the amazing race has

16
00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:03,320
always seemed really fun.

17
00:01:03,320 --> 00:01:04,320
So yeah.

18
00:01:04,320 --> 00:01:06,320
I like it.

19
00:01:06,320 --> 00:01:07,320
I like it.

20
00:01:07,320 --> 00:01:08,320
Todd.

21
00:01:08,320 --> 00:01:09,320
Family Feud.

22
00:01:09,320 --> 00:01:11,320
It would be my opportunity for my stand-up routine.

23
00:01:11,320 --> 00:01:12,320
You took my.

24
00:01:12,320 --> 00:01:15,920
You're being the same team because that was going to be mine.

25
00:01:15,920 --> 00:01:16,920
So true.

26
00:01:16,920 --> 00:01:22,800
Coming soon to a podcast near you, Family Feud is the idea edition.

27
00:01:22,800 --> 00:01:24,280
Family marketing versus security.

28
00:01:24,280 --> 00:01:25,280
It'll be great.

29
00:01:25,280 --> 00:01:26,280
It'll be great.

30
00:01:26,280 --> 00:01:28,600
What about you, Nate?

31
00:01:28,600 --> 00:01:34,280
I totally agree with Matthew of the amazing race.

32
00:01:34,280 --> 00:01:39,200
So I watched the first season and I really enjoy how those ones are so drawn out.

33
00:01:39,200 --> 00:01:42,760
They didn't keep everyone right next to each other.

34
00:01:42,760 --> 00:01:44,960
Marketing did ask which one do I think I could win?

35
00:01:44,960 --> 00:01:49,800
I'm ahead of this and I did say the bachelor because I'd be the only guy making it to the

36
00:01:49,800 --> 00:01:55,800
end, although I would not want to be on the show.

37
00:01:55,800 --> 00:01:56,800
I know I'm stepping back in.

38
00:01:56,800 --> 00:01:59,000
And I am married.

39
00:01:59,000 --> 00:02:02,600
You've just reminded me there's a game show.

40
00:02:02,600 --> 00:02:03,640
I suppose you call it a game show.

41
00:02:03,640 --> 00:02:10,520
I watch called Um Actually that you can find a couple episodes off on YouTube that is basically

42
00:02:10,520 --> 00:02:17,720
just nerd stuff that is incredibly fun if you're into that.

43
00:02:17,720 --> 00:02:21,640
I think I would have a lot of fun playing.

44
00:02:21,640 --> 00:02:22,640
That's awesome.

45
00:02:22,640 --> 00:02:25,520
Now that everybody's stopped listening to the podcast to go on YouTube, pause that for

46
00:02:25,520 --> 00:02:27,520
a second and come back to the podcast.

47
00:02:27,520 --> 00:02:28,520
That sounds awesome.

48
00:02:28,520 --> 00:02:29,920
What about you, Ariel?

49
00:02:29,920 --> 00:02:30,920
That's great.

50
00:02:30,920 --> 00:02:33,920
Oh, I don't know.

51
00:02:33,920 --> 00:02:37,800
I don't know which one I would win, but I think I always wanted to try.

52
00:02:37,800 --> 00:02:41,000
Is it a game show that like Ninja Warrior?

53
00:02:41,000 --> 00:02:42,920
I just think that that's cool.

54
00:02:42,920 --> 00:02:45,320
I just want to climb on all that stuff.

55
00:02:45,320 --> 00:02:47,920
I would be out immediately though.

56
00:02:47,920 --> 00:02:50,040
I would not make it far.

57
00:02:50,040 --> 00:02:51,040
Just the experience.

58
00:02:51,040 --> 00:02:54,320
Make it past like the first thing fall in the water and you did it.

59
00:02:54,320 --> 00:02:56,320
Yeah, for sure.

60
00:02:56,320 --> 00:02:57,320
Yes.

61
00:02:57,320 --> 00:02:58,320
Oh man.

62
00:02:58,320 --> 00:02:59,320
Nice.

63
00:02:59,320 --> 00:03:01,320
Kelsey, you answered yours already, right?

64
00:03:01,320 --> 00:03:02,320
I did.

65
00:03:02,320 --> 00:03:03,320
You guys are going on Family Feud.

66
00:03:03,320 --> 00:03:04,800
Yeah, I piggybacked here.

67
00:03:04,800 --> 00:03:08,320
I was already did like lead up to it and then I was like, well, Todd took it.

68
00:03:08,320 --> 00:03:10,320
So let's say it's over.

69
00:03:10,320 --> 00:03:11,320
It's over.

70
00:03:11,320 --> 00:03:12,320
But I agree with you, Ariel.

71
00:03:12,320 --> 00:03:15,320
I think that would be really fun to do like Ninja Warrior.

72
00:03:15,320 --> 00:03:20,920
And then I'm sometimes when I'm watching that, my partner will, I'll be like, oh, I think

73
00:03:20,920 --> 00:03:21,920
I could do that one.

74
00:03:21,920 --> 00:03:26,720
And my partner has to remind me that it's been a long time since I did rock climbing

75
00:03:26,720 --> 00:03:27,720
of any significance.

76
00:03:27,720 --> 00:03:32,320
The one that will get me is the pull up bar where you have to like jump.

77
00:03:32,320 --> 00:03:33,320
The salmon one.

78
00:03:33,320 --> 00:03:34,320
Yeah, the salmon one.

79
00:03:34,320 --> 00:03:37,320
That one I would be done on.

80
00:03:37,320 --> 00:03:38,320
Yeah.

81
00:03:38,320 --> 00:03:39,320
Oh yeah.

82
00:03:39,320 --> 00:03:41,040
They should just let us skip some.

83
00:03:41,040 --> 00:03:44,760
Like just let me try out some of them in a different order.

84
00:03:44,760 --> 00:03:46,560
And maybe I could, I could get through one or two.

85
00:03:46,560 --> 00:03:49,120
There is no participation trophy here.

86
00:03:49,120 --> 00:03:50,120
So.

87
00:03:50,120 --> 00:03:51,120
Yeah.

88
00:03:51,120 --> 00:03:55,320
Falling in the water feels like that's the participation trophy.

89
00:03:55,320 --> 00:03:56,320
Yeah.

90
00:03:56,320 --> 00:03:57,320
Love it.

91
00:03:57,320 --> 00:03:58,320
Awesome.

92
00:03:58,320 --> 00:04:08,520
Well, I guess speaking, you know, of a human's shortcomings is a little bit what we're going

93
00:04:08,520 --> 00:04:09,760
to talk about today.

94
00:04:09,760 --> 00:04:12,200
And our tech for business podcast.

95
00:04:12,200 --> 00:04:15,040
And thank you.

96
00:04:15,040 --> 00:04:22,280
Our joined by our daughter, CEO and CISO Nate, our director of cybersecurity and Matthew

97
00:04:22,280 --> 00:04:23,280
RBC.

98
00:04:23,280 --> 00:04:30,480
So and today we're posing the question, do we trust deep learning too much?

99
00:04:30,480 --> 00:04:34,520
And I know before the podcast, Nate was kind of talking a little bit about what that is.

100
00:04:34,520 --> 00:04:38,720
And I think we're going to start there is what is deep learning?

101
00:04:38,720 --> 00:04:43,880
And I don't know if you could give us maybe an example so we can kind of connect it into

102
00:04:43,880 --> 00:04:46,080
the real world a little bit more.

103
00:04:46,080 --> 00:04:47,080
What is it?

104
00:04:47,080 --> 00:04:48,080
Yeah.

105
00:04:48,080 --> 00:04:51,840
So I promise I won't go too technical.

106
00:04:51,840 --> 00:04:58,720
But it's a subset of artificial intelligence, a subset of machine learning.

107
00:04:58,720 --> 00:05:03,280
It's just a very.

108
00:05:03,280 --> 00:05:10,120
Big algorithms that traditional machine learning models couldn't address.

109
00:05:10,120 --> 00:05:13,440
And so there's a great YouTuber.

110
00:05:13,440 --> 00:05:16,600
He's the best speaker I've ever seen in person.

111
00:05:16,600 --> 00:05:22,000
I highly recommend looking him up at some point, but Tanmay Bakshi, he has a YouTube

112
00:05:22,000 --> 00:05:24,880
channel, Tanmay teaches.

113
00:05:24,880 --> 00:05:28,840
He's been all around the world speaking on machine learning.

114
00:05:28,840 --> 00:05:33,640
He's 19 years old, phenomenal, wildly smart guy.

115
00:05:33,640 --> 00:05:39,000
Anyways, he has a lot of stuff where and the last time I saw him in person, he said artificial

116
00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:42,360
intelligence is a user experience.

117
00:05:42,360 --> 00:05:49,800
It's kind of what we perceive is these machines seem intelligent.

118
00:05:49,800 --> 00:05:55,480
And then machine learning is the mathematics and algorithms that go beneath that.

119
00:05:55,480 --> 00:06:02,200
And then deep learning is a method of machine learning that says there's new algorithms

120
00:06:02,200 --> 00:06:10,920
to build relationships between databases or data that you wouldn't typically have.

121
00:06:10,920 --> 00:06:18,520
Math and metal math equations between the two so it can make better, more accurate predictions.

122
00:06:18,520 --> 00:06:24,640
And then that's where we start to see this really start coming into the fruition of new

123
00:06:24,640 --> 00:06:36,160
technologies and the fruition of new methodologies to better predict really the outcome of whatever

124
00:06:36,160 --> 00:06:37,160
we're trying to evaluate.

125
00:06:37,160 --> 00:06:45,360
It could be cybersecurity, healthcare, whatever it is, but it's just a newer approach to it,

126
00:06:45,360 --> 00:06:49,000
and it's using just different algorithms.

127
00:06:49,000 --> 00:06:55,960
So I was talking with someone the other day about analogies to kind of get through all

128
00:06:55,960 --> 00:07:01,640
three and I like your user experience description of how we interact with them.

129
00:07:01,640 --> 00:07:09,800
But in terms of trying to visualize what this really looks like, for me at least AI is the

130
00:07:09,800 --> 00:07:16,840
ability for a machine to solve long division without us having to do anything.

131
00:07:16,840 --> 00:07:24,600
Machine learning is it learning how to, like when to do those equations versus other equations.

132
00:07:24,600 --> 00:07:29,320
And then deep learning is knowing how to manipulate the equation so well that it can solve other

133
00:07:29,320 --> 00:07:34,440
problems with that initial bit of information.

134
00:07:34,440 --> 00:07:41,640
So it's things that we kind of do expanded schemas is kind of how it works for us.

135
00:07:41,640 --> 00:07:45,160
We have plans and how we do things and then sometimes something breaks that and so we

136
00:07:45,160 --> 00:07:47,360
have to work on the fly.

137
00:07:47,360 --> 00:07:49,560
Computers obviously can't do that.

138
00:07:49,560 --> 00:07:56,840
Deep learning is about giving it enough data that it can do that to an extent with some

139
00:07:56,840 --> 00:08:00,680
calculations and everything else that go into that.

140
00:08:00,680 --> 00:08:01,680
Yeah.

141
00:08:01,680 --> 00:08:07,080
So I'm just going to quick reference that Tanmay, Bakshi one more time and then I'm done,

142
00:08:07,080 --> 00:08:08,360
I promise.

143
00:08:08,360 --> 00:08:14,480
But one of the illustrations that he gave was machine learning is taking the defined

144
00:08:14,480 --> 00:08:20,280
mathematical models and saying, here's how we would calculate the difference between

145
00:08:20,280 --> 00:08:22,440
a dog and a cat.

146
00:08:22,440 --> 00:08:24,640
We can't really do that today.

147
00:08:24,640 --> 00:08:30,560
Deep learning is going to try and figure that out saying what similarities, what math can

148
00:08:30,560 --> 00:08:35,800
we put in place to calculate how similar these two are.

149
00:08:35,800 --> 00:08:39,800
And we just input the different characteristics of it and it starts building all that data

150
00:08:39,800 --> 00:08:41,800
together.

151
00:08:41,800 --> 00:08:48,800
We didn't have to teach it that.

152
00:08:48,800 --> 00:08:50,680
Very oversimplified, I promise.

153
00:08:50,680 --> 00:08:59,440
Yeah, there might be some deep learning engineers who are raging a little bit at our simplifications

154
00:08:59,440 --> 00:09:00,440
here.

155
00:09:00,440 --> 00:09:04,480
But considering we're only seeing the outputs of them, we're not actually getting in there

156
00:09:04,480 --> 00:09:08,560
and coding it, I feel it's fair.

157
00:09:08,560 --> 00:09:13,120
We also have a lot of things that work in that machine learning side of things that are

158
00:09:13,120 --> 00:09:20,240
very prominent in cybersecurity, such as a lot of EDR software runs at that machine learning

159
00:09:20,240 --> 00:09:28,720
level and they're working on how to tie it into that deep learning side of things.

160
00:09:28,720 --> 00:09:37,440
One thing I want to mention, just because it's, I like to point to negatives directly,

161
00:09:37,440 --> 00:09:40,480
is a problem that we see all the time in tech.

162
00:09:40,480 --> 00:09:45,280
And it's not so much a problem as it is a form of, I don't want to say ignorance, because

163
00:09:45,280 --> 00:09:53,840
that seems a little too harsh, but it is just a lack of awareness really around where our

164
00:09:53,840 --> 00:09:55,360
failings are.

165
00:09:55,360 --> 00:09:58,160
So the whole point of deep learning is that we're feeding it data.

166
00:09:58,160 --> 00:10:02,080
We're feeding it data that we have so that it can learn new things and make decisions

167
00:10:02,080 --> 00:10:03,680
based on that data.

168
00:10:03,680 --> 00:10:11,560
And one of the best bits of information as a reminder of this that I learned while going

169
00:10:11,560 --> 00:10:20,720
through my degree was about research that was done on rodents and basically this is published

170
00:10:20,720 --> 00:10:23,600
in 2014, early 2014.

171
00:10:23,600 --> 00:10:32,240
And they found that basically whenever men are working with rodents during psychological

172
00:10:32,240 --> 00:10:36,000
studies, their stress levels are really high.

173
00:10:36,000 --> 00:10:41,120
And we only found this out after more women joined the field and we're working in the

174
00:10:41,120 --> 00:10:42,960
research side of things.

175
00:10:42,960 --> 00:10:48,760
And an old woman research team was trying to recreate some of the studies that have been

176
00:10:48,760 --> 00:10:54,920
done in the 60s and 70s and found that they were having far lower stress levels and they

177
00:10:54,920 --> 00:11:00,840
were releasing different chemicals while those studies were being done.

178
00:11:00,840 --> 00:11:04,640
And so we found that there is basically an entirely different reaction and in some cases

179
00:11:04,640 --> 00:11:11,200
completely different results to entire experiments based around who was involved in the study.

180
00:11:11,200 --> 00:11:16,400
Now how this ties in for me is that up until that study came out and up until that was

181
00:11:16,400 --> 00:11:23,240
found, the entire belief was that rodents were kind of stressed out the whole time and

182
00:11:23,240 --> 00:11:28,320
we were just accepting that as part of what happened.

183
00:11:28,320 --> 00:11:29,760
And it turns out that it wasn't.

184
00:11:29,760 --> 00:11:34,720
So the deep learning that went into all of the, to follow those analogies, the way we

185
00:11:34,720 --> 00:11:39,840
were calculating the equation in our own deep learning and how we were doing our studies

186
00:11:39,840 --> 00:11:44,680
was wrong or at least biased, heavily biased.

187
00:11:44,680 --> 00:11:49,160
And the same type of thing can and probably will and probably already is happening with

188
00:11:49,160 --> 00:11:51,800
the deep learning that's in use.

189
00:11:51,800 --> 00:11:56,160
So we want to take all of this with that in mind, keep in mind that there is a lot of

190
00:11:56,160 --> 00:12:03,960
things we need to be aware of and try not to trust any of this as gospel, I suppose,

191
00:12:03,960 --> 00:12:06,560
for lack of a better word.

192
00:12:06,560 --> 00:12:10,800
We are still letting the computers make decisions based on information we're giving them and

193
00:12:10,800 --> 00:12:13,240
we don't have all the information yet.

194
00:12:13,240 --> 00:12:16,760
I wanted to expand on that a little bit too because I think there's a lot of different

195
00:12:16,760 --> 00:12:17,960
biases that go into it.

196
00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:21,880
And I think Matthew's point at the very, very beginning is quite frankly, we don't know

197
00:12:21,880 --> 00:12:22,880
what we don't know.

198
00:12:22,880 --> 00:12:25,920
And so as we're trying our experiments, we're kind of learning as we go.

199
00:12:25,920 --> 00:12:30,960
I mean, there was an example very similar to the one that Matthew gave where I believe

200
00:12:30,960 --> 00:12:36,280
Amazon created an AI program to help with their interviewing process and they didn't

201
00:12:36,280 --> 00:12:39,960
get too terribly far into it before they realized that there was a heavy bias towards

202
00:12:39,960 --> 00:12:43,640
males just due to the way that they were asking questions.

203
00:12:43,640 --> 00:12:48,640
And it reminded me of another one where sometimes people do this in their normal communications,

204
00:12:48,640 --> 00:12:52,000
you may say something like you guys where you think it's all encompassing, but that's

205
00:12:52,000 --> 00:12:58,040
actually you excluded half the people that are on this podcast just by saying you guys

206
00:12:58,040 --> 00:13:01,280
when the intent was supposed to be everybody, you all, right?

207
00:13:01,280 --> 00:13:02,280
It should have been you all.

208
00:13:02,280 --> 00:13:07,160
And it just happens across the board and it's not necessarily intended to be that way.

209
00:13:07,160 --> 00:13:08,280
Maybe it was, maybe it wasn't.

210
00:13:08,280 --> 00:13:12,440
We grew up with a lot of those kinds of biases in our lives, but it is something that's becoming

211
00:13:12,440 --> 00:13:13,920
very, very prevalent.

212
00:13:13,920 --> 00:13:18,880
Another one that's really interesting to me as well is how you can get some of that just

213
00:13:18,880 --> 00:13:19,920
based on location.

214
00:13:19,920 --> 00:13:25,920
So for example, if we ran an experiment in Alaska, Matthew may come up with some great

215
00:13:25,920 --> 00:13:29,680
examples of how things are going, but it may not apply to somebody in Kentucky.

216
00:13:29,680 --> 00:13:33,640
They may be in a totally different world just because of their locations.

217
00:13:33,640 --> 00:13:39,280
And so again, not really fully understanding how we're gathering that data and how it may

218
00:13:39,280 --> 00:13:43,960
impact something three, four steps down the line will drastically impact the results of

219
00:13:43,960 --> 00:13:44,960
these types of tools.

220
00:13:44,960 --> 00:13:48,600
So I think when we were talking about this at the beginning, as do we rely on this too

221
00:13:48,600 --> 00:13:53,560
much, maybe, although I think it's still a relatively early, but just to be aware of

222
00:13:53,560 --> 00:13:57,240
the context of what it looks like when those kinds of things are happening.

223
00:13:57,240 --> 00:14:02,160
And again, I don't think that the intent originally was designed to be bad or negative.

224
00:14:02,160 --> 00:14:05,800
It just happened because we're humans and we're fallible.

225
00:14:05,800 --> 00:14:11,120
Yeah, Matthew, you had mentioned the 2014 study on the mice.

226
00:14:11,120 --> 00:14:16,960
Todd, you carried on about the inherent human biases even today, right?

227
00:14:16,960 --> 00:14:22,320
With the communication that we have, there's actually, and then kind of bringing tech back

228
00:14:22,320 --> 00:14:23,320
into it.

229
00:14:23,320 --> 00:14:30,880
I wanted to mention, back in 2019, there was a report that NIST, the National Institute

230
00:14:30,880 --> 00:14:36,640
of Standards and Technology, which is a US government agency, they put out a report because

231
00:14:36,640 --> 00:14:44,840
these organizations were trying to sell facial recognition software to the federal government.

232
00:14:44,840 --> 00:14:53,440
And what MIT and NIST ended up doing was they analyzed all this data and said, there are

233
00:14:53,440 --> 00:15:01,040
inherent biases based off of this facial recognition software because it's doing a better job recognizing

234
00:15:01,040 --> 00:15:09,120
white males compared to people in other minority classes, children, elderly, people of color,

235
00:15:09,120 --> 00:15:11,920
women, anything like that.

236
00:15:11,920 --> 00:15:18,080
And so I don't know if women would be included because you guys make up 50% of the population

237
00:15:18,080 --> 00:15:19,080
too.

238
00:15:19,080 --> 00:15:25,600
But anyways, there were inherent biases in the data set because that was the training

239
00:15:25,600 --> 00:15:29,400
model that was typically used to develop the software.

240
00:15:29,400 --> 00:15:31,800
And we've seen that perpetually a little bit.

241
00:15:31,800 --> 00:15:39,080
However, at least we are seeing that the biases are becoming a front and center consideration

242
00:15:39,080 --> 00:15:41,880
as they start to develop new software.

243
00:15:41,880 --> 00:15:48,160
It's not perfect yet, but Matthew, yours started all the way back in the 60s and 70s with just

244
00:15:48,160 --> 00:15:50,040
the raw science.

245
00:15:50,040 --> 00:15:58,520
And now it's taken all this time and it's really becoming apparent that bias in our development

246
00:15:58,520 --> 00:16:00,600
has to be a core consideration.

247
00:16:00,600 --> 00:16:01,600
Yeah.

248
00:16:01,600 --> 00:16:02,600
Yeah.

249
00:16:02,600 --> 00:16:06,440
One of the things I'll throw on there in addition to is it is a real problem, right?

250
00:16:06,440 --> 00:16:10,920
I mean, I think that that problem is going to get worse before it gets better.

251
00:16:10,920 --> 00:16:12,720
And as we touched on, there's all kinds of reasons.

252
00:16:12,720 --> 00:16:15,560
It may be a non-diverse group that's pulling the information together.

253
00:16:15,560 --> 00:16:16,560
You name it.

254
00:16:16,560 --> 00:16:18,120
There's all kinds of issues with it.

255
00:16:18,120 --> 00:16:22,400
But I will say, and we can share this link out too, is there's actually already an open

256
00:16:22,400 --> 00:16:26,080
source tool set out there that's called the AI Fairness tool.

257
00:16:26,080 --> 00:16:30,240
I think it's open AI Fairness 360 or something like that.

258
00:16:30,240 --> 00:16:31,240
We can share the link.

259
00:16:31,240 --> 00:16:35,440
But it's designed to kind of try and go back in time and try to peel back some of those

260
00:16:35,440 --> 00:16:38,280
biases from the tool sets.

261
00:16:38,280 --> 00:16:42,160
When I was kind of getting into the geographical stuff, we kind of at the beginning kind of

262
00:16:42,160 --> 00:16:46,400
talked about tools and how they impact what we're doing today.

263
00:16:46,400 --> 00:16:50,240
And in cybersecurity, there's a lot of AI coming, whether that's deep learning, machine

264
00:16:50,240 --> 00:16:52,720
learning combination of all three is coming.

265
00:16:52,720 --> 00:16:56,800
Matthew mentioned it right out the outchute that you're seeing it in EDR.

266
00:16:56,800 --> 00:17:02,280
There are some very high-end tools that are out there that say very heavily, we are AI

267
00:17:02,280 --> 00:17:03,280
based, right?

268
00:17:03,280 --> 00:17:06,080
And you can see that it's not too terribly far into the future.

269
00:17:06,080 --> 00:17:10,880
It's happening already that you're going to see AI attacking and AI defending.

270
00:17:10,880 --> 00:17:17,160
And when that's the case, you could have some of those biases, concerns like, is it a nation

271
00:17:17,160 --> 00:17:18,160
state?

272
00:17:18,160 --> 00:17:19,720
Someone from Korea is attacking in this way.

273
00:17:19,720 --> 00:17:21,840
Therefore, it might automatically be them.

274
00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:22,840
Absolutely.

275
00:17:22,840 --> 00:17:26,680
And you may get false positives from kind of that type of stuff that's going on.

276
00:17:26,680 --> 00:17:32,760
So from a cybersecurity perspective, the biases are important, maybe not the most important.

277
00:17:32,760 --> 00:17:38,240
I think my takeaway from that, and I might be going a little far, a field at the moment,

278
00:17:38,240 --> 00:17:42,920
but one of my takeaways of that is while these tools are great, you can't use the tool and

279
00:17:42,920 --> 00:17:43,920
depend on it wholly.

280
00:17:43,920 --> 00:17:46,480
You're going to need that human being on the back end.

281
00:17:46,480 --> 00:17:47,480
Exactly.

282
00:17:47,480 --> 00:17:50,560
Go ahead, Matthew.

283
00:17:50,560 --> 00:17:56,360
There's a very specific language you'll find if you are researching EDR software.

284
00:17:56,360 --> 00:17:58,600
And a lot of them will say machine learning.

285
00:17:58,600 --> 00:18:05,560
They will not say deep learning, but they'll also say supervised or unsupervised machine

286
00:18:05,560 --> 00:18:06,760
learning.

287
00:18:06,760 --> 00:18:12,360
And part of that is when we are tracking threats, when we are tracking behavior, there are so

288
00:18:12,360 --> 00:18:20,480
many things that we as humans are, from a computer perspective, inherently chaotic.

289
00:18:20,480 --> 00:18:25,880
We may do the same thing 100,000 times and then we'll randomly go, you know, maybe that

290
00:18:25,880 --> 00:18:28,600
wasn't the best way to do it and just start doing it differently.

291
00:18:28,600 --> 00:18:34,000
And from the computer's perspective, that doesn't make any sense.

292
00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:36,600
So the machine learning side of things, they track that.

293
00:18:36,600 --> 00:18:40,800
They say, actually, this is just someone doing something new for reasons that we don't know

294
00:18:40,800 --> 00:18:42,520
about.

295
00:18:42,520 --> 00:18:46,560
We spend a lot of time on those biases, but that's because that's what ties into all of

296
00:18:46,560 --> 00:18:47,560
this.

297
00:18:47,560 --> 00:18:48,560
We're feeding it data.

298
00:18:48,560 --> 00:18:50,400
We're feeding it language.

299
00:18:50,400 --> 00:18:56,120
And the people there helping with that supervised machine learning are doing the same thing.

300
00:18:56,120 --> 00:18:57,120
They're clicking these buttons.

301
00:18:57,120 --> 00:18:58,320
They're saying, yeah, that's normal.

302
00:18:58,320 --> 00:18:59,320
That's not normal.

303
00:18:59,320 --> 00:19:01,720
Let's try and find this.

304
00:19:01,720 --> 00:19:07,960
Where deep learning really kicks in is when computers are acting autonomously.

305
00:19:07,960 --> 00:19:13,920
Kind of like what Nate and Todd mentioned there, which is if it's doing its own research

306
00:19:13,920 --> 00:19:20,240
and it's trying to make its own actions, deep learning is the way to track a machine doing

307
00:19:20,240 --> 00:19:25,200
something strangely rather than a person doing something strangely.

308
00:19:25,200 --> 00:19:32,800
We're creating systems where they're having to check on themselves, which has its own

309
00:19:32,800 --> 00:19:33,800
problems.

310
00:19:33,800 --> 00:19:39,520
We're just creating Skynet at this point, aren't we?

311
00:19:39,520 --> 00:19:44,200
Those types of items and how we look at it, deep learning is a specific thing where it's

312
00:19:44,200 --> 00:19:46,200
running itself and it's checking for itself.

313
00:19:46,200 --> 00:19:50,960
It's learning on its own items from data that are being fed to it.

314
00:19:50,960 --> 00:19:55,760
And as these become more and more integrated into tools that we use, whether it's network

315
00:19:55,760 --> 00:20:01,640
scanning, whether it's anything else, we're going to start seeing times when a false positive

316
00:20:01,640 --> 00:20:04,120
maybe knocks someone out of a system.

317
00:20:04,120 --> 00:20:10,240
Maybe the CEO is traveling and signs into the wrong spot and so the system fully locks

318
00:20:10,240 --> 00:20:13,440
them out.

319
00:20:13,440 --> 00:20:15,720
There are things to keep in mind for that as well.

320
00:20:15,720 --> 00:20:23,920
Are you and is your system and your SOC team prepared and ready to handle if a deep learning

321
00:20:23,920 --> 00:20:28,320
change resulted in the entire system deciding something was bad that had previously been

322
00:20:28,320 --> 00:20:29,320
good?

323
00:20:29,320 --> 00:20:30,320
Yeah.

324
00:20:30,320 --> 00:20:42,000
So, Matthew, you and Todd have both mentioned false positives already.

325
00:20:42,000 --> 00:20:48,800
And while you guys are talking, and I promise marketing team that I'll give you a chance

326
00:20:48,800 --> 00:20:51,280
to ask questions here shortly.

327
00:20:51,280 --> 00:20:56,680
I tend to be a glass half full kind of person most of the time, right?

328
00:20:56,680 --> 00:21:02,760
I embrace the AI, the machine learning, the deep learning, all that kind of stuff.

329
00:21:02,760 --> 00:21:05,120
So do I think we trust it too much?

330
00:21:05,120 --> 00:21:14,880
I'll summarize my opinion very early into the podcast is yes, I do, but I still want

331
00:21:14,880 --> 00:21:18,720
to embrace it because the technology is phenomenal, right?

332
00:21:18,720 --> 00:21:25,080
And so, but there are careful considerations, which we've been talking about, but kind of

333
00:21:25,080 --> 00:21:29,520
getting back to the false positive versus that you guys have both mentioned.

334
00:21:29,520 --> 00:21:31,680
I also want to mention false negative.

335
00:21:31,680 --> 00:21:38,040
So for those that aren't familiar with it, we have false positive is something has flagged

336
00:21:38,040 --> 00:21:43,360
and alert, but it was falsely correlated, right?

337
00:21:43,360 --> 00:21:50,120
Maybe it wasn't something malicious that it thought wasn't malicious.

338
00:21:50,120 --> 00:21:53,000
The more dangerous one is false negative, right?

339
00:21:53,000 --> 00:22:00,960
Is saying that I thought something was legitimate or non malicious and it led it through.

340
00:22:00,960 --> 00:22:07,320
And so, when we start talking about do we trust deep learning or AI or machine learning

341
00:22:07,320 --> 00:22:09,360
too much?

342
00:22:09,360 --> 00:22:14,160
Those are the considerations that I do want to have at least people aware of or, you know,

343
00:22:14,160 --> 00:22:19,080
vendors that are developing this software being aware of saying as the tools are trying

344
00:22:19,080 --> 00:22:26,000
to learn this stuff, we have seen cases where false positives are common, right?

345
00:22:26,000 --> 00:22:28,840
Everyone wants to try and be as restrictive as possible.

346
00:22:28,840 --> 00:22:30,800
So those are very, very frequent, right?

347
00:22:30,800 --> 00:22:36,720
So maybe there's two anomalous activities that are miscorrelated that look malicious

348
00:22:36,720 --> 00:22:40,080
together, but they are two independent events.

349
00:22:40,080 --> 00:22:44,680
But the more dangerous one is that there's two independent malicious things happening

350
00:22:44,680 --> 00:22:50,560
or maybe just one that slips under the radar that doesn't quite seem malicious, but maybe

351
00:22:50,560 --> 00:22:55,160
it's a precursor to a larger attack.

352
00:22:55,160 --> 00:23:05,960
And so that's where I guess I'm still glass half full, but we have seen cases even here

353
00:23:05,960 --> 00:23:12,520
at CIT as we're monitoring customer networks that both could come into play.

354
00:23:12,520 --> 00:23:17,160
But that's where Todd, you had mentioned the human element still has to come into play

355
00:23:17,160 --> 00:23:23,280
to give that deeper review to confirm the potential inherent bias that the human put

356
00:23:23,280 --> 00:23:25,320
into the first place.

357
00:23:25,320 --> 00:23:26,800
Yeah, I agree.

358
00:23:26,800 --> 00:23:29,720
I mean, for what it's worth, and I think we've talked about this in previous podcasts,

359
00:23:29,720 --> 00:23:32,280
too, is I think we're all tech nerds and we love the technology.

360
00:23:32,280 --> 00:23:34,120
And I think it's a game changer, right?

361
00:23:34,120 --> 00:23:38,840
I mean, it absolutely has massive, massive upside.

362
00:23:38,840 --> 00:23:40,480
Am I concerned about SkyNet?

363
00:23:40,480 --> 00:23:41,480
100%.

364
00:23:41,480 --> 00:23:44,360
Am I concerned it's happening today or tomorrow?

365
00:23:44,360 --> 00:23:46,400
No, absolutely not.

366
00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:51,120
I do tend to fall into the NAIC category, too, is I think there's a lot more good than

367
00:23:51,120 --> 00:23:52,120
bad.

368
00:23:52,120 --> 00:23:56,040
I think that when I'm bringing up the cautionary things that are coming up in it is, in my

369
00:23:56,040 --> 00:24:00,200
opinion is, it means that there's a reason to pay attention.

370
00:24:00,200 --> 00:24:01,640
There are concerns there.

371
00:24:01,640 --> 00:24:03,920
You still need, you can't just flip it on and go, oh, we're all good.

372
00:24:03,920 --> 00:24:06,980
We've got this magical computer taking care of us now.

373
00:24:06,980 --> 00:24:08,320
There are things that you need to watch.

374
00:24:08,320 --> 00:24:13,000
You need to continue to see how it's evolving, what's changing in the industry, et cetera,

375
00:24:13,000 --> 00:24:14,000
et cetera.

376
00:24:14,000 --> 00:24:18,720
So from that perspective, I think that awareness helps you with the risk categorization, if

377
00:24:18,720 --> 00:24:19,800
that makes sense.

378
00:24:19,800 --> 00:24:21,520
There are risks associated with it.

379
00:24:21,520 --> 00:24:31,440
It's doing a nice job, but it is not infallible, just like the data that we fed it.

380
00:24:31,440 --> 00:24:32,440
I promise marketing.

381
00:24:32,440 --> 00:24:36,680
You promised and then I was like, dang, good questions ready.

382
00:24:36,680 --> 00:24:38,680
Todd ruined that one.

383
00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:39,960
Nope, Todd took over.

384
00:24:39,960 --> 00:24:41,200
I promise to you.

385
00:24:41,200 --> 00:24:42,800
Yeah, that's okay.

386
00:24:42,800 --> 00:24:47,720
We let Todd talk, but I did have kind of a tangent question of, okay, so we've mentioned

387
00:24:47,720 --> 00:24:52,200
EDR and the sake of that, right, CIT is a tech provider.

388
00:24:52,200 --> 00:24:53,320
We work with other businesses.

389
00:24:53,320 --> 00:24:54,400
We install these tools.

390
00:24:54,400 --> 00:24:56,000
We monitor it.

391
00:24:56,000 --> 00:25:01,080
In that case, how would you know if your tech provider is trusting deep learning too much

392
00:25:01,080 --> 00:25:06,240
when you're not the person necessarily being that first line looking at the tool?

393
00:25:06,240 --> 00:25:07,240
Ask.

394
00:25:07,240 --> 00:25:08,240
Thank you.

395
00:25:08,240 --> 00:25:15,480
I mean, I'm more than happy to answer those questions when they come through.

396
00:25:15,480 --> 00:25:19,520
I mean, we do get them sometimes, we do have, you know, there's due diligence questions

397
00:25:19,520 --> 00:25:22,560
that come through and a lot of the compliance stuff I'm looking at.

398
00:25:22,560 --> 00:25:27,080
And so not afraid of it, right?

399
00:25:27,080 --> 00:25:32,600
Any tech company, in my opinion, that's worth their salt isn't going to get upset or push

400
00:25:32,600 --> 00:25:36,160
back when you ask questions about their process.

401
00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:43,800
On top of that, fully support full vulnerability scans or, you know, penetration testing that

402
00:25:43,800 --> 00:25:47,600
can be done by third parties to find out where things are going on.

403
00:25:47,600 --> 00:25:54,080
And this is just part of that due diligence of we are doing our due diligence.

404
00:25:54,080 --> 00:25:55,080
We're looking into it.

405
00:25:55,080 --> 00:25:56,080
We're testing it.

406
00:25:56,080 --> 00:25:58,920
We're finding that level that works for us.

407
00:25:58,920 --> 00:26:02,160
So if you ask us about it, we'll have an answer.

408
00:26:02,160 --> 00:26:06,440
My first step would be to ask them if they have a podcast called, do you trust deep learning

409
00:26:06,440 --> 00:26:09,880
too much?

410
00:26:09,880 --> 00:26:13,440
So yeah, I would, I would kind of add on to that.

411
00:26:13,440 --> 00:26:16,680
I would say that you really should ask.

412
00:26:16,680 --> 00:26:20,000
I think it's not as simple as saying, do you or don't you?

413
00:26:20,000 --> 00:26:23,720
Because a lot of the tech companies out there are actually outsourcing a lot of their security.

414
00:26:23,720 --> 00:26:27,320
And so they may not have a security team on board.

415
00:26:27,320 --> 00:26:29,800
They may just send it to somebody else.

416
00:26:29,800 --> 00:26:33,120
And so depending on how that question goes is who's handling that for you?

417
00:26:33,120 --> 00:26:35,840
Is it is it people on your team?

418
00:26:35,840 --> 00:26:38,280
To me that it does have some importance now.

419
00:26:38,280 --> 00:26:39,360
We do have it on our team.

420
00:26:39,360 --> 00:26:43,320
So that that probably again, going into the bias that probably biases me.

421
00:26:43,320 --> 00:26:48,920
Specifically, but I feel like our customers turn to us very specifically and say, you

422
00:26:48,920 --> 00:26:51,800
tell me, I this is not my field of expertise.

423
00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:54,400
I need you to tell me like I'd go to a lawyer, right?

424
00:26:54,400 --> 00:26:56,000
I'm going to go, Hey, you're my lawyer.

425
00:26:56,000 --> 00:26:59,440
You can't just lob that back to me and say, I'm not going to answer your question or I'll

426
00:26:59,440 --> 00:27:00,880
answer it with another question.

427
00:27:00,880 --> 00:27:03,160
I'm coming to you because you're my expert.

428
00:27:03,160 --> 00:27:05,320
And I think that's what our customers are doing.

429
00:27:05,320 --> 00:27:10,320
So having that on staff, IT person or security individuals incredibly important.

430
00:27:10,320 --> 00:27:13,760
So that's how I would find out the answer to that question.

431
00:27:13,760 --> 00:27:14,760
Yeah.

432
00:27:14,760 --> 00:27:17,760
And, you know, I had mentioned that I'm a glass half full.

433
00:27:17,760 --> 00:27:20,600
I embrace the technology.

434
00:27:20,600 --> 00:27:24,080
I am still very hesitant of it.

435
00:27:24,080 --> 00:27:30,640
We have tools that are deep into the machine learning here at CIT to try and better detect

436
00:27:30,640 --> 00:27:33,040
threats within our environment.

437
00:27:33,040 --> 00:27:41,600
We've got layers on layers on layers of tech to try and identify security threats here.

438
00:27:41,600 --> 00:27:48,640
Even then, I don't trust the vendors that start claiming AI, you know, they're going

439
00:27:48,640 --> 00:27:54,000
to solve all the issues where one stop shop.

440
00:27:54,000 --> 00:27:57,320
Security is all about the multi-layered approach.

441
00:27:57,320 --> 00:28:02,640
And it's one of the things where even though I do trust it, so sorry, I don't trust it.

442
00:28:02,640 --> 00:28:09,480
I just said that earlier, even though I embrace it so much, it's still one of the things where

443
00:28:09,480 --> 00:28:17,040
if someone claims that their tool can stop either 100% of all threats out there, I don't

444
00:28:17,040 --> 00:28:18,040
trust it.

445
00:28:18,040 --> 00:28:24,440
And as your technology provider trying to educate, come ask us and we'll tell you, you know,

446
00:28:24,440 --> 00:28:30,200
where are the potential pitfalls of a solution and where should you fill in with another

447
00:28:30,200 --> 00:28:34,640
solution to accommodate that next threat, right?

448
00:28:34,640 --> 00:28:35,640
Yeah.

449
00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:38,200
So, it's all about the layers.

450
00:28:38,200 --> 00:28:39,200
Yeah.

451
00:28:39,200 --> 00:28:40,200
I like the analogy.

452
00:28:40,200 --> 00:28:44,680
You can't put the genie back in the bottle just because you don't want the wishes, right?

453
00:28:44,680 --> 00:28:51,040
These products are out there and they have a lot of the ones that, you know, OpenAI has

454
00:28:51,040 --> 00:28:54,480
a very easy to use interface.

455
00:28:54,480 --> 00:28:55,480
People are going to use it.

456
00:28:55,480 --> 00:28:56,960
You can't put it away.

457
00:28:56,960 --> 00:29:02,040
So let's find ways to figure out how to introduce it safely.

458
00:29:02,040 --> 00:29:06,240
Come up with ways that you can have your organization either implement or specifically

459
00:29:06,240 --> 00:29:11,480
say do not implement parts of what it does.

460
00:29:11,480 --> 00:29:17,120
But it's out there and so we need to be aware and we need to be thinking about it.

461
00:29:17,120 --> 00:29:18,120
It's going to keep happening.

462
00:29:18,120 --> 00:29:21,080
There's going to be things that come out and there are things that come out like this for

463
00:29:21,080 --> 00:29:28,920
us regularly staying on top of these things is literally the job.

464
00:29:28,920 --> 00:29:34,920
As fun as it is sometimes to use these tools, there are things that I use for home that

465
00:29:34,920 --> 00:29:39,800
I would never use for work and making that distinction and having those conversations

466
00:29:39,800 --> 00:29:43,440
is a critical part of doing your due diligence.

467
00:29:43,440 --> 00:29:44,440
Yeah.

468
00:29:44,440 --> 00:29:50,280
I think part of doing your own due diligence as well as run the tool through its paces.

469
00:29:50,280 --> 00:29:54,800
If you get a proof of concept on something, try and break it.

470
00:29:54,800 --> 00:30:00,400
Try and figure out how you can bypass it.

471
00:30:00,400 --> 00:30:05,160
We've taken a look at plenty of security solutions over the years and whenever I get a new one,

472
00:30:05,160 --> 00:30:08,960
I say here's some common attack paths.

473
00:30:08,960 --> 00:30:11,200
By the way, your tool didn't account for that.

474
00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:12,480
Your tool didn't account for that.

475
00:30:12,480 --> 00:30:14,560
Your tool didn't account for that.

476
00:30:14,560 --> 00:30:20,520
Then eventually we find one that's, wow, this is a very phenomenal tool.

477
00:30:20,520 --> 00:30:25,400
Otherwise, if you're talking about EDR, that's just one topic.

478
00:30:25,400 --> 00:30:27,960
There's plenty of security solutions out there.

479
00:30:27,960 --> 00:30:33,920
Taking a look at unbiased third-party testing solutions.

480
00:30:33,920 --> 00:30:37,120
We've talked EDR many, many times in the past.

481
00:30:37,120 --> 00:30:41,320
Go take a look at the MITRE Injunuity test results.

482
00:30:41,320 --> 00:30:42,320
It's unbiased.

483
00:30:42,320 --> 00:30:45,240
They just say, here's the results.

484
00:30:45,240 --> 00:30:47,560
Vendors submit their tool.

485
00:30:47,560 --> 00:30:50,160
There's no opinions about it.

486
00:30:50,160 --> 00:30:55,240
Then from there, you can formulate your own opinions.

487
00:30:55,240 --> 00:30:58,200
Take third-party research into consideration as well.

488
00:30:58,200 --> 00:31:01,640
Don't just trust the vendor.

489
00:31:01,640 --> 00:31:09,920
As a final caveat on all this, I want to add, remember Richard Sarah in the early 70s was

490
00:31:09,920 --> 00:31:15,360
talking about television and said, if something is free, you're the product.

491
00:31:15,360 --> 00:31:16,920
Please remember that.

492
00:31:16,920 --> 00:31:21,280
Don't feed your business critical information into a product that they're giving you for

493
00:31:21,280 --> 00:31:25,320
free because there's a good chance they're using that data for something else.

494
00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:31,640
This is a nice little paranoid warning to end my part of the podcast.

495
00:31:31,640 --> 00:31:33,640
Thank you and good night.

496
00:31:33,640 --> 00:31:34,640
Ah.

497
00:31:34,640 --> 00:31:35,640
I love it.

498
00:31:35,640 --> 00:31:39,080
I love it.

499
00:31:39,080 --> 00:31:43,320
It feels like a great little closer, important to keep in mind.

500
00:31:43,320 --> 00:31:47,960
I want to just echo communication is key.

501
00:31:47,960 --> 00:31:53,040
Asking, and if you have a question or a concern, whether you're a customer or not, please reach

502
00:31:53,040 --> 00:32:00,720
out to us at info at cit-net.com or you can head out to our website, cit-net.com, slash

503
00:32:00,720 --> 00:32:01,720
podcast.

504
00:32:01,720 --> 00:32:05,280
Thank you, Todd, Nate, and Matthew for joining us today.

505
00:32:05,280 --> 00:32:12,960
We'll be back next week with an all-new episode.

